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Abstract 
 
The Third Battle of Ypres was officially terminated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig with the opening of the Battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Nevertheless, 
a comparatively unknown set-piece attack – the only large-scale night operation 
carried out on the Flanders front during the campaign – was launched twelve days 
later on 2 December. This thesis, a necessary corrective to published campaign 
narratives of what has become popularly known as „Passchendaele‟, examines the 
course of events from the mid-November decision to sanction further offensive 
activity in the vicinity of Passchendaele village to the barren operational outcome that 
forced British GHQ to halt the attack within ten hours of Zero. A litany of unfortunate 
decisions and circumstances contributed to the profitless result. At the tactical level, a 
novel hybrid set-piece attack scheme was undermined by a fatal combination of snow-
covered terrain and bright moonlight. At the operational level, the highly 
unsatisfactory local situation in the immediate aftermath of Third Ypres‟ post-
strategic phase (26 October-10 November) appeared to offer no other alternative to 
attacking from the confines of an extremely vulnerable salient. Perhaps the most 
tragic aspect of the affair occurred at the political and strategic level, where Haig‟s 
earnest advocacy for resumption of the Flanders offensive in spring 1918 was 
maintained despite obvious signs that the initiative had now passed to the enemy and 
the crisis of the war was fast approaching.  
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Notes 
  
Some of the stylistic conventions found in this thesis have been adopted from the 
relevant British Official History.
1
 Officers are described by the rank they held during the 
winter of 1917-18. Troop and place locations are normally written from right to left of the 
respective British and German forces. Thoroughfares running through the frontline are 
described with the names of towns or villages in British hands taking precedence, thus: 
„Passchendaele – Westroosebeke Road‟. OH emulation of standard BEF conventions in 
regard to distinguishing numbers of Army, Corps, Division and Brigade has also been 
adhered to, thus: Second Army, II Corps, 2
nd
 Division, 2 Brigade. German formations and 
units are reproduced in italics, thus: Fourth Army, Gruppe Ypern, 4
th
 Division, 4
th 
  
Infanterie-Brigade, Infanterie-Regiment (abbreviated IR) 4. Exceptions and adjustments 
to these conventions have been made with the following: Reference to artillery brigades, 
which, in contravention of the Army-wide practice of using Arabic figures for units 
numbered higher than 100, will be described „161 Field Artillery Brigade‟, etc. Formal 
unit titles, exclusive of direct quotations, have been adopted, thus: 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire 
Regiment, 11
th
 Border Regiment, etc. Commonly recognised regimental abbreviations are 
also employed: 1
st
 RIR for 1
st
 Royal Irish Rifles and 16
th
 HLI for 16
th
 Highland Light 
Infantry, etc. These titles will, on first appearance, be reproduced in full with the intended 
abbreviation in squared brackets. See list of abbreviations and terms for all other 
acronyms, etc. Recurring terms „operational‟, „tactical‟ and related forms are loosely 
defined, with the exception of direct quotes, throughout as follows: Operational concerns 
the activities of armies and corps in the conduct of large-scale military operations; 
tactical concerns the conduct of military operations at divisional level and below.  
                                                 
1
 See Sir J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France Belgium 1917 Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1948), pp. 
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POW    Prisoner of War (plural: PsOW)  
QMS    Quarter Master Sergeant 
RAMC   Royal Army Medical Corps 
RAP    Regimental Aid Post 
RE    Royal Engineers 
RFA    Royal Field Artillery 
RIR    Reserve Infanterie Regiment 
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German Ranks and British Equivalents 
 
General-Leutnant -- -- Lieutenant-General 
Oberstleutnant -- -- Lieutenant-Colonel 
Major -- -- Major 
Hauptmann -- -- Captain 
Leutnant -- -- Lieutenant 
Feldwebel -- -- Sergeant Major  
Vizefeldwebel -- -- Staff Sergeant  
Sergeant -- -- Sergeant 
Unteroffizier -- -- Corporal 
Gefreiter -- -- Lance Corporal 
Musketier, Fusilier, Schütze, Ersatz-Reservist -- -- Private (infantry) 
  
     Introduction 
This thesis examines a First World War attack involving two British divisions (8
th
 
Regular and 32
nd 
New Army) launched near Passchendaele village in the icy pre-dawn 
hours of 2 December 1917. The operation remains almost entirely unknown and 
unmentioned in most standard works on the Third Battle of Ypres or what is commonly 
known as „Passchendaele‟, a highly controversial campaign in which it was a notable last 
act.  
 
Over ten years have passed since I first came across a clearly rendered operational 
battle map entitled „PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE 1/2 December 1917‟ whilst leafing 
through a dog-eared 1926 edition of The Eighth Division 1914-1918 by Lieutenant-
Colonel J.H. Boraston and Captain C.E.O. Bax. This surprising discovery occurred 
during a leisurely shelf-browse of the popular „Shell Hole‟ bed and breakfast/antiquarian 
bookshop not far from the Grote Markt in Ypres. Baffled, I contemplated the date: 
“December 1917? Surely „Passchendaele‟ had finished up by then?”2 Initial investigation 
provoked two main research questions: First, why was another attack on the 
Passchendaele Ridge deemed necessary and important after the official conclusion of the 
seemingly inconclusive Third Battle of Ypres? Second, was there more to this perceived 
lunatic and “futile” operation than “attacks on meaningless fragments of trench, barbed 
                                                 
2
 Martin Gilbert, The British History Atlas (1968) contains a general map (reproduced with minor 
annotations for this thesis) entitled „Third Ypres: The Advances June-December 1917‟ that is probably 
based on the folding campaign map issued with Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s 
Despatches: December 1915- April 1919. A related sidebar insert states that the campaign „began on 31 
July and lasted until early December‟ (my emphasis). This recognition that British offensive operations 
continued well after Third Ypres‟ oft-cited (10 November) close date is, when compared with similar 
examples found in popular specialized works like Arthur Banks, A Military Atlas of the First World War 
(1975), highly unusual.    
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 6 
wire, and pillboxes…?”3 Subsequent examination of key archives and available printed 
sources led to the formulation of six detail-specific queries into the affair: First, was Field 
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig wise to sanction the operation given prevailing political and 
strategic circumstances? Second, was there a viable alternative, given the unfortunate 
local military situation, to securing the extremely vulnerable Passchendaele Salient 
without having to resort to further offensive measures? Third, did an unpropitious full 
moon or enemy foreknowledge directly contribute to the barren operational outcome? 
Fourth, how was it that the right and left battalions of the assaulting 8
th
 and 32
nd
 
Divisions only discovered the loss of a tactically vital strongpoint shortly before the 
attack? Fifth, were the attackers detected on the forming-up tape prior to the advance? 
And sixth, what sort of tactical/operational conclusions were reached in the subsequent 
unit and formation after-action reports? The importance of the topic lies in these general 
and specific enquiries and their direct correlation to an event that has never been 
appraised within its proper historical context. From a broader perspective, evaluation of 
the attack‟s planning and preparations also clearly demonstrates, despite the obvious 
failure, a „fit for purpose‟ operational/tactical template (circa late 1917) adopted by the 
BEF following a period of intense fighting.   
 
 The chosen analytical framework for this thesis is that of in-depth battle account 
with a considered attempt to mesh the detailed narrative with rigorous academic enquiry. 
Such proceedings, it must be admitted, are an unapologetically atypical format for a study 
                                                 
3
 See John Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns: An Infantry Officer on the Western Front (London: William 
Kimber, 1979), p. 115, Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military 
Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-18 (Oxford: Blackwells, 1992), p. 273 and William Moore, See How 
They Ran: The British Retreat of 1918 (London: Sphere Books, 1975), p. 31.  
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 7 
offering a necessary corrective to the accepted chronology of the Third Ypres campaign. 
“A crucial and unavoidable feature of narrative history is the fact of selectivity. The 
narrative historian is forced to make choices and selections at every stage: between 
„significant‟ and „insignificant‟, between „sideshow‟ and „main event‟, and between 
levels of description”.4 For example, is a First World War battle best described at the 
level of policy-makers and generals or infantrymen and artillerymen? Is it possible to 
place these varied participant perspectives into a readable interpretive account? The 
decision to engage and blend these contextual conundrums (thus conceivably illuminating 
complex and varied aspects of a somewhat arcane event) has been my ultimate goal from 
the start. While primary focus is on operations and the interaction of mid-level 
commanders, tactical, strategic and political determinants are also investigated, in order 
to facilitate understanding of what amounts to a three-week period culminating in a large-
scale night attack on a front still active in the immediate aftermath of a great campaign. 
Operational narrative with accompanying analysis is seldom taken to this level. Recent 
scholarship focusing on complexities of a particular style of set-piece attack circa 
September-November 1917,
5
 is further substantiated by detailed enquiry into the genesis, 
planning (especially in regard to employment of standard operating procedure guidelines 
as related in contemporary S.S. 135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for 
Offensive Action and S.S.143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive 
Action, 1917 General Staff training manuals) and execution of what was widely viewed, 
                                                 
4
 Understanding Society: Innovative Thinking About Social Agency and Structure in a Global World 
<understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2008/11/narrative-history.html>   
5
 For example, see Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 
1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006), p. 106 and John Lee, „Command and Control in Battle: British 
Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 September 1917‟, in Gary Sheffield & Dan Todman (eds), 
Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-1918 (Staplehurst: 
Spellmount, 2004), pp. 119-39.  
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 8 
despite the application of a novel, albeit highly controversial and flawed hybrid assault 
scheme, contemporarily as a „dud show‟ or „half-success‟. What follows, therefore, is an 
original combination of official history-like operational detail, recent related and 
complementary academic viewpoints/perspectives on BEF and Westheer leadership, 
organization, operations and tactics coupled with applicable first-hand accounts. The 
human cost is also poignantly explored by focusing on the personal experience and 
varying tangible legacies of three British participant fatalities. Thus this study, in addition 
to reconstructing for the first time in a wide-ranging accessible narrative format, the 
background, course of events and outcome of a forgotten attack that cost approximately 
1,689 British officers and men killed, wounded and missing, also highlights the 
accompanying sacrifice whilst contributing to further understanding of the Third Battle of 
Ypres and its aftermath in particular and First World War scholarship in general.  
 
 The dearth of published accounts covering the night operation on the 
Passchendaele Ridge has no doubt contributed to its relative obscurity. Indeed, Sir 
Douglas Haig, in his wartime despatch concerning the 1917 campaign, made only vague 
reference to the event in a brief statement of post-strategic phase policy: “These 
operations [Second Battle of Passchendaele] concluded our Flanders offensive for the 
time being, although considerable activity was still continued for another fortnight…” 
(my emphasis).
6
 Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Bond DSO subsequently recognised in his 
postwar history of the KOYLI that the only large-scale night attack associated with  the 
lengthy Third Ypres campaign had been understandably overshadowed by the concurrent 
                                                 
6
 See Fourth Despatch dated 25 December 1917, in Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s 
Despatches: December 1915- April 1919 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1919), p. 133.  
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Cambrai offensive: “There was yet an incident on the Passchendaele front, dismissed in 
half-a-dozen lines in contemporary history, which involved a handful of battalions in dire 
distress … It is the affairs of the battalions and with the lives of the gallant soldiers that 
this regimental record is concerned. In devoting a few pages to this incident, therefore, it 
can hardly be said that the treatment of the affair is bringing it out of its perspective”.7 
Bond‟s appreciation that the general public remained unaware of the so-called affair was 
substantiated by the Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee [BNC], which 
determined “what were officially the actions of the war and what were the geographical 
and chronological limits of those actions and their relative importance”.8 The 
committee‟s published findings (1922) bestowed the honour „Assault of Southern 
Redoubt, Passchendaele‟ to 8th Division, whilst 32nd Division, tasked with carrying out 
the most difficult part of the two-division attack, was inexplicably awarded nothing for 
the 1917 campaign beyond „Defence of Nieuport‟ in July 1917.9 Why, during the course 
of its lengthy deliberations, did the BNC focus on Southern Redoubt when 8
th
 Division‟s 
assigned objectives also included neighbouring Venison Trench and Northern Redoubt? 
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Southern Redoubt and its immediate environs 
represented the only tangible (albeit short-lived) territorial gain made during the ill-fated 
                                                 
7
 Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald C. Bond DSO, The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the Great War 
Vol. 3 (London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., 1929), pp. 909-10.  
8
 House of Lords, The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Fifth Series – Volume XLIX (London: 
HMSO, 1922), column 127. Appointed by the War Office immediately after the armistice, the „Battles 
Nomenclature Committee‟ (presided over by Major-General Sir John Headlam) consisted of representatives 
of all the forces. The guiding principle in selection and allotment of battle honours was based on the 
determination that HQs and at least 50% of a unit‟s effective strength must have been present during an 
engagement.  
9
 See Major A.F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 1 – The Regular British Divisions (London: 
HMSO, 1934), p. 95 and, by the same author, Order of Battle Divisions, Part 3B – New Army Divisions (30 
- 41); and 63
rd
 (RN) Division (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 28.  
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attack. Reason or rationale for the committee‟s failure to recognise 32nd Division‟s 
principal role in the costly operation remains enigmatic.
10
 
 
 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, in his Official History of the Third Battle 
of Ypres, also overlooked the Passchendaele night operation by noting that the “intention 
to complete the capture of the main ridge northward to Westroosebeke as a winter 
position could not be put into effect”, regardless of the fact that a large-scale attempt was 
made a fortnight after the official conclusion (20 November) of the Flanders campaign.
11
 
A surviving correspondence relating to the second volume for 1918 reveals that Major-
General C.D. Shute (GOC 32
nd
 Division) once expressed particular interest in what 
Edmonds and his team of historians had to say (in addition to other “rather big shows” 
under his direct command) about the attack, although work on the relevant 1917 volume 
did not commence until three years after Shute‟s death in 1936.12 The latter‟s not 
unreasonable assumption that the night operation would be part of the official narrative 
                                                 
10
 Regiments were subsequently bestowed with the generic „Theatre of War‟ honour „Ypres 1917‟, which 
ostensibly represented the campaign‟s nine distinct phases (Pilkem Ridge, Capture of Westhoek, Battle of 
Langemarck, Battle of Menin Road, Battle of Polygon Wood, Battle of Broodseinde, Battle of 
Poelcappelle, First Battle of Passchendaele, Second Battle of Passchendaele). Unofficial battalion „Battle 
Honours‟ were more phase specific („Pilkem 1917‟, etc. for 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, etc.). Thus 
general acknowledgement of a battalion‟s role in the night operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, while not 
officially recognised as part of Third Ypres, could technically fall within the parameters of allotted theatre 
of war honours.  
11
 Sir J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1948), pp. 
359-60. Casualties (killed, wounded and missing) sustained during the night operation, William Moore 
observed, are not included in the official history‟s (pp. 364-65) „final figures for Passchendaele‟. See 
Moore, See How They Ran, p. 32. That British troops were called upon to continue the work of Canadian 
Corps following its withdrawal from the Passchendaele sector is, taking into consideration parochial former 
Dominion perspectives about Third Ypres, indicative that the campaign should, among others, be viewed in 
an „Imperial‟ context.   
12
 See Appendix 18 for typescript facsimile of Major-General Shute‟s 1930 letter. Brigadier-General 
Edmonds submitted first narrative drafts to „as many survivors as possible (down to battalion commanders) 
and all replies acknowledged and responded to where necessary‟. Andrew Green, Writing the Great War: 
Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 57 and 168. No 
doubt Shute was subsequently informed (Edmonds‟ reply not found) that many of the engagements 
mentioned in his correspondence would be covered in future volumes.   
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was primarily based on concern for his professional reputation relative to posterity. The 
absence of any sort of similar correspondence from surviving officer participants is 
indicative of an apparent dearth of advocates for inclusion.
13
 Subsequent exclusion, 
notwithstanding the fact that similar sized or much smaller affairs were often recounted, 
however briefly, in other series monographs, may have been influenced by the 
operation‟s occurrence outside the nine BNC adopted phases (31 July to 10 November) 
that comprised what is officially known as the Third Battle of Ypres.
14
 Edmonds‟ ready 
adherence to this officially adopted chronologic construct is still accepted by historians, 
normally critical of his Passchendaele volume‟s perceived pro-Haig bias, to this day. 
Published accounts of what was most recently referred to as a “futile sideshow”,15 
therefore, remain limited to a miscellaneous assortment of personal memoirs, one 
divisional and a dozen or so battalion histories primarily but not exclusively produced 
during the interwar period, which, by their very nature, focus on individual experience or 
a particular unit without, more often than not, any sort of broad perspective or contextual 
evaluation. General historical focus on Cambrai and the succession of German offensives 
that followed in 1918 has, as with the BNC and Official History, thoroughly consigned 
the intervening local Passchendaele affair to almost complete obscurity, as perusal of 
                                                 
13
 Conversely, official historians sometimes deliberately overlooked comparatively successful local 
operations despite earnest advocacy for inclusion. In 1938, Brevet-Major I.S.O. Playfair pleaded („a 
splendid example of bold tactics‟ the novelty of which „should be a refreshing contrast to the prevailing 
stereotyped methods and I feel that readers would be glad to know that ingenuity and imagination were not 
entirely lacking in those days‟) with official historian Captain Cyril Falls to include an account of the 
capture of „Infantry Hill‟ by 76 Brigade (3rd Division) on 14 June 1917. „His plea went unanswered. The 
Official History makes no mention of activities on the Monchy front after 30 May‟. See Colin Fox, Monchy 
le Preux (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), p. 100.  
14
 For example, see Captain Cyril Falls, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol. 1 (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1940), pp. 525-32 for „Events Outside the Arras Battlefield‟ during the spring of 1917. 
Indeed, the Passchendaele night operation, given its somewhat vague strategic connection (see Chapter 1, 
p. 28) with Third Army‟s offensive, would not have been out of place in the relevant volume (HMSO 1948) 
dealing with the Battle of Cambrai.  
15
 Michael Stedman, Salford Pals: A History of the Salford Brigade – The 15th, 16th, 19th, and 20th (Service) 
Battalions the Lancashire Fusiliers 1914-19 (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 157.  
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even the most comprehensive available chronologies of the First World War will attest.
16
 
Moreover, given the understandably parochial focus of postwar Dominion accounts, a 
much smaller operation (occurring on 3 December) in which two New Zealand battalions 
participated in a failed daytime operation against Polderhoek Chateau, has received far 
more attention in a wide variety of Antipodean military literature, while the much larger 
nocturnal attack involving nine British battalions remains largely forgotten. It is also 
curious to note that the German official monograph of the Third Ypres campaign 
(published 1928) makes, unlike its British equivalent twenty years later, particular 
mention – albeit in a few short lines – of the night operation. This in itself clearly 
demonstrates that the author perceived it to be the last major “English” attack in Flanders 
for the year 1917.
17
 
 
 A large variety of primary source documents were found in the National 
Archives‟ extensive „WO‟ series. This vast collection, a fundamental starting point for 
scholars wishing to understand the British Army during the First World War, contained 
the essential formation/unit war diaries, operation orders, intelligence and after-action 
reports on which the foundation of this study is based. Analysis of their contents 
revealed, besides comprehensive operational and tactical details, a reasonably efficient 
bureaucratic process for dissemination of information at all levels and general 
encouragement, by written report, questionnaire or personal interview, of subordinate 
                                                 
16
 See Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, Chronology of the Great War (London: Greenhill, 1988 
omnibus reprint of 1918-20 editions) and Randall Gray & Christopher Argyle, Chronicle of the First World 
War Vol. 2 1917-1921 (Oxford: Facts on File, 1991).  
17
 Werner Beumelburg, Flandern 1917 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1928), p. 167. Jack Sheldon‟s more 
recent work also acknowledges this late resumption of British offensive operations. See Jack Sheldon, The 
German Army at Passchendaele (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), pp. 310-12.  
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commanders to  communicate their thoughts and actions frankly to immediate superiors. 
In addition, surviving VIII Corps and 32
nd
 Division telephone and telegraph transcripts 
provided valuable „fly on the wall‟ retrospective insight into the prevailing chaos and 
consequent impact of contradictory and erroneous messages at corps and division level 
throughout the attack. Subsequent examination of the available diaries and or papers of 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig (C-in-C BEF), General Sir Henry Rawlinson (GOC 
Second/Fourth Army), Major-General A.A. Montgomery (MGGS Second/Fourth Army), 
Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston (GOC VIII Corps) and Major-General 
W.C.G Heneker (GOC 8
th
 Division), among others, disclosed the thoughts and actions of 
over a dozen participants from Field Marshal to Private. New material relating to the 
character and command style of Major-General C.D. Shute GOC 32
nd
 Division (who left 
no surviving papers) and additional Passchendaele night operation documents not found 
in the equivalent Kew files, was also discovered in the seemingly unrelated personal 
paper collections of Major-General A.H. Marindin and Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert 
respectively. German primary sources are almost completely absent from this study 
because of complete destruction of the central military archives at Potsdam during the 
Second World War. Nevertheless, six relevant Hessian and Thüringian regimental 
histories provided the principal source for understanding perspectives and course of 
events relating to the „other side of the hill‟. The factual gulf between these accounts and 
the wealth of British primary documents was, in comparison, very limited, the former 
sources, more often than not, complimenting the latter.  
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 Chapter 1 considers the military situation in the period leading up to the capture 
(6 November 1917) of Passchendaele village. Sir Henry Rawlinson‟s succession as 
commander of Second Army and the subsequent Anglo-Canadian attack (10 November) 
to gain additional ground north and NW of Passchendaele follows. The decision to attack 
again in early December, enemy defensive measures, consequent tactical planning and 
controversy between participating division commanders, infantry training and artillery 
preparations are examined next in order to set the stage for the contemplated night 
assault. Part one of Chapter 2 compares and contrasts the plethora of related divisional 
instructions and orders. Part two explores the partially successful German riposte (30 
November) that ultimately disrupted the attackers‟ painstakingly laid plans and the final 
hours leading up to Zero. Chapter 3 chronicles the assembly and initial assault in the 
early hours of 2 December. Chapter 4 continues the narrative from sunrise to the 
commencement of the afternoon German counter-attack. Chapter 5 relates events and 
immediate consequences of the hostile retaliatory thrust, resultant British consolidation of 
ground gained and GHQ‟s decision to terminate further offensive measures within ten 
hours of Zero. This is followed by a detailed tactical analysis. The concluding chapter 
analyzes the operational, strategic, political and human consequences as they directly or 
indirectly relate to this opaque episode of the First World War. Use of extensive 
acronyms made it necessary to include a glossary of terms and abbreviations. Eighteen 
related appendices and sixteen maps have also been collected in a separately bound 
volume for ease of access.  
  
1 
 
Antecedents 
 
 Any further offensive on the Flanders front must be at once 
discontinued though it is important to keep this fact secret as long as 
possible.
18
 
 
 
1.1 Setting the Stage 
 
Great Britain and her Empire went to war in August 1914 to prevent a German hegemony 
of Europe and, in particular, to prevent the Low Countries and channel ports from falling 
into the hands of a hostile power. The cost of achieving these ends rose exponentially. 
Britain was the world‟s premier maritime power, but by the middle of 1916, the 
exigencies of the Franco-British alliance and the strength of the Imperial German Army 
had compelled Britain to create an enormous army to match that of its primary 
continental foe. The exigencies of the French alliance also compelled the employment of 
this largely extemporized army before it was fully trained and equipped. The subsequent 
long, drawn-out Battle of the Somme (July-November 1916) was the bloody template 
from which the British Army developed and applied emerging operational methods and 
technologies that would be effectively adapted and adjusted throughout1917-18.   
 
On 1 December 1917 the First World War passed into its fortieth month. Three 
years‟ deadlock on the Western Front had taken its toll. Imperial Germany was hard-
pressed but defiant in the west. Victorious on the Eastern Front in the immediate 
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 Sir Douglas Haig correspondence with CIGS Sir William Robertson, 15 November 1917, reproduced in 
Robert Blake (ed), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), 
p. 267.  
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aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, Germany prepared for an all-out offensive 
designed to bring France and Great Britain to terms before the influx of millions of 
reinforcements from the United States tipped the military balance. France, reeling from 
internal unrest and the tremendous human and material costs sustained during the fighting 
of 1914-17, anticipated a previously agreed upon takeover by its British ally of a forty-
mile swath of battlefront south of the Somme as the campaign season drew to a close. 
The ability of the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] to continue offensive operations in 
the west would be further reduced by the Lloyd George government‟s insistence that five 
divisions be dispatched to support the beleaguered Italian Army in the aftermath of the 
Caporetto defeat. Meanwhile, Britain‟s civil and military leadership, having sanctioned 
three costly and seemingly inconclusive western offensives commencing with the Battle 
of Arras the previous April, further exacerbated prevailing strategic/political contentions 
by engaging in heated debate over a growing manpower shortage that appeared to 
seriously threaten the Empire‟s capacity to continue the conflict.  
 
 It was against this alarming strategic and political backdrop that Field Marshal Sir 
Douglas Haig (C-in-C BEF) officially terminated his great Flanders offensive, the „Third 
Battle of Ypres‟ or what is still popularly known as „Passchendaele‟, on 20 November 
1917. The very real danger of Kaiserliche Marine destroyer and U-boat flotillas 
contesting Royal Navy dominance of the English Channel from occupied Belgian ports 
made Germany‟s expulsion from Flanders a cornerstone of British war policy. Dealing 
with this threat was deferred until the spring of 1917 in order to support the offensive 
schemes of Britain‟s main continental ally, France. The subsequent „Nivelle Offensive‟ 
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(16 April-9 May 1917) and the series of widespread mutinies that affected the French 
Army afterwards left the BEF to shoulder the main burden of offensive operations on the 
Western Front. This provided Haig with the opportunity to confront the menace in 
Flanders. Thus the West Flanders market town of Ypres, the last major Belgian 
municipality remaining in Allied hands, and its notorious salient became the starting 
point for what would be the principal British military effort of 1917 (Map 1) Haig aimed 
at nothing less than driving the enemy from Belgian soil. Clearance of dominating high 
ground of the Messines and Passchendaele ridges was to be followed by an eastward 
advance to capture the key railway centres at Roulers and Thourout. The German 
defenders, unable to disengage without having their vital lateral rail communications 
severed, would be worn down in an attritional campaign that would force the 
abandonment of occupied Belgium. British occupation of hostile naval bases on the 
Belgian coast, a serious threat to cross-channel communications since late 1914, would 
follow in due course.  
 
By this time the BEF, bolstered by the full mobilization of British industry which 
was producing not only colossal quantities of established weaponry, but also new 
weapons such as the tank and trench mortar, had honed its fighting skills to conduct 
offensive operations that caused growing anxiety at all levels of the German high 
command. At the strategic level, Sir Douglas Haig failed to curb his overriding ambition, 
some say over-ambition, to expel Germany from Flanders in 1917. This still debatable 
strategic design was, nevertheless, accompanied by an increasingly effective operational 
approach that challenged the stark realities of position warfare with a lethal combination 
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of massed artillery providing overwhelming fire support for limited infantry attacks. 
Tactical level developments were characterized by an increase in the amount of firepower 
through automatic rifles such as the Lewis Gun and rifle grenades, and a return to fire and 
manoeuvre that devolved initiative to platoon level under the auspices of an innovative 
GHQ inspired infantry training manual.  
 
Seizure of the Messines Ridge, a necessary preliminary to a northern offensive 
aimed at Passchendaele Ridge, Roulers and Thourout, was successfully carried out by 
Second Army on 7 June. Grudging sanction for the next stage of Sir Douglas Haig‟s 
campaign was authorised by the Lloyd George government on 20 July. The main 
offensive by Fifth Army supported by Second and French First Armies on the right and 
left respectively, opened on 31 July. Three and one half months severe fighting resulted 
in the capture of over three-fourths of Passchendaele Ridge by the offensive‟s official 
close date. Another major offensive, launched that very day by General Sir Julian Byng‟s 
Third Army, broke through the vaunted „Hindenburg Line‟ defences on a six-mile front 
near Cambrai. A devastating German counter-offensive, opening on 30 November, 
succeeded in re-capturing most of the British territorial gains. These events, occurring 49 
miles south of Ypres, did not completely distract Sir Douglas Haig from sanctioning a 
relatively large-scale attack by General Sir Henry Rawlinson‟s Second Army. Its 
subordinate VIII Corps (GOC Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston) and II 
Corps (GOC Lieutenant-General Sir Claud W. Jacob) were tasked with overseeing a 
night operation near the almost obliterated village of Passchendaele on 2 December. The 
objective was to make a short advance from a dangerously exposed salient on a 2,870-
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yard front north and NW of Passchendaele. On the right, 8
th
 Division (GOC Major-
General W.C.G. Heneker)
19
 would assault with one brigade; on the left, 32
nd
 Division 
(GOC Major-General C.D. Shute),
20
 utilizing a reinforced brigade, would prolong the left 
flank. The operation, if successful, would secure important observation points whilst 
fleshing out the protruding bulge to provide additional defensive security during the 
winter of 1917-18.
21
  
 
 General Sir Henry Seymour Rawlinson Bt. (GOC Fourth Army) had, by the time 
the December operation was being contemplated, taken over the embattled Second Army 
from the Italy-bound Sir Herbert Plumer on 8 November.
22
 The new commander – 
sidelined to command subsidiary operations on the Flanders coast
23
 since the previous 
June – arrived just in time to oversee the next operational phase to secure the northern 
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 Major-General Sir William Charles Giffard „Billy‟ Heneker DSO, ADC (1867-1939). Commissioned 
Connaught Rangers 1888; Traveling commissioner Niger Coast Protectorate, West Africa 1897-1899;  
Benin Territories Expedition 1899; CO Ubium and Ishan expeditions 1900; Aro Expedition 1901-02; OC 
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rd
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th
 Division 9 December 1916, promoted Major-General 
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20
 Major-General Cameron Dean „Tiger‟ Shute (1866-1936). Commissioned Welsh Regiment 1885; Staff 
College 1893-94; transferred to Rifle Brigade 1895; Sudan 1898; DAAG Malta 1899-1904; GSO2 Scottish 
Coast Defences 1905-09; CO 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade 1910-14; GSO 1 Aldershot 1914; BGGS 1914-15; GOC 59 
Brigade, 20
th 
Division 1915-16. Promoted temporary Major-General on assuming command of 63
rd 
(Royal 
Naval) Division October 1916; GOC 32
nd 
Division February 1917; temporary GOC 19
th
 (Western) Division 
April - May; GOC 32
nd
 Division and promoted Major-General June 1917.  
21
 The projected attack was one of four contemplated during the winter months. Only two of the four 
actually took place.  
22
 Plumer had been chosen, at the insistence of the Lloyd George government, to command a British 
contingent of 5 divisions dispatched to assist the Italians following the Caporetto rout regardless of the fact 
that Second Army was conducting major offensive operations in Flanders.   
23
 The contemplated amphibious landing and concurrent coastal advance under Rawlinson‟s command were 
dependent on measured offensive progress made by Second and Fifth Armies. The scheme was abandoned 
in mid-October following the Second Battle of Passchendaele. See Andrew A. Wiest, Passchendaele and 
the Royal Navy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 163-64.   
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extremity of the Passchendaele Ridge.  Plumer and his staff, having taken on the main 
part of the Anglo-French offensive from Sir Hubert Gough‟s stalled Fifth Army on 25 
August, carefully oversaw and administrated a series of limited step-by-step advances 
dependent on the range and mobility of the supporting artillery; the overall aim was a 
combined maximum penetration of German Fourth Army’s defences to a depth of 24,000 
yards. Second Army‟s celebrated set-piece attacks (battles of Menin Road Ridge, 
Polygon Wood and Broodseinde) between 20 September and 4 October, with their 
thorough preparations and strictly limited objectives, frustrated previously successful 
German attempts to retake lost ground by counter-attack.
24
 Indeed, the seemingly 
relentless British gains made under favourable weather conditions during 20 and 26 
September, interrupted by pauses of four or five days to bring batteries forward, were 
almost immediately followed by a consequent ill-considered attempt by OHL to bolster 
the once lightly held German forward area with additional troops. Their subsequent 
slaughter by massed British and Dominion batteries during the Battle of Broodseinde (4 
October) contributed to Fourth Army’s loss, in addition to what remained of the tactically 
vital Gheluvelt Plateau in its entirety, of the southern extremity of the main 
Passchendaele Ridge from east of Polygon Wood to just beyond Broodseinde crossroads. 
Meanwhile, Fifth Army, keeping pace with its southerly neighbour‟s three drives, 
steadily pushed eastward toward Poelcappelle and, surmounted by the sprawling village 
of Westroosebeke, the remaining northern stretch of the extended Passchendaele plateau. 
Second and Fifth armies thus appeared poised for further success against a weakened and 
demoralized enemy. The Australian official historian C.E.W. Bean, famously 
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 See Sir J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol.2 (London: HMSO, 1948), 
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commenting on the notable territorial gains made during 20 September-4 October, asked 
rhetorically: “Let the student, looking at the prospect as it appeared at noon on 4 October, 
ask himself: „In view of the three step-by-step blows all successful, what will be the 
result of three more in the next fortnight?”25 These lauded victories were not cheap; 
combined total losses sustained by Second and Fifth armies amounted to approximately 
56,375 men killed, wounded and missing.
26
  
 
Plate 1.1 General Sir Henry Rawlinson 
(Source: Author’s collection) 
 
 Against this novel “British approach to the battle, the Germans could find no 
remedy; the recapturing of ground once lost was impossible”. Gruppe Wytschaete chief 
of staff Albrecht von Thaer remarked on 28 September: “We are going through a really 
awful experience. I do not know anymore what to do in the face of the British”.27 By 
                                                 
25
 C.E.W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France 1917 Vol. IV (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1936), p. 881. See Sketch 25 „Forecast of the Stages of the Campaign GHQ 22nd September 1917‟, in 
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mid-October, Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht, of which Fourth Army was part, 
seriously considered a “comprehensive withdrawal” to husband “men and material, 
which would have included the abandonment of the navy bases at Zeebrugge and 
Ostend”.28 Second Army was now prepared to launch its primary thrust opposite a 
swampy, low-lying area just below the northern portion of the Passchendaele Ridge. This 
tapering extremity, with its constituent heavily-fortified, mutually supporting 
Passchendaele and Bellevue spurs protruding SW like extended fingers, presented a 
formidable obstacle. A fatal combination of sustained German resistance, narrowing 
assault frontages (the attackers, driving NE instead of due east into a constricted salient, 
were unable to establish enough available sites for the deployment of batteries tasked 
with overwhelming the enemy‟s artillery and providing support for the assaulting 
infantry) and recurring bad weather, which reduced the battlefield to the infamous folk-
memory nightmare of autumnal mud and floodwater in the days following Broodseinde, 
foiled further attempts to achieve a breakthrough. Rushed preparations to increase 
operational tempo and neglect of crucial “logistico-engineering” factors ultimately led to 
recognition that the strategic phase of the campaign had, in the immediate aftermath of 
the operationally barren follow-up battles of Poelcappelle (9 October) and First 
Passchendaele (12 October), run its course. This dolorous operational phase cost 9,741 
British, Australian and New Zealanders killed, wounded and missing for no appreciable 
gain. Meanwhile, Fifth Army, at the cost of a further 5,598 casualties, made some barely 
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measurable territorial gains toward Westroosebeke whilst closing with the southern 
fringes of Houthulst Forest.
29
  
 
 British GHQ, having abandoned all thoughts of strategic breakthrough aimed at 
capturing the indispensable enemy railway centres at Roulers and Thourout followed by 
clearance of hostile naval bases on the Belgian coast, now brought in Lieutenant-General 
Sir Arthur Currie‟s Canadian Corps to seize Passchendaele village and its elevated 
environs before the onset of winter. The painstaking Currie insisted that sufficient guns 
should be brought forward and “adequate” preparations, by which he meant time to get 
battlefield communication routes in a proper state, were crucial before further attacks 
occurred. Granted a required two-week preparation period by Sir Douglas Haig, Currie 
and his staff made certain that vital communication arteries were “pushed forward into 
the salient at a considerable cost of 1,500 casualties” before offensive operations were 
resumed.
30
 The series of three methodically planned and “carefully scripted” 500 yard 
advances that subsequently followed during the period 26 October-6 November (Map 2) 
allowed assaulting Canadian divisions to “gobble up the ridge, piece by methodical 
piece”, until pulverized, corruption-strewn Passchendaele village and Bellevue Spur were 
overrun.
31
 Fifth Army‟s neighbouring corps (XVIII and XIV), foundering in horrific, 
swamp-like conditions below Westroosebeke and opposite Houthulst Forest, made little 
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headway during 26-30 October. GHQ subsequently instructed Second Army to take over 
XVIII Corps‟ front on the 31st, “so that the forthcoming further operations should be 
under one command”.32 Fifth Army, once the primed spearhead of the great northern 
offensive, was left with a single corps under its command. II Corps replaced the tired 
XVIII Corps two days later on 2 November. In the meantime, almost bloodless minor 
operations perpetrated by the exchanging corps‟ right-hand 63rd (Royal Naval) Division 
during the nights of 1/2 and 3/4 November successfully secured a number of seemingly 
impregnable German strongpoints.
33
 These small, company-level enterprises, carried out 
by stealth, would influence the operational planning of the only large-scale night attack to 
occur in Flanders during 1917. Prior to this, Haig, his great campaign having lapsed into 
an uncertain post-strategic phase in which clearance of the northern part of Passchendaele 
Ridge was paramount, had determined to launch one more offensive (what would become 
known as the Battle of Cambrai), employing massed tanks accompanied by a 
revolutionary predicted artillery barrage, before the long and bloody campaigning season 
came to an end.
34
 The semi-distracted British Field Marshal, nonetheless, would continue 
to contemplate theatre strategic designs centring on Flanders well into the first quarter of 
1918.  
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 Sir Henry Rawlinson was left to conduct waning offensive operations on the 
Ypres front. The northern extremity of the Passchendaele Ridge as far as Westroosebeke 
still remained in enemy hands. On 10 November another attack was launched on both 
sides of the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke Road. On the right, 1st Canadian Division 
gained 500 yards along the main ridge, although the summit and NE slope of Hill 52 (the 
highest tactical feature on the northern part of the ridge) was not secured. On the left, 1
st
 
British Division (II Corps), attacking with two battalions (1
st
 South Wales Borderers 
[SWB] and 2
nd
 Royal Munster Fusiliers [RMF]) provided left flank protection.
35
 Their 
objectives were a tongue-shaped outcrop of the main ridge known as „Vat Cottage 
Ridge‟36 and two corresponding strongpoints situated on the Passchendaele plateau. A 
right-hand divergence by 1
st
 SWB allowed counter-attacking German infantry to exploit a 
considerable gap between the assaulting battalions; 1
st
 RMF was cut off and routed with 
heavy loss after capturing a number of strongpoints. 1
st
 SWB, its left flank dangerously 
exposed, was thus compelled to fall back to the original jumping-off line situated in the 
marshy Paddebeek valley.
37
 The attack frontage “narrow enough to begin with, and 
reduced by three-fifths by failure on the left, allowed the enemy to concentrate an 
unusual weight of artillery against the new line. In all, the counter-batteries of German 
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(Ottawa: Queen‟s Printer, 1962), p. 326.  
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corps were turned on the Canadian front”.38 That evening Sir Henry Rawlinson recorded 
his summation of the day‟s events in his diary:  
It has been a very disappointing day [.] After a wet blustery 
night the II and Canadian corps assembled for the attack at 
6:5[0] am [,] and went over the top [.] By 7:30 they had 
gained all their objectives [,] and were [,] I hoped [,] well 
established [,] but soon after 9am the Bosch began 
concentrated hurricane artillery fire [,] which we could not 
hope to cope with [,] as no airmen were available to get 
into the air [,] and the counter-battery work was ineffective 
[.] The Bosch has greatly strengthened his batteries 
opposite Passchendaele [,] and until we can bring their fire 
under [,] I doubt [we] are making much progress [.] We 
shall be driven out every time. The Canadians have held on 
[,] but the Munsters and SWB have been driven back to 
their original line [.] It is very disappointing [.]
39
 
 
Sir Douglas Haig, in contrast to his new Second Army Commander, was satisfied with 
the results of the day:   
Attack launched at 6:5[0] am today on II and Canadian 
corps fronts extending from north of Passchendaele village 
to Tornaut farm [sic] on the west of the ridge. At 9:30 am 
Second Army reported all objectives taken. Very heavy 
rain had fallen in the night and the ground was very deep. 
At 3:30 pm Second Army reports our troops have been 
driven out of „Veal Cottages‟ on the [Vat Cottage] spur 
northwest of Passchendaele and also from Vox and 
Vocation Farms, which are on the main ridge. „Steps are 
being taken to retake these localities.‟ Notwithstanding 
these points being still in enemy hands, our troops have 
improved their position on the Passchendaele ridge very 
greatly.
40
 
 
The ultimate result, despite this reserved optimism, was the creation of the narrow and 
extremely vulnerable Passchendaele Salient, a deadly, jutting proboscis “extended to a 
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 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, p. 326.  
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 CAC: RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 10 November 1917.  
40
Haig diary entry 10 November 1917 in „The First World War Political, Social and Military Manuscript 
Sources: Series One: The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, Part I Haig‟s Autograph 
Great War Diary‟, Parts 9-10 1917 (NLS Acc., 3155, Reel No. 5. 96, 97 and 141-53 (Brighton: Harvester 
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depth of about three thousand yards to a width of only 1,000 yards. This confined area,   
the combined responsibility of VIII and II Corps from 18 November, was “overlooked by 
the enemy from Westroosebeke, and suffered from shellfire and gas of all descriptions 
continuously both night and day”.41 The overall position was so dire that Brigadier-
General Cecil Faber Aspinall (BGGS VIII Corps)
42
 prepared, ostensibly for Second 
Army HQ, a controversial appreciation that painted a grim picture of prevailing 
conditions in the salient.
43
  
 
1.2 Aspinall’s Appreciation 
Brigadier-General Aspinall‟s report began with a topographic and logistic overview of 
the newly created salient (Map 3). The British front, an exact semi-circle with a radius of 
1,300 yards, extended from the vicinity of Goudberg Copse (NNW of Passchendaele 
Village) to Tiber (a captured German strongpoint south of the village).
44
 The distance 
from the Menin Gate to the apex was 13,000 yards, and every yard of this approach was 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel Graham Seton Hutchison, The Thirty-Third Division in France and Flanders 1915-
1919 (London: Warlow & Sons, 1921) p. 75.  
42
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Rhine. See LHCMA: „Second Army No. 20/59 (G)‟, 19 November 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd 
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under the effective range of the German 5.9-inch howitzer
45
 from some portion of the 
enemy line, “and the last 8,000 yards, i.e. from the old German forward system” could be 
“reached by 5.9‟ fire from any point in an arc of more than 180 degrees”: 
For the last 3,000 yards, until duckboard tracks can be made 
in the present impassable valleys, troops must move either 
along the BELLEVUE spur or along the main 
Passchendaele Ridge. The first named route is nowhere 
more then 1,500 yards from the frontline of the [II] Corps on 
our left; the last named route is throughout within 1,000 
yards of our own frontline. The necessity for us to use one 
of these routes is well known to the enemy, who can cut off 
all communication by the simple expedient of placing a 
barrage across them.  
 
The right (33
rd) division was “served by one passable road as far as Devil‟s Crossing, 
whence pack animals can be taken as far as Seine”.46 This point was “4,000 yards from 
the left flank of the Division‟s line”. The left (8th) division‟s route was passable for 
wheeled transport only as far as the indispensable nodal point at Kansas Cross,
47
 and for 
pack mules as far as Bellevue, “whence there is a 3,000 yard carry to the frontline”.48  
                                                 
45
 The 5.9-inch howitzer had a maximum range of 9,296 yards.  
46
 Devil‟s Crossing was situated on the Ypres – Roulers railway. Seine was a captured German strongpoint 
NE of Zonnebeke.  
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                                                   Plate 1.2 Brigadier-General C.F. Aspinall  
                                                                   (Source: NPG 163753)   
 
Accumulated artillery assets remained vulnerable and exposed: “Owing to the 
paucity of roads and tramlines, the artillery is at present dangerously bunched and 
casualties are heavy. This must continue until the guns can be separated, which can only 
be done when more lateral roads are completed”. Light railway construction, to service 
gun platforms on Windmill Cabaret Ridge and Abraham Heights (west of the 
Passchendaele Ridge) was, with consequent difficulties, underway to ease a portion of the 
gunners‟ logistical nightmare:  
                        LIGHT RAILWAYS 
 
(3) In order to give adequate counter-battery support to the 
infantry it is essential to bring heavy artillery up to the 
WINDMILL CABARET Ridge. Guns can only be 
adequately supplied on this line when the loops between 
Y4 and Y8 spurs has [sic] been completed.  
 
The situation on the Abraham Heights – Boeteleer Line would remain unsatisfactory for 
the ubiquitous British 18-pounder [pdr.] field gun
49
 until served by a light railway. 
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“Unfortunately, however, the construction of [railway] lines is hampered by hostile fire 
from our [VIII Corps] right flank, the shape of the salient being such that railways in our 
area, when still 5,000 yards from our own frontline, are within 2,000 yards of the front of 
the [II Anzac] Corps
50
 on our right”.51 
 
There was clearly a great deal of work to be done: “The backward state of 
communications necessitates a very large amount of labour, and the constant heavy 
shelling necessitates a further large number of men for maintenance alone”. Manpower, 
however, was in short supply: “It is estimated that the total number of battalions required 
for work in VIII Corps area is eight, of this number it is at present impossible to provide 
more than three battalions from within the Corps”.52  
 
A carefully considered appraisal of „advantages‟ and „disadvantages‟ of retaining 
such a poor position followed in parts 6 and 7:  
                        ADVANTAGES OF OUR POSITION. 
 
6. The main advantages to be derived from our position in 
the salient are: 
 
(a) MORAL. Passchendaele was one of the main objectives 
of our summer offensive, and was captured despite the 
enemy‟s most strenuous efforts. 
 
(b) It denies to the enemy close observation of some 
portion of our back areas. 
 
                                                 
50
 On 8 November, II ANZAC Corps relieved the I ANZAC Corps along the Passchendaele Ridge from 
Tiber southwards, as far as the Reutelbeek stream (SE of Polygon Wood).  See Lieutenant-Colonel H. 
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51
 TNA: WO/95/821: „Appreciation of the Situation on the VIII Corps Front: November 1917‟, VIII Corps 
War Diary.  
52
 Ibid. 
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(c) It would greatly assist a spring offensive either from 
Poelcappelle towards Westroosebeke, or eastwards towards 
Moorslede and Menin. 
 
As regards (b), it will be noticed that only negative 
advantages are claimed on the score of observation. The 
present British position offers few facilities for observation 
N or NE, and up to the present no satisfactory OP has been 
established in the salient. 
 
DISADVANTAGES OF OUR POSITION.  
 
7. The disadvantages of our position are:  
 
(a) The frontline troops can be shelled from any point on an 
arc of 240 degrees. 
 
(b) There is no cover for supports or close reserves, and 
distances are so great that material can only be carried up 
with great difficulty. 
 
(c) The approaches are such that, with a very small effort, 
the enemy can make it impossible for us to reinforce the 
frontline by troops kept outside the salient. Conversely the 
area comprised within the salient is so small that the enemy 
could blot out the whole garrison by artillery fire at will, 
and the larger the garrison the greater would our losses be.  
 
(d) The „rent‟ in casualties which we pay for the occupation 
of the salient is extremely severe. 
 
(e) Troops holding the frontline have so arduous a time that 
they will have little chance of „picking up‟ for a spring 
offensive. 
 
(f) The line has to be strongly supported by artillery. This 
necessitates a large proportion of available artillery being 
kept in the line without rest, and the guns are so far forward 
that they are subjected to close range fire from their flanks. 
 
A contentious strategic poser followed this careful survey: 
IS THE SALIENT WORTH KEEPING? 
 
8. A consideration of the foregoing paragraphs leads to the 
question of whether it is worthwhile to maintain a position 
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which was fought for and gained as a means to an end, and 
which, since the end was not achieved, has in itself so few 
advantages  
  
The answer to this question is largely dependant on 
whether or not there is to be a British offensive in the 
spring, and it can therefore be given only by the high 
command. It would appear, however, that if the British 
forces in Flanders are to be on the defensive in 1918, the 
moral and political advantages of remaining at 
Passchendaele are more than outweighed by the military 
disadvantage of clinging to so unfavourable a position.
53
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
9. It is strongly urged, therefore, that unless a British 
offensive is to take place in this area in the spring, a policy 
of withdrawal [westward] to the Westhoek – Pilckem Ridge 
Line should be decided on, and that preparation of a strong 
defensive system in that neighbourhood be commenced at 
once. 
 
It is further urged that if the policy of withdrawal from the 
salient be accepted, the retirement should take place as 
soon as a defensive position in the rear was prepared. Such 
a retirement, carried out in our own time, and as a surprise, 
could almost certainly be completed without loss. If, on the 
other hand, it was decided to postpone the withdrawal until 
the enemy should attack, there would be a great risk of our 
only two roads being destroyed by his fire and a very large 
number of guns being sacrificed.  
 
A deliberate retirement 8,000 yards westward to the Westhoek – Pilckem Ridge Line 
would relinquish most of the gains made north of Gheluvelt Plateau during three and one 
half months of costly fighting. The contemplated withdrawal, based on a logical outcome 
of pure attrition, made military sense. On the other hand, the “moral and political 
advantages of remaining at Passchendaele” could not be ignored.54 
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 Brigadier-General Aspinall was presentient in regard to the BEF‟s adoption of a defensive policy during 
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To give up territory, gained at such immense expenditure of men and material 
during an offensive that was the British Empire‟s major effort for the year 1917 would, 
besides demonstrating a clear admission of the failure of Sir Douglas Haig‟s preferred 
strategy, have adverse effects on the army, the civilian population at home and Great 
Britain‟s allies. Germans propaganda could also be expected to announce such a 
withdrawal to the world as another victory over the Entente. Already strained relations 
between the Lloyd George Government and British GHQ would be further exacerbated if 
the meagre gains in Flanders were relinquished before year‟s end. Third Ypres, Gary 
Sheffield has observed, was “never just an attritional battle”, so psychological and 
political factors took equal precedence for consideration as the campaign drew to a 
close.
55
 Finally, British GHQ still planned to resume the offensive in early 1918. Second 
Army expected, come spring, to jump off from advantageous positions on the 
Passchendaele plateau in order to continue operations toward Roulers (a downhill 
advance of approximately five miles to this former strategic objective), Thourout and the 
Belgian coast. Operational, tactical and logistical infrastructure difficulties could be 
improved upon during the winter months, while retention of the possessed heights 
provided desirable dry ground on which to spend the winter.
56
  
 
                                                 
55
 Gary Sheffield, Chapter 8 of forthcoming Sir Douglas Haig biography (2008 draft).   
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 The projected 1918 offensive was outlined by Lieutenant-General Sir L.E. Kiggell (CGS GHQ) during a 
conversation with the influential Times Military Correspondent Colonel Repington the previous October:  
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Sir Henry Rawlinson, taking into consideration plans for the continuance of 
further operations to clear the main ridge before 1917 ended, future plans for 1918, and 
the dismally obvious points made in Brigadier-General Aspinall‟s „Appreciation of the 
Situation‟ concluded the Passchendaele Salient would have to be retained. It was, in any 
case, not BEF policy to make withdrawals of the kind contemplated by the BGGS VIII 
Corps, so the GOC Second Army lacked ultimate authority to abandon the position. Such 
a decision would have been the exclusive purview of GHQ. The salient, however, could 
be rendered less vulnerable if satisfactory observation was gained over valleys to the 
north and NE. GHQ, Rawlinson noted in his diary, provided further incentive: “Tavish 
[Brigadier-General J.H. Davidson DMO GHQ] was here today [,] but I missed him. He 
says that if D[ouglas] H[aig] considers the Third Army attack [at Cambrai] sufficiently 
successful he will want me to have a further go at the ridge [;] so I am to prepare for it 
about the end of this month”.57  
 
           On 18 November Sir Henry Rawlinson convened a conference, attended by 
Lieutenant-Generals Jacob, Hunter-Weston and Currie, the GOC of the out-going 
Canadian Corps, at II Corps HQ: 
I gave them their objectives for the next operation [,] which 
will go as far as the edge of Westroosebeke [.] The 32 will 
protect and prolong the flank [.] I left it to them to discuss 
the details [.] If we can get enough guns forward we shall 
do all right [,] but the II Corps command are the difficulty 
[.] Everyone is crying out for labour and there is none to be 
had [.] All help is required for II Corps [,] which I hope 
[will] be allowed to keep the 2 [British] Division [.] I will 
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discuss this with D[ouglas] H[aig] tomorrow when I meet 
him at 9:45.
58
 
 
 The GOC Second Army had dispensed with any designs to capture Westroosebeke and 
thereby clear the northern portion of the Passchendaele Ridge; an advance as far as the 
environs of that town was now all that would be contemplated. Formal orders were issued 
on 21 November.
59
 Following this, planning and preparations for the second phase of a 
step-by-step northern drive along the main ridge toward the Passchendaele – 
Westroosebeke – Spriet position were set in motion. On 26 November 8th Division (VIII 
Corps) would make a short advance (100 to 300 yards) on a front of 1,020 yards from the 
apex of the salient. 32
nd
 Division (II Corps) was chosen to safeguard and extend the  
flank by advancing 400 yards (on the right and left) to 700 yards (in the centre) on a front 
of 1,850 yards from the northern shoulder of the salient (Map 4). The limited nature of 
the proposed advance bears comparison with the four 500 yard bounds (two made on 
narrow frontages) accomplished by Canadian Corps from 26 October to 10 November. 
These previous efforts, despite horrendous conditions and heavy losses, demonstrated 
what could be achieved following reasonable time allotment and methodical 
preparation.
60
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th
 our beloved 2
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    Major-General Shute (GOC 32
nd
 Division) had previously received a warning 
order for pending operations from II Corps HQ on 16 November:  
Early in November, the 32
nd
 Division, at that time resting   
around Lederzeele, were informed that they would move 
into the line at an early date in the neighbourhood of 
BELLEVUE and would attack northward with a view to 
improving our position at PASSCHENDAELE.
61
 
 
The forwarded document clearly outlined Sir Henry Rawlinson‟s intention to flesh-out 
Second Army‟s position within the Passchendaele Salient:  
So far as can be foreseen, it will be necessary for your 
division to relieve the 1
st
 [British] Division on the front 
between approximately Vocation Farm on the right and the 
Paddebeek on the left.  
 
Further operations will then probably have to be undertaken 
to drive the enemy from the PASSCHENDAELE – HILL 
50 – SPRIET position and so widen out the front and gain 
observation east of the WESTROOSEBEKE – STADEN 
Ridge.  
 
Though no definite orders have been received on the 
subject it is possible either –  
 
a) That the VIII Corps may operate on the right of the II 
Corps and be responsible for forming a flank down the 
slopes of the hill towards WRANGLE FARM and 
RACKET WOOD. 
 
b) That the II Corps (32nd Division) may have to takeover 
the front as far as the PASSCHENDAELE – 
WESTROOSEBEKE Road and may itself be 
responsible for forming a right flank to the advance 
towards VALUATION HOUSES –  HILL 50.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rawlinson Diary, 20 November 1917, LHCMA: „Notes of Army Commander‟s Conference at Chateau 
Lovie‟, 20 November 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, File 7/15, King‟s College, London and 
appendices 3 a b & c, 4 a & b, 5 a & b and Map 4.   
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II Corps concluded by asking Shute to relate “briefly how in either of the above 
eventualities you would propose employing your division to gain the approximate line 
VALUATION HOUSES – HILL 50 – MULLET FARM –  WESTWOOD HOUSE – and 
thence a line along the western edge of the WESTROOSEBEKE Ridge in the vicinity of 
TOURNANT FARM”.62 On the afternoon of 18 November, Major-General Heneker 
(GOC 8
th
 Division) met Brigadier-General Aspinall (BGGS VIII Corps), who related that 
there was to be “another and rather more considerable local operation, in which troops of 
the VIII and II corps were to be engaged”.63 This attack, according to Heneker‟s diary, 
would occur on 26 November. The objective was to “drive [the] Boche off the edge of 
the plateau we are on”.64  Subsequent conference minutes relate that offensive operations 
would be resumed by Second Army “about the end of the month” on the fronts of II 
Corps and VIII Corps: “The objective of the VIII Corps will be the capture of VENISON 
TRENCH, thus obtaining observation to the east, while at the same time the II Corps will 
capture the line VOLT FARM – V.23 central (vicinity of Mallet Wood)65, improving our 
position on the ridge, and making our hold on PASSCHENDAELE doubly secure”.66 The 
proposed operation would, if successful, open out the west side of the salient and at the 
same time carry the British line “sufficiently far northward along the ridge to give us 
observation into the valleys running up to the Passchendaele plateau from the north and 
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 TNA: WO/95/643: „II Corps G.S. 6, 16 November 1917‟, II Corps War Diary. See Map 3 for general 
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east”. Occupation of these new vistas would also make it difficult for the enemy to mass 
troops along reverse slopes of the ridge, thus reducing potential threats to the salient‟s 
vulnerable garrison throughout the winter months.
67
  
 
 Sir Douglas Haig, keeping one strategic eye on Flanders as the opening of the 
Cambrai offensive fast approached, made an important tactical suggestion during a 
meeting with Sir Henry Rawlinson on 19 November: 
At 9:45 a.m. I saw Sir H. Rawlinson commanding Second 
Army. He told me of his views to extend the front 
northwards of Passchendaele. He does not wish to take 
Westroosebeke. I suggested attack by small units at night, 
because up to the present nothing of this nature has been 
attempted by us at the Ypres battlefront. I directed 
Rawlinson to work out his plan, but not to give effect to 
them until the result of tomorrow‟s attack is known, and I 
can decide on our future plans.
68
  
 
Rawlinson noted: “D[ouglas] H[aig] is not in any hurry [for a continuance of operations], 
but if we wait [,] I shall have no fresh troops”.69 His concern was no doubt engendered by 
the dispatch of British divisions to Italy and requirements for Third Army‟s forthcoming 
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offensive. These factors, combined with a politically contentious manpower shortage,
70
 
would limit the number of troops available for any subsequent operations intended to 
improve the situation on the Passchendaele Ridge before year‟s end.   
 
 
1.3 German Defensive Measures 
 
Two German Army Corps (Gruppe Staden and Gruppe Ypern) were situated opposite the 
Passchendaele Salient and its environs.
71
 Gruppe Staden was organised and placed 
between Gruppes Diksmuide and Ypern following the First Battle of Passchendaele, when 
it was recognised that the British offensive was being directed northwards in an attempt 
to clear the remainder of the ridge as far as Westroosebeke.
72
 The boundary between 
gruppes Staden and Ypren ran NE along the road from Vindictive Crossroads to 
Oostnieuwkerke.
73
 By mid-November, the right division of Gruppe Staden and left 
division of Gruppe Ypern were responsible for the Passchendaele plateau from 
Passchendaele village to Vat Cottage Ridge. Defensive arrangements for both divisions 
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were, nevertheless, somewhat contradistinctive.
74
 Gruppe Ypern’s right division 
(responsible for Abschnitt A or sub-sector A) occupied two breastworks (known to the 
British as Southern Redoubt and Northern Redoubt) situated NE of Passchendaele. 
Venison Trench, a shallow, muddy furrow of 550 yards extending in an undeviating line 
between two roads merging approximately 600 yards NE,
75
 conjoined the redoubts 
(originally laid out and excavated as part of a rear defence system during late 1916 and 
early 1917) in a conventional trench configuration.
76
 It was highly unusual for the 
Germans to construct, improve or occupy any sort of linear system at this stage of the 
campaign. The deviation was based on local operational and tactical necessities.  
                                                 
74
 The German defences are described as they were following the Anglo-Canadian assault of 10 November. 
Captured German maps indicated the Passchendaele Salient was divided into a left „Passchendaele Sector‟ 
and right „Westroosebeke Sector‟. The line of Gruppe Staden’s right division extended from the 
Lekkerboterbeek stream inclusive to Vindictive Crossroads, while the line of Gruppe Ypern’s left division 
continued from the vicinity of Vindictive Crossroads to south of Passchendaele Village. Divisional rotation 
in the Gruppe Staden’s right sub-sector during the period 11-30 November was as follows: 199th Reserve 
(to night of 16/17 November), 4
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 (20 to 26 November), 25
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                                                                  Plate 1.3 Venison Trench  
                  (Source: Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin  
                                                     (3. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117) 
 
Defensive arrangements known as die Leer des Gefechtsfeldes (invisible garrison) 
were introduced by Fourth Army as one of a number of OHL inspired amendments on 23 
October.
77
 This was part of the update to established defence doctrine adopted in the 
aftermath of British “bite and hold” attacks from 20 September to 4 October. 
Eingreifdivisionen no longer encountered an overextended enemy pressing forward 
beyond the range of supporting artillery. Deadly protective barrages and a solidly 
established defence of recently gained objectives foiled German attempts to develop 
large-scale counter-strokes.
78
 
 
These new defensive measures called for a counter-attack or Eingreifdivision to 
be “brought up wholly or in part so close” behind each line-holding or Stellungsdivision 
                                                 
77
 Captain G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 310. 
78
 Robert T. Foley, „The Other Side of the Wire: The German Army in 1917‟, in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey 
Grey (eds), 1917: Tactics, Training and Technology (Commonwealth of Australia, Australian History 
Military Publications, 2007), pp. 174-75.  
Chapter 1 
 42 
that the former would be within the zone of the enemy‟s long range fire and could, if 
necessary, intervene at once in the battle. German military authorities estimated that 
under “normal conditions, and with divisions at full strength, two divisions assembled in 
depth in this manner should be able to hold a frontage of 5,000 yards”. Severe weather 
conditions, intense bombardments and “the failing quality and quantity” of manpower 
had halved the originally proposed frontage to 2,500 yards by the close of the 
campaign.
79
  
 
The application of the two-division defence organisation led to the creation “of a 
new battle unit, a German legion of two divisions under the front divisional 
[Stellungsdivision] commander”. This allowed for command and control cohesion to 
continue once a Stellungsdivision became heavily engaged. Subsequent Gegenstoss 
(formal, deliberate counter-stroke supported by artillery) were to be carried out, if 
necessary, by an Eingreifdivision echeloned immediately behind each Stellungsdivision. 
An Eingreifdivision would be placed, on arrival in the forward area, under operational 
control of the Stellungsdivision commander whose proximity to events allowed for on-
the-spot decision-making.
80 
Available artillery batteries remained, as per doctrine adopted 
in late 1916, under his authority: “The commander of a Stellungsdivision was assisted by 
a newly created divisional artillery commander. Prior to the new doctrine, artillery was 
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primarily a corps-level asset. With the shift to the division as the primary tactical unit, 
came a redistribution of artillery assets”.81 
 
   On 9 October a memorandum inspired by Generalquartiermeister Erich 
Ludendorff, detailing the desired method of deploying Eingreifdivisionen on the Western 
Front, was distributed by OHL. Stellungsdivisionen were, in principal, to use organic 
reserves to drive the enemy from areas of responsibility.
82
 The Germans were now faced 
with the problem of concealing two divisions, deployed 8,000 yards in depth, on the 
barren, shell-swept Passchendaele Ridge. Their immediate solution was to adopt the 
aforementioned die Leer des Gefechtsfeldes arrangements. Shell holes would provide the 
necessary cover:  
There was no entrenched position or anything resembling a 
connected trench system, which the enemy‟s artillery could 
have destroyed in a few hours; our lines were such that they 
were unrecognizable to the enemy‟s ground or air 
observers. There was no lack of accommodation, wet and 
filthy though it was; for every crater made by the heavy 
shells was a potential shelter for a machine-gun nest or a 
few men, with a tent or a strip of corrugated iron as their 
only head-cover and a few planks as their only chairs or 
beds.
 83
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Eingreifdivisionen were expected to shelter in the cellars of villages and farms in areas 
immediately behind designated Stellungsdivisionen. 
 
The Westheer began to organise its defences into two (Vorfeldzone and 
Grosskampfzone) defensive zones at the close of 1916.
84
 This general arrangement 
remained in place throughout the Flandernschlacht. The recent attempt to counter British 
tactics by packing the frontline with additional troops had, nevertheless, proved 
disastrous on 4 October. Forward companies of battalions holding the frontline were now 
arranged in groups of shell holes.
85
  These formed a Vorfeldzonelinie (outpost zone or 
what Ludendorff described as a “narrow strip of territory”) of double sentry posts some 
400 yards or less from the British line. At the immediate rear of this zone was the 
Sicherungslinie (safety line) where the Vorfeldzonelinie garrison would, if pressed by the 
enemy, retire first. This safety or security line was, as an additional defensive measure, 
only occupied during the night. Approximately 400 yards behind was the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie (main line of resistance), a series of mutually supporting fortified 
farms, pillboxes and shell hole positions.
86
 Troops driven into the Sicherungslinie were, if 
unable to contain a hostile assault, required to withdraw and reinforce 
Hauptwiderstandslinie defenders against a rapidly developing large-scale attack. General 
                                                 
84
 „The concepts of flexible defence and the centrality of the Division were incorporated into a new manual, 
„Grundsatze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg‟ („Principles of Command in the 
Defensive Battle in Position Warfare‟), issued on 1 December 1916, and into „Allegemeines über 
Stellungsbau‟ (Principles of the Construction of Positions‟) issued on 15 December 1916. These two 
manuals, together the new doctrine for defensive warfare, enshrined the ideas of elastic area defence‟. See 
Foley, „The Other Side of the Wire‟, in Dennis & Grey (eds), 1917, pp. 164-65.  
85
 The average strength of a German battalion on the Western Front in November 1917 was approximately 
640 men. This seemingly small complement was backed up by an increase in machine-gun firepower. Ibid., 
p. 283 
86
 Ludendorff op. cit., quoted in Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele, p. 226 The companies 
defending this line were „given areas or zones, instead of lines to hold, and they lay out in shell holes or 
shelters within it ready to occupy the main line of resistance, which was some defined bank or track across 
the regiment‟s sector‟. See Wynne, If Germany Attacks, p. 310. 
Chapter 1 
 45 
von Kuhl (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht) wrote of this 
elastic arrangement: 
The foremost shell crater area to a depth of 500 to 1,000 
yards was to be considered merely a Vorfeld and only to be 
occupied by a thin line of sentries with a few machine-
guns. In face of a big offensive these few troops were to 
retire to the Hauptwiderstandslinie at the back of the 
advanced zone, while the artillery were at once to lay down 
and maintain a dense barrage of shell in front of it.
87
 
 
Vorfeldzonelinie garrisons were expected to withdraw only if pressed by a major attack. 
Kuhl observed that an inherent tactical conundrum beset the defenders of Ludendorff‟s 
“narrow strip of territory” from the start: Was it possible to differentiate a hostile patrol 
or local attack from a large-scale attack? “Was it always possible to tell one from the 
other? And was it not possible that a thin line of men, who could count on no support, 
would feel that they had been abandoned and so tend to withdraw even earlier?” This part 
of the scheme had an “artificial air” that the men never fully comprehended.88  
 
            The Grosskampfzone extended 1,700 yards from the Hauptwiderstandslinie to 
Artillerieschutzstellung (artillery protective line).
89
 Support and reserve battalions of a 
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Stellungsdivision were positioned here for Gegenangriff (automatic counter-attacks) 
toward the embattled main line of resistance the moment the enemy broke through. There 
was a clear distinction between local Gegenangriff and formal, deliberate Gegenstoss; the 
variance was in timing. Gegenangriff by support and reserve battalions would only be 
launched if the defensive barrage failed to stop advancing British infantry in the 
Vorfeldzone. A Stellungsdivision commander set the designated Eingreifdivision in 
motion to Gegenstoss if the earlier Gegenangriff failed to achieve its objective.
90
 
 
   Plate 1.4 Northern Redoubt in the summer of 1917  
   (Source: MMP) 
 
Venison Trench and its redoubts, although provided with the prescribed 
Vorfeldzonelinie, evolved into a doctrinally anomalous linear Hauptwiderstandslinie 
position following Canadian gains on 10 November. Situated where a firm hold could be 
maintained on the sloping eastern contours of the Passchendaele Ridge, its reverse slope 
                                                                                                                                                 
intelligence report, which concluded that boundaries of the main line of resistance (Hauptwiderstandslinie) 
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defences prevented direct observation of valleys to the north and east. Thus the British 
were denied a corresponding panoramic view, seized after so much blood and effort from 
4 October to 6 November, available southward along the ridge from Passchendaele 
village to Broodseinde.   
 
The sub-sector (Abschnitt B) of Gruppe Staden’s left division continued along dry 
ground west of Northern Redoubt. On the east side of the straight Passchendaele – 
Westroosebeke road lay a concrete pillbox identified on British maps as „Teall 
Cottage‟.91 This tiny shell-scarred edifice was ideally placed to cover the northern 
approaches of the Venison Trench defences. Beyond the road lay outworks blocking the 
ridge route to Westroosebeke. Defences in this sector differed from those of Venison 
Trench: in keeping with the idea of die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes, there was no definite 
line, but “a series of fortified localities and improved shell holes”.92  
 
 Hill 52, a local promontory 200 yards west of Teall Cottage, was the key position 
in Abschnitt B. The Germans knew this elevation, and the flat-topped high ground around 
it, as Höhenrücken (high ridge) Passendale.
93
 It provided good observation of the British 
forward area “from almost any part of the [Passchendaele] ridge north of Vindictive 
Cross Roads…”94 British maps designated this rise (an objective of 1st Canadian Division 
on 10 November) as the highest point on the northern extremity of the Passchendaele 
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Ridge. Some, according to David Schurman, viewed the use of the word „ridge‟ to 
describe the Passchendaele high ground as a misnomer – an illusion gradually dispelled 
during the Canadian advance:  
Strictly speaking, the expression is geographically accurate, 
but to Canadian eyes the slope was so imperceptible that 
the advancing troops almost doubted its existence, until 
they were on top and looked back over the slowly 
undulating sea of mud toward Ypres.
95
  
 
This deceptive upland contributed to post-operational uncertainties about the actual 
situation at Hill 52. Daniel Dancocks asserts, based on statements found in the battalion 
after-action report that 10
th
 Canadian Battalion secured the tactically important elevation 
on the evening of 10 November.
96
 Postwar published official accounts also generally 
avouch, regardless of contrary contemporary evidence, that 1
st
 Canadian Division 
captured Hill 52 along with its other assigned objectives. Nevertheless, a Second Army 
intelligence summary, written immediately following the conclusion of the Second Battle 
of Passchendaele, stated: “The left flank of the Canadians is thrown back in the vicinity of 
Hill 52 (my emphasis) and rests on Venture Farm”.97 A II Corps intelligence summary 
outlined what was known by 13 November:  
It is almost certain that the enemy‟s main defensive line 
prior to the 10
th
 inst. was on the reverse, or northeastern 
slope of Hill 52, and so far beyond immediate local 
counter-attacks, he has made no great effort to prevent us 
from reaching the southwestern slopes, or possibly the top 
of this hill.  
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To obtain command over the area which lies in the triangle 
Westroosebeke – Vindictive Crossroads – Oostnieuwkerke, 
and to discover the enemy‟s battery positions [,] it would 
be necessary for us to advance to the false crest on the 
northeastern slope of Hill 52. It is apparently on, or near 
this false crest that the enemy‟s line runs [,] and he appears 
to be organising artillery so that he can deny it to us by 
artillery fire.
98
  
         
Thus this vital hillock remained, notwithstanding earlier Canadian gains on its SW slope, 
an important topographical asset to the German defenders.
99
 The remaining defences in 
this sector (the scene of 1
st
 Division‟s debacle) extended in a loose collection of fortified 
farms across the protruding tongue of the Vat Cottage Ridge. Strongpoints at Volt, Void, 
Vocation, Virile and Vox farms and Veal and Vat cottages dotted the area.
100
 There were 
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also a number of pillboxes and fortified positions exclusive of these strongpoint 
locales.
101
   
 
 Approximately 400 yards NE of the German forward posts on Vat Cottage Ridge 
lay a scarcely discernable spinney known as Mallet Copse. This shattered clump of fallen 
trees and overlapping shell holes, situated at the junction of the former outcrop with the 
western slope of the main Passchendaele Ridge, contained a cluster of battered trenches, 
dugouts and shelters to house support troops. Situated just 300 yards to the north was a 
soggy, confused wilderness of bare and broken timberland known as Mallet Wood.
102
  
 
   The established Vorfeldzone was approximately 150 yards deep opposite 
Southern Redoubt and 400 yards opposite Venison Trench and Northern Redoubt. Its 
maximum depth from the vicinity of Hill 52 to Vat Cottages was 200 yards. Behind, 
incorporated into the Hauptwiderstandslinie, were Venison Trench and its redoubts and, 
accurately delineated as part of the enemy outpost zone or main line of resistance with 
increased difficulty by intelligence officers at II Corps HQ,
103
 were Hill 52, Void and 
Volt farms (situated on the 50-metre Y-shaped height overlooking the SW gradient of 
Vat Cottage Ridge), Mallet Copse, Vat Cottages and Veal Cottages.  
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Three regiments of nine battalions of Gruppe Staden’s right Stellungsdivision, 
along with one regiment of three battalions of Gruppe Ypern’s left Stellungsdivision, 
were responsible for a line (extending from Southern Redoubt exclusive to north of 
Tournant Farm) 2,850 yards in length by 1 December. The remaining two regiments of 
the latter clung to Southern Redoubt and low-lying positions east of Passchendaele 
village. Designated front, support and reserve battalions were echeloned to a depth of 
approximately 2,500 yards from the Vorfeldzone to the Artillerieschutzstellung.
104
 
Forward battalions defended Vorfeldzonelinie and Hauptwiderstandslinie positions
105
 
while support battalions were deployed behind the Grosskampfzone. Reserve battalions 
garrisoned the vicinity of the Artillerieschutzstellung.
106
 Beyond this lay 
Eingreifdivisionen in immediate reserve. 
                                                 
104
 The German defences were sited north, NE, east and SE of where the Flandern I and Flandern II lines 
intersected (Map 2). Second Army penetrated the junction of both positions during October-November, 
thus forcing the defenders to echelon into a re-entrant from Goudberg Copse to Tiber. See Edmonds, 
Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol. 2, pp. 141-146 for development of the multi-zoned 
(Frontline, Albrecht, Wilhelm, Flandern I, Flandern II, Flandern III) defence-in-depth positions during the 
first-half of 1917.  
105
 The depth of the Hauptwiderstandslinie was approximately 600 yards. See TNA: WO/95/643: „Map A. 
Showing Enemy Dispositions, Line of Resistance, and Assembly Positions of Reserve Battalions to 
Accompany II Corps O.O. 167‟, 22 November 1917, II Corps War Diary. II Corps intelligence observed 
that 32
nd
 Division‟s proposed assault involved the „capture of practically all the area occupied by the front 
battalions of the centre and left [German] regiments. It also effects [sic] the right regiment insomuch as it 
threatens the isolation of its forward battalion‟. Prisoners related that „support battalions are 500 yards to 
600 metres in the rear, but they are probably distributed over considerable areas as the localities they 
occupy have been continuously and heavily shelled‟. Detailed dispositions of companies were „almost 
impossible to determine‟, but it appeared „tolerably certain that all four companies of each battalion are 
forward and maintain groups pushed forward between main line of resistance and our frontline‟. See TNA: 
WO/95/2370: Notes to Accompany Special Intelligence Maps of the Area V.15 to V.30‟ November 1917, 
32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
106
 Ibid. The British were well aware of changes to Fourth Army’s defence scheme after 7 October, as their 
intelligence files and maps attest. Reserve battalions of the front left Division of Gruppe Staden were 
billeted along the road running NE, between Oostnieuwkerke and Roodkruis, from Vindictive Crossroads. 
Reserve battalions of Gruppe Ypern’s right division were quartered in the open near the Veldebrook (just 
south of the junction of the Moorslede-Roulers highway with the Ypres-Roulers railway) and in the villages 
of Vierkavenhoek, Zilverberg, La Cavalier and Magermeirie.  
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Plate 1.5 KTK Headquarters: Winter 1917-18 
(Source: Author’s Collection) 
 
A Stellungsdivision’s three attached regiments, Jack Sheldon has observed, 
readily diversified and delegated command responsibilities amongst component battalion 
commanders throughout 1917. The Kampftruppenkommandeur or KTK (Commander of 
Forward Troops) deployed his battalion in the frontline. Approximately 600 to 800 
metres behind was the support battalion under the command of the 
Bereitschaftstruppenkommandeur or BTK (Commander of Supporting Troops). The third 
battalion occupied reserve positions under command of the Reservetruppenkommandeur 
(RTK). In the event of an attack, the BTK was sent forward “a further 300 yards or so, 
ready to participate in the defence in whatever way events dictated they were needed”, 
while the RTK would reinforce if deemed necessary.  “Without any doubt, the key man in 
each sector was the KTK.
 
 His command responsibilities went well beyond that of a 
normal battalion commander. Whenever possible he and his small staff (including an 
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artillery liaison officer) were located in a concrete blockhouse, preferably of reasonable 
size, between the main defensive line and the gun lines”. Communications difficulties 
experienced during Third Ypres dictated, “regimental, brigade and divisional 
commanders were not in a position to react swiftly enough in the face of enemy attacks. 
The supporting troops were always near at hand, at the disposal of the KTK, and the 
companies of the reserve battalion were usually within easy reach as well”.  Thus the 
KTK (usually a Hauptmann) was, analogous with the aforementioned authorised 
responsibilities of a Stellungsdivision commander, delegated with the immediate 
command decision of when and where a BTK’s support troops would be deployed. “From 
the moment they were committed, they came under his direct command. The same 
applied to the reserve battalion if it was called for, but the deployment of this unit was a 
decision for the regimental commander in the first instance”.107  
 
Dispersed bulwarks based on the die Leer des Gefechtsfeldes concept, the two-
division defensive organisation, along with application of a flexible, mobile defence of 
the Vorfeldzonelinie and Hauptwiderstandslinie zones undoubtedly assisted those tasked 
with maintaining a firm grip on Westroosebeke and the northern portion of the 
Passchendaele Ridge. By mid-November Fourth Army was “reduced to hanging on 
grimly, assisted by the weather, until winter came to their rescue”.108 
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 Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele, pp. xiii-xiv.  
108
 Ibid., p. xii.  
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1.4 Tactical Controversy 
 
Preparations for a narrow front attack to open out the western face of the Passchendaele 
Salient and carry the frontline northward in order to provide desired observation into low-
lying valleys situated north and east of the main ridge had been set in motion.
109
 On the 
right, 8
th 
Division
110
 (VIII Corps) would advance on an approximate frontage of 1,020 
yards east northeast to a varied depth of 100 to 300 yards. On the left, 32
nd
 Division
111
 (II 
Corps) was to protect and prolong the northern flank by advancing west and north on a 
frontage of 1,850 yards, to a depth of 400 yards on the left and right and 700 yards in the 
centre. 
 
Information gleaned from recently captured documents (outlining the new 
defence scheme ordered by Generalquartiermeister Ludendorff following Fourth Army’s 
disastrous experience of 4 October) caused the commanders of both divisions a great deal 
of concern. The papers related that the commencement of a British bombardment was 
perceived as a sign of imminent assault. The massed hostile infantry would now be dealt 
with by bringing an immediate defensive artillery barrage to bear on jumping-off 
positions inside the enemy frontline. After a few minutes, the barrage would be 
withdrawn across positions already evacuated by the Vorfeldzonelinie (outpost zone) 
                                                 
109
 See appendices 4 a & b, 5 a & b, 6 and 7 for VIII Corps, II Corps, 8
th
 Division and 32
nd
 Division 
operation orders respectively.    
110
 The 8
th
 (Regular) Division sustained a combined total of 5,320 killed, wounded and missing during the 
opening stages of the Third Ypres campaign. Sent south to the comparatively quiet Ploegsteert sector for 
rest and refit, it was ordered to return north in November. See Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, pp. 
156-61 and Appendix 1 for infantry orders of battle.  
111
 The 32
nd
 (New Army) Division had been deployed on the Flanders coast, where it suffered heavy losses 
(10-11 July) during the German riposte at Nieuport, throughout the Third Ypres campaign. It was ordered 
south to join II Corps the following October. See Major A.F. Becke, Order of Battle Divisions Part 3B: 
New Army Divisions (30-41); & 63
rd
 (RN) Division (London: HMSO, 1945), pp. 21-29, and Appendix 1 for 
infantry orders of battle.   
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garrison at the start of the enemy bombardment. Surviving British troops, traversing the 
hurriedly abandoned outpost zone in order to come to grips with the heavily defended 
Hauptwiderstandslinie (main line of resistance) would then encounter an intense curtain 
of annihilating shellfire. Fourth Army began to put this method into effect on 13 October. 
The artillery was now the main line of defence. “It was hoped that the „dense barrage of 
shell‟ in front of the main line of resistance would stop, or at least break up, an offensive 
before it covered the varying depths of the Vorfeld”.112  This tactic made it necessary for 
the attackers to get beyond the Vorfeldzonelinie as quickly as possible. To this end, it was 
decided to attempt to surprise the advanced hostile outpost zone before the supporting 
artillery could be brought to bear on the British forward line. 32
nd
 Division faced the most 
difficult task in the projected night attack, so the planning and preparations of 8
th
 
Division were influenced and constrained by the tactical schemes of the former.
113
  
 
 Major-General Shute recognised it was impossible for a brigade to form up below 
Vat Cottage Ridge during daylight owing to the unpleasant fact that any such movement 
would be in full view of the enemy. A dawn or night attack offered the only prospect of 
achieving surprise: “As so many recent attacks have been made at dawn [,] it was decided 
to risk the inherent dangers of a night attack on a big scale and to attack at night.”114 No 
                                                 
112
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by 8th Division on 1st/2nd December 1917‟, 13 
December 1917, 8
th
 Division War Diary and Captain G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth 
in the West (West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers,1976), p.309.  
113
 32
nd 
Division was due to relieve 1
st
 Division on the night of 23/24 November.  
114
 See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part II, Plan of Operations, Section I, General‟, 11 
December 1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary, p. 2. Major-General Shute composed his narrative of the night 
operation of 2 December 1917 in the form of an ex post facto general report of eighteen pages and eight 
appendices. His concern about a kind of  „wooden‟ approach to operations was previously expressed by 
Brigadier-General Shoubridge (GOC 54
th
 Brigade) during the Somme offensive, when the dangers of 
„trying to do every attack by barrage and relying on stereotyped tactics which meant that the Bosch always 
knows by our barrage where we are going to attack and when we are‟. See Brigadier-General T.H. 
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doubt Sir Douglas Haig‟s earlier recommendation to Sir Henry Rawlinson that Second 
Army should “attack by small units by night, because up to the present nothing of this 
nature has been attempted by us at the Ypres battle front” had made its way down the 
chain of command to the GOC 32
nd
 Division.
115
 Shute, however, would substitute the 
idea of nocturnal assaults by small units suggested by Haig, with a large-scale set-piece 
night attack involving a reinforced brigade from his division. With this tactical approach 
he hoped to secure the formidable defences of Hill 52 and Vat Cottage Ridge.   
 
                                  Plate 1.6 Major-General C.D. Shute (Source IWM H82157) 
 
 Two primary factors caused Major-General Shute concern during planning for the 
proposed operation. First, the artillery brigades could only fire from west to east in 
support of an infantry brigade assaulting along the ridge from south to north. The failure 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shoubridge op. cit., quoted in Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: 
Defeat into Victory (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 108.  
115
 Haig diary entry 19 November 1917 in „The First World War Political, Social and Military Manuscript 
Sources: Series One: The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, Part I Haig‟s Autograph 
Great War Diary‟, Reel 5, Parts 9-10 1917 and Sheffield & Bourne (eds), Douglas Haig, p. 345.   
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of 1
st
 SWB on 10 November had been attributed to this same difficulty.
116
 Perennial 
difficulties (bad weather, poor roads, mud, hostile shelling) encountered while shifting 
batteries forward continued to be exacerbated by the diminishing number of dry sites 
available for heavy and field guns. Such locations that did exist were limited to the area 
of waterlogged ground to the west, and within the restricted confines of the 
Passchendaele Salient.
 
 
 
Second, how to avoid the defensive barrage that would surely be brought down on 
32
nd
 Division‟s jumping-off positions the moment British artillery commenced its 
bombardment? Major-General Shute succinctly outlined his considered solution: 
The idea of an advance under a creeping barrage was 
therefore abandoned, and it was decided to advance for the 
first 200 yards without artillery fire, except of course, 
preliminary artillery bombardment within safety limits, and 
to attempt to surprise the enemy‟s most advanced posts and 
to overwhelm them with the bayonet.
117
 
   
The usual procedure was to be dispensed with; batteries would not open fire at Zero. As 
the unfortunate tactical situation facing the gunners dictated that fire – to assist an 
advance with a creeping barrage that would “perforce be in enfilade, and experience had 
shown that such a barrage was difficult to manipulate, was often inaccurate and tended to 
mislead the infantry as to their direction”118 – was to commence at “Zero plus 8 with all 
available artillery and machine-guns in a series of area concentrations,
119
 those inside the 
                                                 
116
 Only one part of the 3 Brigade‟s barrage was fired in enfilade during 10 November. Shute could only 
contemplate a similar barrage along the entire front of his assaulting brigade.   
117
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part II, Plan of Operations, Section I, General‟, 11 December 
1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
118
 Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, p. 164. 
119
Area concentrations, fired in lieu of a creeping barrage by the supporting artillery, would have been the 
most effective method in targeting the dispersed German defences along Vat Cottage Ridge. 
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objective to lift as the infantry advanced”.120 This hybrid tactical approach to the set-
piece attack, with its delayed artillery scheme and employment of area concentration fire 
instead of a creeping barrage, would allow, it was hoped, for the Vorfeldzone garrison to 
be surprised and overwhelmed. A more effective bombardment (although the necessary 
pre-attack dominance of enemy batteries was hardly realised) of the dispersed targets on 
Vat Cottage Ridge would also be obtained. Conversely, Shute‟s assaulting brigade would 
be exposed to the direct fire of the German defenders for 8 minutes. 
 
Major-General Shute realised the danger of allowing his men to be exposed to 
machine-gun and rifle fire for six to eight minutes, “but it was considered preferable 
running this risk to drawing the enemy‟s intense artillery barrage on us by opening our 
own barrage”.121 In this way, the dangerous area could be traversed and the forward 
German posts rushed to a depth of 200 yards before hostile batteries could bring down 
the feared defensive barrage. “Playing for safety” was not an option if desired objectives 
were to be achieved.
122
 The current plan, given the problematic tactical circumstances, 
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 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part II, Plan of Operations, Section I, General‟, 11 December 
1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary. 
121
 Ibid. Major-General Shute also noted that his „decision was further strengthened by the fact that in 
previous attacks on this front the enemy had disclosed such a superiority in artillery fire that the assaulting 
troops suffered very heavy casualties in reaching their objectives‟. 
122
 Major-General Shute later expressed strong views on the necessity for such operational risk taking: 
RISKS: „Try to be versatile and strive to invent some new plan. Remember that your effort should always 
be to „mystify and mislead the enemy‟– Stonewall Jackson. Don‟t be contented time after time to follow 
the same old plan. No two military problems are exactly the same. A line of action which succeeded once 
under one set of circumstances may be the worst possible one to follow in the next battle. Don‟t hesitate to 
take risks. Don‟t dread defeat. Feel sure of victory. Your optimism will communicate itself to those under 
you. Remember that the man who takes no risks will never get great results and does not deserve them. 
Fortune favours the bold. The enemy does not know your risk. Then when you have made your plan see red 
and go all out‟. See JSCSC: Major-General A.H. Marindin Papers: „Senior Officers‟ School: Lecture 
Delivered by Major-General Sir C.D. Shute, KCG, KCMG November 1920‟. The contents of this unique 
document are a valuable representation of Shute‟s cumulative Great War military thought and experience. 
It is not unreasonable to assume, given the postwar lecture date that many of the ideas expressed were, as 
we shall see, idée fixe in the GOC 32
nd
 Division‟s mind by late 1917. Shute has no traceable personal 
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was the best that could be devised and the GOC 32
nd
 Division was a confident soldier: 
“The strong man in war is an OPTIMIST. He won‟t allow himself that he is going to 
fail”. Night attacks, Shute also observed “almost invariably succeeded”.123  
 
A night operation was a difficult undertaking. Major-General Shute found it 
necessary to attack during the relative darkness of a moonlit night in order to ensure 
direction and rapidity of advance across the almost featureless battlefield.
124
 Thus co-
ordination was deemed more important than concealment. Indeed, the GOC 32
nd
 Division 
stated in the aforementioned postwar lecture: “Night Attacks: Moonlight best – not 
worst”.125  A moon at full sphere would therefore, in Shute‟s view, expedite the first 
operational stage by providing the attackers with just enough light to quickly traverse wet 
and broken ground to overrun the Vorfeldzonelinie before Zero + 8. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
papers, so a very special thanks to Professor Gary Sheffield for bringing these long forgotten lecture notes 
to my attention.  
123
 Ibid.  
124
 Major-General Shute‟s, as acting GOC II Corps, operation against Puisieux and River Trenches (3-5 
February 1917) is a case in point: „With the object of surprise, so far as that was possible, on ground 
covered with snow and in bright moonlight, the attack was launched at 11 p.m.‟ See Falls, Military 
Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol.  1, p. 71. 
125
 JSCSC: Major-General A.H. Marindin Papers: „Senior Officers‟ School: Lecture Delivered by Major-
General Sir C.D. Shute, KCG, KCMG November 1920‟. Failure to take into account the crucial 
relationship between nocturnal operations and astronomic projections was amply demonstrated during the 
disastrous large-scale night attack by Fifth, Third and First armies (Third Battle of the Scarpe) on 3 May 
1917. GHQ adjusted zero hour, at Fifth Army‟s request, just before the assault. „A night attack was 
therefore carried out, based on dispositions suited to an attack at dawn. The sun did not rise till 5:22 [a.m.] 
and it was impossible to distinguish a line of men at a distance of fifty yards until 4.5 a.m. – the original 
Third Army Zero. Nor was this all. The moon, approaching the full, set 16 minutes before the new zero 
hour. On large stretches of the front the troops assembling for the assault were silhouetted against its light 
as it sank behind them, their appearance giving warning of the attack and drawing heavy fire, which caused 
serious loss and confusion‟. Official historian Cyril Falls gloomily concluded: „That British troops, with 
their traditional skill in estimating the effect of the lights of the heavens and turning it to their own 
advantage, should have suffered to fall into this trap is one of the most melancholy features of a melancholy 
episode…‟ See Falls, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol.  1, 430-33.  
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Major-General Heneker related, during the nascent planning stage, that he 
preferred to attack at dawn because “the difficulties of assembly leave no choice for the 
hour of attack”.126 Brigadier-General Aspinall stated, in his reply on 21 November, that II 
Corps was “anxious for the attack to take place at night [,] and since you [Heneker] are in 
agreement with this [aspect of the] plan, the [VIII] Corps commander is concurring with 
the II Corps proposal”.127 Heneker also expressed grave concerns about other aspects of 
Major-General Shute‟s plan. He was not in complete agreement in regard to the 
immediate danger of the German defensive barrage or the necessity of dispensing with a 
creeping barrage on 8
th
 Division‟s front. This is not to say he dismissed the necessity of a 
surprise advance without a creeping barrage or the inherent threat of the defensive 
barrage employed by enemy gunners. On the nights of 18/19, 20/21 and 24/25 November, 
the 8
th
 Division advanced its line by stealth, thus narrowing the distance to the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie, and seized portions of the Vorfeldzonelinie opposite the Venison 
Trench defences. During the latter operation, a new line, offering an uninterrupted view 
for approximately 400 yards, was dug on the ridge crest.
128
 Obviously there was 
something to be said for this tactic. Shute, however, envisaged the opening phase of the 
forthcoming night attack as only the precursor to a larger operation that would be carried 
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 TNA: WO/95/1677: „8th Division No. G. 97/1/1, 18th November 1917,‟ 8th Division War Diary.. 
127
 Brigadier-General Aspinall added that the „actual time of Zero will be decided on after trials of the time 
required for forming-up have been carried out by the divisions concerned‟. See TNA: WO/95/1677: „VIII 
Corps G.1990, 21
st
 November 1917‟, 8th Division War Diary.  
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 2
nd
 Devonshire and 2
nd
 West Yorkshire (23 Brigade) participated in this minor operation. On the left, 1
st
 
British Division carried out, prior to its relief by 32
nd
 Division on the night of 23/24 November, similar 
small-scale operations on the nights of 16/17 and 17/18 November. These modest enterprises succeeded in 
advancing the frontline along the western slope of Vat Cottage Ridge. Two important strongpoints 
(Vocation and Virile farms) were thus secured, although the hostile garrison occupying Vox Farm 
continued to hold out. 1
st
 Division‟s measurable gains reduced overall distances to the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie opposite and strengthened the boundary between II Corps and VIII Corps. See 
TNA: WO/95/1712: „Report of Minor Operation carried out by this Battalion on night of 24/25 November‟, 
26 November 1917, 2
nd
 Devonshire War Diary, WO/95/1714: 2
nd
 West Yorkshire War Diary, C.T. 
Atkinson, The Devonshire Regiment 1914-1918 (London: Eland Brothers, 1926), pp. 318-19 and 
WO/95/1232: 1
st
 Division War Diary 
Chapter 1 
 61 
out on established lines with artillery assistance once the Vorfeldzonelinie was overrun. 
Ominously, one of Heneker‟s battalions experienced a number of casualties during the 
small advance on the night of 24/25 November. These losses were sustained when a 
German machine-gun crew easily observed movement under the bright moonlight.129  
 
 Plate 1.7 Major-General W.C.G Heneker  
(Source: IWM Q114384). 
  
Assaulting enemy positions on a small scale, under cover of darkness without a 
barrage, became fairly routine in the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke sector following the 
successful operations carried out west of the Paddebeek by 63
rd
 Division on the evenings 
of 1/2 and 3/4 November. Lessons learned during these attacks were elaborated in a 
lengthy after-action report – lessons clearly recognised by Major-General Shute: 
                  MINOR OPERATIONS 
 
 Minor night operations and surprise tactics as employed on 
the nights 1
st
/2
nd
 and 3
rd
/4
th
 November are most effective 
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against enemy outpost lines in marshy country, and are 
infinitely less costly than set-piece attacks under a barrage. 
 
 A policy of minor night enterprises when holding battle 
lines is strongly advocated. Those enterprises increase the 
morale of our troops, and the constant movement of our 
posts prevents their being accurately located by the 
enemy‟s artillery.  
 
 Further, if a set-piece attack is contemplated soon after a 
series of such enterprises, the enemy will be in ignorance of 
the exact position of his own outpost line. This will cause 
him to place his initial barrage at a greater distance from 
his line than would otherwise be the case and minimize the 
risk of this barrage opening on our troops.  
 
 To make minor enterprises successful special attention 
must be paid to the training of subordinate commanders in 
night work, minor tactics, and reconnaissance, as the 
success of such enterprises entirely depends on the 
initiative of subordinate commanders.  
 
 The new German tactics as described in a captured order of 
the 11
th
 Infantry Division received since these notes were 
written appears to make night enterprises of a kind 
advocated above more than ever valuable.  
 
 The few men that the enemy employs to hold his forward 
zone and the uncertainty that must exist in their minds as to 
how much resistance they are to offer should render posts 
in this zone particularly liable to capture by such 
enterprises. Further if a set-piece attack is contemplated it 
is more than ever necessary to get as close as possible to 
the “line of resistance of the forward zone” prior to the 
attack. Unless this is done our troops may be caught by the 
enemy counter-barrage when it is brought back at Zero plus 
15 minutes. 
 
                  NIGHT OPERATIONS VERSUS DAY OPERATIONS 
 
 In the case of a strong position such as TOURNANT   
FARM [captured by 1
st
 Division on 10 November] there is 
little chance of a minor enterprise succeeding unless the 
enemy is taken by surprise. In such situations the attack 
must be supported by artillery fire. It is, however, 
suggested that in swampy ground a night attack on a large 
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scale following a preliminary bombardment will have more 
chance than a set-piece daylight attack, the success of 
which largely depends on the ability of the assaulting 
infantry to keep up to the barrage.
130
  
 
The terrible battlefield conditions that limited movement and decreased creeping barrage 
effectiveness combined with excellent observation capabilities afforded the Germans 
during daylight hours, made it necessary to isolate and overwhelm with small assault 
parties by night, certain pillboxes and strongpoints that could not be approached without 
severe loss by day. Thus “individual pill-boxes would be on their own [at night], and not 
mutually supporting as by day; they would have fewer targets, and would be vulnerable 
to surprise attacks”.131  
 
                                                       Plate 1.8 German pillboxes Flanders 1917  
                                                                 (Source: Author’s Collection) 
 
                                                 
130
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It was the thought of what a luminous moon would allow the Germans to observe 
that vexed Major-General Heneker most when considering application of this tactic on a 
large scale: “How was I to protect the infantry from the enemy‟s MG and rifle fire 
between Zero and Zero plus 8 in case the enemy becomes alarmed before the latter hour, 
and opened on the attacking infantry?”132 He had originally requested a conventional 
creeping barrage: 
The [creeping] barrage should move fairly quickly as the 
advance is short: I hope to be able to ask for lifts of 100 
yards in four minutes, but naturally this depends on 
reconnaissance [and] the state of the weather and ground. If 
this can be managed, the attacking troops should be past the 
main German defences [Venison Trench] before the enemy 
barrage comes down on them.
133
 
 
Gunners responsible for the 8
th
 Division‟s barrage were not limited by the difficulties 
confronting 32
nd
 Division batteries. As the former division‟s assaulting brigade advanced 
NE, its supporting artillery would be capable of firing an orthodox creeping barrage. 
Brigadier-General Aspinall‟s response was, at first, somewhat equivocal: “II Corps is 
suggesting that there should be no creeping barrage. The Corps Commander is deferring 
an answer to this point until you have formed your opinions on it”.134 It was, however, 
subsequently deemed necessary, regardless of the fact that both divisions were assaulting 
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th
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in different directions, to have a homogeneous artillery timetable, so 8
th
 Division had to 
conform to the 8-minute interregnum prescribed by its neighbour. Consequently, Major-
General Heneker was required by VIII Corps HQ to adhere to Major-General Shute‟s 
scheme so as not to alert by the opening of a preliminary barrage, an already vigilant 
enemy obstinately clinging to the northern portion of the much-contested ridge.   
 
Major-General Heneker proposed two ways to minimize the risk: First, he 
suggested that a protective artillery barrage should immediately be brought down on to 
the enemy line if the German defenders opened fire before Zero + 8. The assaulting 
battalions could then form up under cover of this fire. As the barrage lifted forward, the 
infantry would rush the enemy line in the ordinary manner. “Had this been agreed to I 
[Heneker] would have had my outpost line all along the front withdrawn at Z - 1 hour to a 
line 150 yards from the enemy trenches.”  The GOC 8th Division added that he had 
applied this method on previous occasions with success.
135
 Arrangements could be made 
with Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S. Irwin MC (CO 2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment),
136
 whose 
HQ would be at Mosselmarkt, to discharge an SOS rocket “as soon as he considered it 
advisable, between Z[ero] and Z[ero] plus 8”. This officer would be in a position “to see 
and hear how soon the enemy‟s fire opened”; his signal would alert British gunners to 
commence the necessary protective barrage. 32
nd
 Division HQ, unwilling to adjust its 
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preferred artillery scheme, summarily rejected Heneker‟s latest contingency plan by 
claiming it would lead to confusion.
137
   
 
            The denial of Major-General Heneker‟s first recommendation was immediately 
followed by a further suggestion that the barrage start time be reduced from Zero + 8 to 
Zero + 6 or Zero + 4, “for in my [Heneker] experience [,] I felt much more fearful of the 
enemy‟s MG fire from prepared positions on a bright moonlight [sic] night then I did of 
any artillery barrage”. The brigadier and battalion commanders of 25 Brigade (the 
formation chosen to carry out 8
th
 Division‟s part of the night operation) expressed 
complete agreement with this latest proposal. “This idea was overruled, for the 32nd 
Division which had to carry out the major operation [sic] were against curtailing the 
time”.138 Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston and Captain Cyril E.O. Bax, authors of the 
postwar history of 8
th
 Division, noted that Heneker‟s suggestions “were overruled, as the 
32
nd
 Division considered that it was impossible to organise an effective creeping barrage 
to cover an infantry advance on their front…”139 
 
           Major-General Heneker subsequently wrote: “I did not feel justified in refusing to 
attack although I felt very doubtful of success and I said so”.140 He was even more candid 
in his diary: [Shute] “wishes to do a surprise attack by moonlight and have no covering 
fire to protect the advance from hostile machine-gun fire before Z + 8. I don‟t agree and 
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protested [,] but my protest was overruled.
141
 I told the Corps Commander that neither we 
nor the 32
nd
 would succeed in consequence. However, I was ordered to attack”.142 The 
apprehensive Heneker privately expressed little confidence in his infuriatingly 
irrepressible Corps Commander: “Hunter-Weston is mad and very trying. Such Corps 
Commanders should not be allowed out here”.143 As Lieutenant-Colonel Edward „Moses‟ 
Beddington (GSO1 8
th
 Division) recalled decades later: “Both the General and I hated 
this operation, and suggested amendments, all of which were turned down. It was a night 
attack over horribly churned up ground three nights after a full moon and we considered 
that even if we were not seen advancing to the attack, which was highly improbable, we 
were certain to be heard squelching through the mud”.144  
 
            Sir Henry Rawlinson had previously considered lunar impact on night operations. 
The foundations of his approach, based on military history, recent experience in South 
Africa and study of the Russo-Japanese War, was related by the then Brigadier-General 
Rawlinson during a lecture at Aldershot in December 1907:  
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In all military operations the weather often influences the 
situation. In night work it is probably the most important 
and perhaps the most unstable factor which calls for our 
consideration. I fancy there is a good deal of conflict of 
opinion even amongst soldiers as to the ideal night for a 
night march, but again I find it impossible to generalise, 
and must leave each particular occasion to be judged on its 
merits. There is, however, no doubt that a bright, clear, 
moonlight night very much facilitates the movement of 
troops…145 
 
Rawlinson still retained this outlook nine years later when planning the second phase of 
the Somme campaign. Two of five Fourth Army assault divisions were successfully 
assembled in no man‟s land under the light of a full moon to reduce a 1,500-yard gap 
opposite the heavily defended German second line. The subsequent Battle of Bazentin 
Ridge led to the seizure, “on the heels of a truly devastating bombardment”, of 
formidable German positions during a surprise dawn attack on 14 July 1916.
146
 It is 
probable, based on theoretical disposition and previous battle experience that the GOC 
Second Army heartily approved of Major-General Shute‟s large-scale moonlight scheme 
regardless of perceived risks, although final sanction was certainly the administrative 
purview of II Corps.
147
 Enemy battery groups caused Rawlinson greater concern: “Shute 
                                                 
145
 Brigadier-General Sir H.S. Rawlinson, Bart., CVO, CB, psc, commanding 2
nd
 Infantry Brigade, 
Aldershot Command, „Night Operations‟, RUSI: Royal United Services Institute Journal, 52:1 (June 1908), 
p. 810.  
146
 See Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson 1914-1918 (Oxford: Blackwells, 1992), p. 202.  
147
 Passages found in FSR (1909) shed further light on the tactical mindset of those involved with the 
complex decision making process: „Night operations may be undertaken to … pass over an area of ground 
which it has been found difficult or impossible to traverse in daylight‟; „Surprise in some form is usually an 
object of night operations‟; „Night assaults, that is to say assaults delivered in the dark, should rarely be 
attempted by a force larger than an infantry brigade against a single objective unless the conditions are 
exceptionally favourable‟; „In all night operations the maintenance of connection is of the first importance‟. 
Lunar effect was not directly addressed in the contents, although its relative value, when considering 
maintenance of co-ordination, could not have been lost to contemporary readers. See War Office, Field 
Service Regulations Part 1: Operations 1909 (Reprinted with Amendments, 1912) (London: HMSO, 1914), 
pp. 176-77.  
Chapter 1 
 69 
is very confident of bringing off a good success [.] The only thing I am anxious about is 
the guns of which the Bosch has concentrated in large numbers in that area”.148   
 
 The date finally chosen for the forthcoming night operation was based on 
meteorological data indicating the next period when the moon would be full.
149
 It was, as 
we have seen, recognised, by Sir Henry Rawlinson, Major-General Shute and 32
nd
 
Division staff among others, that assaulting troops would, in order to facilitate co-
ordination, direction and rapidity of advance on the barren desolate ridge, be better able 
to discern objectives in the relative darkness of a moonlit night. Examination of  carefully 
prepared, widely distributed documents like Second Army‟s „Moonlight Chart for 
October, November & December‟ related the moon was certain to be full, or just past full 
sphere, during the nights of 26 November to 1 December.
150
 The original date (26 
November) was shelved because of the need for additional preparation time by both 
assault divisions. A new attack date (night of 1/2 December) was subsequently agreed 
upon by all concerned.
151
 Zero had to be fixed for an hour that would ensure “time to 
assemble and yet assault as early as possible in order to give the maximum number of 
hours of darkness in which to consolidate ground gained”. 1:55 a.m. was subsequently 
chosen as the hour “best meeting” desired operational requirements.152  
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1.5 A New Zealand Gambit: Polderhoek Chateau 
 
On 22 November, Sir Henry Rawlinson convened a conference at II ANZAC Corps HQ, 
in order to discuss another contemplated operation approximately 7,500 yards to the SW 
of the Passchendaele Salient (Map 1). South of the boundary between II ANZAC Corps 
and IX Corps lay a well-marked spur: an eastern outcrop of the Gheluvelt Plateau. “On it 
were perched the piled ruins of Polderhoek Chateau and groups of pillboxes which 
occupied sites of the attached buildings amid the shattered trees of the once luxuriant 
pleasances”.153 This bleak outcrop stronghold successfully withstood four previous 
assaults since the capture of strategically important high ground from Tower Hamlets 
spur to Broodseinde on 4 October.
154
 Owing to a sharp re-entrant in the II ANZAC 
Corps‟ line, the frontline of and approaches to the New Zealand Division were “exposed 
to continuous and pressing discomfort caused by enfilade fire” from the spur just beyond 
the left flank of the neighbouring IX Corps.
155
 “For the satisfactory occupation of the 
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Divisions‟ sector, it was highly desirable that a fresh effort should be made to capture the 
Polderhoek Spur”.156  
 
 Local commanders thought it fitting, regardless of the fact that the chateau and its 
grounds lay opposite the IX Corps (GOC Lieutenant-General A. Hamilton Gordon) front, 
that the New Zealand Division “should strike the blow for its capture”, as it suffered most 
from the galling flanking fire. To this end, Lieutenant-General Alexander J. Godley 
(GOC II ANZAC Corps) submitted a proposal to Second Army HQ “that the New 
Zealanders, immediately affected, should carry out the attack and, on the conclusion of 
the operation, hand over the territory won to the IX Corps”. Army HQ subsequently 
agreed to this proposal. The assault frontage would be 400 yards. A projected advance of 
only 600 yards would carry the line as far down as the reverse slope of the Polderhoek 
Spur “as was necessary to deprive the enemy of his commanding and enfilading position. 
Further examination also showed that, owing to the height of the spur and general 
configuration of the ground, the new lines proposed about the chateau would not to a like 
degree be exposed to similar enfilade fire from the Gheluvelt Spur to the south”.157 Sir 
Henry Rawlinson observed that this operation required “hearty good will on the parts of 
IX and II ANZAC corps [,] and this I found to exist to a very satisfactory degree and I 
think all will be amicably arranged [.] I was well pleased with the conference”.158  
 
                                                 
156
 A combined attack on both Gheluvelt village and Polderhoek Spur was initially contemplated „as one of 
various local operations designed to continue our offensive during the winter, to add depth to our defence 
along the Army front, and to facilitate the initial phases of a resumed offensive on a large scale in the 
spring.‟ The scope of this operation was eventually reduced to an attack on Polderhoek Chateau and the 
formidable pillboxes situated on its grounds. Ibid. p. 305.  
157
 Ibid. p. 305.  
158
 CAC: RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 22 November 1917 and LHCMA: „Second Army No. 1 (G).‟, 22 
November 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, File 7/15, King‟s College, London.   
Chapter 1 
 72 
 Second Army had now committed itself to two attacks designed to improve the 
local tactical situation in select areas astride the Passchendaele Ridge. Rawlinson and his 
corps commanders considered launching the much smaller Polderhoek enterprise 
simultaneously with the operation scheduled to jump off from the Passchendaele Salient 
on the night of 1/2 December. “The tactical objects in view, however, bore no correlation, 
and in addition the zero hours selected were different”.159 II Corps and VIII Corps had 
previously agreed on a night attack, whilst the New Zealand operation was scheduled to 
occur at 12:00 p.m. The latter hour was selected because it was believed the obvious 
disadvantages of a daylight attack would be more than compensated for by the fact that 
the assault would be delivered at a time when the Germans least expected it. “In the end, 
therefore, it was decided that the 2 operations should be executed independently”. 3 
December was eventually chosen for the next attempt to seize Polderhoek Spur.
160
 
 
 
1.6 Preparations & Preliminaries: 18-30 November 
 
A ghastly routine was maintained on both sides of the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke 
sector while the Battle of Cambrai was in progress. Life in the forward area consisted of 
improving and extending the foremost positions, and taking cover from frequent 
bombardments in shell holes and any other available shelter. Patrols probed no man‟s 
land and approaches to the enemy line where ground was dry enough to allow a firm 
footing. Ammunition, ration, fatigue and relief parties made their way forward after dark, 
as best they could under frequent shelling, to battalion and battery positions and other 
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rendezvous on tramways, along corduroy roads or treacherous duckboard avenues 
extending across the seemingly endless sea of water-filled shell holes.
161
 Owing to 
extreme conditions, the average tour of the frontline by a British infantry brigade was just 
48 hours: “Reliefs were hazardous operations and they would not have taken place every 
other night if it had not been absolutely necessary. But two days at Passchendaele in 
winter was enough for the most earnest seeker of austerity and a great deal too much for 
most men”.162 German observers remained vigilant to signs of another British attack, 
while artillery, communication and training preparations for the forthcoming attack 
proceeded in VIII Corps, II Corps and attached divisions.
163
   
 
 On 18 November Major-General Heneker requested that VIII Corps HQ find   
suitable assault training grounds.
164
 He added that Brigadier-General Coffin VC,
165
 
whose 25 Brigade would carry out 8
th
 Division‟s part in the operation, “says this area is 
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essential” for attack preparation. Notification of a designated site was received on 21 
November.
166
 By that time Coffin‟s Brigade was in divisional reserve near Brandhoek.167 
His HQ diarist noted: “All battalions were bathed today. Battalions are situated in camp 
all round Brigade Headquarters. Headquarters are in the same camp as the 2
nd
 Royal 
Berkshire Regiment. A field is being taped out for the Brigade to practice the attack”. 
Coffin‟s battalions duly carried out practice manoeuvres on the assigned acreage over the 
next five days.
168
 This sort of thorough pre-battle preparation for a specific assault was de 
rigueur throughout the BEF by 1917. Maintenance of signal communications between 
corps and division, division and brigade and brigade and battalion proved problematic 
under the inexorable stress of battle. Intense shell fire, which often disrupted the 
established communications infrastructure, led to the development of various standard 
operating procedures that helped to maintain assault impetus and organisation while an 
attack was in progress: “If generals accepted that they had little chance to „control‟ the 
battle once it had started”, John Lee notes, “their solution was to do everything in their 
power to create the conditions for success before it began. This included the careful 
training of the infantry so that all ranks understood the task ahead and the battle drill that 
would see them achieve success”.169 Troops designated for an attack were withdrawn a 
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few miles to the rear “and given intensive study of maps, air photos and models of the 
terrain”. Participation in 1:1 reenactments of their duties in a field specially taped out to 
the correct proportions followed. “An attempt would be made to simulate such aspects as 
creeping barrages, the loss of key personnel at critical moments, or the enemy‟s expected 
counter-attack during the consolidation period”.170  
 
Plate 1.9 Brigadier-General C. Coffin VC 
(Source: Author’s Collection) 
  
 Major-General Shute selected 97 Brigade (GOC Brigadier-General C.A. 
Blacklock DSO)
171
 to carry out 32
nd
 Division‟s part in the night operation. The latter 
favoured calculated aggression, and was a proponent of “careful planning and proper 
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preparation against facsimile objectives before carrying out attacks”.172 To this end, 
“special measures were taken to ensure that every officer and man not only understood 
the object of the scheme of operations [,] but also knew the definite part he himself had to 
play”. The GOC 97 Brigade also had a plasticine model constructed, “which represented 
with great accuracy and detail”, the entire area of operations. The model was kept at 32nd 
Division HQ, “and officers, NCOs and men were daily lectured, not only by their own 
officers, but by their Divisional Commander, Brigadier, and their respective staffs, on the 
forthcoming operations”. Each man was issued a map, “and it may be safely said”, Shute 
subsequently wrote “that as far as explanation went on the ground and on the model, little 
was left undone to ensure each man knowing his part”.173 97 Brigade did not start training 
until relieved by 96 Brigade on the night of 26/27 November. The former then withdrew 
to Dambre Camp near Vlamertinghe, where battalions of the Brigade “rested and 
completed preparations for the forthcoming offensive at Passchendaele”. Brigadier-
Generals Coffin and Blacklock, like many of their counterparts throughout the BEF, 
placed great value on these pre-attack briefings and practice exercises, which ensured 
staffs and subordinate officers “were efficient and also well briefed on the content and 
nuances of orders and battle plans” so they could direct operations in a brigade 
commander‟s place “should he become a casualty or lose contact through a failure in 
communications”.174  
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Plate 1.10 Brigadier-General C.A. Blacklock 
(Source: IWM H82159) 
 
 The platoon
175
 had been transformed into the basic sub-unit of manoeuvre within 
the BEF by the distribution of S.S. 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for 
Offensive Action in February 1917.
176
 Its authors provided the infantry with a general 
blueprint for platoon re-organisation, whereby the integration of firepower technology 
with tactical independence and flexibility permitted the co-ordination of “Lewis Gun, 
rifle grenade and trench mortar fire with the advances carried out by riflemen and 
bombers”. Sophisticated „fire and movement‟ drills carried out by these four component 
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sections of specialists (operating as firepower and manoeuvre elements within the 
platoon) were now applied to overcome any resistance. “Great emphasis was placed on 
seeking out and turning the enemy‟s flank in any circumstance and the initiative of the 
platoon commander was favoured”.177 This was, as Tim Cook points out, “never that 
easy, as there were often no gaps within the interlocking defensive fields of fire, but 
infantrymen had a more flexible organisation and system of weapons which better 
allowed them to fight their way forward when the artillery barrage broke down, as it often 
did”. All of this, nevertheless, “blended with an increasing confidence in the gunner‟s 
ability to lay down effective creeping barrages”, thereby transforming British low-level 
tactics and battle performance in 1917-18.
178
 
 
 S.S. 143 was based on battle experience gained during the Somme offensive in 
1916.
179
 Instruction in the prescribed platoon battle drills – debate over their complete 
acceptance and standardization throughout the BEF continued well into 1918 – became 
the basis of routine pre-assault training, so battalions of 25 and 97 brigades, simulating 
attacks across specially prepared practice fields in waves or lines of columns, rigorously 
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rehearsed manoeuvres against mock objectives in the days leading up to Zero. The 
increased proficiency gained during these exercises would, perhaps, also mitigate any 
infantry apprehension about the absence of an orthodox artillery barrage from the 
impending operation‟s first stage.180 
 
 That stage, it will be recalled, was not subordinate to an artillery plan; it was up to 
the infantry to surprise and overrun the German advanced posts before the inevitable 
defensive barrage was called for. Batteries of VIII Corps, II Corps and attached divisions 
were, however, still an important component to this hybrid set-piece assault. Field 
artillery was tasked with providing fire support after the Vorfeldzonelinie was 
overwhelmed, whilst heavy guns searched approach roads, bombarded assembly areas, 
and places where support and reserve battalions were disposed. Counter-battery groups 
were expected to continue with their main task: suppression of deadly artillery 
concentrations opposite the Passchendaele Salient.  
 
 Eight field artillery brigades and one Heavy Artillery Group
181
 would support 8
th
 
Division‟s attack.182 Major-General Heneker requested that the „Northern Bombardment 
Group‟ (62nd HAG – a Corps artillery asset) be placed under his orders for the necessary 
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artillery preparation prior to the assault: “This arrangement had worked excellently on 
several occasions this year when I [Heneker] was operating in similar conditions under 
the orders of the G.O.C XV Corps”.183 VIII Corps HQ acquiesced, but required the GOC 
8
th
 Division to submit his orders to Brigadier General H.D.O. Ward (GOCRA VIII 
Corps) for co-ordination.
184
 
 
 Work continued with all available labour on repairing and extending VIII Corps 
roads and tramlines under deadly enfilade fire from the right flank. This effort greatly 
improved supply routes to field batteries on the Abraham Heights – Boeteleer Line and 
the newly placed heavy guns on the Windmill Cabaret Ridge. The guns (the maximum 
range of the 18-pounder field gun and 4.5-inch howitzer was 7,000 yards) on the former 
position were now approximately 3,000 yards from Venison Trench and its environs. 
Both field and heavy batteries, however, still remained dangerously bunched and 
vulnerable to shelling by German counter-batteries.  
 
 The eight field artillery brigades directly supporting the night attack were 
designated „Right (or 32nd Divisional) Group‟, which consisted of sixteen batteries from 
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1
st
, 32
nd
, 63
rd
 divisions and two attached army brigades.
185
  Divisional batteries were 
under orders of II Corps GOCRA (Brigadier-General Kirby) for the purpose of co-
ordination and distribution of instructions and barrage tables.
186
 
 
 A formidable array of siege and heavy batteries were also deployed to support 
32
nd
 Division‟s attack. These guns were laboriously shifted forward along corduroy roads 
and rail lines intersecting the devastated area west of the Langemarck – Winnipeg Road. 
Conveying them away from these avenues to carefully prepared off-road gun 
emplacements was the most trying ordeal.
187
 As November drew to a close, II Corps‟ 
accumulated siege and heavy artillery consisted of (1) 15-inch howitzer served by a crew 
of Royal Marine Artillery, (4) 12-inch howitzers, (12) 9.2-inch howitzers, (24) 8-inch 
howitzers, (88) 6-inch howitzers, (42) 60 pdrs, (8) 6-inch Mark VII guns and (1) 9.2-inch 
gun.
188
 Brigadier-General Kirby was able to surmount the difficulties of transporting east, 
across very bad ground, the required number of field artillery brigades. The newly sited 
batteries were now approximately 5,000 yards from targets on and about Vat Cottage 
Ridge. These accumulated field and heavy guns of II Corps, as in VIII Corps, still 
remained clustered and exposed to concentrated German artillery fire from the north, NW 
and east.  
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Plate 1.11 German 4.2 cm howitzer 
(Source: Author’s Collection) 
 
 Much of the German shellfire encountered on the northern part of Second Army 
front came from artillery situated in the dead ground behind the Passchendaele – 
Westroosebeke portion of the main ridge. Flat terrain, westerly winds, foul weather, poor 
ground conditions, continuous bombardments and enemy employment of dummy 
batteries precluded effective use of sound ranging and flash spotting technology 
(responsible for detecting 75 percent of all German batteries by mid-1917)
189
 to locate 
hostile guns for British counter-batteries.
190
 The efficacy of flash spotting groups was 
also reduced because there were practically no observation posts between Houthulst 
Forest and Hill 60. Such posts that did exist were in captured pillboxes offering views to 
the NE. These structures, offering the only available cover for observers, were frequently 
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defiladed by shellfire from the ridge. “That closest to the enemy was 5,000 yards from 
Passchendaele”.191 Consequently, the counter-battery efforts of VIII Corps and II Corps 
relied primarily on the RFC to provide information on the locus of enemy battery 
positions. The airmen‟s efforts were often hampered by bad visibility and mist.192  
 
 Sir Henry Rawlinson had been “anxious” about the massive concentrations of 
enemy guns opposite the Passchendaele Salient. He was also aware of the need 
(especially in II Corps) of obtaining necessary labour to “get enough guns forward”.193 
Much progress had been made by his subordinates in regard to improving the 
unsatisfactory artillery situation on VIII Corps and II Corps fronts in the weeks leading 
up to the next attack. Nevertheless, mastery of enemy battery concentrations had not been 
achieved during the second-half of November. The loss of guns to enemy counter-battery 
fire in the vicinity of the salient remained high – 58 heavy and 248 field guns being 
“knocked out” between 14 and 29 November.194  
 
 „Second Army Artillery Instructions No. 28‟ had been distributed to all corps HQs 
on 20 November. This considered change in previously applied artillery tactics was 
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scheduled to commence during the lead up to what was still regarded as the tenth stage of 
operations
195
 commencing with the Battle of the Menin Road on 20 September: “Whereas 
artillery attacks recently have taken the form of a series of continuous barrages, the 
attacks to be developed in the future will be in the nature of heavy concentrations upon 
areas and communications”.196 In addition, corps BGRAs and their staffs were to make 
advanced arrangements to meet any heavy bombardment launched against the 
Passchendaele front. All corps were to maintain vigorous counter-battery work. The 
artillery of XIX Corps (GOC Lieutenant-General H.E. Watts) was to pay special attention 
to enemy concentrations
197
 capable of bombarding the Passchendaele Ridge from the 
north and NW. Daily intense bombardments would occur on the fronts of II ANZAC 
Corps, VIII Corps and II Corps during dawn or dusk. Targets to be engaged were 
probable places of assembly and roads leading to and from these locations. The German 
forward area was to be searched simultaneously with shrapnel and machine-gun fire. 
“The time at which these attacks are developed and the localities against which they are 
directed” would be “varied frequently”.198 Corps artillery schemes were to be based on all 
available intelligence. It was the “duty of those responsible for drawing up the plans to 
constantly think out the possible and probable action of the Germans if intending to 
attack on any particular day and to direct the fire accordingly”.199 In the meantime, 
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batteries were dispatched south from Second Army to Italy or in support of the Cambrai 
offensive with increased frequency. Sir Henry Rawlinson lamented the loss of further 
artillery assets: “Today we got an order to send away 22 Brigade Field Art[iller]y … This 
will reduce us greatly [,] but still will leave us enough for defensive purposes. They are 
also reducing us very much in heavies”.200 Adequate artillery support for pending 
operations at Passchendaele and Polderhoek Chateau had been arranged for; only a bare 
minimum of guns, constantly reduced by enemy action and breakage, remained to defend 
the Army front.  
 
 By late November Second Army had committed to two local operations designed 
to improve adverse sector-specific (Passchendaele – Westroosebeke and Polderhoek 
Chateau) situations along the Passchendaele Ridge. Units designated to carry out the fast-
approaching large-scale night assault, regardless of having to jump off from 
disadvantageous positions inside the Passchendaele Salient, were tasked with seizing 
proximate objectives that appeared, given ready acceptance of a novel, albeit highly 
controversial hybrid attack plan, obtainable in the eyes of both Army and Corps HQs. Sir 
Henry Rawlinson confidently expressed this conviction one day before the assault: “I 
visited the XIX, II and VIII Corps today and was satisfied with the plans for the attack 
tomorrow night”.201 
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2 
 
Divisional Instructions & Orders 
 
                                 It is a beastly operation.202 
 
 
2.1 Standard Operating Procedure & Formulaic Approach  
British and Dominion infantry divisions trained for offensive operations in three ways 
after December 1916: attacks on prepared trench positions; “the semi-open warfare of 
subsequent attacks on an enemy turned out of his main positions; and the longed for 
return to open warfare when the enemy was finally “on the run”. Pre-attack preparations 
and practice exercises for assaults on prepared positions were based on guidelines found 
in S.S.135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action (issued by GHQ 
in December 1916).
203
 This manual of „Standard Operating Procedure‟ was an update of 
S.S.119 Preliminary Notes of the Tactical Lessons of Recent Operations (July 1916). By 
disseminating the operational methodology found in S.S.135 throughout the BEF, “it was 
intended to get all British divisions working in a similar pattern of experience based on 
the Somme fighting” of the previous year.204  
 
 S.S.135 contained thirty-three section headings and two appendices. It serves as a 
“useful reminder of just how complex an organisation was an infantry division of the 
period 1916 -18 and how much work had to go into the planning of an attack by its many 
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component parts”.  Each section of S.S.135 was a means of addressing the problem of 
command and control on the battlefield. Commanders‟ intentions had to be clear and 
properly communicated to all component parts of the attacking force. Units were 
expected, after the commencement of an assault, to make the passing of accurate and 
timely information to command centres their highest priority. This kept superiors fully up 
to date as the battle unfolded. Development of an effective communications infrastructure 
that could withstand, as cables were cut by hostile bombardments and runners became 
casualties, collapse in battle thus became a crucial aspect of pre-assault planning and 
organisation. Standard pre-assault signal preparations at division level called for the 
forward extension of a buried cable system, and the adoption of brigade lines of 
communication manned by signalers organised into brigade forward parties. Wireless 
technology was still in its infancy; so telephones, telegraph, signal lamps, semaphore, 
carrier pigeons and runners were all utilized in order to provide multiple communication 
avenues.  
 
Clarity of purpose during preparations was achieved before the issue of final 
operation orders by the distribution of a series of „instructions‟ covering seventeen 
categories of preliminary organisation and work. These documents dealt with artillery 
organisation and scheme, the action of massed machine-guns, tanks, signal 
communications, boundaries and liaison with neighbouring formations, rights of passage 
on communication routes to the frontline, location of HQs, tasks to be assigned to pioneer 
battalions and Royal Engineers [RE], medical arrangements, handling of prisoners, 
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cooperation with Royal Flying Corps [RFC] contact aircraft and other myriad details that 
needed to be addressed before any set-piece assault.
205
  
 
S.S. 135 also outlined the relationship and responsibilities of corps and division. 
Section I („Issue of Orders by Divisional and Brigade Commanders‟) stated that Corps 
HQ would assign tasks, after which division would draw up the infantry plan. Division 
could issue its scheme to subordinates after review and approval by Corps. This 
procedure was expanded in Appendix A: “The Corps allots the task to be executed by 
Division. The Division Commander will be informed of the frontage, objectives, and 
assembly area allotted to his Division, as well as the artillery support he may expect and 
the action of the Divisions on his flank”. Artillery plans were under the aegis (except for 
minor operations) of Corps. Barrage schemes would be co-ordinated by the Corps 
GOCRA after consultation with division, although the latter “were enjoined to suggest 
any modifications to the plan which might make success more likely”.206  
 
Section II („Objectives‟) articulated the criteria divisions were to utilize when 
selecting objectives for the infantry in any one operation, so corps involvement was 
unnecessary. “But in the next section („Co-Operation Between Artillery and Infantry‟) it 
became clear that artillery planning was very much the province of corps”.207 The control 
of virtually all artillery assets involved made corps HQs the highest operational unit in 
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the BEF: “Army was mentioned in so far as it retained “general control” and would 
attend to the liaison between corps in consequence”.208  
 
Second Army HQ updated S.S.135 with the army-wide distribution of Notes on 
Training and Preparations for Offensive Operations on 31 August 1917.
209
 This 
pamphlet particularly addressed German defensive measures encountered since the 
opening of the campaign on 31 July. “The defence in depth was to be overcome by an 
attack itself organised in great depth, with fresh formations leap-frogging forward to take 
each successive objective line, always covered by massive creeping and standing 
barrages, and with each subsequent advance to an objective being shorter than the one 
before it”. Assigned objectives were based on the infantry‟s ability to carry out the 
task.
210
  
 
Sir Herbert Plumer stressed the need for tactical flexibility: “The enemy has 
deliberately substituted flexibility for rigidity in his defence, and I think the response 
should be a corresponding flexibility in our attack”.211 Gaps in the line did not worry the 
methodical GOC Second Army: “The old linear tactics were thoroughly redundant by the 
autumn of 1917”. Emphasis was also placed on the “need for every commander down to 
company level to keep a reserve in hand to meet and defeat the inevitable counter-
attacks”.212 The usual stress was placed on the need to pass on a steady stream of reliable 
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information to command centres during an attack. Continued application of the guidelines 
found in S.S.135 and the further amelioration of these methods in the booklet circulated 
by Second Army, provided a template for the measured operational success.
213
 
Deviations from certain aspects of this template (rushed preparations, unrealistic 
objectives, dilution of artillery fire support, etc.) combined with bad weather, 
unsatisfactory ground conditions and consequent logistical difficulties, contributed to the 
failures of 9 and 12 October. The return to the methodical pre-battle preparations and 
limited but realistic objectives agreed at a conference on 13 October led to the capture of 
Passchendaele, but also underlined the diminished post-strategic expectations of British 
GHQ.
214
  
 
The reduction of Second Army‟s manpower and artillery assets limited further 
efforts to improve the local tactical situation on the Passchendaele Ridge after 20 
November. Nevertheless, a pattern of tactical experience and increased operational tempo 
had evolved by the close of the offensive. Though the operations of 20 September to 12 
October were “conducted with increasing frequency, they became steadily less successful 
as the Second Army advanced into a salient and the ground got worse, so … it was not 
possible to sustain a tempo higher than the enemy‟s. The set-piece attack, however, 
organised by corps, had been fully developed”.215 Corps HQs acted as conduits of 
information from Army to division. This was a direct result of an increasingly formulaic 
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operational approach by Second and Fifth Armies after 20 September. Orders from Army 
HQ “almost invariably began with the words “Ref. „Attack Map” and objectives were 
marked on this map, as well as the stages of the attack being described in relation to it. 
Other than that, the orders were terse statements of the timetable, which corps were 
involved, any corps movements and when the attack should take place”.216  
 
Although Corps remained the principal level of command responsible for the 
organisation of the battle, a trend, which began at Messines, toward allowing divisions 
more latitude with their artillery arrangements continued throughout the campaign.
217
 
This type of arrangement was demonstrated when VIII Corps agreed to allow 62
nd
 HAG 
(a corps artillery asset) to be placed under Major-General Heneker‟s command during 
artillery preparations for the forthcoming night attack, although a level of control was 
maintained with the stipulation that the GOC 8
th
 Division was required to submit his 
orders for review by the Corps GOCRA.
218
  
 
Captain Guy Chapman (adjutant 13
th
 Royal Fusiliers) subsequently observed that 
“the winter of 1917-18 was more prolific of paper than any other period earlier or 
later”.219 This evident increase in foolscap „bumf‟ was indicative of complex 
operational/organisational details and the means to pass on such information throughout 
the BEF. The headquarters of 8
th
 Division and 32
nd
 Division would subsequently issue a 
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routine plethora of attack orders, instructions and amendments to subordinate units 
between 18 and 30 November. The contents of these documents were in keeping with the 
standard operating procedures found in S.S. 135, GHQ generated manuals and 
pamphlets,
220
 Second Army‟s Notes on the Training and Preparations for Offensive 
Operations and lessons learned and disseminated during the summer and autumn 
fighting.  
 
 
2.2 8
th
 Division 
 
Major-General Heneker forwarded to VIII Corps HQ an outline proposal for 8
th
 
Division‟s part in the night operation following a meeting with Brigadier-General 
Aspinall on 18 November. An accompanying map detailed objectives, boundaries, 
jumping-off line and opening barrage line. A short advance by 25 Brigade of 100 to 300 
yards would bring about the capture of Venison Trench and Northern and Southern 
redoubts on a frontage of 1,020 yards. The GOC 8
th
 Division believed three battalions 
would be sufficient to carry out this task – “right battalion holding the line and forming a 
defensive flank with about a company” south of Southern Redoubt; “centre and left 
battalions attacking”. The remaining battalion “would be in close support behind the 
jumping-off line”. Another full brigade would be in close support at Bellevue, Wieltje 
and St. Jean ready to take over the line on the evening following “Z[ero] / Z[ero] plus one 
if required”.221  
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 Major-General Heneker proposed that 8
th
 Division‟s attached MG companies 
(23
rd
, 24
th
, 25
th
, 218
th
)
222
 should be employed in three ways: two companies detailed to 
form a covering barrage; one company with eight guns sited for close defence of the 
present front, whilst a further seven guns would be made ready for close defence of the 
captured area. A reserve company was to be retained at Wieltje “ready to take over the 
close defence of the forward area from the M.G. Co[mpany] last referred to if 
required”.223 Speculation that the “present allotment of artillery covering the divisional 
front was sufficient, was followed by a proposal that the forthcoming operation, 
supported by a barrage of “lifts of 100 yards in four minutes”, should commence at dawn. 
VIII Corps HQ, as we have seen, subsequently denied this request because of II Corps‟ 
insistence for a night attack.
224
   
 
Major-General Heneker observed that “first essential” attack preparations would 
concern overland communications. The only traversable road to the forward area 
extended across the elevated spine of the Bellevue Spur. One shell-swept road could not 
possibly accommodate the traffic of two divisions preparing to attack from the narrow 
salient. The solution was to lay two extensions of “No. 5 [duckboard] track to run just 
S[outh] of the Meetcheele [Bellevue] Spur and parallel to it…” These extensions would, 
after skirting the treacherous Ravebeek
225
 quagmire‟s northern edge, be prolonged as far 
as the immediate vicinity of Vindictive Crossroads. There was, however, not enough 
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available labour to carry out this essential work and the construction of certain defended 
localities; the decision was, therefore, made “to give the duckboard tracks preference”.226  
 
Plate 2.1 Dummy Figure: Plan for construction and layout with electrical discharge 
method employed during ‘Chinese’ attacks at the time of Third Ypres (Source: 
Dyer, ‘A Holding Demonstration in September 1917’, Gun Fire No. 6) See fn. 228 
below. 
 
Major-General Heneker next submitted a series of requests for VIII Corps‟ 
consideration.
227
 He asked that the supporting barrage be extended over the front of II 
                                                 
226
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „8th Division No. G.97/1/1‟, 18 November 1917, 8th Division War Diary.  
227
 Ibid. These requests concerned the pushing out of forward posts to hinder enemy work on the 
Vorfeldzonelinie opposite designate attack objectives, desired artillery scheme and organisation and the 
aforementioned application for a dedicated training area.  
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ANZAC Corps, VIII Corps and II Corps to mask the actual frontage of the attack. To this 
end, it would be necessary for 33
rd
 Division to cover 8
th
 Division‟s right flank by placing 
a machine-gun barrage “down the spurs running N.E. and E by S. from Passchendaele”, 
whilst launching a Chinese attack
228
 combined with gas and smoke discharges just south 
of Passchendaele.
229
  
 
  The GOC 8
th
 Division also expressed the view that a boundary adjustment with II 
Corps should take place at an early date “so that divisions may prepare their own front of 
attack”. He followed this by asking, “as soon as possible, for a précis of all available 
information about the German defences and topography south of my [Heneker‟s] present 
boundary and within my future one”. This kind of information would, besides 
determining the most favourable locale for establishment of a new defensive flank, 
provide a basis for further sector intelligence gathering in the days leading up to the 
assault. VIII Corps HQ subsequently agreed to all Major-General Heneker‟s entreaties, 
except those concerning time of attack and artillery barrage arrangements. The requested 
boundary adjustment was scheduled to occur, Brigadier-General Aspinall remarked, “as 
                                                 
228
 „Chinese Attack‟ was contemporary parlance for a feigned assault. In this case, Heneker probably had in 
mind the employment of life-sized, plywood, cutout figures representing advancing British infantry. These 
faux soldiers would be released to rise vertically with hand-manipulated wires or electrically discharged 
detonators during accompanying smoke screen, artillery, machine-gun and gas barrages. Such mechanical 
ruses were designed to convince the enemy that they were under direct attack. 8
th
 Division had previously 
(20 September) carried out one of these „dummy shows‟ in the Lys valley sector opposite Warneton to 
support Second and Fifth armies‟ offensive operations (Battle of Menin Road) farther north. See 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dyer, „A Holding Operation in September 1917‟in Gun Fire No. 6, Series 2 (No 
date) reprint of June 1939 Royal Engineers Journal article, pp. 2-7 and the wonderful two-page illustration 
in Peter Barton, Passchendaele: Unseen Panoramas of the Third Battle of Ypres (London: Constable, 
2007), pp. 376-77.     
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soon as you [Heneker] have completed the minor operation [to capture Hill 52 and Vox 
Farm] discussed at this afternoon‟s conference”.230 
 
„8th Division Instructions No. 1‟ was issued the following day. This document, the 
first of a series drawn up by  proficient GSO 1 Lieutenant-Colonel Beddington, related 
the contents of „VIII Corps Order No. 52‟ i.e., the notification of the resumption of the 
offensive, designated objectives, boundary adjustment, etc., to various attached HQs. 25 
Brigade‟s selection to carry out the attack still scheduled for November 30/1December 
was also confirmed.
231
  
 
„8th Division Order No. 242‟ was distributed at 8:30 p.m. on 23 November. This 
document dealt with further organisational details and the forthcoming divisional 
boundary adjustment (scheduled for the night of 24/25 November) previously related in 
„VIII Corps Order No. 54‟.232 DMGOs from the three divisions concerned (8th, 32nd, 33rd) 
were to arrange for the relief of machine-gun companies during the night of 25/26 
November. “Aeroplane photos, all intelligence details, and trench stores” were, as per 
usual procedure, to be handed over to incoming MG companies.
233
 
 
  Use of the single traversable road and distribution of limited available shelter for 
battalion HQs had already been negotiated between II Corps and VIII Corps: 32
nd
 
Division was to have “rights of traffic” along the Bellevue Spur – Vindictive Crossroads 
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 Ibid: „VIII Corps G. 1990‟, 21 November 1917. See fn. 60.  
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 See TNA: WO/95/1677: „8th Division Order No. 242‟, 23 November 1917, 8th Division War Diary. 
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road. 8
th
 Division had exclusive rights of traffic on the two yet to be extended duckboard 
avenues. The latter division, however, was permitted to use the road “for pack transport 
except when otherwise ordered from div[sional] HQ”. These occasions would “be rare 
and ample notice” given. 8th Division would also retain three battalion HQs and an aid 
post in designated pillboxes situated at Bellevue, Meetcheele and Mosselmarkt.
234
  
 
The first order of business of „8th Division Instructions No. 2‟ (25 November) 
notified the cancellation of preliminary operations to capture Hill 52 and Vox Farm. 
General information concerning the allotment of the two duckboard tracks, battalion 
HQs, etc., in the vicinity of the Bellevue Spur was then restated. Units were, however, 
not to use the road (previously allotted to 32
nd
 Division) that ran the length of the spur 
“between dusk and zero hour on the night before the attack”. Specific details concerning 
pre-attack boundaries between 8
th 
Division, 32
nd 
Division and 33
rd
 Division followed.
235
 
 
Liaison between brigades was spelled out in detail: 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade (CO 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. Roger Brand DSO)
236
, left-hand assault battalion of 25 Brigade, 
was required to maintain close touch with the battalion on its immediate left. To this end, 
Brigadier-General Coffin was to “get in touch” with Brigadier-General Blacklock (GOC 
97 Brigade), who would “insure that the O.C., 2nd Rifle Brigade, left company and 
                                                 
234
 Ibid. Signaller Corporal Eric Rossiter (7
th
 Canadian Battalion) described his unit‟s Mosselmarkt pillbox 
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World War I Military History (November 1982) p. 28-29.  
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 Ibid: „8th Division Instructions No. 2‟, 25 November 1917, 8th Division War Diary.  
236
 Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. Roger Brand (1880-1945). Fifth son of the Second Viscount Hampden. 
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platoon commanders of that Battalion have thoroughly discussed the operation and their 
part in it, with the O.C. 2
nd
 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and the right company 
and platoon commanders of that battalion”.237 A liaison officer would also be detailed to 
make certain that “touch was maintained with 32nd Division throughout the 
operations”.238 Similar arrangements were to be made between assault battalions of 25 
Brigade.
239
 In the event of Coffin becoming a casualty, “command of the brigade would 
devolve” on Lieutenant-Colonel Brand. The GOC 25 Brigade, the instructions also 
stipulated, was to establish his HQ in one of the forlorn pillboxes astride the Bellevue 
Spur.
 
In keeping with Section 30 of S.S.135, a number of officers and men from each 
battalion were chosen to remain behind before the attack. These select personnel would, 
if necessary, provide a readily available nucleus for unit reconstruction and absorption of 
new drafts should heavy losses occur.
240
  
 
S.S. 135 also observed that officers and men “should not be overburdened with 
maps”,241 so a single map („Message Map No. 27 1/10,000‟) was issued to be carried 
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 CO and OC: Technically these terms are not interchangeable in the British Army, „CO‟ being the officer 
in command of a battalion, artillery brigade, RE company, etc. „OC‟ is the officer appointed to command a 
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forward into action.
242
  Red ground flares, originally chosen for communicating with 
designated RFC contact aircraft, were subsequently exchanged for green flares the 
following day (26 November).
243
  
 
POW arrangements were organised as follows: Prisoner escorts from 25 Brigade 
were to hand over captives to an escort detail of two platoons from 22
nd
 Durham Light 
Infantry [DLI] (8
th
 Division Pioneers) near Waterloo Farm.
244
 Prisoners would then “be 
escorted thence to the div[isional] cage… where they will be taken over by the APM”. 
Escorts were to be of the following approximate strength:  
 Up to 5 prisoners – Escort of 1  
 From 5 to 19 – Escort of 2 
 Over 10 – In proportion of 1 escort 
                                         to every 10 prisoners 
 
Lightly wounded men were expected, “as far as possible”, to act as escorts. No 
examination of prisoner documents was to occur forward of the divisional cage, where all 
captured officers and men would be searched under the supervision of the divisional 
APM. Any documents found on the person of a POW were to be “tied in separate bundles 
for each prisoner and docketed with labels stating the owner‟s name, rank and regiment. 
                                                 
242
 The reverse side listed eleven pro forma situation statements that required completion by company and 
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All such bundles were to be “handed over to the divisional IO for transmission to VIII 
Corps”.245 
 
 Instructions No. 2 also detailed organisation for the evacuation of casualties. 
Standard practice allowed for an injured Tommy to be carried by stretcher-bearers 
(usually 32 per battalion) as far as the regimental aid post [RAP], commanded by the 
regimental medical officer, “where essential first aid was carried out, splints were applied 
as necessary, and the wounded sorted out as well as possible into groups for 
treatment”.246. This was followed by transport to the brigade field ambulance and beyond. 
“It was common to need eight men to carry a stretcher in the Ypres salient in 1917, and 
both bearers and casualties – if they arrived at all – would be exhausted by the time they 
reached a suitable aid post”.247 The regimental aid posts of the attacking left and centre 
battalions would be situated at Mosselmarkt. The aid post of the right battalion was to be 
established in the northern outskirts of Passchendaele.
248
 Stretcher-bearers of the left and 
centre battalions were made responsible for clearing the ground of casualties as far as the 
RAP at Mosselmarkt. The bearers of the right battalion were expected to “clear 
[casualties] from their regimental aid post to Mosselmarkt”.249 
 
 The CO 25 Field Ambulance was responsible for evacuation of the wounded. To 
accomplish this herculean task, a total of 260 stretcher-bearers were placed at his 
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disposal. The transport of wounded from aid posts situated at Mosselmarkt would be 
achieved by “hand carriage” down the Bellevue Spur road, and along No. 5 track to 
Waterloo Farm. From there, stretcher parties would carry their loads westward along the 
section of road Gravenstafel – Wieltje, as far as the advanced dressing station [ADS] at 
Somme Redoubt.
250
 This insalubrious accumulation of trenches, tunnels and dugouts, 
subsequently described – along with Waterloo Farm – in one Field Ambulance history as 
“dirty holes”, was where “emergency primary surgery, particularly in arresting 
haemorrhage” would be carried out.251 These complicated medical procedures had, “after 
it became apparent that lack of delay was vital for many types of wounds”, become   
routine undertakings for ADS personnel by 1917.
252
 8
th
 Division‟s wounded would, 
following treatment at Somme Redoubt, be transported by motor ambulance to the „VIII 
Corps Main Dressing Station‟ [CMDS] at Ypres Prison.253  
 
 Instructions No. 2 concluded by providing schemes for brigade reliefs before and 
after the attack: 25 Brigade was scheduled to relieve 23 Brigade the night before; a 
brigade from 14
th
 Division was scheduled to relieve 25 Brigade the night after. Three 
assault battalions of the latter (2
nd
 Royal Berkshire Regiment, 2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment, 
2
nd
 Rifle Brigade) were to march to assembly positions from camps in the vicinity of 
Wieltje and St Jean on the eve of the attack. Assigned routes extended along the “Wieltje 
– Bellevue Road, thence the northern extension of No. 5 Track, No. 5 Track and its 
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southern extension” to the frontline positions held by the remaining battalion (1st Royal 
Irish Rifles [RIR]) of the brigade.
254
 
 
 Instructions No. 3 were issued the following day. 25 Brigade was informed that 
an RE 8 contact plane of No. 21 Squadron would “fly over the attack area at 7:30 a.m. or 
as soon as the weather is sufficiently clear, and will call for flares by sounding its 
KLAXON HORN and by firing Very lights”. This low-flying aircraft would be 
distinguished by placement of a “black plaque extending behind the lower planes and a 
dumbbell [the squadron sign] painted on the fuselage”.255 The most advanced infantry 
posts were, in response to a plane bearing these markings, “to light green flares and wave 
Watson Fans”.256 The discharge of coloured flares, which burned for approximately one 
minute, along the extreme front of a captured objective proved to be the most satisfactory 
means for troops to signal from newly captured positions. “So successful did this method 
prove, that it became part of operation orders for an attack, that flares were to be lighted 
by troops at intervals along their frontline, and in all blocks, sap-heads, and other 
advanced positions…”257 A „Contact Counter-attack aircraft‟ would also be aloft the 
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morning after the assault for the “special purpose of locating and notifying by wireless 
any enemy counter-attack”.258  
 
 The establishment of a complex communications network facilitated the passing 
of reliable information to divisional, brigade, battalion and artillery commanders. 
„Diagram A‟, attached to instructions No. 3, laid out the divisional scheme: Three cable 
routes (buried, ground, ladder) were to extend from 8
th
 Division HQ (situated at Canal 
Bank) through brigade HQ at Wieltje, Gallipoli Dugouts and Korek (near Gravenstafel) 
as far as Bellevue.
259
 A single ladder line was also to be extended from Bellevue to left 
battalion HQ at Meetcheele. Two more ladder lines were to be run from Meetcheele to 
the south and east, as far as battalion HQs situated near Passchendaele and Mosselmarkt. 
Three wireless stations were to be established along the cable route Wieltje – Bellevue, 
while a VIII Corps continuous wave [CW] wireless set was to be setup in the forward 
area. Nine visual signal stations were to be established at Gallipoli Dugouts, Bellevue, 
Meetcheele, Mosselmarkt, and with the five companies holding the frontline. Runner 
relay posts were also to be established along routes extending from company HQs to 
Meetcheele, Bellevue and Korek.
260
  
 
 „Diagram B‟ illustrated the „8th Division Artillery Group‟ liaison scheme. Three 
buried cables were to be run eastward from 8
th
 and 14
th
 divisional artillery HQs at Canal 
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Bank to Gallipoli Dugouts. Two more buried lines were to be extended from the latter 
location as far as Korek, where additional buried and overland cable routes, placed by the 
gunners, had already been extended to Brigade HQ at Bellevue. The VIII Corps forward 
zone wireless station was also to be placed in direct touch with a station situated near the 
divisional artillery HQs. Five visual signalling stations (established at Korek, Bellevue, 
Passchendaele, Meetcheele and Mosselmarkt) were assigned to support the artillery. 
Lateral cables were also to be extended – from a cable junction situated between Canal 
Bank and the exchange at Gallipoli Dugouts – north and south to supporting batteries.261 
By the close of November, 8
th
 Division‟s communications infrastructure had been 
successfully extended west to east for approximately 11,000 yards from Canal Bank to 
the apex of the Passchendaele Salient.  
 
 Instruction numbers 4 and 5 followed on 27
 
November. The former related 
detailed information concerning attack preparations by 8
th
 Division‟s four attached 
machine-gun companies. Company commanders were to arrange for at least 15,000 
rounds per gun to be concealed in positions constructed during a night selected by the 
DMGO. They would also ensure that new barrels were utilized and depression stops 
issued; wooden tripod stands were to be used for anti-aircraft work, while “calculations 
made for the error of the day” would be based on current meteorological reports. All 
machine-gun companies, excluding those designated for close defence of the captured 
area, were to be placed under the direct command of the DMGO throughout the attack. 
The seven designated close defence guns would be under orders of the GOC 25 Brigade. 
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Four tables of data concerning earmarked machine-gun sites to be occupied before the 
attack, along with barrage scheme details, were attached.
262
 
 
 Instructions No. 5 provided detailed schematic drawings of battle insignia worn 
by 2
nd
 King‟s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry [KOYLI] (right battalion of 97 Brigade). 
Both 8
th
 Division and 32
nd
 Division had instituted a complex scheme of patches for 
identification purposes, so it was necessary for officers and men of 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade to 
distinguish those worn on sleeves and below the collar of the neighbouring battalion. 
Information concerning the whereabouts of 97 Brigade HQ followed: “KANSAS at 
present … at CANAL BANK” on the 28th.263 Battalion HQs for 2nd Rifle Brigade and 2nd 
KOYLI would be established at Meetcheele. A liaison officer from 25 Brigade was to be 
attached to 97 Brigade HQ throughout the operation. The GOC 8
th
 Division Artillery 
(Brigadier-General H.G. Lloyd DSO) was also expected to detail “a senior liaison officer 
to be at Headquarters 25 Inf. Bde. during the operations, and for a liaison officer to be 
with each attacking battalion HQ”.264 
 
 Special precautions, organised before the assault by “mutual arrangement” 
between 25 Brigade and 97 Brigade, were taken “to ensure that 2nd Rifle Brigade and 2nd 
K.O.Y.L.I. are in touch on [the] forming up line”. A party of the 2nd Field Company RE 
was to be placed at the disposal of the GOC 25 Brigade “to assist in placing the 
[jumping-off] tapes in position”. All arrangements would be made directly between 25 
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Brigade and 2
nd
 Field Company. In addition, the CRE was to have maintenance parties 
situated along the two assigned duckboard tracks on the night of assembly.
265
  
 
 Instructions No. 5 next addressed the on-going consolidation of positions 
currently held by 23 Brigade. Brigadier-General Grogan‟s infantry, whilst continuing to 
strengthen the forward line of posts, were to see that “three platoon posts in the frontline 
as taken over from 3
rd
 Canadian Division are made strong with good firesteps, and 
inconspicuous wire put round them.” Four additional mutual supporting platoon posts, 
covering gaps between front posts, were to be established some 300 yards to the rear. 
These positions would be constructed and wired on similar lines to the existing front 
posts. Brigadier-General Coffin was required to supply garrisons for the posts “and will 
arrange that they carry up wire with them to strengthen that already put out”. Captured 
ground was required to be “consolidated in depth in posts”. The bulk of available Lewis 
Guns would be pushed forward to the final objective to repel inevitable German counter-
attacks.
266
 
 
 Brigadier-General Coffin was, as per Instructions No. 5, also to arrange for one 
battalion (1
st
 RIR) less one company, to be placed south of Mosselmarkt and Meetcheele, 
to “immediately counter-attack any enemy counter-attack”. The most likely fronts where 
a strong German counter-attack would originate were listed in order of importance:  
 WRANGLE FARM from low ground in W. 19 Central 
 WRATH FARM – the approach is very narrow 
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 WRATH FARM – WRAP COTTAGE from about  
                       WRITTEN FARM 
 
Immediate local counter-attacks could also be expected to emerge from shell hole 
positions about Wrath Farm and Salter‟s Corner. All of these sites were situated on the 
gently sloping ground beyond Venison Trench and its redoubts. In conclusion, the 
assaulting infantry were reminded that they must “rely on their own rifles, bayonets, and 
Lewis Guns” when confronted by enemy counter-attack.267 
 
 Instructions No. 6 followed on the 28
th
: Two battalions (2
nd
 Lincolnshire 
Regiment and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade) were, on the eve of the attack, to proceed – via the 
Wieltje – Bellevue road and No. 5 track and its southern extension – from camp sites 
south of St Julian approximately 6,500 yards to jumping-off positions NE of 
Passchendaele. The remaining two battalions (2
nd
 Royal Berkshire would now deploy on 
the right of 1
st
 RIR) would take over the frontline two nights before the attack. 
268
 
Overland routes assigned to machine-gun units and their mule transport were also related. 
Traffic control posts would be established by the divisional APM at selected points along 
assigned avenues of approach. The divisional CRE was to arrange for additional notice 
boards to be erected as a guide to troops traversing duckboard tracks. In addition, 
Brigadier-General Coffin was to make certain that the un-planked routes beyond the end 
of No. 5 Track and its extension were thoroughly reconnoitered and marked with white 
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posts as far as the jumping-off positions. German patrols were to be kept at arm‟s length: 
“Wherever forming up will take place within 250 yards of our [8th Division] present 
advanced line of posts, posts will be pushed out to cover it. This will be done nightly till 
the assault”.269 
 
 Instructions No. 6 next addressed machine-gun communications, anti-aircraft 
measures and reports. The DMGO and his signal counterpart were to cooperate by 
organizing runners and visual signaling stations for machine-gun companies. The 
experience on 10 November demonstrated the need for infantry to be able to defend 
against marauding German aircraft: “The G.O.C. 25 Inf. Bde. will arrange that heavy rifle 
and Lewis Gun fire is brought to bear on all hostile low-flying aeroplanes. It is of the 
utmost importance that they should be brought down or driven off at once, as accurate 
and heavy hostile shelling of our position is sure to follow a successful reconnaissance at 
a low height”. One machine-gun per company was also equipped for anti-aircraft duties 
during daylight hours.
270
  
 
Instructions No. 6 concluded by stressing the importance of maintaining 
communications throughout the attack. A confirmation report verifying the completion of 
the forming-up of 25 Brigade would be forwarded to 8
th
 Division HQ prior to Zero; 
situation reports were to follow at Zero + 40 minutes and every half-hour afterwards till 
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Zero + 8 hours 45 minutes. Brigadier-General Coffin was to impress on all ranks “the 
importance of frequent reports giving full information in writing or on situation maps”.271  
 
 „8th Division Order No. 247‟ was circulated the same day as Instructions No. 6.272 
It began by stating that VIII Corps was to continue offensive operations on a date “which 
has been communicated to all concerned”. This was followed by recapitulation of the 
operational details previously articulated in the series of instructions forwarded to 
subordinate formations since 22 November: 
 The 32nd Division (II Corps) will attack on the left of [,] and 
                        simultaneously with 8
th
 Division. The 33
rd
 Division, on the  
                        right of 8
th
 Division [,] will not be attacking. 
 
 The attack of the 8th Division will be carried out by 25th Inf. 
                        Bde., H.Q., Bellevue. 
 
 The objective of the division and its boundaries, are shown 
                        on map G.31 issued with 8
th
 Division Instructions No. 1 of  
                        22 November.  
 
 The attack will take place at an hour zero [sic]; which will  
                         be notified later.  
 
 At zero hour the infantry will advance to the assault. 
 
25 Brigade was tasked with advancing to the objective line; old enemy trenches were, “so 
far as possible”, to be avoided, but final consolidation “must be in depth”.273 
 
 Machine-gun companies attached to 23 and 25 Brigades were ordered to support 
the assault by placing an indirect barrage
274
 immediately behind Venison Trench and its   
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redoubts at Zero + 8.
275
 The barrage would lift to a “M.G. S.O.S barrage line” further 
forward at Zero + 9 (Map 5). Here it would remain until Zero + 25. Harassing fire would 
be maintained on this line at intervals from Zero + 37 to Zero + 6 hours and 10 minutes, 
“and on the afternoon after the attack from 3:00 p.m. till 6:18 p.m.”276  
 
24 Brigade machine-guns – less seven guns – would deal with German counter-
attacks originating beyond the M.G. S.O.S barrage line by searching “all avenues of 
approach east of that line” from Zero + 15 to Zero + 16 hours and twenty-minutes, “and 
on the afternoon after the attack from 3:00 p.m. till 6:20 p.m”. The remaining seven guns 
would be “employed for close defence” of the captured area. Machine-gun companies of 
32
nd
 Division and 33
rd
 Division would prolong the “M.G. S.O.S. barrage line to the 
S[outh] and N[orth] respectively, and would “be searching all enemy approaches on their 
fronts under similar arrangements.” All machine-gun units were to be in “allotted 
positions for the attack by Zero - 2 hours”.277 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
274
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Order No. 247 concluded with instructions for the synchronization of watches just prior 
to the attack.
278
 Its concluding sentence informed subordinate formations: “8th Division 
Instructions No. 1-6 [,] which have been already issued are hereby confirmed and 
rendered operative as orders”.279 
 
 The artillery scheme (dated 29 November) was detailed in „Addendum No. 1 to 
8
th
 Division Order No. 247‟. Eight field artillery brigades and the „Northern 
Bombardment Group‟ of VIII Corps Heavy Artillery would carry out the complex fire 
support scheme (Map 6). Field artillery batteries were to maintain the “usual harassing 
fire” prior to Zero + 8. “Occasional rounds” would be fired on the barrage start line 
throughout the night of the attack and the preceding nights, in order to mark the line 
where the barrage would fall. Four field artillery brigades were to fire on „Line A‟ in the 
immediate rear of Venison Trench and the redoubts at Zero + 8. All eight field artillery 
brigades were to fire in combination at Zero + 9. The advancing curtain of fire, consisting 
of 100% HE that Major-General Heneker “found best for night work”, would proceed 
100 yards to „Line A + 100‟, where it would remain until Zero + 13. From Zero + 13 to 
Zero + 40, the barrage would lift 100 yards every four minutes (lines „B‟ to „O‟) until it 
reached the „protective barrage line‟ („Line P‟), behind which the infantry would dig-in 
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and consolidate their gains.
280
 4.5-inch howitzer batteries were to fire “with mean point 
of impact 200 yards in advance” of the protective line. From Zero + 90 to 6:00 a.m., 
bursts of fire were to be placed on „Line P‟ at “irregular intervals”. Additional bursts 
were to be placed 100 to 400 yards in advance of the same line.
281
 
 
 Heavy guns were to commence firing at Zero + 15 “to search roads of approach 
and 200 yards each side of them, and to bombard assembly places and areas where 
German support and reserve battalions are located”. Counter-batteries were to open up 
after Zero + 8 “or prior to that hour if necessary,‟ to engage German artillery 
concentrations; gas shells would be employed only if the “weather is suitable”.282 
 
2.3 32
nd
 Division 
 
32
nd
 Division was entrusted with the primary operational task of opening out the 
Passchendaele Salient to the west and north on a frontage of 1,850 yards by securing Hill 
52 and Vat Cottage Ridge. This would be accomplished by advancing the line to a depth 
of 400 yards on the right and left and 700 yards in the centre. The first inkling Major-
General Shute received about the projected attack was while his division was resting, 
following a lengthy staggered march from the Flanders coast, around Lederzeele in early 
November: II Corps informed him that 32
nd
 Division “would move into the line at an 
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early date in the neighbourhood of BELLEVUE and would attack northward with a view 
to improving our position at PASSCHENDAELE”.283 Subsequent operational orders and 
instructions were based on the following factors governing the plan: 
 It was impossible for 32nd Division to form-up by day 
because the desired jumping-off area was in full view of the 
enemy.  
 
 So many previous attacks having commenced at dawn, the 
decision was made to risk the inherent dangers of a night 
attack on a large scale. 
 
 The artillery, operating from an extremely long range, 
could only fire from west to east in support of an attack 
along high ground from south to north. Approaches due 
west of the enemy‟s position were impassable. 
 
 The idea of a creeping barrage was dispensed with. It was, 
therefore, decided to advance the first 200 yards without 
the customary artillery support (exclusive of a preliminary 
bombardment within safety limits) in order to achieve 
surprise and overwhelm the enemy‟s most advanced posts 
with the bayonet.  
 
 The supporting barrage was to open at Zero + 8 with all 
available artillery and machine-guns in a series of area 
concentrations. Those engaging targets inside the objective 
to lift as the infantry advanced.  
 
 Conceivable exposure of infantry to unsuppressed hostile 
machine-gun fire for six to eight minutes appeared 
preferable to running the risk of drawing, with the start of 
the normally anticipated attack barrage, the enemy‟s 
intense defensive barrage. This controversial decision was 
further strengthened by the fact that hostile artillery 
concentrations displayed such superiority in firepower that 
previous attacks sustained debilitating casualties before 
reaching the objective.  
 
 Attacking at night decreased the risk of casualties from   
hostile machine-guns.  
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 Moonlight was perceived to be a critical element of this 
operation; therefore the attack date was fixed for a night 
when the moon was certain to be full or just past full 
sphere.
284
 
 
Division HQ issued the first attack instructions on 21 November.
285
 „32nd Division 
Offensive Instructions No.1: Outline Plan of Operations‟ provided general information to 
attached infantry brigades and other subordinate units regarding operational phases, tasks, 
troops to be employed, attack scheme, probable direction of enemy counter-attacks, 
artillery plan, machine-guns, etc.
286
 These four-page instructions, the first of a series 
prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. McNamara (GSO 1 32
nd
 Division), were in keeping 
with recognised S.S. 135 guidelines.  
 
II Corps‟ objective was to “continue operations at an early date to drive the enemy 
from the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE”. VIII Corps was to “operate on the right of the II 
Corps”. The first phase would be the capture of the red line objective (Hill 52 and Vat 
Cottage Ridge) by 32
nd
 Division, whilst 35
th
 Division remained in place on the immediate 
left.
287
 
 
 Instructions No. 1 originally entrusted the capture of these objectives to the four 
battalions (2
nd
 KOYLI, 16
th
 Highland Light Infantry, 11
th
 Border Regiment, 17
th
 
Highland Light Infantry [HLI]) of 97 Brigade; two battalions of the 14 or 96 brigades 
would be responsible for the frontline during the attack. This was later adjusted to an 
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assault by 97 Brigade “with two battalions [15th Lancashire Fusiliers [LF] and 16th 
Northumberland Fusiliers [NF] of 96 Infantry Brigade attached”. One detached battalion 
(16
th
 NF) would be held in reserve as a “counter-counter-attacking force on the right 
flank in the vicinity of VIRILE FARM”. Major-General Shute had thus concluded that an 
attack by a reinforced brigade of six battalions was necessary in order to provide the 
proportionate number of men to assault and consolidate the dispersed objectives. In 
addition, definite and distinct units from each battalion were “to be told off to capture, 
garrison, and consolidate each known strongpoint and defended locality”.288 
                
 
 The general scheme of attack called for the capture of the final red line objective 
by night attack; “the essence” of the operation was surprise. In order to meet this 
condition, the Vorfeldzonelinie from Void Farm (dominating gently sloping ground as far 
as the western extremity of Vat Cottage Ridge) to Veal Cottages (inclusive) “had to be 
rushed at Zero without an artillery or machine-gun barrage”. At the calculated hour when 
the German outposts were overrun (Zero + 8), the artillery would “open fire on all known 
and suspected strongpoints and machine-gun positions lying beyond…” The 
bombardment, timed to lift as the attacking troops reached the final objective, would 
“form a protective barrage which will be specifically thick on the enemy‟s most likely 
lines of counter-attack (i.e., Venison Farm – Verse Cottage – Valuation Houses – Mallet 
Wood (exclusive)” and assembly areas.  Exact details relating to open fire and lift-off 
times on targeted strongpoints were, it was related, still unavailable to Division HQ as of 
21 November.  This yet to be shared information was dependent upon orders received 
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from II Corps, the plans of the neighbouring VIII Corps and ground conditions at the time 
of the attack.
289
  
 
 Presumed locale and direction of German counter-attacks were addressed next. 
Examination of aerial photographs and other related sources precluded the flooded low 
ground west of Mallet Wood as an avenue for defenders to emerge from, although small 
local ripostes might originate from this area. The most probable direction would be north 
and NE from Racket Wood, Heidengod Copse and along the main ridge via Valuation 
Houses. Likely positions of enemy reserves at Roodkruis and Oostnieuwkerke (east of 
Westroosebeke) were also noted.
290
  
 
 32
nd
 Division‟s four attached machine-gun companies were to be organised into 
two groupings: Close defence weapons under the GOC 97 Brigade and barrage guns 
under the CMGO (II Corps).
291
 97
th
 MG Company was to remain under Brigadier-
General Blacklock‟s orders for close defence of the captured line. The remaining three 
companies (14
th
, 96
th
, 219
th
) would contribute to the indirect barrage by providing 
protective fire in front of objective areas where counter-attacks in force were expected. 
They were also tasked with maintaining area concentration fire on likely assembly areas 
or over ground which hostile troops could pass. Target areas were to extend as far back 
into the enemy hinterland as possible. Defended localities on the left flank would be kept 
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under fire, in order to engage machine-guns and snipers in areas beyond attack 
objectives.
292
 
 
It was stressed that infantry should immediately consolidate objectives. All 
available Vickers and Lewis guns would be “pushed up for the defence of the captured 
ground, the majority being advanced to the final objective”. Strongpoints for all-round 
defence were to be constructed by 219
th
 Field Company RE and 100 attached infantry in 
the vicinity of Hill 52, Void Farm, Volt Farm, Mallet Copse, Veal Cottages and the 
“enclosures” approximately 300 yards west of Veal Cottages. Two officers and eight 
sappers were specifically assigned to 2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI “for the purpose of siting 
and consolidating strongpoints at HILL 52 and VOID FARM”. 293  
 
Battalions of 97 Brigade were to move forward from assembly positions at Wurst 
Farm (1 battalion), Irish Farm (2 battalions), and the dugout complex at Hilltop (1 
battalion) on the night of the assault. “The problem of the assembly of troops prior to the 
attack was a serious one as even with extra [duckboard] tracks made, it would necessarily 
take a long time to move so large a body of troops in single file a distance of some 6 to 7 
miles by night”. This difficulty was further exacerbated by the fact that hostile batteries 
had carefully registered all tracks and shelled them continuously.
294
 Careful 
reconnaissance failed to identify locations in close proximity to the start line. Alternative 
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sites “were waterlogged and it was decided that the exposure entailed on the men would 
militate more against their fitness for the assault than the march up”. 295  
 
Possible delays whilst passing through the heavily shelled zone east and west of 
the flooded Steenbeek valley made it essential to identify the time taken by units to 
traverse the approximately 2,000 yards from Wurst Farm and 8,000 yards from Irish 
Farm and Hilltop.
296
 Brigades carrying out reliefs prior to the attack were thus required to 
record marching times and distances. This data would, after careful checking, be 
forwarded to Division HQ the following morning. There were only three available routes 
as of 21 November: Mouse Trap and No. 3 duckboard tracks and the Gravenstafel Road. 
It was “hoped to get a fourth route constructed by the night of the attack”, but this could 
not be relied on due to serious labour shortages in Second Army.
297
  
 
The final section of Instructions No. 1 related chosen sites of various HQs: 32
nd
 
Division at the Canal Bank, 97 Brigade advanced HQ at Kronprinz Farm and 14 Brigade 
(in support during the attack) inside a small pillbox at Kansas Cross. Brigadier-General 
Blacklock was to select battalion HQs after undertaking “necessary reconnaissance” of 
the forward area. The divisional signal officer was to ensure that buried cables reached 
brigade and battalion HQs before the attack.
298
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„32nd Division Operation Order No. 134‟ followed at 7:00 p.m. on 23 November. 
Its contents dealt with specifics concerning the boundary adjustment (scheduled for the 
night of 24/25 November) between II Corps and VIII Corps. Right of passage along the 
Bellevue Spur – Vindictive Crossroads Road “except between dusk and zero hour on the 
night before the attack” and the apportioning out of limited HQ accommodation astride 
the Bellevue Spur were also clearly delineated on the neighbouring 8
th
 Division‟s 
behalf.
299
  
 
Order No. 135 was circulated at 8:30 p.m. on 24
 
November. 14 Brigade – now in 
reserve at Irish Farm, Canal Bank and Dambre Camp near Vlamertinghe – was to 
dispatch a battalion to relieve 97 Brigade‟s close support battalion at Bellevue on 25 
November. In addition, 96 Brigade would provide a battalion to relieve the reserve 
battalion at Wurst Farm on 26
 
November. The former brigade was scheduled to replace 
the latter opposite Vat Cottage Ridge on the night of 27/28 November: “The first two 
battalions of the 96 Infantry Brigade to go into the frontline will be prepared to stay in till 
the night 30 November/1 December”. Days and nights spent in jumping-off positions 
allowed time for assault units to become accustomed to a new sector, whilst also directly 
observing attack objectives by day and patrolling approaches to enemy positions at night. 
Subsequent reliefs by units from sister brigades would also allow time for additional 
training and organisation in the rear. A table outlining brigade movements for the period 
24-28 November was attached.
300
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Instructions No. 2 (24 November) dealt with vital preliminary work on railway 
and duckboard communications and further extension of buried cables. Two Pioneer 
battalions and eight RE field companies with attached infantry (commanded by the CRE) 
were to carry out this vital work. General policy now called for the bulk of available 
labour to extend two existing duckboard tracks whilst constructing two more. Brigade 
and battalion HQs were to be improved, tramways extended and roads repaired. Provision 
of additional shelter east of the canal was also to be undertaken by constructing a new 
forward camp at Wurst Farm. Extensions of an existing line of buried cable to Bellevue 
and an additional “main buried line” as far as 97 Brigade HQ at Kronprinz Farm was the 
responsibility of the CO Signals.
301
 
 
Details concerning liaison between 97 Brigade and 25 Brigade were explained in 
Instructions No. 3 (26 November). Brigadier-General Blacklock was ordered, as per 
instructions issued by 8
th
 Division the previous day, to “arrange with the G.O.C. 25th 
Infantry Brigade, for the Commanding Officer, Company Commanders and Platoon 
Commanders of the 2
nd
 K.O.Y.L.I. and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade to meet and discuss their 
various parts in the operations”. Special mutual precautions were to be taken to ensure 
that both battalions were in touch on the jumping-off line prior to Zero, whilst “definite 
parties” from 97 Brigade were “detailed to join hands” with 25 Brigade in the vicinity of 
Teall Cottage and on the final objective. Liaison officers would be attached to brigade 
HQs throughout the attack. Battle insignia worn on the upper sleeves and below the 
collars of officers and ORs of 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade and 2
nd
 KOYLI were depicted in 
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diagrammatic drawings to illustrate identification schemes of units sharing the inner 
boundary between 25 Brigade and 97 Brigade. Chosen HQ locations for both brigades 
and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade followed.
302
 
 
Order No. 136 (26 November) concerned the forthcoming relief (scheduled for 
the night of 27/28 November) of 97 Brigade. All details would be “arranged between the 
Brigadiers concerned”.303 Instructions No. 4 („Employment of RE and Pioneers‟) and No. 
5 („Machine-guns‟) were distributed the following day. The former provided projected 
details and unit distribution information for the necessary preliminary work found in 
Instructions No. 2.
304
 Instructions No. 5 related that five additional machine-gun 
companies (80 guns) would be at 32
nd
 Division‟s disposal.305 Unfavourable ground 
conditions that hampered the deployment of field artillery on II Corps‟ front, made it 
necessary to reserve all available heavy machine-gun assets as a substitute force 
multiplier tasked with carrying out offensive barrage and SOS support fire.
306
 Two 
batteries (16 guns), under orders of the GOC 97 Brigade, would provide close defence of 
the captured line. Ten batteries (80 guns), under orders of II Corps MGO, were to fire a 
protective barrage in front of the objective (Map 7). The latter would also search and 
sweep areas where enemy reserves were sheltering. Six more batteries (48 guns), under 
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the latter officer, were tasked with providing area concentration fire on selected locales. 
Information about sites where this formidable array of 144 Vickers guns would be 
established prior to the assault, along with attached charts containing the usual barrage 
data, were also included.
307
  
 
Information regarding communications infrastructure was outlined in Instructions 
No. 6 (27 November). The cover letter of this four-page document informed those 
concerned: “The attached scheme of communications will be adhered to during 
forthcoming operations.” General particulars related that 97 Brigade forward signal 
station would be established immediately behind the frontline at Virile Farm. This 
station, however, would not follow-up the advancing infantry as laid down in S.S. 148 
Forward Inter-Communications in Battle (March 1917), due to the limited nature of the 
operation “and of the ground over which it is being carried out…”308  
 
Every effort would be made to maintain telegraphic communications between 
assault battalions and artillery forward observation officers [FOO] and their brigades and 
groups. Liaison between infantry and artillery was to be centralized at Virile Farm and 
6,500 yards farther back at Cheddar Villa. Visual signal and runner communications 
between battalion HQs and companies were to be thoroughly organised. Telephone lines 
would be extended forward as soon as possible after the start of the attack.
309
 Of the 
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“auxiliary means of communication” available, chief reliance would be placed on visual 
signaling organised to provide a “complete chain of communication in the event of the 
telegraphic system being destroyed”. Communication by runners and aircraft were also 
arranged. Contact between 97 Brigade and 25 Brigade would thus be maintained by a 
complex network of buried wire, visual signals, runners and wireless”.310 
 
Plate 2.2 Schematic drawing of 32
nd
 Division communications infrastructure 
(Source: TNA: WO/95/2370) 
 
Use would be made of the already established “VIII Corps bury” system for 
communication between 32
nd
 Division HQ at Canal Bank and the HQs of artillery groups 
and infantry brigades; this system had been extended as far as Bellevue by 27 November. 
The VIII Corps bury was supplemented by a complete system of ladder lines “connecting 
the division to the artillery groups, infantry brigades with Cheddar Villa, also the artillery 
groups and infantry brigades with their batteries and battalions and with the brigade 
forward signal station at VIRILE FARM”. Linemen and relay posts would be established 
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at select points along ladder routes. These were to be arranged, “as far as possible, to 
coincide with visual stations and other points where auxiliary means of communication 
are available”.311  
 
Spark wireless sets were to be employed during the attack.
312
 Power Buzzer, 
amplifier and CW sets would not be utilized. Five wireless stations (established at 
Bellevue, Kronprinz Farm, Kansas Cross, Cheddar Villa, and II Corps Directing Station) 
were in place before the assault.
313
 All messages, except in cases of emergency, had to be 
sent in code: “If handed in “in clear” they will be enciphered and deciphered by the 
wireless operators unless franked “in clear” by an officer.  In all cases messages must be 
brief”.314 Wireless stations would, in order to communicate with supporting artillery 
groups, make direct contact with RFC receiving sets only during hours of darkness (4:30 
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to 6:30 p.m.).
315
 Special attention was to be paid to this means of communication 
“especially in the case of S.O.S messages and cancel S.O.S. messages”. 316  
 
A network of seventeen visual signaling stations, for use by infantry battalions, 
machine-gun companies and artillery, was to be extended from the frontline to Canal 
Bank. Company runners were to deliver messages to battalion HQs. Runners dispatched 
from battalions and the brigade forward signal station would carry messages to the rear 
by a series of relay posts set up near established linemen posts at “intervals of 400 yards 
along duckboard tracks from VIRILE FARM to KRONPRINZ FARM … thence to 
KANSAS CROSS and CHEDDAR VILLA and on to artillery groups”. Mounted 
orderlies, the last link in the chain, would then carry messages from artillery groups to 
Division HQ. Responsibility for the organisation of visual signals and runners devolved 
on signal officers attached to assault battalions, forward brigade, support brigade and 
artillery groups.
317
  
 
Assault battalions were issued 8 pigeons which, on release, would fly directly to a 
pigeon loft at Vlamertinghe. Artillery FOOs were expected to “draw on the nearest 
battalion for any birds they require”. In addition, Brigade HQs were issued 16 pigeons 
that would home-in to a loft at Watou.  This means of communication, it was pointed out, 
“is not as reliable as usual owing to the time of year. Any messages of great importance 
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must be sent by at least two birds”. Messenger dogs would not be employed, because 
they “were not sufficiently trained”.318 
 
No. 7 Squadron
319
 was tasked with providing signal and „contact-counter-attack‟ 
aircraft throughout the assault. Fuselage mounted Klaxon horns would be sounded to 
“call attention and to signal to the infantry”, while warnings of impending counter-attacks 
were to be signalled by “wireless and dropping a white parachute light”. The signal plane 
was detailed to accept signals by lamp from brigade and battalion HQs “and will 
acknowledge the same by lamp”. Lamp messages received from the ground were 
required to be air dropped at divisional HQ within five minutes of receipt. 
320
 
 
Each assault battalion would be issued 15 signal rockets to be carried forward by 
HQs and companies. Caution for placing too much reliance on this device followed: 
“These rockets are unreliable owing to faulty manufacture”.321 By the close of November, 
32
nd
 Division‟s communications infrastructure had been successfully organised and 
extended west to east for approximately 10,000 yards from Canal Bank to the vicinity of 
Vat Cottage Ridge. 
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Order No. 137 (27 November) provided an updated table denoting routes and 
timetables for battalions marching to reserve and support positions at Dambre Camp, 
Hilltop Farm, Irish Farm and Wurst Farm. All moves were scheduled to occur following 
the exchange of brigades on the night of the 27/28. “The moves of battalions for 28th inst. 
as notified in table issued with 32
nd
 Division Operation Order 135” were cancelled. Units 
would now commence their march on the 28
th
 in accordance with the newly issued 
table.
322
 
 
„32nd Division Operation Order No. 138‟ – the entire seven-page attack plan in 
outline – was also forwarded on the 27th. Sections one through six related previously 
articulated details: The general objectives of the attack were Volt Farm, Mallet Copse and 
Veal Cottages. Map reference particulars concerning the boundary between II Corps and 
VIII Corps followed. Organisation and deployment of brigades for the attack were: 97 
Brigade, reinforced by two battalions from 96 Brigade, to carry out the assault; 14 
Brigade, in support with the remaining battalions of 96 Brigade, to act as reserve. Assault 
troops would be distributed on a frontage of five battalions. An additional battalion would 
be held in reserve near Virile Farm to deal with German counter-attacks.
323
  
 
Sections seven and eight dealt with method of attack (Map 8). Three objective 
lines (yellow, green, red) were delineated: “At Zero, the advanced posts of the enemy 
will be rushed without an artillery barrage to a depth of 200 yards” (yellow line). At Zero 
+ 8, the artillery was to commence firing at all “known and suspected strongpoints lying 
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outside the line 350 yards from the forming-up line. The bombardment would then pause 
on the „350 yards‟ or „dotted green line‟ intermediary objective for six minutes in order to 
allow the infantry to “close up”.  At Zero + 14, the artillery was to lift back at a rate of 
100 yards in six minutes. Infantry detailed to capture strongpoints were to advance as 
close to the barrage as possible and “rush each defended locality when the artillery lifts”. 
The gunners‟ final task was to place a protective barrage 300 yards outside the red line 
objective. This would be maintained until “Zero plus one hour 36 minutes unless ordered 
to continue”. Definite and distinct units were expected to “capture and hold each known 
enemy strong point and defended locality”. Troops were required to be “collected and 
company and battalion reserves reformed at the earliest possible moment after the capture 
of each position” in order to avoid confusion and straggling.324 
 
Consolidation of objectives and deployment of RE field companies and divisional 
pioneer units were covered in sections nine and ten. The captured area was to be 
“consolidated in depth and all [Vickers] machine-guns detailed for close defence and 
Lewis Guns will be pushed up for the defence of the captured ground, the majority being 
advanced to the final objective”. The position would be further strengthened by the 
construction of the six strongpoints extending from Hill 52 to the enclosures west of Veal 
Cottages. 219
th
 Field Company was to supervise this work with 100 attached infantry. 
This unit was also tasked with the responsibility for patrolling and maintaining 
„Mousetrap Track‟ forward of 97 Brigade HQ at Kronprinz Farm.325 Four RE field 
companies (206
th
, 218
th
, 247
th
, 248
th
, 249
th
) and 14
th
 Worcestershire Regiment (less two 
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companies) were to be employed by the CRE “under special instructions” relating to 
track patrol and maintenance.
326
  
 
Section eleven related how attacking battalions were to deploy on the start-line 
prior to jumping-off. Section twelve provided more general forming-up instructions: 
 The assaulting troops will form up close behind our 
frontline. 
 
 The routes to the forming up places are to be carefully 
reconnoitered and clearly pegged out and marked with 
white posts. 
 
 The forming up place of each platoon is to be marked with 
white posts and tapes. 
      
 Patrols and Lewis Guns will cover the forming up. These 
patrols must be pushed out every night previous to the 
assault so that the enemy may become accustomed to them.  
 
 97th Infantry Brigade will ensure that the forming up is 
carried out in complete silence and that during the first rush 
there is no noise or shouting if possible.  
 
“Every possible means and device for ensuring direction” needed to be employed. All 
officers and “as many N.C.O‟s as possible” would be issued with compasses and “know 
the compass bearing of their objective”. In addition, each company assembly area was to 
be provided with a luminous notice board on which would be painted “the bearing of the 
first company objective and the distance in yards to it”.327 
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 Section 13 provided additional information concerning when the barrage was 
scheduled to open fire and lift on to targeted strongpoints. Fire was to remain normal on 
the eve of the attack until Zero + 8. From Zero + 8 onward, the action of the artillery 
would be as follows: 
 The artillery firing on strongpoints in the area to be 
attacked will act as detailed in Paragraph 7 (i.e., on known 
and suspected enemy positions lying 350 yards from the 
forming up line). 
 
 All known strongpoints and machine-gun emplacements 
outside the area to be attacked will be kept under fire. 
 
 A protective barrage will be maintained 300 yards in front 
of the objective until Zero + 1 hour 30 minutes (4/5 
shrapnel, 1/5 smoke).
328
  
 
 From Zero + 1 hour 30 minutes onwards a combing barrage 
will be put down on all enemy centres of activity and 
suspected assembly places for counter-attacks.  
 
 North and west of the line LIND COT – CLEAR FARM – 
V. 17 central – V. 18 central (southern and eastern outskirts 
of Westroosebeke) [will be deluged with] a proportion of 
smoke and, if safe, gas shells. These projectiles will be 
mixed with other ammunition by guns firing on 
strongpoints, farms, etc., to blind machine-guns in this area 
and confuse the enemy as to the direction of the attack.  
 
Detailed artillery plans would be forwarded at a later date. Liaison with the supporting 
artillery was further facilitated in Section 14: The CRA would “detail a RFA battery 
commander to be attached to Headquarters of the 97
th
 Infantry Brigade”. This officer‟s 
battery was to be at Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s direct disposal throughout the 
operation.
329
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Section 15 outlined details for the employment of Vickers machine-guns. Two 
close defence batteries would move forward to the vicinity of the final objective in order 
to provide direct support during consolidation. Ten batteries, to operate against sites 
where enemy reserves were believed to be sheltered, were allocated for indirect barrage 
work beyond the objective. A further six batteries, furnished by 96 Brigade, were to be 
employed as area concentration guns targeting enemy assembly areas and likely threats 
from localities beyond the left flank. One battery allotted for area concentration work was 
to be withdrawn from this task at Zero + 1 ½ hours, and, following up the advancing 
infantry, position a half-section each at Hill 52, Void Farm, Mallet Copse and Veal 
Cottages. Liaison would be further facilitated by having both II Corps and 32
nd
 Division 
MGOs attached to 32
nd
 Division and 97 Brigade HQs respectively. “Careful 
arrangements” were necessary in order “to preserve communication with all machine-gun 
batteries by runners and all other means of communication”.330  
 
Section 16 concerned the deployment of Stokes Mortars after all objectives had 
been attained. Ten tubes would be carried forward from Virile and Tournant farms to the 
vicinity of Hill 52 (six tubes), Volt Farm (2 tubes) and Veal Cottages (2 tubes) about one 
hour and thirty minutes after Zero. Their rapid indirect fire – 30 to 40 rounds per minute 
– was expected provide considerable assistance during consolidation of the newly 
captured ground.
331
 14 Brigade would deploy two additional tubes against targets west of 
Tournant Farm “for the express purpose of being available to deal with strongpoints 
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which might hold up our advance on the left flank”.332 They would also engage any 
possible counter-attack developing from inundated ground west and SW of Vat Cottage 
Ridge.
333
 
 
Plate 2.3 Map overlay: Tournant Farm from the air 
(Source: MMP) 
 
 Section 17 stated: “Every possible means of communication will be organised as 
laid down in S.S. 148 and utilized to the fullest extent.” The assaulting infantry would, as 
with 8
th
 Division, utilize green ground flares and Watson Fans to communicate with 
contact aircraft. Each man would also be issued two flares to carry forward (Section 
18).
334
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 Liaison arrangements (Section 19) were “as laid down in „32nd Division 
Instructions No. 3‟ (26 November). In addition, the placement of a senior artillery officer 
at 97 Brigade HQ and a junior artillery officer “with the headquarters of each assaulting 
battalion” would further facilitate communications with the infantry.335 
 
 The infantry were to be equipped to advance in “battle order” – steel helmet, rifle, 
bayonet, 170 rounds of standard .303 calibre ammunition carried in equipment pouches 
and issue cotton bandoleers, haversack, water bottle, mess tin, entrenching tool, box 
respirator and PH „tube helmet‟. Each man would also carry a shovel (Section 20). 
Leather jerkins were probably worn over tunics as additional protection from the cold.
 
 
           
Plate 2.4 Reconstruction: Private ‘B’ Company, 2nd KOYLI in ‘Battle Order’ 
Goudbergstraat 2 December 2007 
(Source: Author) 
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Section 21 reminded officers and men not to carry “any document likely to be of 
value to the enemy” on their persons. German insignia and equipment denoting unit 
identity, captured documents, etc., was to be immediately sent back to Division HQ for 
examination.
336
  
 
Cadres from each of the six assault battalions‟ establishment of approximately 
thirty officers would remain behind during the attack as per S.S. 135. (Section 22): “No 
more than 21 officers will accompany their units into action”. Select NCOs and 
specialists were also to be held back.
337
  
 
Section 23 reminded all concerned that “Separate instructions have been issued as 
to medical arrangements, prisoners of war, positions of dumps, S.A.A., etc”. Situation 
reports (Section 24) would be forwarded to Division HQ “at zero and at least every 
subsequent half-hour during the attack. Subordinates were reminded of the “importance 
of very frequent reports giving full information in writing or on situation maps must be 
impressed on the troops”. In addition, artillery liaison officers attached to battalions were 
responsible “for collecting all possible information from F.O.O.‟s and forwarding it, 
through Infantry Brigade Forward Station and Infantry Brigade Headquarters to 
Divisional Headquarters”.338  
 
Section 25 related that orders for the synchronization of watches would follow 
shortly. Section 26 related HQ locations for 32
nd
 Division and its three subordinate 
                                                 
336
 Ibid.  
337
 Ibid. 
338
 Ibid.  
Chapter 2 
 135 
infantry brigades. A final note, almost identical to a section found in „8th Division 
Instructions No. 6‟, explained the expected response to German reconnaissance aircraft: 
“It must be impressed on all troops that it is of the utmost importance that the heaviest 
possible rifle and Lewis Gun fire must be brought upon all low-flying enemy 
areoplanes”. All planes that escaped would, it was ominously observed, “certainly report 
our positions and bring down a very heavy artillery concentration”.339  
 
A supplement to „Offensive Instructions No. 1‟ was also issued on the 27th. „32nd 
Division Administrative Arrangements‟ provided information on the positions of 
ammunition, supply, ordnance, water, salvage and RE dumps. Soup kitchens at St. Julian 
and south of Cheddar Villa were established to offer soup, tea, biscuits and cigarettes to 
men returning from the frontline. Hot food would be “issued to the troops at the latest 
possible moment under brigade arrangements”. Three straggler posts, manned by the 
military police, were to be established west and SW of St Julian. A straggler collection 
station would also be situated NW of Wieltje. All prisoners were to be escorted to the 
divisional cage at Canal Bank. A Division forward cage would be established NW of 
Wieltje, the APM arranging for escorts from this point to the enclosure at Canal Bank. 
The document concluded with instructions for the removal and burial of the dead.
340
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These grim but necessary provisions were part of the routine administrative arrangements 
made before an attack. 
 
32
nd
 Division HQ issued a further supplement to accompany Order No. 138 the 
following day: “Definite distinct and complete units would be detailed to capture, mop 
up, and garrison each known enemy strongpoint”.341 Careful arrangements were to be 
made for maintaining direction by ready knowledge of easily identified landmarks. All 
ranks were required to know distances from the jumping-off line to each strongpoint or 
trench. The direction faced on the final objective – north, south, east or west – was 
compulsory knowledge for everyone concerned: “Every officer and as many N.C.Os as 
possible must be in possession of compasses and know the compass bearing of their 
objective”.342 
 
Hostile counter-attacks were expected to commence shortly after the attackers 
reached the final objectives:  
Troops must hold out against them [counter-attacks] to the 
last man and no one must retire under any circumstances. 
Should any individual or individuals retire [,] troops behind 
them must never under any conditions conform to the 
retirement. On the contrary [,] they must advance and 
counter-counter-attack the enemy at once [underlined in 
original].
343
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All ranks “must be made to realise that experience has proved that troops who retire 
invariably suffer 3 or 4 times greater losses than troops who advance”.344 This section of   
“cyclostyled sheet” was viewed by the postwar history of 16th HLI as indicative of a 
“desperate attack for important ground … Every inch on Passchendaele Ridge was 
valuable”.345 
 
  Junior officers were reminded to keep subordinates from scattering in search of 
souvenirs: “Every opportunity for reforming troops as reserves for repelling counter-
attacks” was to be made use of. “Counter-counter-attacks must be delivered on the 
initiative of the officer on the spot”. Subsequent success depended on “intelligence, dash 
and initiative of junior commanders”.346 
 
Extreme care was to be taken that adequate “moppers up” were detailed from 
“rear platoons to mop up the captured area”. Secured ground was “not to be too thickly 
held.” Formed bodies were to be carefully placed in the rear to engage enemy counter-
attacks. It was necessary that close touch be maintained between the “O.C., counter-
counter-attacking troops” and the frontline commander, “so that the former may have all 
arrangements made for a sudden move forward which must be made on his own 
initiative”. Battle patrols would also be immediately pushed forward to “points of 
vantage where they can give early notice of approach of any counter-attacks”.347 
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The importance of maintaining an unbroken line and secure flanks was stressed: 
“Touch must be maintained with units on the right and left and no gaps must be left”. All 
units were to be prepared to form a defensive flank following attainment of objectives. 
“If the troops on their flanks are checked they “must make every endeavour to join up 
with troops on either flank should there be a gap when the objective is reached”. Flanking 
fire from neighbouring battalions could, it was also stressed, be expected to provide 
valuable assistance to units held up during the advance.
348
 
 
Every available Vickers and Lewis gun would immediately be brought forward 
once the final objective had been gained and “the main defences of the newly captured 
area entrusted to them while the men are digging in”. All guns needed to be placed some 
distance in advance or rear of the final objective to avoid hostile shelling. Work on 
organising defences and consolidation “must be begun at once no matter how tired the 
men are”; the enemy, previous experience had demonstrated, would waste no time 
preparing a strong counter-attack. It was, therefore, crucial that the consolidation period 
“be utilized to the utmost to get cover and prepare for the counter-attack which is certain 
to come and which can be easily beaten off if machine-gun defence is organised at once 
and our trenches are prepared with energy”.349 
 
Timely information was essential if Division and brigade HQs were to gauge the 
situation and provide the attackers with essential fire support: “Without such reports it is 
impossible for the commanders behind to organise efficient artillery support for the 
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troops in front. Early information, although it may appear of little value to the sender, 
may be a great factor of success”.350  
 
Steps were to be taken to ensure all ranks had serviceable rifles despite muddy 
conditions that often rendered them useless: “It must be understood that rifle fire 
invariably wins the day”. Wire to clear muzzles and brushes to clean breaches and bolts 
would be distributed; issue canvas breach covers would also be kept in place as long as 
possible.
351
  
 
The success of any assault was dependent on “lines of the assaulting troops being 
square on the objective to be attacked” during the forming-up. Jumping-off lines for each 
platoon had to be carefully marked by pegs and taped: “Failure to do this will lead to loss 
of direction which is fatal”. Advancing troops were reminded to maintain touch with rear 
units: “Neglect of keeping this touch has lately resulted in failure”.352 
 
Bypassed strongpoints that continued resistance were to be left alone “until the 
attacking troops have securely established themselves beyond them” and consolidated 
their positions against inevitable counter-attack. “Then and not till then call on them to 
surrender”. Prisoners were to be sent back immediately, as “the tide of battle may turn 
and the prisoners lost become a source of danger”. The lengthy document concluded with 
an appeal to divisional esprit: “It must be remembered that it is a point of honour for 
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every man in the 32
nd
 Division that any position captured is held to the last and that not 
an inch of ground gained is ever given up”.353 
 
The final series of instructions and orders were issued during the period 28 to 30 
November. Three instruction documents (7, 8, and 9) were forwarded on 28
 
November. 
Technical information (organisation, rates of fire, communication, equipment and rations, 
preparation and camouflage of emplacements) and pre-attack movements concerning  
deployment of the 128 barrage and area concentration machine-guns were related in 
Instructions No. 7.
354
  
 
Instructions No. 8 were based on the contents of „II Corps Operation Order No. 
172‟ of 27 November.355 „Part A‟ elaborated additional air to ground communication 
details: “A contact aeroplane will fly over the line at 7:30 a.m. on the morning of the 
attack [,] and will call for flares by sending a succession of „A‟s on the Klaxon Horn and 
dropping a white light”. The most advanced line of infantry would burn green flares at 
that hour “as soon as called for by the aeroplane”. Issue green flares were not to be 
expended unless specifically called for from the air or, accompanied by manipulated 
Watson Fans, at all other times on request. “Two oblong black panels fixed at right 
angles to the rear edge of the lower plane, one on each side of the fuselage and about 
three feet from it” would identify the contact aircraft. Ground flares were only to be lit 
for a machine bearing these markings. The „Contact Counter-attack Aeroplane‟ would, as 
                                                 
353
Ibid.  
354Ibid: „32nd Division Instructions No. 7: Machine-guns‟, 28 November 1917. Barrage and area 
concentration duties were to be carried out by MG companies (14
th
, 96
th
, 219
th
) from 32
nd   
(188
th
, 189
th
, 
233
rd
) 63
rd
 and (32 guns) 35
th
 divisions.  
355
 See TNA: WO/95/643: „II Corps Operation Order No. 172‟, 27 November 1917, II Corps War Diary. 
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in 8
th Division‟s attack scheme, be in the air “from dawn on the morning of the day of the 
attack [,] to watch for any indication of impending counter-attacks and to give warning of 
same by wireless and by dropping a WHITE PARACHUTE LIGHT”.  „Part B‟ provided 
additional details for the synchronization of watches.
356
 
 
Instructions No. 9 stressed that “every officer and NCO and as many men as 
possible moving to position of assembly must know the details of the route he is to 
follow”. Elaborate measures were to be taken to ensure that assault troops reached their   
positions prior to Zero. 97 Brigade HQ, with attached infantry and engineers, would 
move to the assembly area on the night of 1/2 December. Chosen routes were to be 
marked by notice boards, which were not to be placed by any other troops except for road 
control and track maintenance parties. “Any individuals or parties meeting troops of 97th 
Infantry Brigade on any route will give way to them and get off the road or track” until 
clear. All duckboard tracks in the divisional area were reserved for the exclusive use of 
97 Brigade from 4:00 p.m. on 1 December to 6:00 a.m. on the 2
nd
. Care was to be taken 
that carrying, artillery and signal parties were clear of these avenues during that time. 
Traffic control and reconnaissance of overland routes were the respective responsibilities 
of reserve brigade and assault brigade: 14 Brigade would establish a reliable traffic 
control post at the junction of the Gravenstafel – Bellevue Road with „Peter Pan‟ track to 
deny access to 8
th
 Division‟s allotted tracks. 97 Brigade was to see that all tracks and 
roads to assembly positions were carefully reconnoitered, while also ensuring traversable 
                                                 
356Ibid: „32nd Division Offensive Instructions No. 8‟, 28 November 1917. The scheme for synchronization 
of watches called for an officer to be sent from Division HQ to the HQs of all three brigades, the CRA and 
CRE „between 12 noon and 1 p.m. on the day of attack‟. This would be repeated between 3:00 and 4:00 
p.m. The DMGO would be provided with time information by divisional HQ at 11:30 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.  
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paths forward of established duckboard tracks were marked with white-washed guide 
posts.
357
 
 
Communication with the „Contact Counter-attack Aeroplane‟ was articulated in 
Instructions No. 10 (30 November). This machine was not to be confused with the 
contact aircraft referred to in Instructions No. 8. It would be identifiable by a single 
streamer attached to its tail. The observer was prepared to receive messages from the 
infantry by signal lamp. A chart containing thirty signal instructions for the attack was 
attached. One example required the infantry to signal “CAR.CAR.CAR”. This meant, 
“Enemy counter-attacking on our right flank”. Confirmation of receipt from the air would 
be a repetition of any lamp signal received from troops on the ground.
358
 
 
Brigadier-General F.W. Lumsden‟s 14 Brigade was placed in divisional 
support.
359
  Part „A‟ of Instructions No. 11 (30 November) related its assigned role: “You 
[Lumsden] will be in command of the brigade in divisional support (14 Brigade, less 14
th 
MG Company on barrage fire work) during the forthcoming operations”. Arrangements 
were to be made to have his four battalions (5/6
th
 Royal Scots, 1
st
 Dorsetshire Regiment, 
2
nd
 Manchester Regiment, 15
th
 HLI) deployed at Irish Farm, Hilltop, Wurst Farm and 
Bellevue for the immediate defence of the Bellevue Spur. These units would be ready “to 
                                                 
357
 Ibid: „32nd Instructions No. 9: Assembly‟, 28 November 1917 and „Addendum No. 1 to 32nd Division 
Offensive Instructions No. 9‟, 29 November 1917.  
358
 Ibid: „32nd Offensive Instructions No. 10: Communication with Contact Counter-attack Aeroplane‟, 30 
November 1917.  
359
 Brigadier-General Frederick W. Lumsden VC CB DSO (1872-1918). Commissioned Royal Marine 
Artillery 1888; Staff College 1910; General Staff Singapore 1910-14; CO Royal Marine Howitzer Brigade 
1915; General Staff First Army 1916-17; A/Brigadier-General and GOC 14 Brigade April 1917; DSO (2 
bars) and VC for period January-April 1917. See Gerald Gliddon, VC’s of the First World War: Arras and 
Messines 1917 (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), pp. 33-38.  
Chapter 2 
 143 
move at notice of ½ hour from Zero onwards”. They were not to be employed “unless the 
enemy should make such a determined counter-attack as to endanger the present 
frontline.” In any case, Lumsden was “to keep in close touch with the general situation 
and with the 97
th
 Infantry Brigade, and have a liaison officer at the 97
th
 Brigade 
Headquarters”. 360 
 
14 Brigade was also tasked with establishing observation posts in the vicinity of 
Bellevue in order to provide divisional HQ with frequent reports “as to your [Brigadier-
General Lumsden‟s] view of the situation and all events that come to your knowledge.” 
Lumsden would assume command of operations in the event of the Brigadier-General 
Blacklock becoming a casualty. He could “probably” expect to relieve 97 Brigade two 
nights after the attack, “but must be prepared to do so earlier if required”. Appendix A of 
Instructions No. 11 outlined deployment (against troublesome snipers, strongpoints and 
possible counter-attacks just beyond the left flank of 97 Brigade) of the two detached 
Stokes mortars from 14 Brigade. At Zero + 2 hours, both tubes were to be brought 
forward to the vicinity of Tournant Farm, where they would provide additional fire 
support assistance to the left battalion [15
th
 LF] of 97 Brigade.
361
  
 
  Part „B‟ informed Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood (GOC 96 Brigade)362 that his 
command – less two battalions and 96th MG Company attached to 97 Brigade – would be 
in divisional reserve. The remaining two battalions (2
nd
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and 
                                                 
360
 See Appendix 8.   
361
 Ibid.  
362
 A/Brigadier-General Austen Claude Girdwood DSO. Commissioned Northumberland Fusiliers 1896; 
Sudan 1898; South Africa 1899-1902; Staff College; Mohmand Expedition 1908; Major 1915; 
A/Lieutenant-Colonel and CO 11
th
 Border Regiment 1916-17; GOC 96 Brigade August 1917.  
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16
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers) were to be ready to move forward from Canal Bank and Irish 
Farm “at maximum notice of 2 hours from Zero onwards”.363 
 
 Organisation for the evacuation of casualties was divided into two sectors: 
Wounded in the right sector would be carried along a mule track by stretcher-bearers 
from the RAP at Mosselmarkt, through relay posts at Meetcheele and Waterloo; wounded 
from the left sector were to be carried (via duckboard and connecting timber track) from 
the RAP near Wallemolen, through relay posts at Kronprinz Farm, Lump House and 
Kansas. The interim destination for both routes was the ADS at Somme Redoubt.  These 
paths, treacherous enough in the daytime, would be carefully flagged and night-lights 
placed “close to them to direct stretcher-bearers and walking wounded cases to the 
Advanced Dressing Station”. All stretcher cases would, following treatment, be   
transported by ambulance car and Red Cross lorry westward along the section of road 
Gravenstafel – Wieltje, to the entraining point at Bridge House. Casualties, after being 
transferred to a light railway, would then be carried as far as the „II Corps Main Dressing 
Station‟ just north of Ypres. The DDMS II Corps was also to make arrangements for 
trains to be in place at Somme Redoubt at Zero + 2 and Zero + 3 hours. “Subsequent 
trains could be called up as required from the control point at BRIDGE HOUSE in 1 ½ 
hours”.364  
 
 The CO 92
nd
 Field Ambulance would be responsible for evacuation of casualties 
from RAPs to ADS. Stretcher-bearers from divisional field ambulances were to be placed 
                                                 
363
 See Appendix 8.  
364
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „G‟, Report on the Medical Arrangements During   
the Recent Operations: Night 1/2
nd
 December 1917‟, 15 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary.  
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at his disposal to accomplish this task. “It was known the carrying of the wounded would 
be very arduous and arrangements were made with [the] General Staff, whereby 2 
officers and 100 O.R. of infantry battalions of 14
th
 Brigade could be called upon to act as 
stretcher-bearers after the R.A.M.C. bearers were too fatigued to carry on”.365  
 
Sir Henry Rawlinson was pleased with the organisational efforts of both 
divisions:  
I went into details of their attack with the 32 and 8 and I 
was well satisfied with their preparations – Heneker‟s 
arrangements and plans were particularly good … Shute 
has an excellent model of the Passchendaele Ridge which 
he is going to lecture his men on so that each and all may 
know exactly what is required of them – both divisions 
have been very thorough in the details of their barrages.
366
   
 
Maintenance and prolongation of roads and tracks remained problematic. On 28 
November Rawlinson wrote: “We are suffering much from the difficulty in 
communication from the frontline – the condition of Passchendaele is terrible with dead 
all over the place and no chance of burying them so long as the shelling continues”.367  
                                                 
365
 Ibid.   
366
 CAC: RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 27 November 1917.  
367
 Ibid. 28 November 1917.  
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Plate 2.5 33
rd
 Battalion MGC Sector Model: ‘Passchendaele-Broodseinde Ridge Defences’ 
February 1918. Tabletop and outdoor scale models in relief were popular and effective tools for 
pre-operational instruction and sector orientation (Source: IWM Q56263)  
 
          It is remarkable, given the dreadful conditions and almost impossible task of 
subduing active German battery concentrations ringing the salient that necessary 
preparation for, and consequent execution of any sort of coherent attack occurred. This 
had much to do with organisational and logistical aspects, as comparison of 8
th
 Division 
and 32
nd
 Division orders and instructions readily demonstrate, of S.S. 135 and the 
formulaic operational approach adopted by Second Army as standard operating procedure 
after 20 September. Adequate advance dumps of rations, water, ammunition and HE 
stores were in place by the close of November. Overland communications 
infrastructures
368
 were maintained and extended.
369
 The lengthening of vital duckboard 
                                                 
368
 „[I] n November 1917, the state of mapping of the British area in the Ypres Salient was so poor that the 
[4
th
 Field Service] Company [FSC] had to obtain information about the roads constructed for and during the 
Flanders offensive of June to November by referring to captured German maps. The information had 
simply not been recorded by 2
nd
 or 5
th
 FSC [attached to Second and Fifth armies respectively] during the 
operations‟. See Peter Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers: A History of British Survey and Mapping on the 
Western Front 1914-1918 (Lewes: Map Books, 1999), p. 379.  
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tracks across the impassable mud from Canal Bank to the forward area was duly noted by 
Major-General Shute: “This extension reflects great credit on the R.E”.370 All such efforts 
were a triumph over extreme adversity.  
 
 
2.4 Loss of Teall Cottage 
 
Aggressive German defenders, worried by three successful British efforts to reduce the 
depth of their established Vorfeldzonelinie, re-captured Teall Cottage – now an advanced 
outpost previously occupied without resistance by a British patrol on the night of 21/22 
November – after overwhelming its small garrison of 14 men on 30 November.371 Second 
                                                                                                                                                 
369
 Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Pollard (CRE 32
nd
 Division) outlined what was accomplished in a report dated 
6 December: „On taking over from 1st Division work was pushed on with duckboard tracks toward the 
frontline. The following tracks were in existence: MOUSETRAP TRACK up to V.28.d.2.5 (vicinity of 
Source Farm), No. 6 TRACK up to D.3.d.9.9 (vicinity of Kronprinz Farm). It was decided to make a third 
track from WINNIPEG or its vicinity to KRONPRINZ [FARM] where it carried on along what had been 
No. 6 TRACK to direct through PETER PAN and on to VIRILE FARM, thus giving 3 distinct tracks to the 
frontline exclusive of the BELLEVUE ROAD. C.[R.]E., II Corps agreed to deliver 1,200 duckboards daily 
and this was found to be as much as could be carried up. The length of the track laid was decided by the 
strength of the carrying party. Dumps were a long way back and not more than one journey could be done 
at night. MOUSETRAP TRACK was got through to the frontline by 28/11/17. No. 6 Track through 
VIRILE FARM by 1/12/17. Cross tracks were also put in. The centre track (KRONPRINZ TRACK) was 
got to VAPOUR FARM by 1/12/17. Progress was slow on this track as it was badly shelled and the ground 
was boggy in places. The new track from WINNIPEG to KRONPRINZ [FARM] was pushed through by 
29/11/17, as much as 1,500 yards being laid in one night. Great credit is due to Major Waters of the 218
th
 
Field Coy. RE for his energy and determination in pressing on the work‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-
action report, „Part II, Plan of Operations, Section 1, General‟ 11 December 1917, p. 3 and „Appendix „F‟, 
Report on RE Work during Operations by 32
nd
 Division on 2/12/17‟, 6 December 1917, 32nd Division War 
Diary. Nine field companies (206
th
, 218
th
, 219
th
 of 32
nd
 Division, 23
rd
   of 1
st
 Division, 247
th
, 248
th
, 249
th
 of 
63
rd
 RND and 446
th
, 447
th
 of 50
th
 Division) were employed to carry out road, track and tramway work. Two 
pioneer battalions (1/5
th
 Welsh of 1
st
 Division, 14
th
 Worcestershire of 63
rd
 RND) and 1 infantry battalion 
(Howe of 63
rd
 RND) provided additional labour.  
370
 Ibid: After-action report, „Part II, Plan of Operations, Section 1, General‟, 11 December 1917, p. 8 and 
„Map Showing Tracks Scale 1:20,000 32G/MAPS/46.M‟, 32nd Division War Diary.   
371
 Teall Cottage became the responsibility of 32
nd
 Division following the scheduled boundary adjustment 
with 8
th
 Division on the night of 24/25 November. Belated discovery of its loss after nightfall delayed 
immediate local counter-attack. An attempt to regain the position by 16
th
 NF (96 Brigade) before dawn on 1 
December was repulsed with the loss of 2 officers and 100 ORs. See TNA: WO/95/1677: 8
th
 Division War 
Diary, WO/95/1718: 24 Brigade War Diary, WO/157/120-121: Disposition maps in „Second Army 
Intelligence Summaries‟, 11 November to 5 December 1917, Second Army Intelligence File and TNA: 
WO/95/2398: 16
th
 NF War Diary.  For the tragic circumstances by which a decorated company commander 
(Captain C. Cundall MC) of 2
nd
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was killed while unknowingly approaching the 
German-occupied post – thus alerting the British of its capture the previous morning – on the night of 30 
November/1 December see WO/95/2397: 2
nd
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers War Diary.  
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Army intelligence confidently noted an “easy repulse with no gains”; II Corps‟ 
intelligence summary for 1 December stated: 
At 6:00 a.m. this morning [30 November] the enemy 
massed for attack behind the high ground at V.30.a and at 
the same time opened a heavy barrage in front of and 
immediately behind our frontline. Our artillery barrage 
prevented the attack from developing in force and only 
straggling parties advanced. They were easily driven off 
and several of the enemy were seen to be hit.
372
 
 
The war diaries of II Corps, VIII Corps, 8
th
 Division and 32
nd
 Division also failed to 
register the loss of Teall Cottage, while 96 Brigade‟s diarist laconically observed days 
later: “It is surmised that during barrage in the morning enemy must have taken the post 
unnoticed”. Subsequent events would soon demonstrate that the capture of this seemingly 
insignificant concrete blockhouse had placed its hostile garrison – estimated at thirty men 
with one machine-gun – in a convenient position (32nd Division side of its boundary with 
8
th
 Division) to disrupt at the outset, the imminent night operation.
373
  
                                                 
372
 TNA: WO/157/289: II Corps Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1917, II Corps Intelligence File. This 
belated attempt to regain portions of the Vorfeldzonelinie (gained by 8
th
 Division on the nights of 18/19, 
20/21 and 24/25 November) is indicative of the local German commander‟s elastic response – as opposed 
to adhering to any rigid tactical doctrine – to prevailing battlefield situations and conditions. This flexible 
approach, retained throughout 1914-18 as part of the Imperial German Army‟s pre-war cultural ethos, 
ignored, in this particular circumstance, doctrinal expectations that the Vorfeldzonelinie would be regained 
quickly: „The Outpost Zone – In a large attack a deep advanced zone prevents the enemy from destroying, 
with his artillery fire, great numbers of our garrisons and thereby penetrating our front. In local attacks, 
however, the troops must not withdraw from it without serious fighting. If momentarily abandoned it will 
be retaken immediately’ (my emphasis). See Introduction by Robert T. Foley in Captain G.C. Wynne, If 
Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (Brighton: Tom Donovan unexpurgated edition, 2008), 
p. xxvi and Historical Sub-section, General Staff, A.E.F., A Survey of German Tactics 1918 (Washington 
DC: War Department, December 1918), p.33.  
373
 See TNA: WO/157/120: „Second Army Intelligence Summary‟, 30 November 1917, Second Army 
Intelligence File, WO/157/288: „II Corps Summary of Information‟, 1 December 1917, II Corps 
Intelligence File, WO/95/643: II Corps War Diary, WO/95/821: VIII Corps War Diary, WO/95/1677: 8
th
  
Division War Diary, WO/95/2370: 32
nd
 Division War Diary, WO/95/2396: 96 Brigade War Diary, Captain 
H. FitzM. Stacke MC, The Worcestershire Regiment in the Great War Vol. 1 (Kidderminster: G.T. 
Cheshire & Sons, 1928), p. 300 and IWM 4732: „32nd Div. No.G.S.1499/3/33‟ (CO 16th NF after-action 
report), 5 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
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Plate 2.6 Site of Teall Cottage from site of Northern Redoubt (Source: Rob Thompson) 
 
 
2.5 Final Hours 
 
Pre-arranged brigade reliefs commenced after dark on 30 November. On the right, two 
companies each from the 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire Regiment and 1
st
 RIR (25 Brigade) took 
over a frontline extending west of Exert Farm to Teall Cottage exclusive from 23 Brigade 
(Text Map 2.1.1).
374
 On the left, 16
th
 NF and 15
th
 LF (attached 97 Brigade) relieved 2
nd
 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and 16
th
 LF (96 Brigade) from opposite Teall Cottage to 
Tournant Farm. Forward movements by 16
th
 HLI and 11
th
 Border Regiment to 97 
Brigade support and reserve positions at Bellevue and Wurst Farm occurred 
simultaneously.
375
  
                                                 
374
 TNA:  WO/95/2370: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by 8th Division on 1st /2nd December 1917‟, 
8
th
 Division War Diary, p. 1.   
375
 TNA:  WO/95/2370: 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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Map 2.1.1 8
th
 Division: Dispositions Morning 1 December 
(Source: TNA: WO/95/1677) 
 
            1 December dawned with low clouds and thick mist; visibility remained very 
poor. The meteorological station at Vlamertinghe recorded temperature values of a 47° 
high during the day and 37° low after dark. Sunset was at 3:47 p.m.; moonrise at 6:21 
p.m.
376
 Sir Henry Rawlinson continued to express reserved optimism, regardless of 
intelligence that the enemy was alert and expectant, about the impending night operation: 
The weather is better and I have great hopes that we shall 
do the trick at Passchendaele all right [,] but the Bosch is 
expecting us. I visited the 32 & 8 divisions this PM and 
was well satisfied with their arrangements – They are two 
                                                 
376
 LHCMA: Second Army War Diary, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, File 7/16, King‟s College, 
London, TNA: WO/95/15: „Temperature Values during December 1917: Degrees Fahrenheit‟, in GHQ 
War Diary and WO/157/288: „Calendar for December 1917: Times Calculated for Second Army Front and 
Greenwich Mean Time‟, II Corps Intelligence File.   
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very good div[isions] and will [,] I am sure [,] do all that is 
possible.
377
  
 
Battle preparations (priming Mills bombs, examining rifles, gas masks, Lewis guns, field 
dressings, iron rations, identity discs, etc.) by assault battalions of 25 and 97 brigades 
were being made in dank dugout complexes, dismal hutted camps and shattered farms 
west of the Passchendaele Ridge. 25 Brigade, for example, had previously issued (27 
November) a final itemized list of equipment and ammunition to be carried forward by 
the attacking troops; every combat necessity appeared to be provided for.
378
 The long, 
arduous journey to the jumping-off positions was scheduled to commence after dark, time 
being allowed for the attackers to reach their destination before zero hour at 1:55 a.m. on 
2 December.  
 
            Brigadier-General Aspinall (BGGS) submitted the weekly operations report, 
outlining activity in VIII Corps sector during 24 to 30 November, to Army HQ on 1 
December: “During the week harassing fire has been carried out on enemy‟s trenches and 
several concentration shoots on suspected areas”. Ammunition dumps in the German rear 
were observed to be “blown up, and from prisoners statements, our artillery appears to 
have been successful”. German guns were noted to be “extremely active” on the 
                                                 
377
 CAC: RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 1 December 1917.  
378
 The 3 assault battalions of 25
 Brigade were equipped as follows: „1st and 2nd Lines (a) Riflemen: Rifle 
and bayonet, 170 rounds of SAA, 1 shovel, valise, iron rations, rations for day of attack, water bottle full, 2 
sandbags, 2 ground flares, Small Box respirator, leather jerkin, groundsheet, 1 Watson Fan per section. (b) 
Bombers:  As for (a) except – 120 SAA only, 5 Mills grenades. (c) Rifle Bombers: As for (a) except – 50 
rounds of SAA only, 8 rifle grenades, 16 cartridges for same. (d) Lewis Gunners: As for (a) except – Nos. 1 
& 2 carry no rifle or bayonet, 50 rounds of SAA only, 20 drums SAA per gun, only two shovels per gun. 2. 
3
rd
 Wave: As for 1 except the following will be carried in addition: Riflemen: 100 rounds of SAA (i.e. 270 
in all). Bombers: 2 men 16 L[ewis] G[un] drums, remainder 100 rounds of SAA (i.e. 270 in all). Rifle 
Grenadiers: 100 rounds of SAA (i.e. 270 in all). Lewis Gunners: 10 extra drums (i.e. 30 in all) SAA per 
gun. 3. 10 SOS grenades per company, divided between Company HQ, Platoon Commanders and 
Sergeants. 1 Box “Very” Lights divided between companies‟. See TNA: WO/95/1727: „25th Infantry 
Brigade Instructions No. 3‟, 27 November 1917, 25 Brigade War Diary.   
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Passchendaele Ridge, special attention being paid to Seine and Levi cottages.  Hostile 
artillery shoots of “short duration” were also directed on the new 18-pounder battery 
positions in the vicinity of the Abraham Heights. The enemy infantry, “though quiet, 
have shewn [sic] themselves to be alert and awaiting any signs of a renewal of the attack 
by our troops”. 8th Division‟s steady success in narrowing the distance to Venison Trench 
and adjacent redoubts was also noted: 
No minor operations have been undertaken, but the line of 
posts has been gradually pushed forward until the forward 
posts are now in close proximity to the enemy‟s main 
position, thus denying him the use of the defended zone in 
front of his main defences. 
 
German machine-guns, however, had been active by night during the previous week, “but    
have fired very little during the day”. Despite this, active patrolling was continued after 
dark; no enemy patrols were encountered.
379
  
 
            Major-General Heneker, suffering from a severe bout of Lumbago and still 
harbouring extreme reservations about the impending “beastly operation”, wrote tersely 
of “last preparations” in his diary. One detects a certain amount of fatigue, irritability and 
semi-fatalism in his correspondence prior to the attack. 1917 had been an arduous 
campaign year for the GOC 8
th
 Division. Recurrent lumbago complaints, coupled with 
discomfort from a thigh wound received in December 1915, no doubt contributed to the 
pessimistic outlook.
380
  
 
                                                 
379
 BL: 48359: „VIII Corps, G. 2283, Weekly Report on Operations for week ending 6-0 p.m., Friday 30th 
Nov., 1917‟, 1 December 1917, VIII Corps Official War Diary with Appendices and Addenda, Hunter-
Weston Papers, Vol. V.  
380
 TNA: WO/95/1677: 8
th
 Division War Diary and IWM:  66/541/1: Heneker Diary, 1 December 1917.  
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          The weekly operations report, outlining activity in II Corps‟ sector during the same 
period as that covered by VIII Corps‟ report, described the general policy of preparation 
for the forthcoming operation: Patrols had been “very active throughout the week, with 
the idea of denying the superiority of no man‟s land to the enemy, and also to find out the 
nature of the ground over which we are to fight”. Several machine-gun positions were 
also identified. British machine-guns carried out harassing fire each night. This took the 
form of “concentrated shoots on communications and occupied posts”. British gunners 
concentrated “twice daily on enemy occupied areas and used tracks”. Counter-
preparation took place “at dawn for the first three days of period under review”, after 
which concentrated bursts of fire were “directed on selected places in addition to 
harassing fire by day and night on enemy‟s approaches, roads, tracks, and centres of 
activity”. German activity varied in intensity. Their patrols seemed to have diminished, 
while hostile artillery fire was “normal except that his [German] shelling of duckboard 
tracks and of the GRAVENSTAFEL – MEETCHEELE road has become intense”. There 
was, however, little sign of a decrease in shellfire during the week.
381
 “Very little 
activity” by German machine-guns was also noted: “On a few occasions our roads and 
tracks received attention, but generally speaking, the enemy appears to have confined 
himself to direct fire [,] which has consisted of occasional sweeping of no man‟s land”. 
Prompt fire was directed on spotted British patrols, “but these bursts have been short”.382 
                                                 
381
 „The WESTROOSEBEKE group has been most active. Little fire has been reported from 
HOUTHOULST [sic], but shelling from POLDERS WOOD and SHAW WOOD has been reported almost 
daily. Considerable decrease in gas shelling is noticeable, but there has been no active gas bombardment, 
merely gas shelling over wide areas‟. See TNA: WO/95/643: „II Corps No. 227 G., II Corps Summary of 
Operations for Week-ending 30. 11. 17‟, II Corps War Diary and IWM 4723: „HARASSING FIRE MAP 
(To Accompany II Corps Artillery Instructions No. 10)‟, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 
80/10/2).  
382
 Ibid. Casualties for the period covered by this report were 32
nd
 Division: Officers - 3 killed, 15 
wounded; ORs - 97 killed, 337 wounded, 108 missing, 35
th
 Division: Officers - 3 killed, 8 wounded; ORs - 
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           Enemy shellfire remained normal on 32
nd
 Division‟s front during the remainder of 
the 1
st
. Divisional artillery responded with the usual concentration and harassing barrages 
on German trenches, pillboxes, dugouts and tracks to the frontline. The following moves 
were to be carried out after dark “in accordance with table” attached to 32nd Division 
O.O. 139:  
1. HQ 97 Infantry Brigade to move from Canal Bank to 
Kronprinz Farm. 
 
2. All four battalions of 97 Infantry Brigade into the 
frontline. 
 
3. HQ 14 Infantry Brigade from Canal Bank to Kansas 
relieving HQ 96 Infantry Brigade, with 16
th
 
Northumberland Fusiliers and 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers 
assembled in accordance with 32
nd
 Division 
Instructions  No. 9, with 5 battalions in line.
383
  
 
Dusk and the march forward to assembly tapes along allocated roads and slimy 
duckboard tracks were fast approaching. Time remained to consume one more hot meal 
and conduct final administrative and equipment checks. Battalion commanders discussed 
a myriad of last minute details with their staffs, while company and platoon officers, 
dressed like ORs with unobtrusive pips on shoulders and carrying rifles, performed 
inspection parades of equipment-laden men. Two heavy rain showers occurred after 
nightfall “making the ground greasy”. Previous tours of the horrific salient, a certain 
amount of unease about the attack plan and Major-General Heneker‟s consequent semi-
fatalism had left their mark on subordinates, so some pessimism appears to have 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 killed, 116 wounded, 63
rd
 Division: 4 ORs wounded, Corps Troops: Officers - 6 wounded; ORs -17 
killed, 66 wounded, 1 missing.  
383
 TNA: WO/95/2370: 32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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prevailed at brigade and battalion level.
384
 As Lieutenant Charles Carrington (1/5
th
 Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment) observed whilst recounting preparations for an earlier operation 
in his postwar memoirs: “Men going into action support themselves by a sort of enforced 
hysterical cheerfulness, but no one could be cheerful in the Third Battle of Ypres”. The 
official termination of that dreadful campaign on 20 November was of no consequence to 
the morale, cheerful or otherwise, of troops primed for another advance along the 
Passchendaele Ridge.
385
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Guns (London: Batsford, 1936), pp. 57-58 and the manifestly polemical David Lloyd George, War 
Memoirs Vol. 2 (London: Odhams Press abridged edition, 1937), p. 343.   
  
3 
A Moonlight Massacre 
 
    It may be said at the outset that the element of surprise intended 
in the Passchendaele attack failed entirely, as the enemy were 
aware of the British intentions and fully prepared.
386
 
 
 
3.1 Assembly 
Saturday 1 December 6:21 p.m.: A full moon rose with singular brilliance against an 
expansive backdrop of a starry winter sky. Scuddy clouds, propelled westward by winds 
of 5 to 10 mph, interspersed the quasi-luminous atmosphere. Occasional flares cast an 
ephemeral gloss on swollen streams and the roily liquid surface of hundreds of shell 
holes. Afternoon showers failed to wash away a light coating of snow.
387
 Major-General 
Heneker‟s after-action report noted: “The night was fine and clear and the moon was 
particularly bright. Individual figures could be distinguished at 100 yards, and bodies of 
men at 200 yards. The ground had been severely torn up by artillery fire, but was on the 
whole, unusually dry and the going was good”, so earlier anxiety about being “heard 
squelching through the mud” was abated.388 
                                                 
386
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Plate 3.1 Passchendaele December 1917 
(Source: IWM Q56257) 
 
 Seven and one half assault companies from three battalions of Brigadier-General 
Coffin‟s 25 Brigade were detailed to assemble in three waves inside the line of their 
advanced posts on a frontage of 1,020 yards from opposite Exert Farm to the vicinity of 
Northern Redoubt (Map 9). Coffin hoped to reduce recognised dangers by having the 
attackers form-up in rear of his advanced positions:  
On account of our outpost line being close up to the 
enemy‟s advanced posts, and owing to the fact that it was 
only three days after a full moon and the nights were very 
light, forming up had to be carried out 200 yards inside our 
outposts on a line about 350 yards from the enemy‟s main 
position on the N[orth] and 250 yards from his main 
position on the S[outh] … The outpost line which was held 
by 2 ½ companies was to be responsible for covering the 
advance of the attacking troops by rifle and Lewis Gun fire 
until the attacking troops passed through it. We knew 
where the enemy‟s M.G.‟s were and directly they opened, 2 
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Lewis Guns at least were to concentrate on to each M.G. 
and endeavour to neutralize it.
389 
  
 
The right battalion (2
nd
 Royal Berkshire Regiment), tasked with forming a defensive 
flank in order to protect the “attacking battalions from an attack from a SE direction”, 
would advance with one and one half companies. The “object was a line running from 
NW to SE, passing one hundred and fifty yards west of Wrath Farm to a point about two 
hundred yards north of Exert Farm, where it curved back towards the south-west. The left 
boundary of the battalion‟s area was directed NE towards Wrath Farm”. Assault 
companies were organised in three waves: half of „D‟ Company on the right, „B‟ 
Company on the left, „C‟ assigned to form defensive flank “on the right in the latter part 
of the advance”, while „A‟ Company remained in reserve. The remaining half of „D‟ was 
detailed to hold the outpost line.
390
 “In the case of 2/Rifle Brigade and 2/Lincoln Regt. on 
the left and centre respectively, three companies were told off to do the attack while one 
company was told off to hold the outpost line and so cover forming up”. One of 2nd 
Lincolnshire‟s three assault companies was assigned to fill an anticipated gap as the inner 
flanks of the former battalion (advancing due east) and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade (advancing NE) 
diverged. 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade‟s left company was also detailed to “form up behind the left 
flank” to fill another anticipated gap on the left.  The out-going 1st RIR would proceed to 
Brigade reserve at Meetcheele following relief of its companies in the outpost line. 
“Guides were provided from the head of the tracks [,] under [25] Brigade arrangements 
[,] to lead battalions to the right of their forming up tapes”. Forming up was to be carried 
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out “on a single tape laid from 150 yards SE of Teal [sic] Cottage” to west of Exert Farm. 
“This tape was laid on iron pickets each bearing a sign painted white denoting the 
frontage of various battalions”. Direction tapes, “leading from the forming up tape in the 
direction of the advance [,] had also been laid” to aid the assembly.391  
 
 The 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire Regiment, responsible for the right half of 25 Brigade‟s 
line since the night of 30 November/1 December, began to deploy on a frontage of 200 
yards as soon as darkness permitted. „D‟ Company “took over the frontline on the 
frontage allotted to the battalion with one platoon of „C‟ Company on the right in position 
as the beginning of the defensive flank, which was to be formed on the right”. The 
remainder of the latter company was withdrawn from the line following relief, “pending 
the time for it to form up on its tape later”. „A‟ Company, in reserve during the attack, 
began the march forward from the neigbourhood of Meetcheele just after dusk. “Owing 
to the extreme darkness” this company became lost and, suffering “numerous casualties” 
from shellfire while traversing the southern extension of No. 5 Track, did not reach its 
assigned reserve position, where it dug in, until about 9:00 p.m.
392
  
 
 At 7:15 p.m., „B‟ Company (left assault company of 2nd Royal Berkshire) and two 
platoons of „D‟ Company (right assault company) moved forward from Meetcheele along 
No. 5 Track South under intermittent shelling. The going was rough and several men 
were lost:  
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B Company [,] which was leading found great difficulty in 
getting across the gaps in the duckboards caused by 
shellfire and a great many men got badly stuck in the mud 
with the result that they and the leading half of D Company 
were [,] by the time they reached the head of the 
duckboards [,] in a state of disorganisation. 2
nd
 Lieutenant 
Giddings (OC B Company) got together 1 platoon and led 
it forward to the tapes with one of the guides provided by 
Bat [talion] HQ leaving 2
nd
 Lieut[enant] s Upton and 
Tremellan to get the remainder out of the mud and into 
their sections and platoons again. By 9:30 p.m. this re-
organisation was complete [,] but 2
nd
 Lieutenant Giddings 
has not returned. 2
nd
 Lieut[enant] Rice and Lieut[enant] 
Francis (B[riga]de Intelligence Officer) went forward to 
look for him.
393
  
 
Twenty-three-year-old acting Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.H. Stirling MC (former CO 2
nd
 
Cameronians)
394
 extricated and took forward the stalled elements of „B‟ and „D‟ 
companies “as the congestion at the head of the track was great, many men of the 2nd 
Lincolns and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade having arrived there”. The forming up was carried out 
with “little further trouble”. Stirling reported to Brigade HQ that his battalion was ready 
to attack at 11:30 p.m.
395
 
 
 Twenty-one-year-old 38243 Private Frederick John Wakely was a gunner in the 
„Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps‟ or recently designated – by Royal Warrant on 28 
July 1917 – „Tank Corps‟, who somehow ended up in the ranks of 2nd Royal Berkshire. 
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 Captain and A/Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Robert Hoste Stirling MC replaced a physically and mentally 
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nd
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th
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Land-Locked Lake (London: Arthur Barker, 1932), pp. 290-317, Loraine Petre, The Royal Berkshire 
Regiment Vol. 2, p. 96 and 2
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Military authorities, possibly influenced by manpower deficits, deemed „Fred‟ was 
required for service in a line infantry battalion. Fate thus necessitated that the experienced 
young veteran should find himself, instead of the noisome, stifling confines of a Mark IV 
tank, ensconced in a shell hole ready to advance with his company in the icy pre-dawn 
hours of 2 December 1917.
396
  
 
Plate 3.2 Private F.J. Wakely (Source: MMP) 
 
 Numbed sentries of C‟ and „D‟ companies 1st RIR, responsible for the left half of 25 
Brigade‟s line since the night of 30 November/1 December, anxiously anticipating their 
imminent withdrawal to Brigade support, scanned a narrow no man‟s land irradiated by 
moonlight. German activity, other than the staccato rattle of a machine-gun, sharp report 
of a rifle or a bursting flare, appeared almost non-existent opposite the advanced line of 
outposts extending from the vicinity of Teall Cottage to the right boundary of 2
nd
 Royal 
Berkshire. The expected relief would occur following the arrival of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire and 
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2
nd
 Rifle Brigade (centre and left assault battalions of 25 Brigade) whose men, burdened 
with Lewis Guns, hand grenades, ammunition, magnesium flares, picks, shovels, etc., 
made slow progress along assigned roads and serpentine duckboard tracks traversing the 
barren expanse of shell holes and swamp. “The journey, however, was ultimately 
accomplished and, once they arrived, the troops, assisted by Lieutenant O.S. Francis, 
M.C., Brigade Intelligence Officer, succeeded in getting into their correct forming-up 
positions without further difficulty”.397 
 
  The 2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade commenced their march of 
approximately 6,500 yards to the forward area shortly before nightfall. Exiting California 
Camp near Wieltje at 4:30 p.m., companies of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire proceeded along Track 
No. 5 and the southern extension. „C‟ Company, assigned to relieve „A‟ Company 1st RIR 
in the centre of the outpost zone, had been dispatched earlier at 3:15 p.m. The march was 
especially onerous along the southern extension, which was “in a deplorable state”:  
The boards [,] which had laid on trestles high up off the 
ground, were severely shelled and there were few cases of 
more than 20 yards in one stretch in good condition. The 
height of the boards from the ground and the bad state of 
the ground in the vicinity of the track made it very difficult 
to regain the track after passing a point where the boards 
had been blown away.
398
  
 
To “step off the track was to become engulfed in deep clinging mud, and across country 
the “going” was impossible.” The battalion adjutant subsequently wrote: “The condition 
of the duckboard track No. 5 S[outh] was heartbreaking … It took an unloaded man over 
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3 ½ hours to walk from WIELTJE to MOSSELMARKT instead of under 2 hours by 
road”.399 
 
 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade, after departing from a campsite near Capricorn (a section of 
British frontline prior to 31 July) at 5:00 p.m., marched without mishap along the Wieltje 
– Gravenstafel – Bellevue Road as far as Waterloo Farm, and thence astride the northern 
extension of No. 5 track to its terminus near Mosselmarkt. The 2
nd
 Lincolnshire were not 
so fortunate, „C‟ Company suffering heavy casualties from shellfire at the head of No. 5 
Track. Twenty survivors eventually arrived to relieve two left posts and form a 
strongpoint approximately 150 yards in the rear of the outpost line. Lieutenant-Colonel 
N.M.S. Irwin (CO 2
nd
 Lincolnshire) took immediate steps to ensure his frontline was 
adequately defended by ordering „D‟ Company, 1st RIR to remain in place, its spot in 
brigade reserve being taken by a company of 2
nd
 West Yorkshire Regiment (23 
Brigade).
400
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Plate 3.3 Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S. Irwin 
(Source: Creagh, The Distinguished Service Order) 
 
 Forward outposts had already been occupied by what remained of „C‟ Company, 2nd 
Lincolnshire and „D‟ Company of 2nd Rifle Brigade, when 25 Brigade guides led the six 
remaining assault companies forward from ends of the northern and southern tracks. The 
Lincolnshire regimental history later recalled the exhausting ordeal: “[S]ome idea of the 
terrible nature of moving up at that period may be gathered from the fact that it took the 
first [„C‟] Company five hours to arrive at the head of the duckboard track”. Shambling 
lines of encumbered men were then conducted across an un-planked gulf of 
approximately 700 yards that separated the two duckboard avenues eastern extremities 
from the near edges of carefully laid direction tapes. The Lincolnshire‟s adjutant 
observed: “For the attack men were not overloaded, although the condition of track No. 5 
made the men dead tired before Zero”. Direction tapes, connected at right angles every 
fifty yards with the single tape, were easily followed to a jumping-off line 480 yards in 
length. “No difficulty was experienced in getting into position”, though it was believed 
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“that individual groups of men were observed by the enemy, their rifle fire being fairly 
severe, the hostile artillery, however, was unusually quiet”.401  
 
 Close-range sniping, however, was received from an unexpected quarter on the left 
of 25 Brigade front, as taping-parties of 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade began to prepare for the arrival 
of „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ companies at the designated 340 yard jumping-off line. Teall Cottage, 
it was soon realised, was still in the hands of the enemy; 32
nd
 Division had failed to 
secure the lost strongpoint despite several attempts. This small bastion, recaptured by the 
Germans on the morning of 30 November, still threatened the junction of 8
th
 and 32
nd
 
divisions. Hostile enfilade fire could now be brought to bear on any advance toward 
Northern Redoubt and Hill 52. Division and brigade staffs, it appears, had hoped this 
threat would be dealt with by local counter-attack in the hours before dawn on the 1
st
; 
their expectations remained unfulfilled.
402
  
 
 To add to this misfortune, Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. Roger Brand DSO (CO 2
nd
 
Rifle Brigade) was “wounded by a rifle bullet while reconnoitering the forming-up line”. 
The Battalion adjutant (Lieutenant G.H.G. Anderson MC) immediately assumed 
command.
403
 25
 Brigade‟s diarist recorded this incident, along with other trials and 
tribulations during the final march to the jumping-off line:  
The 2
nd
 Lincolns Regt., the 2
nd
 Royal Berks and the 2
nd
 Rifle 
Brigade moved up into position on the tape ready for the 
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attack on the morning of the 2
nd
 December. The enemy was 
shelling rather heavily when the battalions were marching in 
[,] so they suffered some casualties. The weather was fine 
on the whole [,] though there was some occasional showers. 
Bde Hdqtrs moved up to Bellevue about 7 p.m. Lt. Col. the 
Hon. R. Brand [,] commanding the 2
nd
 Bn Rifle Brigade [,] 
was wounded early in the evening. The 1
st
 Royal Irish Rifles 
came out in to support. The relief was carried out according 
to Bde. Order No. 257.
404
  
 
Two hundred yards inside the forward line of outposts, massed ranks of 25
 Brigade‟s 
assault infantry hunkered down in cursory shelter of disparate trench sections or shell 
holes of various shapes and sizes, while others not so fortunate lay prostrate on the algid 
earth. Fleeting figures of officers and NCOs were occasionally observed treading 
between companies, platoons and sections in the moonlight. Many anticipated the 
approach of zero hour with customary apprehension; while to some it seemed apparent 
that „Fritz‟ could not have missed their presence at the jumping-off tape.  
 
 
 Twenty-one-year-old Lieutenant John Nettleton (IO 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade) had been 
detailed to act as liaison officer, as per „8th Division Instructions No. 2‟, with the 
neighbouring battalion (2
nd
 KOYLI) of 97
th
 Brigade for the attack‟s duration.405 The 
boyish veteran (he volunteered for active service in 1914) recalled a flawed attack 
scheme in a vitriolic postwar indictment:  
   For this show, the staff put their great brains to work and 
decided on a surprise attack. It was to start at the unusual 
hour of 1:55 a.m., instead of just before dawn, and the 
troops were to dash forward and „overrun‟ the enemy‟s 
outposts before he knew what was happening. Then our 
barrage was to come down at zero plus 8 minutes and 
pulverize the enemy‟s main position.  
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This may have looked all right on paper back at GHQ but 
in fact was sheer raving lunacy under the existing 
conditions. To begin with, on the night of 1
st
/2
nd
 Dec: the 
moon would be only just past full;
406
 there was no cover of 
any sort, not even a blade of grass, to hide the advance 
from the enemy; and there was no possibility of rushing 
forward and „overrunning‟ anything; it was only with 
difficulty that one could advance at all at a dead slow 
stumble.  
 
All these objections were put forward, to my certain 
knowledge, by battalion commanders to Brigade and by 
Brigade to Division. And our Divisional Commander is 
reported to have backed them up to the higher command, 
saying specifically that „hostile machine-gun fire from 
prepared positions on a bright moonlight night was more to 
be feared than any barrage‟ and making several alternative 
suggestions. But he was over-ruled and, in the event, 
everything went exactly as anticipated; as anticipated, that 
is, by us and not by the staff.  
 
Nettleton observed signs of low morale before the attack. He was certain the operation 
had been compromised:  
Everybody realised that the whole thing was going to be a 
shambles. That is not a good mood to start any operation. 
Then, in my opinion, the Boche knew all about it from the 
start. I feel sure he spotted the RE‟s laying out jumping-off 
tapes on the night before the show. Even if I‟m wrong 
about this, he had many other chances to learn about it. 
There can seldom have been a „surprise‟ attack of which so 
much clear notice was given to the enemy.  
 
The newly designated liaison officer‟s misgivings grew as he trudged, enfiladed by 
sporadic indirect machine-gun fire, up the corpse-strewn road from Gravenstafel to 
Mosselmarkt with 2
nd
 KOYLI.
407
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Plate 3.4 Lieutenant J. Nettleton 
(Source: Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns) 
 
 Five assault battalions, four from Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s 97 Brigade and 
one attached from Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood‟s 96 Brigade, formed up on a 
frontage of 1,850 yards below the barely perceptible summit of Hill 52 and the gently 
rising southern slope of Vat Cottage Ridge (Map 10). Battalions deployed from right to 
left as follows: 2
nd
 KOYLI with 3 assault companies and 1 support company; 16
th
 HLI, 
11
th
 Border and 17
th
 HLI “on a two company frontage with Nos. 3 and 4 companies in 
rear of Nos. 1 and 2 companies respectively”, and 15th LF (holding the line with 16th NF 
since the night of 30 November/1 December) with 3 assault companies and 1 support 
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company. The 16
th 
NF retired to Brigade reserve in the vicinity of Virile Farm following 
relief in the right sub-sector.
408
 
 
 Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s battalions assembled on a two or three company 
frontage forming four successive waves. Standardized small unit formations – known as 
„worm‟ or „snake‟ columns – were adopted to lead off and manoeuvre round the flank 
and rear of dispersed objectives:  
1
st
 wave: 3 sections of each of Nos. 1 and 2 platoons in line 
of sections in snake formation (i.e. not extended).  
 
2
nd
 wave: Lewis Gun sections and platoon H.Qrs. of  Nos.   
1 and 2 platoons in snake formation. 
 
3
rd
 wave: No. 3 Platoon in line of sections 
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day Goudbergstraat] in V.29.a & b. towards VOX FARM and from VOX FARM in a S.E. direction in 
front of HILL 52 (V.30.a.). The line from V.29.b.d.7. to 7.9. (N.W. of VIRILE FARM) is probably held. In 
addition to farms and Pill-boxes in the forward zone, his main line of resistance [Hauptwiderstandslinie] 
(which is constantly changing) probably runs as follows: From VAT COTTAGES along the road in front of 
VEAL COTTAGES [;] the dotted trench in V.23.d., V.29.b., to a point just north of VOX FARM. 
Continuing east from that point as a line of small trenches or linked up shell-holes just north and east of 
HILL 52 (a prisoner stated that this line beyond HILL 52 is to be held). (c) Supports. The support line is 
very uncertain, but is thought to run approximately from V.17.b., west of the WESTROOSEBEKE – 
PASSCHENDAELE ROAD. Supports also line in ruins and pill-boxes just north of the SPRIET ROAD. 
There is also a line of occupied shell-holes or short trenches running S.E. from V.17.c.0.8. towards 
MILLET [sic MULLET] FARM.(d) Reserves. Reserves lie about OOSTNIEUWKERKE (W.3.) and can 
counter-attack within 3 hours or even less‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: „Notes to Accompany Special 
Intelligence Maps of the Area V.15 to V.30‟ November 1917, 32nd Division War Diary.  
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4
th
 wave: No. 4 Platoon in line of sections
409
 
 
“In 1917 XVIII Corps410 „advocated a more elastic infantry formation for the attack‟ 
employing platoons „working in depth rather than battalions stereotyped in waves‟ so that 
behind the initial assault wave „worms‟ of „little columns of units in depth‟ were ready to 
„stalk‟ the enemy on a narrow front‟ close to the barrage”. Second Army also observed 
that attack waves employed by the end of Third Ypres “did not „give sufficient elasticity‟ 
to counter the new conditions being experienced and abandoning linear formations 
advocated that the troops „should move in small columns in file, the formation which the 
nature of the ground forces the men to adopt eventually”. Common practice during 1917-
18 called for two lines of skirmishers to act as an advanced guard for loose groups 
following in worm formation. “By early 1918 the platoon attacked with either one section 
thrown out as skirmishers and three sections advancing behind in single file or „worms‟ 
of each section advancing in single file preceded by its two scouts”. Brigadier-General 
Coffin‟s 25 Brigade adapted the former battle formation (platoons of the 1st wave in a 4 
section skirmish wave trailed by two platoons, in 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 waves, of 4 sections in 
column) to tackle what was a rudimentary linear defence. Major-General Shute and 
Brigadier-General Blacklock chose the latter formation for the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 waves in order 
to apply the connate tactical flexibility of worm or snake columns advancing across 
                                                 
409
 TNA: WO/95/2400: „97th Brigade Operation Order 178‟, 21 November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary. 
410
 Lieutenant-General Sir (Frederick) Ivor Maxse (appointed GOC XVIII Corps in January 1917) was well 
known throughout the BEF as a progressive trainer of troops. His XVIII Corps was involved in the 
Flanders offensive as part of Fifth Army from its opening on 31 July until relieved by II Corps in early 
November. Historians have since noted Maxse‟s considerable influence on tactical development and 
training. Some junior contemporaries, however, were not impressed. Guy Chapman recalled a spirited 
lecture given by the GOC XVIII Corps in April 1917: „We stayed there for five days, in which the only 
diversion was a lecture by the Corps Commander, General Maxse. „Infantry, gentlemen‟, he began, „is a 
rectangular animal‟; and then delighted with his trope, proceeded to draw a parallelogram on the 
blackboard. I glanced around the room. The rectangular animal sat with sullen face. Dim hopelessness 
settled on features as the Corps Commander warmed to his theme, a sullen resignation. They felt they had 
little enough time to live: it was cruel to waste a spring afternoon listening to this high-falutin‟ chatter‟. See 
Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), p. 153.  
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broken ground against the enemy‟s diffused die Leer des Gefechtsfeldes positions. 
Distances between their attacking waves and companies were set at 20 and 40 yards 
respectively.
411
  
 
 Assembly areas had been “carefully reconnoitered and pegged out by the 97th 
Infantry Brigade when in the line between November 23
rd
 and 27
th”. Assembly areas for 
each battalion were plotted with wire on the night of 30 November/1 December, and 
checked by compass bearing during the day. “On Z night [1/2 December] the assembly 
positions of each platoon were marked out with tapes and the position of its flanks 
marked with white discs”. Luminous notice boards had also been “erected in company 
assembly areas on which were painted the bearing of the company objective and the 
distance in yards to it”, while “tapes or wire on screw pickets” were placed to distinguish 
routes from the heads of duckboard tracks. Strong patrols and Lewis Gun teams entered 
no man‟s land, as per „32nd Division Operation Order No. 138‟, to cover the forming up 
after nightfall.
 412
  
 
 „C‟ and „D‟ companies of 16th NF 413 easily repulsed a small German attack with 
rifle and Lewis Gun fire at 5:15 a.m. on 1 December. A wounded prisoner was brought in 
after the enemy was driven off. Designated reserve or “Counter-counter-attacking 
Battalion” following relief by 2nd KOYLI and 16th HLI, its companies assembled on the 
                                                 
411
 See Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: Defeat into Victory (London: 
Frank Cass, 2005), p. 101 and TNA: WO/95/1677: „Map C, Dispositions of 25th Infantry Bde: 
Diagrammatic Only‟, „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/2nd December 1917‟, 
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th
 Division War Diary.  
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nd
 Division War Diary, p.8.   
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Commerce in September 1914.  
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right flank in the vicinity of Virile Farm, “as all available information indicated that any 
serious counter-attack would come from this flank on account of the known dispositions 
of the enemy‟s reserves and the supposed impracticability of the ground west of 
MALLET WOOD”. At 9:00 p.m., Battalion HQ moved from Meetcheele to Virile Farm, 
while parties from 97
 
Brigade laid forming-up tape along the 1,850 yard front from Teall 
Cottage to NE of Tournant Farm.
414
  
 
 The 2
nd
 KOYLI, billeted at Irish Farm throughout the 1
st
, had three hot meals served 
up during the day and “a final hot meal at 5:45 p.m.”. Companies paraded at 6:55 p.m. 
before trekking 8,000 yards to a taped 400 yard jumping-off line. “Order of march was D, 
C, A, B companies, and Battalion Headquarters, at platoon intervals of 100 yards”. The 
leading platoon passed the starting point (road junction north of Irish Farm) at 7:10 p.m. 
“and proceeded to the line via BUFFS ROAD – ROAD junction [NE of Wieltje] 
C.23.a.5.3 – No. 6 Track and PETER PAN SWITCH to BELLEVUE – MEETCHEELE – 
MOSSELMARK [T] – pillboxes at road junction [Gravenstafel Road with present-day 
Osselstraat] V.30.c.45.15 – VENTURE FARM – Assembly Position, a distance of about 
8 kilometres altogether”.415 Lieutenant Nettleton recalled a nightmare journey: 
I was detailed as Liaison Officer with 32
nd
 Division on our 
left, so I went up the metalled [Gravenstafel] road with 
them. We … had a sticky time and one incident must have 
given the Boche fair warning of what was happening, even 
if he hadn‟t known before. As we came up to the top of the 
ridge, a man carrying a sandbag full of Verey lights and 
SOS signals was hit by a machine-gun bullet, which set off 
the flares he was carrying. He blazed like a torch and 
                                                 
414
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action Report, „Part II, Plan of Operations, Section 4, Detailed Plan‟, 11 
December 1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary pp. 7-8 and WO/95/2398: 16
th
 NF War Diary.  
415
 TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI War Diary.  
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though we rolled him in the mud, we couldn‟t stop the fire-
work display, which must have been visible for miles.
416
  
 
The postwar battalion history also noted the “element of surprise was all important for a 
successful attack. This night was bright with moonlight. The movement of troops before 
“Zero” hour had been only too easily observed”.417 
 
 Thirty-two-year-old acting Lieutenant-Colonel L. Lamotte (CO 2
nd
 KOYLI since 26 
November)
418
 marched at the head of his battalion:  
The battalion was led by the commanding officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel L. Lamotte, and paused at KANSAS 
CROSS for a halt of ten minutes. The commanding officer 
personally guided the battalion to the “jumping-off” tape 
and saw each section of the battalion into its correct 
position and after synchronizing the watches of every 
officer, gave to each the correct angle of advance and made 
certain that it was perfectly understood by the platoon and 
section commanders. The march between BELLEVUE and 
MOSSELMARK[T] was rendered difficult owing to 
congestion, but energetic measures prevailed, and plenty of 
time was allowed for assembly, and every man was in his 
proper position by 1:20 a.m., or thirty-five minutes before 
ZERO. The commanding officer reported this fact [from 
his newly-established HQ at Meetcheele] to brigade 
headquarters accordingly.
419
  
 
Nettleton, unlike the 2
nd
 KOYLI war diary, recollected surprise and consternation 
engendered by the discovery that Teall Cottage was still in enemy hands:  
This [Teall Cottage] was supposed to have been captured 
by the 32
nd
 Division two days previously and it had been so 
reported. But when we got there we were met with 
machine-gun fire and found the Boche were still in 
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possession. This fairly put the cat among the pigeons, 
because this position was the hinge between the two attacks 
and could enfilade either one of them. I went off at once to 
our own battalion [2
nd
 Rifle Brigade] HQ to report this bad 
news, only to find that they had some more of their own. 
Roger Brand, our CO, had been wounded and Anderson, 
the Adjutant, had just got back to HQ after seeing him 
carried off.
420
  
 
One platoon, however, was subsequently detailed by 2
nd
 KOYLI to tackle Teall Cottage 
during the main assault.
421
  
 
  How was it that the left and right battalions of 8
th
 and 32
nd
 divisions were unaware 
of the failure to regain Teall Cottage until just prior to the attack? Post-operational reports 
and diary entries only recount resultant disruption and heavy casualties caused by 
machine-gun fire from the hostile strongpoint, while two battalion war diaries (2
nd
 Royal 
Innsikilling Fusiliers and 16
th
 NF) record a single unsuccessful attempt to recapture the 
position during the early hours of 1 December. It appears, if Lieutenant Nettleton was 
correct, that 32
nd
 Division HQ failed to perceive the threat, although, given the 
circumstances, a further counter-attack to regain the position would have had to be made 
under cover of darkness. The loss of Teall Cottage was not revealed until the night of 30 
November/1 December; time remained for only one abortive counter-attack before 
daybreak. Perhaps it was hoped the situation would be cleared up – one more obstacle to 
overcome – once the main advance had begun. It is also possible that the serious danger 
posed by a German garrison in the seemingly insignificant pillbox was not immediately 
recognised. This is a reasonable hypothesis when one considers the rapid course of 
events, available intelligence and confused nature of the battlefield.   
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 The 16
th
 HLI,
422
 in 97 Brigade support at Bellevue since the 30
th
, spent the 
daylight hours of 1 December at rest, despite “frequent bursts of hostile shell-fire” that 
failed to inflict any casualties. Its nominal strength at the time was 16 officers and 404 
ORs. Numbers changed with the arrival – during the distribution of “a hot meal of tea and 
rum” – of a reinforcement consisting of 4 officers and 65 ORs at 5:30 p.m. These new 
drafts were hurriedly amalgamated into the battalion strength, now increased to 20 
officers and 469 ORs. One hour later, a battalion taping party, under Lieutenant J. 
McLellan MC with 18 ORs, departed to lay engineer tape from the vicinity of 
Mosselmarkt “to frontline position via VENTURE FARM”.423 
 
 Lieutenant McLellan, assisted by Corporals Hilley, Gilmour and four NCOs per 
company, successfully extended a march line tape to the forming-up area. “They then 
taped the assembly position and erected luminous numbered boards to mark the right of 
each platoon”. The jumping-off tape was set along a battalion frontage of 300 yards and 
“within a depth of 30 y[ar]ds as experience had shown that this position was forward of 
the enemy‟s S.O.S. Barrage lines”.424 
 
 At 9:30 p.m., the 16
th
 HLI moved forward (order of march: „D‟, „B‟, „C‟, „A‟, 
companies) from Bellevue with a distance of 100 yards maintained between platoons. 
Among their numbers was twenty-year-old 350220 Private Hugh Cairns (previously 
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attached to the 1
st
 and 10
th
 (Works) battalions Royal Scots Fusiliers) a native of 
Glasgow‟s poverty-stricken east end where he was raised, along with nine siblings, in a 
two-room tenement. Hugh, according to family lore, emulated three older brothers 
already in the service by enlisting, much to his father‟s fury, while underage. Was he a 
member of the newly arrived and swiftly assimilated draft? Whatever the circumstances, 
there is no doubt the young Glaswegian volunteer kept pace with equally burdened 
comrades as they slogged up Bellevue Spur toward the battalion jumping-off position.
425
  
 
Plate 3.5 Private H. Cairns (Source: Dr Joanne Coyle) 
 
 The first leg of 16
th
 HLI‟s journey was complete by 9:25 p.m.; Bellevue 
crossroads were cleared at approximately 10:10 p.m. A guide from battalion HQ led the 
column “up to the position of assembly where the tape leaves the [GRAVENSTAFEL – ] 
MOSSELMARKT road”. Five men had been lost to enemy shellfire before companies 
                                                 
425
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Chapter 3 
 177 
deployed along the jumping-off tape at 11:10 p.m. The Battalion diarist subsequently 
recorded that 16
th
 HLI was now “in line with 11th Borders on its left. The 2nd KOYLI had 
taken up a position on a parallel line to our right 100 yards in rear. Liaison was obtained 
with both units”. Advanced HQ had already (10:30 p.m.) been established at Vocation 
Farm and connected, by the Battalion Signaling Officer (Lieutenant S.M. Roberts), with 
Battalion HQ at Bellevue. Meanwhile, the OC „B‟ Company detailed two guides to meet 
the attached heavy machine-gun detachment near Bellevue. The rendezvous did not occur 
until, as directed, 2
nd
 KOYLI passed up the road from Gravenstafel, after which the 
Vickers Gun teams were led to their allocated positions.
426
  
 
 The 11
th
 Border Regiment,
427
 in 97 Brigade reserve at Wurst Farm since the 30
th
, 
arrived, after a 2,000 yard tramp via “MOUSETRAP TRACK – SOURCE FARM” 
(platoons separated by 100 yard intervals) at the 300 yard jumping-off line without loss. 
Battalion HQ was established in the vicinity of Bellevue at Point 83. “The initial stages of 
the attack, assembling, etc., were successfully carried through”, the battalion diarist 
noted, “but the enemy – as was afterwards learned – had been appraised of our intentions 
and had made strong preparation against them”.428  
 
 Twenty-two-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant William Thomas Ridgway (attached 11
th
 
Border Regiment), armed with revolver, rifle and bayonet and garbed in OR‟s Service 
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Dress [SD] like other company officers, awaited the approach of zero hour with his 
platoon. „Will‟ hailed from the picturesque rural village of Tingewick, where his father 
was parish clerk, in North Buckinghamshire. He chose, after completing his education at 
Tingewick Council School, to pursue a career in journalism. Eighteen months at the 
National Union of Journalists (Northampton and Peterborough) Typographical School led 
to employment as a young sports reporter for the Cambridge Times. Short service 
enlistment in the RAMC – Will had been a member of St John Ambulance Brigade – was 
attested at the busy East Anglia railway town of March on 12 September 1914. Six 
months training was followed by eighteen months service with the BEF. During that time 
he was promoted to local acting Sergeant (January 1916) while serving in the battle area, 
although the temporary rank was reverted, when employed behind the lines at No. 18 
General Hospital Camiers, to Corporal five months later. At the end of August 1916, 
Will, having regained his Sergeant‟s stripes applied for a temporary commission in the 
Regular Army and was subsequently accepted. RAMC comrades expressed their 
admiration and appreciation for the popular NCO by presenting him with a cigarette case 
inscribed: “Presented to Sergeant Wm. T. Ridgway, ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL 
CORPS, as a mark of respect and esteem, from His Brother Members No. 18 General 
Hospital British Ex. Force, France. Oct. 3
rd
 1916”. 429   
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Plate 3.6 Sergeant (later 2
nd
 Lieutenant) W.T. Ridgway 
(Source: Brenda Eastaff) 
 Sergeant Ridgway returned to England for instruction at Cambridge University. 
Training at No. 5 Officer Cadet Battalion [OCB], accommodated amidst the aristocratic 
precincts of Trinity College, began on 4 November 1916. No. 5 OCB, one of twenty-
three similar institutions established throughout the United Kingdom, was “a mixture of 
boot camp and public school or Oxbridge college”, where ex-rankers and other potential 
officer material learned, besides military skills, to emulate the ethos of pre-war Regular 
officers.
430
 Will spent the holidays with his parents, two sisters and 6-year-old brother 
Fred: “I remember him coming home on leave during Christmas 1916”, Fred recalled; 
“He looked very smart in his officer‟s uniform”. One can almost visualize the upright, 
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enthusiastic cadet – white-banded service cap in hand – attired as „on parade‟ in tailored 
khaki tunic, polished Sam Browne belt, whipcord breeches, carefully wrapped puttees 
and ankle boots, joining in hymns with his kindred during celebration services at St Mary 
Magdalene Church.
431
    
 
 2
nd
 Lieutenant Ridgway was posted, after passing out of No. 5 OCB, to the Border 
Regiment the following February. His commission was duly confirmed in the London 
Gazette on 23 March 1917. Departure for the front followed sometime afterward. It had, 
by early December, been almost a year since the youthful subaltern, formed up in the 
moonlight with 11
th
 Border Regiment along the shell-churned southern slope of Vat 
Cottage Ridge, last visited with his family at their residence on Buckingham Road just 
outside Tingewick.  
 
 The 17
th
 HLI 
432
 moved off, after “resting all day” at Hilltop Farm, to march, with 
platoons at 100 yard intervals by way of “MOUSETRAP TRACK – SOURCE FARM”, 
approximately 8,000 yards to its allotted assembly position. The Battalion, passing by 
Wurst Farm at 8:55 p.m., arrived at the 400-yard long jumping-off tape without serious 
incident. HQ was, as with 11
th
 Border, setup at Point 83. Companies were to deploy at the 
start of the advance “from a two platoon frontage to snake formation – this method 
having been adopted owing to the shell torn nature of the ground…” 433  
                                                 
431
 Angela Foster, „Fred Paid His Final Tribute‟, Buckinghamshire Advertiser (November 2000).   
432
 The 17
th
 (Service) Battalion HLI (3
rd
 Glasgow) was formed by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in 
September 1914.  
433 TNA: WO/95/2405: 17th HLI War Diary, WO/95/2400: „97th Brigade Operation Order No. 178‟, 27 
November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary, WO/95/2370: „Table to accompany Addendum No. 3 to 97th Inf. 
Bde. C.C. 178‟, 32nd Division War Diary and Arthur & Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland Light 
Infantry, p. 68.  
Chapter 3 
 181 
 Led by an attached American Medical Officer
434
 – a “rational and very welcome 
acquisition” for 17th HLI – Private Albert Elshaw and his fellow stretcher-bearers began 
the lengthy trek from Hilltop Farm to the forward area. All were encumbered by a “white 
man‟s burden of ropes, ladders, spades, etc.” and standard infantryman‟s kit:  
After a full briefing we set off again a day or two later – 
armed with rifles, grenades, picks, shovels, ladders, ropes 
and Uncle Tom Cobley and all. We carried all but the arms, 
but had in addition, stretchers, extra dressings and huge 
Red Cross armbands. „Jerry‟ was not to be trusted to 
respect anything less and even that was no guarantee of 
immunity, for stretcher-bearers trying to get at casualties 
became casualties themselves. 
 
Struggling “up by” that night each human pack mule, not 
only due to his burden, but also due to the necessity of 
keeping “eyes down” to avoid floundering in the mud was 
very nearly nose to the ground. A halt was called where the 
duckboards wound between heavy batteries – owing mainly 
to the fact that we had progressed so well as to be in front 
of schedule. This provided a welcome break for those who 
may have been at liberty to avail themselves of the 
hospitality of the gunners – but the rest of us merely stood 
and waited, waited for what we deemed inevitable – and 
sure enough over came „John‟s‟ souvenirs intended 
presumably for the discomfort of the artillery personnel – 
though perhaps with an eye on a passerby. They were in the 
shape of 5.9 HV shrapnel. I never heard the one that hit me, 
raised a bump under my tin hat and left me with a helpless 
left arm. That shell sprayed its “bulls eyes” down one side 
of the halted column and inflicted wounds – all on the left 
side – from hand to toe on a dozen to twenty men.  
 
After first-aid treatment I set off with a limping squad back 
down the line, being fully aware that “Zero” and its 
accompanying barrage was due all too soon. I hustled my 
fellow patients past local aid posts and our recently left 
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billets – stopping only to report – and made for the Corps 
Main Dressing Station. This involved a five-mile tramp in 
anything but ideal conditions and I marveled at the stoicism 
of those with foot and leg wounds – but none wished to 
dally in the vicinity of the “hate” that was due to breakout 
once our guns opened up – communications [routes], 
especially unprotected ones would be decidedly unhealthy 
– besides having “touches” for a spell out who wanted to be 
greedy and stop another one? The journey took us nearly 
three hours.  
 
Elshaw, wounded seriously enough to avoid the impending embrace with “Johnnie” on 
the Westroosebeke ridge, was subsequently dispatched, along with injured companions, 
by motor ambulance to a CCS.
435
  
 
 Sometime after 10:30 p.m. companies of 15
th
 LF,
436
 holding the 97 Brigade‟s left 
since the night of 30 November/1
 
December, began to concentrate opposite their 
objective following relief on a frontage of 700 yards by Lewis Gun teams of the 
incoming 11
th
 Border Regiment and 17
th
 HLI.
437
 The forming-up line was reconnoitered 
and marked out, as per brigade instructions, with wire by 2
nd
 Lieutenant J.S. Scrivener 
(„A‟ Company) before dawn on the 1st. Confirmation of its accurate placement was 
ascertained by compass the following morning. On the night of 1/2 December the “wire 
was replaced with tape and the flank of each platoon‟s position was marked with a white 
disc”. Companies („A‟ on the right, „B‟ in centre, „C‟ on the left) were thus re-deployed 
without difficulty or loss along the assigned three-company frontage of 450 yards:  
Since any sort of landmark had been utterly obliterated by 
the colossal weight of shellfire which pulverised this area 
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for months beforehand, the Fusiliers‟ company objectives 
were identified by boards at the start lines, each one giving 
a compass bearing and distance to be covered with the 
details in luminous paint.  
 
„D‟ Company remained in support immediately behind „A‟ Company. The Battalion was 
formed-up without loss and ready to move by 1:30 a.m. HQ was placed under cover in a 
vacant pillbox SW of Tournant Farm.
438
  
 
 Approximately 2,000 yards to the SW, Brigadier-General Blacklock and the red-
tabbed staff of 97 Brigade settled into their large pillbox HQ just east of the swampy 
Stroombeek at Kronprinz Farm. Sheltering beyond narrow entryways (screened by heavy, 
solution-saturated anti-gas blankets) in cramped, fuggy, coke fume permeated ferro-
concrete recesses where odorous paraffin lamps and flickering candles cast spectral 
shadows on clammy walls, they patiently awaited confirmation that each assault battalion 
had taken its designated place along the attack frontage of 1,850 yards. These 
prearranged messages – “Assembly Complete CONTACT” – dispatched either by 
wireless or runner from sundry low-roofed, largely windowless battalion HQs, crowded 
to capacity by colonels, adjutants, artillery liaison officers, signallers, runners, medical 
officers and stretcher-bearers, duly arrived one by one during the hours leading up to 
Zero. At 1:40 a.m. 97 Brigade verbally reported to Division HQ: “Forming up complete. 
All quiet”.439  
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 TNA: WO/95/2397: 15
th
 LF War Diary, Major-General J.C. Latter, The History of the Lancashire 
Fusiliers in Two Volumes Vol. 1 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1949). p. 276 and Michael Stedman, Salford 
Pals: A History of the Salford Brigade – The 15th, 16th. 19th and 20th (Service) Battalions the Lancashire 
Fusiliers 1914-19 (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 154 and IWM 4723: „Narrative of Operations 2/3rd 
December 1917, 15
th
 (S) Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers‟, 4 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. 
Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
439
 Advanced report centres were situated at Point 83 and Virile Farm. Prearranged battalion messages 
arrived at the following times: 2
nd
 KOYLI (1:20 a.m.), 16
th
 HLI (12:00 a.m.), 11
th
 Border (12:05 a.m.), 17
th
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 Sir Henry Rawlinson‟s diary entry for 1 December: “I have great hopes that we 
shall do the trick at Passchendaele all right [,] but the Bosch is expecting us”, implies 
some foreknowledge of British intentions by the enemy.
440
 Available war diaries, postwar 
unit accounts and memoirs also express the conviction that surprise was not achieved due 
to lack of available cover and increased visibility in the prevailing moonlight. Were the 
Germans aware of the impending night attack? Were the attackers detected on the 
forming-up tape prior to Zero? The history of IR115 (responsible for the left sector of 25
th
 
Division) noted: “From the relief of opposing infantry, the possibility of attacks in sector 
was assumed; for 28 November, heightened readiness was ordered”, but added “these by-
the-book precautions proved premature”. This precipitate alert is confirmed by a Second 
Army intelligence summary dated 3 December: “Two prisoners of 6th Coy., 117th Inf. 
Regt. captured in E.1.a [vicinity of Exert Farm] at 1:30 a.m. on 2
nd
 inst., state: A big 
attack by the British was expected on the 28
th
 Nov[ember]. The advanced posts to retire 
on frontline and supports were to reinforce”.441 A captured Feldwebel of 3rd Company, 
IR94 (left regiment of the recently arrived 38
th
 Division) subsequently related during 
interrogation:  
Dispositions. 
 
The III Battalion has been holding the line since 30/1
st
 
[December] and the I Battalion was ordered to the support 
positions last night with a view of relieving III Battalion in 
                                                                                                                                                 
HLI (1:25 a.m.), 15
th
 LF (1:33 a.m.); 37 casualties were sustained before Zero. See TNA: WO/95/2400: 
„97th Brigade Operation Order No. 178‟, 27 November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary, WO/95/2370: After-
action Report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 
December 1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary and IWM 4723:„Preliminary Report on Operations, December 
1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
, 4 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).     
440
 CAC: RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 1 December 1917.  
441
 Victor von Frankenberg und Ludwigsdorff, Das Leibgarde Infanterie Regiment (1. Grossherzoglich 
Hessisches Nr. 115) im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Stuttgart: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921), p. 163 and TNA:  
WO/157/121: „Annexe to Second Army Summary, Dated 3rd December 1917: Information Obtained from 
Prisoners‟, Second Army Intelligence Files.  
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the frontline tonight [2 December]. Subsequent orders 
were, however, issued at 10 p.m. last night [1 December] 
resulting in the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 companies being sent forward to 
reinforce the frontline. The 1
st
 Company was at VELDT 
FARM. From this statement it seems apparent that an 
attack was expected this morning, but the time and method 
was a complete surprise to the enemy.  
 
Prisoner‟s Opinion of This Morning‟s Battle. 
 
It seems that although the higher command expected an 
attack on our front today, the men of the foremost posts 
[Vorfeldzone] had either not received timely warning or did 
not act upon it. Prisoner states that too many men were 
asleep and that a large majority were running back from the 
line instead of putting up any resistance.
442
  
 
It appears, despite the conclusion reached by British intelligence officers, that the 
German defenders remained, as a matter of course, especially vigilant in sectors  
(Venison Trench and its redoubts, the ridge route toward Westroosebeke, Vat Cottage 
Ridge) where British assault troops could expect reasonably good going across vital 
traversable high ground. The determination reached by II Corps intelligence that “the 
German higher command had received information of our intentions, for at 10 p.m. on 
the night of the 1
st
 a warning order was issued stating an attack was expected and at least 
one of his frontline battalions was reinforced by two companies of the battalion in 
support”, was likely based on enemy reaction to “important disclosures” made by “three 
Englishmen” captured opposite IR94 sometime after dark on 1 December. The content of 
these revelations are, unfortunately, not related in the postwar regimental history, but 
                                                 
442
 TNA: WO/157/288: „Annexe to II Corps Summary No. 31, Examination of Sergt. Major of the 3rd 
Company, 94
th
 I.R. 38
th
 Division, Captured at V.30.a on the morning of the 2
nd
 Inst.‟, II Corps Summary of 
Information, 2 December 1917, II Corps Intelligence File. The circumstances of this POW‟s capture were 
as follows: „Prisoner was ordered, as part of his training, to go forward during last night and ascertain the 
exact positions of the infantry, machine-guns and artillery in his regimental sector. He chose the period 
from midnight onwards as being the most suitable and left ROULERS about this time, proceeding direct to 
the frontline, intending to work his way back. He had only been in the line about five minutes before our 
attack started and was captured very shortly afterwards‟. See TNA: WO/157/120: „Annexe to Second Army 
Summary Dated 3
rd
 December 1917, Information from Prisoners‟, Second Army Intelligence File.  
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their relation to the subsequent action taken by the Thüringian Regiment‟s support 
battalion can be inferred. Furthermore, other relevant German unit histories, whilst 
acknowledging surprise, fail to mention any prior notice of the night attack, so it is 
possible that the shifting of two support companies to the frontline was a local response 
to recent POW declarations.
443
 An argus-eyed officer of IR95 also detected enemy patrol 
activity on the immediate (German) right:  
There was a light covering of snow on the landscape with a 
full moon lighting up the night sky, so one had to be 
careful. At around 11:00 p.m [German time]
444
on the 
evening of 1 December, not long after the Regiment made 
itself comfortable in the [new] position, the commander of 
7
th
 Company discovered approximately 30 to 40 English in 
front of the Vorfeldzone. These were believed to be ration 
carriers who had lost their way and were immediately shot 
down.
445
 
 
It must, therefore, be generally assumed that the attackers were not discerned opposite 
either divisional sector until just before 1:00 a.m. (British time), and even then enemy 
intentions were only realised in 38
th
 Division’s sector minutes before zero hour:  
Shortly before 2:00 a.m. an English patrol [either from 2
nd
 
Rifle Brigade or 2
nd
 KOYLI] approached on the right of 2
nd
 
Company [IR94] and was shot down. The Vorfeldzone then 
reported that much activity and moving about could be seen 
in the enemy lines. At first this movement was believed to 
be only a relief in progress. Shortly before 3:00 a.m., it was 
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 TNA: WO/157/288: „II Corps Summary of Information‟, 2 December 1917‟, II Corps Intelligence File 
and Alexander von Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 
94 im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag von Klasing & Co., 1921), p. 236. For German interrogation methods and 
British PsOW see Christopher Duffy, Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 1916 (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), pp. 36-45.  
444
 Relevant German regimental accounts record continental time, i.e., one hour ahead of British time. See 
Appendix 16.  
445
 Major A.D. Buttmann, Kriegsgeschichte des Koninglich Preusischen 6. Thüringishen Infanterie 
Regiment Nr. 95: 1914-1918 (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), p. 251. „32nd Division 
Operation Order No. 138‟ (27 November) stated: „Patrols and Lewis Guns will cover the forming up. These 
patrols must be pushed out every night previous to the assault so that the enemy may become accustomed 
to them‟. The unfortunate British patrol encountered by IR95 was probably carrying out this portion, a 
standard pre-operation procedure by late 1917, of the previously issued order. See TNA: WO/95/2370: 
„32nd Division Operation Order No. 138‟, 27 November 1917, 32nd Division War Diary 
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realised by 9
th
 Company that an English assault on the 
Vorfeldzone was imminent. Annihilation [artillery] fire was 
immediately called for.
446
 
 
At 2:15 a.m. on 2 December, a strong twenty-man patrol 
was sighted in front of the Vorfeldzone [of IR95] and easily 
dispersed. Suddenly, in the moonlight, an unbroken line of 
the enemy was discovered approaching the Feldherrnhügel. 
Shortly before 3:00 a.m. the enemy advanced through the 
deep mud. Abruptly, artillery fire, approaching the level of 
drumfire, bombarded the [divisional] hinterland where all 
of the light and heavy guns were located.
447
  
 
Outposts comprising the Vorfeldzonelinie of 25
th
 Division failed to distinguish the 
imminent threat. A prisoner of 2
nd 
Company, IR116 later informed his captors: “Our 
[British] attack was a surprise. Half his Co[mpan]y (including the Co[mpan]y. 
Commander) ran away and the rest were overwhelmed”.448  
 
 Identification of new formations (8
th
 Division and 32
nd
 Division) opposite 
contributed to anticipation of further efforts to seize more ground on the Passchendaele 
Ridge, so Sir Henry Rawlinson‟s view of an expectant enemy was most likely based on 
intelligence reports conveying augmented German vigilance.
449
 It can also be speculated 
                                                 
446
 Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg , 
pp. 236-37.  
447
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rd December‟, 4 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
448
 TNA: WO/157/121: „Annexe to Second Army Summary Dated 5th December 1917: Information 
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that the Vorfeldzone garrison, no doubt chilled and weary by the early hours of 2 
December, received no warning of imminent attack because, as stated above, the exact 
day and hour could only be surmised. The absence of the expected opening barrage and 
shortened distance to the foremost outposts, especially opposite 8
th
 Division, also 
increased the vulnerability of those attempting to make the most of uncomfortable “rabbit 
hole” positions comprising the Vorfeldzonelinie.  
 
 
3.2 A Moonlight Massacre 
  
Elements of nine battalions, arrayed besides a jumping-off line of 2,870 yards, made final 
preparations and adjustments as zero hour approached. Pallid exhale vapors, dissipating 
as rapidly as they appeared, were momentarily visible in the bitterly cold air. The enemy, 
situated across a broken, cratered no man‟s land permeated by moonlight, appeared 
relatively quiet and unsuspecting. Officers, glancing at previously synchronized 
luminescent wristwatch dials, gave the order to fix bayonets
450
 minutes before the assault: 
a collective metallic clatter of blade hilts being fitted to rifle nose caps succeeded 
whispered commands along the attack frontage extending from west of Exert Farm on the 
right to NE of Tournant Farm on the left.   
 
 Zero hour: Sunday 2 December 1:55 a.m. The attackers, organised in waves and 
columns, silently rose from their forming-up positions. Adhering to narrow, frozen crater 
rims separating innumerable shell hole cavities, they passed through friendly outposts and 
embryonic barbed wire obstacles, rifles at the port, to enter a constricted no man‟s land in 
                                                 
450
 Bayonet blades were blackened prior to the assault. See TNA: WO/95/1727: „25th Infantry Brigade 
Instructions No.3‟, 27 November 1917, 25 Brigade War Diary.  
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the pre-dawn semi-darkness. Extreme haste, whilst negotiating the pulverized, 
pockmarked landscape in the half-light, was necessary in order to close with dispersed 
Vorfeldzonelinie outposts as quickly as possible. Collective and individual focus was thus 
devoted to reaching the Hauptwiderstandslinie before the enemy defensive barrage 
started.  
 
  The prevailing silence did not last long: unwelcome glinting muzzle flashes
451
  – a 
deadly multiple display of direct fire – being readily discerned as the distinctive 
mechanical din from at least a half dozen Maschinen-Gewehr 08/15 erupted opposite the 
left of 25 Brigade immediately after Zero. “Two were seen firing from TEALL 
COTTAGE and three from the front trench of the NORTHERN REDOUBT, but there 
were certainly others firing direct fire from the left flank”. On the right and centre, 
“where the shadow of a passing cloud momentarily veiled the front”, the German 
machine-guns “did not open fire until Zero + 3 minutes [1:58 a.m.]. A few coloured lights 
were sent up at this time”. By Zero + 5 (2:00 a.m.) a withering rifle and machine-gun 
fusillade “had been opened up by the enemy along the whole front of attack and lights of 
various colours and designs were sent up in great numbers by him”.452 The onrushing 
battalions of 97 Brigade received an identical shock. Captain A. Fraser MC, a nearby 
observer, subsequently recollected:  
Those of us who stood on the high ground near Bellevue at 
zero hour on that memorable morning will always retain a 
                                                 
451 A muzzle-mounted flash suppressor or hider, like the conical-shaped attachment affixed to an MG 
08/15, redirects discharged incandescent gases to both sides of a barrel thus preserving a machine-gunner‟s 
nighttime vision. The belief that such devices were developed to mask a shooter's position from the enemy 
remains a commonly held misconception.  
452
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/ 2nd December 
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very vivid impression of the fight. It was a fine night with 
everything quiet on the front. The hillside on which we 
stood was bathed in moonlight so that it was difficult to 
realise that within a few moments some five battalions 
would be advancing across that dark patch down the valley 
and that the stillness of the night air would be shattered by 
the rat-tat-tat of machine-guns and the whine of high 
explosives. At 1:55 a.m. we knew our men had started and 
we were glad that for the next two minutes everything was 
quiet.  
 
Suddenly, at three minutes to two, came the sound of several 
enemy rifle shots followed immediately by the ripple of 
machine-guns all along the front; up went the SOS on both 
flanks of the attack. Still our artillery was silent! We knew 
that we could hope for no assistance from them until three 
minutes after the hour, and, meantime, the enemy was 
having a free hand for five minutes on a target that looked 
grotesquely big against the bright moon.
453
 
 
Major-General Shute‟s after-action report noted: “By Zero + 7” (2:02 a.m.), “the enemy‟s 
machine-guns opened on all portions of the front with great intensity and held up the 
advance of our troops at nearly all points”.454 Major-General Heneker‟s worst fear was 
realised: the hoped for surprise had been lost in the dire minutes following zero hour. 
Captain Fraser lamented the fate of junior leaders charged with tactical command and 
control during the desperate enterprise: “Some of the finest officers that ever wore the 
King‟s uniform went to their deaths with brave faces, well knowing that their chances of 
success were frail”.455  
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454
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3.3 25 Brigade 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling accompanied the advancing „B‟ and „D‟ companies of 2nd 
Royal Berkshire through the forward outpost line into a no man‟s land temporarily 
shrouded by darkness:  
At zero hour 1:55 a.m. B & D companies moved forward to 
the attack in touch with 2
nd
 Lincolnshire Reg[iment] on my 
left and until 1:58 apparently remained unobserved by the 
enemy. The moon was at this time behind some clouds. At 
1:58 the enemy put up a large number of red, green and 
golden lights
456
 and opened a heavy but hurried and ill-
aimed rifle and MG fire, which did not cause heavy 
casualties.
457
 
 
The aroused defenders‟ wildly misdirected bursts, aimed far too high despite increased 
visibility from discharged flares, failed to halt the momentum of the Berkshire onslaught. 
One platoon of „D‟ Company pressed on down the gentle gradient opposite Exert Farm 
and Exert Copse, while the left platoon of „D‟ and two platoons of „B‟ traversed the slight 
rise toward Southern Redoubt. Surprised Vorfeldzonelinie outposts were immediately 
overrun, the recumbent occupants bayoneted. Sustaining the necessary impetus was one 
thing; maintaining proper direction was to prove more difficult: “At this time” [1:58 
a.m.], Stirling wrote, “it appeared that the Battalion on my left was easing off to its left 
and in consequence the left of B Co[mpan]y led by 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton bore off to 
maintain touch”.458 The opening of the British barrage beyond Vension Trench and the 
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 German Verey light signal instructions were previously translated in a II Corps intelligence report 
prepared by Major F.P. Nosworthy: „A captured order of the 204th Division (LEKKERBOTERBEEK 
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redoubts at 2:03 a.m. succeeded the unfortunate divergence by the left platoon, 
attempting to preserve contact with 2
nd
 Lincolnshire, of „B‟ Company. The anticipated 
German defensive barrage was put down one minute later:  
The enemy‟s artillery barrage came down on the 
PASSCHENDAELE – VINDICTIVE crossroads road one 
minute after our guns opened fire, namely at zero plus 9. 
On the left our troops were well clear of the line of the 
enemy‟s barrage, but unfortunately on the right the support 
platoons of the attacking companies were caught in the 
barrage and suffered heavy casualties.
459
 
 
At 2:04 a.m. the enemy‟s barrage came down along the the 
VINDICTIVE CROSSROADS – PASSCHENDAELE 
road very heavily. It also caught the reserve and support 
platoons of B Co[mpan]y who suffered heavy casualties. 
Co[mpan]y HQ of this Co[mpan]y was also blown up at 
this point and 2
nd
 Lieutenant Giddings knocked over and 
dazed.
460
  
 
Nevertheless, No. 5 Platoon of „B‟ Company, deprived of reinforcements from the 
shattered reserve and support platoons and lacking ready assistance from Upton‟s 
deviating platoon, stormed Southern Redoubt along with a platoon from „D‟ Company. 
“A large number of the enemy advanced out of the Southern Redoubt to meet the attack 
of this battalion. Severe hand to hand fighting ensued, but the Berkshires killed them all 
with the bayonet…” The remaining platoon of „D‟ “dug themselves in on a line extending 
to the south-east edge” of the redoubt. On the right „C‟ Company (CO Captain Flint), 
forming a defensive flank opposite the marshy depression in the vicinity of Exert 
                                                 
459
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/ 2nd December 
1917‟, 13 December 1917, 8th Division War Diary.   
460
 TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary. 21-year-old 2nd 
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Farm,
461
 “had succeeded in their task without much difficulty; though in getting into 
touch with „D‟ company their left platoon under 2nd Lieutenant Smith had some brisk 
fighting and took 30 prisoners, including an officer, and a machine-gun”.462 
 
Plate 3.7 Exert Farm from the air (Source: MMP) 
 8536 Sergeant A. Sturgess DCM, a reliable and celebrated NCO, led his No. 5 
Platoon into the shallow excavations comprising Southern Redoubt.
463
 The forlorn party, 
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 Opposite Passchendaele, a swampy morass (sumpf) extended NNE and SE of Exert Farm 
(Kolonnenhof). See Ludwigsdorff, Das Leibgarde Infanterie Regiment (1. Grossherzoglich Hessisches Nr. 
115) im Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Skizze 17. 
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 See TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/ 2nd December 
1917‟, 13 December 1917, 8th  Division War Diary, Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, p. 165 and 
Loraine Petre, The Royal Berkshire Regiment Vol. 2, p. 97. 2
nd
 Lieutenant (former CQMS) F.J. Smith was 
subsequently awarded the MC for this action.  
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joined by the left platoon of „D‟ Company, engaged the defenders with bomb and 
bayonet along dark, narrow confines of rudimentary trenches. Drifting barrage smoke 
further obscured the dim panoramic view from the rectangular reverse slope earthwork – 
a low-lying Flemish hinterland of leafless spinneys, snow-coated fields, spiring Gothic 
church steeples and tiled rooftops north of elevated Moorslede, during the hours before 
dawn. Retention of such corresponding high ground would place Oostnieuwkerke village, 
the billeting hamlets of Vierkavenhoek, Zilverberg, Magermeirie, Kalve, Roodkruis, De 
Ruiter and dozens of outlying farms west of Roulers under direct observation from the 
Passchendaele Ridge. Resistance by IR116 (commanded by Oberstleutnant von 
Westernhagen) and IR117 (commanded by Oberstleutnant Klotz) of 25
th
 Division, 
responsible for Abschnitt A (northern sector of Gruppe Ypern) 
464
 since 26 November, 
was fierce; the Germans could not afford to lose the skyline. A sustained breach at the 
boundary between IR116 and IR117 
465
 was expanded by „B‟ Company‟s stray platoon 
under 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton, who, with 2
nd
 Lieutenant Tremellan, successfully led his 
men to seize the portion of Venison Trench (an objective of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire) 
approximately 50 yards to the north of Southern Redoubt.
466
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 The 25th (Hessian Grand Ducal) Division, a pre-war formation attached to XVIII Armeekorps, entrained 
for Flanders from the St Quentin sector in mid-September. Its 1917 intelligence „value estimate‟ stated: 
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The Royal Berkshire Regiment Vol. 2, p. 97 and Cull, The Second Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment in 
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th
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Plate 3.8 Panorama looking east from site of Southern Redoubt (Source: Rob Thompson) 
Six companies of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade, on the immediate left of 
2
nd
 Royal Berkshire, rushed forward at Zero with fixed bayonets to storm Venison Trench 
and Northern Redoubt. The three Lincolnshire assault companies, in position at the 
battalion jumping-off line since 12:20 a.m., had not yet cleared their line of forward posts 
when, having been observed, four light machine-guns opened fire on exposed skirmish 
waves and trailing worm columns at 1:58 a.m.: “The advance continued, although all the 
officers of assaulting companies became casualties before our own outpost line was 
reached…”467 Survivors pressed on as the astonished Vorfeldzonelinie garrison 
abandoned their shell hole positions and fled toward the main line of resistance at 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) Nr. 94 im Weltkrieg, Skizze 32and Ludwigsdorff, 
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 Lincolnshire War Diary.   
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Venison Trench. Momentum was lost when the advance inexplicably stopped just 30 
yards short of the objective and 2
nd
 Lincolnshire dug in. The subsequent battalion after-
action report related varied motivations for the halt:  
On investigation some men state that they were under the 
impression they had gained the objective – others that they 
were forced to dig in by hostile M.G. fire. The impression 
that the advanced line had reached their objective was 
probably caused by the fact that the advance had overcome 
enemy shell hole posts driving back the enemy + these 
shell hole posts were mistaken for the enemy trench. All 
men were informed in training that in the event of all 
officers becoming casualties, they must know where to stop 
by capturing the first continuous enemy trench they came 
to + then digging in about 50 yards in front of it or as close 
up to our barrage as they could get.
468
  
 
The Lincolnshire attack had already stalled when the British barrage started. Described in 
the aforementioned report as “efficient”, charting its progress proved difficult: “Owing to 
the advance being held up by M.G. fire from M.G.s on our side of the barrage line it is 
[was] not possible to determine whether the pace of the barrage was suitable”. Friendly 
fire also caused a certain amount of trouble: “One or two howitzers were repeatedly firing 
short in S + T zones as far back as VINDICTIVE CROSSROADS”.469  
 
 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade faced an uncertain situation during the remaining few hours 
before Zero. The enemy held Teall Cottage in strength and Lieutenant-Colonel Brand had 
been seriously wounded. Lieutenant Nettleton (IO detached for liaison duty with 2
nd
 
KOYLI) returned to battalion HQ shortly before zero hour:  
I went off at once to our own battalion HQ to report this 
[loss of Teall Cottage] bad news, only to find that they had 
some more of their own. Roger Brand, our CO, had been 
                                                 
468
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469
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wounded and Anderson, the Adjutant, had just got back to 
HQ after seeing him carried off. Normally, when the CO 
becomes a casualty, the next senior officer of the battalion 
takes charge. But in this show, because of the difficulty of 
getting hold of any officer from the companies, it had been 
specifically laid down that the chain of command would go 
down the people normally at battalion HQ i.e., first to 
Anderson, then to me and then the Regimental Sergeant 
Major.  
 
We were still pondering this news about Teall Cottage 
when the Brigade Major came in and gave us his advice. I 
was struck by the way he kept on insisting that it was only 
advice that he was giving. Although Anderson was only a 
Lieutenant and the Brigade Major [acting Captain W.F. 
Somervail] was, besides being a Major [sic]
470
, also, in 
effect, the GSO 1 of the Brigade and the direct 
representative of the Brigadier, he kept on saying, “Now, I 
am not giving you orders. You are in command of the 
battalion. I am only saying that, if I were in your position, I 
would try and echelon your left companies behind Teall 
Cottage etc., etc., but this is not an order”. But of course 
Anderson was very glad of his advice and immediately 
went out to try and put it into effect, while the Brigade 
Major went back to Brigade HQ to report what had 
happened. For myself, I sat on in the pillbox and prayed 
that Anderson would not be hit, because I definitely did not 
want to take over command of the battalion in these 
circumstances.
471
 
 
The original intent, according to Major-General Heneker‟s after-action report, was to run 
the forming-up tape to Teall Cottage. This no longer being possible, 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade 
were “compelled to at once throw back a defensive flank” on a front of 150 yards “so as 
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 Lieutenant A/Captain William Fulton Somervail MC (2
nd
 Cameronians) functioned as Brigade-Major 
during the operation. See IWM: 02(41).221[British Expeditionary Force]/3-2, „Composition of the British 
Army Headquarters 1914-1918‟.  
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to keep touch with the 32
nd
 Division operating on our [8
th
 Division] left, Teal Cottage 
[sic] being in the hands of the enemy”.472  
 
 Lieutenant Nettleton remained under cover at 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade‟s pillbox HQ 
throughout the battalion adjutant‟s absence; it was a very crowded affair:  
The pillbox was about the size of a smallish kitchen, 
though of course with a very much lower ceiling; you 
couldn‟t stand upright in it. This small space had to contain 
two battalion HQ (2
nd
 Rifle Brigade and 2
nd
 Lincolns) and 
later a third, as the CO [Major T.H. Ivey]
473
 of the [1
st
 
Royal] Irish Rifles, which were in reserve, came forward 
from his reserve position and remained with us. Only the 
officers of the three battalion HQ and some signallers could 
be accommodated inside the pillbox and even then it was 
congested. The rest of the personnel had to find what cover 
they could in the trench outside. The runners of the Royal 
Irish Rifles, who always were an undisciplined mob, got at 
the rum ration and made themselves uproariously drunk 
and quite useless.
474
 When their CO wanted to send 
messages to his companies, he had to borrow runners from 
us.
475
 
 
Anderson, Nettleton recalled, returned just before zero hour, “having done what he could 
to adjust our line, which wasn‟t very much…”476 He was, nevertheless, able to arrange 
for the left flank to be thrown back from “the point where the tapes ended on the left (i.e. 
about 250 yards from the MOSSELMARKT – WHISK FARM road) to join hands with 
32
nd
 Division”. Both men passed the remaining minutes leading up to Zero glancing at 
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their watches and waiting. “Promptly at 1:55 a.m. we heard the Boche machine-guns 
open up and knew that the attack had started”.477 
 
 The advance of 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade (attacking NE from the gap at the top of the X that 
made up Vindictive Crossroads) was over almost before it started, as deadly machine-gun 
fire from enemy outposts, Northern Redoubt and Teall Cottage wreaked havoc on 
stumbling skirmish lines and worm columns.
478
 Lieutenants Anderson and Nettleton soon 
realised what the fearful din signified: 
And within a very few minutes after that we knew that it 
had failed. When our barrage came down at Zero plus 8, it 
was a magnificent one – I think the most tremendous I ever 
heard. But long before that, the show was over. The Boche 
machine-guns had eight minutes in which to play 
unhindered on our troops advancing in bright moonlight 
and had simply wiped them out. We had advanced about 
100 yards and lost ten officers out of twelve in those few 
minutes and there was nothing to be done except pick up 
the pieces.
479
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 Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns, p. 118. Officer casualties for 2
nd
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Killed: Captain E.F. Ratliff MC, 2
nd
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nd
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Desperate men sought shelter in any available shell hole or old German practice trench 
sections SW of the redoubt, while others flung themselves down and dug frantically to 
escape the murderous stream of bullets.
480
 Additional defensive fire support was provided 
by a plunging indirect machine-gun barrage originating, approximately 500 yards beyond 
the Hauptwiderstandslinie, from the line Wrangle Farm – Wrath Farm. Consolidation of 
the meagre bit of ground gained, “about 100 yards in advance of their original line”, 
proceeded, as posts of 3 to 6 men each were formed in shell holes under the almost 
continuous hail of machine-gun fire.
481
 Anderson later described the supporting artillery 
barrage as “efficient” with few shorts and “suitable” pace. “Visibility in the moonlight”, 
he also observed, “was up to 500 yards. The moon was behind us. It seems obvious that 
the enemy observed our forming up, but instead of interfering with it, pushed forward 
posts and machine-guns in front of our barrage line. Consequently, when our barrage 
commenced the machine-gun fire commenced rather than lessened”.482 The relevant 
German regimental history appears to partially confirm Anderson‟s speculation: “The 
English were very strong, attacking IR94 with three battalions.
483
 The men in the outpost 
line opened strong fire with rifles and machine-guns”.484  
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  Plate 3.9 Northern Redoubt and environs in the summer of 1917 (Source: MMP) 
 
 25 Brigade‟s assault had almost completely broken down in the minutes following 
Zero. “The enemy were holding TEAL [sic] COTTAGE, the NORTHERN and 
SOUTHERN REDOUBTS and the [VENISON] trench connecting them in considerable 
strength. Isolated groups of men had also been pushed well out in front. These were 
occupying shell hole positions”.485 Stalled elements of 2nd Lincolnshire and 2nd Rifle 
Brigade persevered with the laborious process of improving, by sustained digging and 
scraping, upon any available cover under heavy hostile machine-gun fire. Lieutenants 
Anderson and Nettleton did what they could in the aftermath of the shambles:  
After the noise had died down, we went out to find out 
what we could. Men had grouped themselves in shell holes 
                                                 
485
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to get what shelter they could, but there was no 
organisation left and all we could do was to get the groups 
in touch with each other and pull some back and push 
others forward to make some sort of coherent line and 
evacuate as many wounded as we could find. Even this 
activity had to stop when dawn came, as one could not 
move about in daylight up at front.
486
  
 
A barrage, as per Major-General Heneker‟s request, from Major-General Pinney‟s 33rd 
Division (responsible for left sub-sector of VIII Corps) was fired to cover the right flank 
of 8
th
 Division. Brigadier-General A.W.F. Baird‟s 100 Brigade held the line as divisional 
artillery and machine-gun batteries opened up simultaneously with the main 
bombardment at Zero + 8.
487
 Retaliation, it was later noted, amounted to a “few shells in 
the vicinity of Brigade HQ.”488 On the left, German batteries commenced their dreaded 
protective barrage at Zero + 9 by targeting the Vindictive Crossroads – Passchendaele 
Road. This fire was, as expected, afterwards shortened to Venison Trench and the 
redoubts. Meanwhile, two platoons of 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire fought desperately to maintain 
a hold on Southern Redoubt.
489
  
 
 
3.4  97 Brigade 
 
Five assault battalions of 97 Brigade, companies organised into two distinct frontages, 
advanced toward their final red line objective: 2
nd
 KOYLI and 15
th
 LF (far right and left 
battalions) attacked on a “three company frontage with one company in support moving 
in rear of No. 2 Company”. 16th HLI, 11th Border and 17th HLI (centre battalions) 
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attacked on a two-company frontage “with Nos. 3 and 4 companies in rear of Nos. 1 and 
2 companies”. All companies had assembled earlier at the jumping-off line in varied 
(snake formation and line of sections) platoon frontages forming four waves. Anticipated 
frontages for each battalion on the final objective were, from right to left: 2
nd
 KOYLI 
(520 yards), 16
th
 HLI (450 yards), 11
th
 Border (400 yards), 17
th
 HLI (500 yards) and 15
th
 
LF (700 yards). It was estimated that all battalions would be on their final red line 
objective by Zero + 32 (2:27 a.m.) 
490
  
 
 Available intelligence concerning expected German tactics and probable counter-
attack assembly areas in the sector Vat Cottages – Hill 52 was explained in concise terms 
prior to the attack:  
Enemy Tactics. Enemy makes use of immediate counter-
attack, which generally speaking comes from N and NE.  
 
Assembly Places. Probably in low ground and woods on 
the E[ast] side of the ridge i.e. from NNE and E. He can see 
our advanced positions.  
 
Enemy machine-guns, it was also noted, were “generally echeloned according to the field 
of fire in shell holes. The light MGs [Maschinen-Gewehr 08/15] are usually all 
forward.
491
 All dry shell holes are potential MG emplacements. Some of the heavy MGs 
are possible [sic] fired from elephant dugouts” [splinter-proof shelters constructed with 
corrugated iron]. Barbed wire obstacles were almost unknown on this part of the front, 
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but a formidable belt, beyond the final objective, was believed to exist “parallel to and 
west of the main street of WESTROOSEBEKE, running north and south and there is 
possibly a belt of wire running from NW to SE in front of WESTROOSEBEKE on high 
ground”. Another belt was definitely discerned “running from NW to SE across V.12. 
central (WESTROOSEBEKE)”. The intelligence report concluded with the optimistic 
statement that „Experience on this front show that there is nothing to be feared from the 
enemy so long as he is resolutely tackled”.492 
  
 The 2
nd
 KOYLI, aligned along the jumping-off tape since 1:20 a.m., promptly 
advanced at 1:55 a.m. Its final red line objective extended for 520 yards from NW of 
Northern Redoubt to just opposite the large, water-filled depression just west of the 
Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road.493 From right to left, „A‟, „C‟ and „D‟ companies 
moved forward in good order. These companies were, according to 97 Brigade orders, 
responsible for the “capture of all localities and strongpoints occupied by the enemy 
between our assembly positions and the final objective”. The “denial of Hill 52 to the 
enemy”, it was also stressed, was “essential to the success of the operations”. „B‟ 
Company, following immediately behind „C‟, was to be prepared for two possible 
operational contingencies: “Support any of the leading companies should it become 
necessary to do so to enable these companies to reach their final objectives” or “Give 
assistance to the left battalion [2
nd
 Rifle Brigade] of the [25] Brigade on our right in the 
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event of its being held up by forming a defensive flank on the east”. „B‟ Company, 
should neither of these eventualities occur, was to consolidate the captured area behind 
„C‟ Company.494   
 
 Captain J.H. Howard (Adjutant 2
nd
 KOYLI) was responsible for compiling an 
account of the operation for the battalion war diary. His efforts were, unlike other 
consulted examples found in the National Archives, remarkably forensic in methodology 
and scope. “The subsequent action of the battalion”, Howard explained, “is best 
described in narrative form by companies, the descriptions being those given by the 
surviving officers and non-commissioned officers. The essence of the attack”, he added, 
“was the element of surprise. The night was very bright and moonlight [sic] and there is 
no doubt that all movement could be seen at a short distance”.495  
 
 2
nd
 KOYLI „s advance was almost immediately followed by “very heavy machine-
gun fire, owing to which the casualties, particularly among officers and NCOs, were very 
heavy”. Intense enfilade fire was also experienced from the direction of Venison Trench, 
Teall Cottage and Volt Farm. Wayward elements of battalions (2
nd
 Rifle Brigade and 16
th
 
HLI) on the flanks “lost direction and, crossing our [2nd KOYLI] front, caused much 
confusion”.496  
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 Captain Howard, basing his findings on interviews with surviving officers and 
NCOs, carefully reconstructed the four companies‟ ordeal for the 2nd KOYLI war diary. 
2
nd
 Lieutenant H.J. Knight (CO „A‟ Company), all hope of obtaining surprise gone, led 
his four platoons forward in the face of fierce German resistance:  
This [„A‟] company was on the right of the battalion and 
left the tape in good order at Zero. 2
nd
 Lieutenant H.L. 
Brigham was wounded half an hour before Zero. He was 
the right platoon commander and detailed for keeping touch 
with the 2
nd
 Bn. Rifle Brigade on our right. Sergeant Davies 
[acting liaison officer with 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade] then took 
command of his platoon; before „A‟ Company moved off 
they noticed the troops on our right were on the move 7 
minutes before ZERO. The company at first, under the 
impression that these were hostile troops, nearly fired on 
them but discovered that that they were 2
nd
 Bn. Rifle 
Brigade advancing in a NORTHERLY direction across our 
front.
497
 The commander of „A‟ Company (2nd Lieutenant 
H.J. Knight) endeavoured to redirect these troops but the 
officer he saw became a casualty almost immediately. This 
caused confusion amongst „A‟ Company. The Rifle 
Brigade crossed the PASSCHENDAELE – 
WESTROOSEBEKE road at V.30.b.30.05 [vicinity of 
Teall Cottage]. The enemy opened fire less than a minute 
after ZERO; this fire appeared to come from TEALE 
COTT [sic], VENISON TRENCH and VOID FARM. 2
nd
 
Lieutenant C.P. Halliday MC, 2
nd
 Lieutenant J.V. Webb 
(who joined the battalion late on the night of November 30) 
and the Company Sergeant Major became casualties in the 
first five minutes. The company progressed in spite of this 
until our artillery barrage came down, causing the men to 
hold up. At this time it is believed the 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade lost 
heavily. No. 1 Platoon, which had been told off to capture 
TEALE COTTAGE, had lost its platoon commander and 
platoon sergeant and was reduced to 7 men. Sergeant 
Pannett from No. 3 Platoon was detailed to do this work; 
only the company commander and 1 NCO now remained to 
lead the company. The enemy artillery fire was very 
dispersed and not in the nature of a barrage. „A‟ 
Co[mpan]y‟s commander found his men closing to the right 
and he tried to re-organise his men as best he could in spite 
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of the fact that he had been severely shaken by a shell burst 
and was grazed above the eye by a bullet. The men at this 
point dug in groups with the 2
nd
 Bn. Rifle Brigade…498  
 
Remnants of „A‟ Company laboured at converting their shared shell hole positions, 
situated east of the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road, into outposts. Lieutenant 
Knight subsequently stated that his company‟s failure to reach the objective “was entirely 
due to his being mixed up with 2
nd
 Bn. Rifle Brigade and the fact that he had lost all his 
officers and NCOs in the early stage of the advance.
499
 Owing to the troops on his right 
moving forward before ZERO the element of surprise was frustrated”.500  
 
 In the centre, „C‟ Company (CO Captain P. Lambert) experienced devastating 
losses amongst its leadership after proceeding just fifty yards:  
„C‟ Company left the tape in perfect order. After going 
some 50 yards they came under heavy machine-gun fire 
and all the officers and senior NCOs became casualties.
501
 
The fire appeared to come from directly from our front and 
flanks. In spite of this they pushed on. Sergeant Hayward 
was then in command of the company and reports that he 
went a distance of 500 yards (?)
502
 At one point he crossed 
the PASSCHENDAELE – WESTROOSEBEKE road about 
V.30.b.0.08 and found some derelict field guns and 
shelters, the occupants of which were killed. He then found 
himself in front of a line of trees, which were held by the 
enemy in force.  
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Sergeant Hayward, the only remaining company leader, took stock of the situation and 
decided to remain under cover where he was with the seven men who had miraculously 
accompanied him thus far.
503
   
 
 On the left, „D‟ Company (CO Captain H.R. Forde MC)504 was to overrun Hill 52 
before gaining its final objective opposite the water-filled depression west of the 
Passchendaele – Westroosebeke road. Heavy losses were also sustained amongst „D‟ 
Company officers and NCOs. A Sergeant Horne was the only remaining company leader 
available for Captain Howard to interview:  
„D‟ Company, No. 3 or left company … recounted by 
Sergeant Horne: „D‟ Company left the tape in perfect order 
and immediately came under heavy machine-gun fire. He 
[Sergeant Horne] lost twelve men before going twenty 
yards. He was in touch with the 16
th
 High [land] L.I. on his 
left the right company of which advanced across his front 
and the two companies became mixed-up. He went forward 
with his few men until he reached two pillboxes. At this 
time he had three men of his platoon left, one being a 
Lewis Gunner, and he sent one man back for support but 
the man became a casualty. At this time he saw his 
company commander (Captain H.R. Forde MC) some 
distance off, when a Very Light went up and illuminated 
the surroundings. He was unable to reach him and never 
saw him again; this was some 250 yards in front of the 
tapeline.
505
 After this he got in touch with Number Thirteen 
Platoon, commanded by 2
nd
 Lieutenant J.N. Ellis, and they 
made an attempt to take the pillboxes but were unable to 
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sniper hit him in the head and, poor lad, he was killed at once‟. See Marquis De Ruvigny, De Ruvigny’s 
Roll of Honour 1914-1918 vol IV (London: Naval & Military Press reprint of 1922 edition), p. 58.  
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find an entrance. Here 2
nd
 Lieutenant Ellis and his Platoon 
Sergeant were killed.
506
 With the assistance of some men of 
the 16
th
 High[land] L.I., he worked round the pillboxes and, 
after going about 80 yards, he dug in.
507
   
 
Consolidation of captured ground a further eighty yards beyond these concrete structures 
was carried out, under Sergeant Horne‟s supervision, by the mixed party of 2nd KOYLI 
and 16
th
 HLI.
508
 
 
 „B‟ Company (CO Captain J. Hassell), following in the wake of „C‟, found it 
necessary to carry out the second operational contingency – “Support any of the leading 
companies should it become necessary to do so to enable these companies to reach their 
final objectives” – assigned by 97 Brigade. “D‟ Company sustained heavy casualties and 
Hill 52 had to be secured at all costs:  
„B‟ Company, No. 4 or Support Company … recounted by 
the Company Commander Captain J. Hassell: „B‟ Company 
started off the tape in correct order. Immediately the enemy 
illuminated the ground and opened machine-gun fire which 
did not impede his [Captain Hassell] progress or cause 
many casualties to his company, as it appeared to go 
overhead. He reached Hill 52 with Number 5 Platoon, the 
other three platoons being in front in positions from which 
the enemy had been driven out. The sappers [219
th
 Field 
Company RE] who accompanied him immediately got to 
work and taped and sited the strongpoint and he set 
Number 5 Platoon to dig.
509
 Whilst this was in progress, 
casualties of other companies reported to him and he set 
them to dig in. This trench was sited close to an old enemy 
                                                 
506
 19-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant J.N. Ellis is buried in Tyne Cot Cemetery.  
507
 TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI War Diary. 
508
 „D‟ Company officer casualties, in addition to Captain Forde and 2nd Lieutenant Ellis, were 2nd 
Lieutenant R.D. Abbiss DOW and 2
nd
 Lieutenant J.S. Wilson (attached to 97 TMB) wounded. 30-year-old 
2
nd
 Lieutenant Reginald Donald Abbiss is buried in Mendinghem Military Cemetery.  
509
 „[A] T-shaped strongpoint, with 4 fire bays and four traverses in each arm‟ was taped-out and dug with 
infantry assistance under the direction of Lieutenant Spottiswoode RE. „Time spent on the job was 2 
hours‟, after which the wounded Spottiswoode and his party departed for billets. See IWM 4723: 
„Statement by OC [219th Field Company]‟, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
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trench, where he temporarily set up his company 
headquarters. 
 
Thus a tenuous position was established on Hill 52. Would the British be able to retain 
this vital high ground against the odds?
510
  
 
 Three regiments (IR94, IR95, IR96) of 38
th
 Division
511
 were responsible for 
defending Abschnitt B of Gruppe Staden since 1 December.
512
 On the left, IR94 
(commanded by Oberstleutnant von Taysen) was tasked with defending the sector 
opposite 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade and 2
nd
 KOYLI. Its Vorfeldzonelinie garrison was, regardless 
of a general state of alertness following the capture of the three prisoners in the waning 
hours of 1 December or the infliction of heavy losses on 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade and „A‟ and  
„C‟ companies 2nd KOYLI, rapidly overwhelmed opposite the right and centre by 
elements of „D‟ and „B‟ companies.513 Höhenrücken – Passendale (Hill 52) was 
subsequently lost, whilst isolated outposts continued to hold out against surrounding 
British forces. Reinforced companies of IR94 prepared, during the remaining hours 
before dawn, to resist further enemy attacks against the Hauptwiderstandslinie, while 
                                                 
510
 TNA: WO/95/2400: ‟97 Brigade Operation Order No. 178‟, 27 November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary 
and WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI War Diary. 
511
 The 38
th
 (Thüringian) Division, a pre-war formation attached to XI Armeekorps, sustained heavy losses 
during the opening phase of the Third Ypres campaign. Rest at Antwerp was followed by deployment south 
of the Scarpe in early September, after which it returned north to hold the line at Houthulst Forest from 19 
to 25 November. Its 1917 intelligence „value estimate‟ stated: „As a rule it gave a good account of itself in 
the numerous battles in which it took part…‟ Its main objective on taking over Abschnitt B was „to prevent 
the English from obtaining a foothold on the entire PASSCHENDAELE Ridge‟. The divisional commander 
(General-Leutnant Schultheiss) was „very emphatic on this point…‟ See Intelligence Section of the General 
Staff. American Expeditionary Forces, Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions, p. 431, TNA: 
WO/157/288: „Annexe to II Corps Summary No. 34, Miscellaneous Information from a Prisoner of 94 I.R. 
(from Corps on Right), II Corps Summary of Information‟, 5 December 1917, II Corps Intelligence File 
and  Appendix 2 for infantry orders of battle.  
512
 The disposition of 38
thDivision’s regiments were roughly, from right to left: IR96: Sector opposite 
Source Farm; IR95: Vicinity of Veal Cottages to Osselstraat; IR94: Osselstraat to Northern Redoubt 
(inclusive). See TNA: WO/157/288: „Situation Map Showing Enemy Dispositions on 3/12/17‟, II Corps 
Intelligence File and Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) Nr. 
94 im Weltkrieg, Skizze 32.  
513
 See Appendix 16, Part D (paras. 7 and 8).  
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embattled Vorfeldzonelinie posts hoped for imminent relief by counter-attack troops. 
Local commanders recognised the danger; immediate action was necessary if the British 
were to be denied a permanent hold on Hill 52 and its environs. 
 
 Increased distance to the final red line objective required the two front companies 
of 16
th
 HLI (acting CO Major W.D. Scott DSO MC)
514
 to capture and consolidate a 
„dotted green‟ or „350 yard‟ line‟ halfway to the final red line objective. The remaining 
two companies, following closely behind, were to “leap frog on the dotted GREEN line 
and advance to the final objective and will be responsible for the capture of all occupied 
localities between the dotted GREEN line and their final objective”.515 Brigade orders 
were clear: Advancing roughly along two unusually close avenues (present-day 
Osselstraat and Haringstraat) the battalion would seize and consolidate Vox, Void, 
Veldt
516
 and Volt farms respectively before halting on the red line south of Valuation 
Houses. The ground to be traversed was, besides embracing four nearly indiscernible 
farm sites, the usual expanse of shell holes with several dugouts and concrete shelters 
identified in the vicinity of Vox, Void and Volt farms. One continuous trench, however, 
extending eastward across the left front of 16
th
 HLI from the objective area allotted to the 
neighbouring 11
th
 Border Regiment, was also known to exist in the Vorfeldzonelinie area 
south of the dotted green line.
517
  
 
                                                 
514
 T/Major W.D. Scott was awarded the DSO for gallantry at Nieuport on 10-11 July 1917.  
515
 TNA: WO/95/2400: ‟97 Brigade Operation Order No. 178‟, 27 November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary.  
516
 Veldt Farm was situated astride the boundary between 16
th
 HLI and 11
th
 Border Regiment.  
517
 TNA: WO/95/2400: „Notes to Accompany Special Intelligence Maps of the Area V.15 – V.30‟ 
November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary.  
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 “At Zero hour (1:55 a.m.)”, the 16th HLI diarist recorded, “the battalion 
advanced”. The weather, he also noted, was “bright moonlight, no wind, visibility good 
up to 300 yards, ground soft but quite practicable”. Men, organised into „worm‟ columns 
and line of sections, passed over the jumping-off tape and negotiated the gentle slope 
toward the illuminated void: “The fickle moon crept behind dark clouds as they attacked. 
Forward they drove in the black o‟ night, each man alone – robbed even of the comfort of 
human companionship in the face of eternity”. Hopes of achieving complete surprise 
were almost immediately dashed by “intense enemy machine-gun fire from directions of 
MALLET COPSE, VOX FARM, VOID FARM and HILL 52”. The attackers, 
nevertheless, pressed forward: “Blundering on, sobbing for breath, they strove towards 
the vicious red flashes of the machine-guns that stabbed the gloom. These guns were 
densely packed in Mallet Copse, Vox Farm, Void Farm and Hill 52, strongholds that – 
with the weather – denied the British Army its coveted objective of Westroosebeke to the 
end”. The low, mud-spattered pillbox and nearby trench sections at Vox Farm were “at 
once rushed and the garrison disposed of, 50 prisoners being sent to the rear”. 
Concentrated fire, unfortunately, had “seriously thinned” the battalion‟s ranks and was 
not checked until the opening of the barrage at Zero + 8.  The attackers, assisted by this 
timely suppressing shellfire, were able to gain, despite a decline in remaining strength by 
the wandering of stray groups of men into the sector of 2
nd
 KOYLI, a line running east 
and west, “with the right flank refused toward Hill 52”, through the SW corner of Void 
Farm by 2:40 a.m. On the immediate right, continued resistance by an outpost of the 
neighbouring German regiment isolated 16
th
 HLI from 2
nd
 KOYLI. On the left, contact 
with the 11
th
 Border Regiment was also lost in the confusion. Two officers (Captain G.L. 
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Davidson and 2
nd
 Lieutenant W.R. Bennie)
518
 were subsequently killed, “whilst 
endeavouring to locate this unit”, by sniper fire from the direction of Mallet Copse. 
Further efforts to rally and push on proved difficult in the period immediately after Zero. 
The CO 16
th
 NF recalled: “There was practically no artillery fire [,] a few shells only 
falling behind our original line. I consider [sic] the attack was sticking, anyhow just 
N[orth] of VIRILE FARM I personally found many men by VOCATION FARM and 
ordered them forward. This was about zero plus 10 minutes and there was very little 
hostile fire. About three machine-guns were firing from about TEALL COTT, just north 
of [HILL] 52”.519 
 
Plate 3.10 A.M. Burnie’s ink drawing of 16th HLI advancing from the jumping-off 
line at Zero. This is the only known illustration depicting the night operation on the 
Passchendaele Ridge (Source: Chalmers (ed), A Saga of Scotland)  
 
                                                 
518
 27-year-old Captain George Leslie Davidson (4
th
 Battalion attached 16
th
 Battalion HLI) and 22-year-old 
2
nd
 Lieutenant William Robertson Bennie (7
th
 Battalion attached 16
th
 Battalion HLI) have no known grave 
and are commemorated on the Tyne Cot Memorial to the Missing. 
519
TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division 
War Diary, p. 11, WO/95/2403: 16
th
 HLI War Diary, IWM 4723: „32nd Div. No.G.S.1499/3/33‟, 5 
December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2), Chalmers (ed), A Saga of Scotland, 
p. 110 and Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im 
Weltkrieg, p. 237. Lieutenant Kerr, CO RE party detailed to construct a strongpoint at Void Farm (Chapter 
2, p. 111), observed leaderless troops retiring from the front and right at about 2:30 a.m. Following this, he 
oversaw consolidation of Vox Farm by a mixed group of approximately 50 men from 2
nd
 KOYLI, 16
th
 HLI 
and 11
th
 Border. See Lambert Papers: „STATEMENT BY LIEUT. KERR R.E.‟.  
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  Plate 3.11 Site of 11
th
 Border Regiment jumping-off position (Source: Author)  
 
 The anticipated area concentration barrage had momentarily suppressed the fierce 
German machine-gun fire, but 16
th
 HLI were nowhere near to breaching the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie defences.  Forced to dig-in, with both flanks exposed, east and 
west of Void Farm, the battalion had only managed to reach the southern edge of the 
Vorfeldzonelinie in the forty-four minutes after Zero:  
The remnants of the battalion then consolidated two 
positions on the line of our first objective.
520
 One under 
Lieut[enant] J. Miller and Lieut[enant] J.W. Lumm with 
about 40 other o.r. from „B‟ and „D‟ companies was 
immediately in front of VOID FARM about V.23.d.9.4. 
facing N[orth]. The other under Captain J. Alexander, 
Lieut[enant] D.V. Charlton and Lieut[enant] R.B. 
                                                 
520
 „Consolidated‟ relative to objective (Vorfeldzonelinie) depth; the dotted green line had not been reached.  
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Robertson with about 30 o.r. from „A‟ and „B‟ companies 
was about V.24.c.3.4 [east of Void Farm] facing NE.
521
  
 
Shell holes and any other available cover were deepened and otherwise improved upon in 
the half-light while posted sentries fixed their gaze on front and flanks during the 
remaining hours before sunrise.  
 
 Colonel H.C. Wylly‟s history of the Border Regiment during the First World War 
records that on 2 December 1917, the 11
th
 Battalion participated in a “smart little action; 
moving up from Wurst Farm in the Westroosebeke area to the frontline” to carry out “a 
night attack on the German positions S[outh] of Westroosebeke in conjunction with other 
units of the 97
th
 Brigade and two battalions of the 96
th
 Infantry Brigade. The „Lonsdales‟ 
took their objectives and held them all through the day until the enemy launched a 
counter-attack at 4:30 p.m., when the battalion had to fall back to the old line”.522 This 
brief account – unavoidable due to limits of space when recounting the deeds of all 
sixteen Regular, Territorial and New Army battalions in one volume – only provides the 
barest outline of a tragic, but now forgotten feat of arms enacted on a low, wind-swept 
Flanders ridge in the immediate aftermath of a great campaign.    
 
 With two companies in front and two immediately behind, the 11
th
 Border 
Regiment (CO Major and acting Lieutenant-Colonel T.F. Tweed MC)
523
 waited for Zero 
                                                 
521
 TNA: WO/95/2404: 16
th
 HLI War Diary.  
522
 Colonel H.C. Wylly, The Border Regiment in the Great War (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1924), p. 173.  
523
 Twenty-seven-year-old A/Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Frederic Tweed MC (1890-1940). Educated at 
Liverpool Institute and Liverpool University; underwriting member of Lloyd‟s; Liberal agent for Eccles at 
the outbreak of war; commissioned 15
th
 LF (1
st
 Salford Pals); transferred 16
th
 LF (2
nd
 Salford Pals) 
November 1914; Captain and OC „B‟ or 1st Eccles Company 1915-16; Major and 2/ic 1916-17; MC 
January 1917; CO 11
th
 Border Regiment from 25 August; relinquished commission and Hon. Lieutenant-
Colonel March 1918; Secretary Manchester Liberal Federation 1918-26. Tweed went on to a distinguished 
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along the 300-yard jumping-off tape. Silence was maintained as the battalion ascended 
the gentle incline toward the summit of Vat Cottage Ridge at 1:55 a.m. Confronting them 
was the anticipated collection of occupied shell hole outposts comprising the 
Vorfeldzonelinie, the left hand portion of linear trench facing 16
th
 HLI and, beyond the 
forward edge of the Hauptwiderstandslinie and subsequent green line objective, the 
ramshackle agglomeration of dugouts shelters and trenches found, approximately 200 
yards south of the battalion‟s final red line objective, in Mallet Copse.524 Another short 
stretch of linear trench, protected by barbed wire and extending from Veldt Farm to 
Mallet Copse, had also been noted by II Corps intelligence in the days leading up to the 
attack.  
 
  Plate 3.12 Lieutenant-Colonel T.F. Tweed (Source: Stedman, Salford Pals)  
                                                                                                                                                 
political career as co-founder of „Liberal Summer Schools‟ and chief of staff and primary political advisor 
to David Lloyd George from 1926 until the former‟s untimely death by stroke. He also wrote three novels 
(Rinehard: A Melodrama of the Nineteen-Thirties or, alternatively in the USA, Gabriel Over the White 
House, Blind Mouths and Destiny’s Man) the first of which was made into a motion picture by American 
press baron William Randolph Hearst‟s „Cosmopolitan Productions‟ in 1933. Evidence has recently come 
to light that he may have fathered the only child (Jennifer Longford b. 1929) of the former Prime Minister 
and his long-time mistress and subsequent wife Frances Stevenson. See John Campbell, If Love Were All: 
The Story of Frances Stevenson and David Lloyd George (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006) for an account of 
the five-year affair between Tweed and Stevenson.   
524
 An aerial photograph, taken on 27 November, showed the „area about old trench at V.23.d.00.45 and 
MALLET COPSE still dry. North of the [winding Goudbergstraat] road the ground is very wet except for 
the isolated shell holes which are dry probably because new. Pillbox can still be seen in southwest corner of 
MALLET WOOD. See „Appendix to II Corps Summary No. 27, Preliminary Report on Photos Taken 27-
11-17, II Corps Summary of Information‟, 28 November 1917, TNA WO/157/287, II Corps Intelligence 
File.  
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  The enemy remained quiet as the four companies of 11
th
 Border Regiment 
silently entered no man‟s land. Sporadic rifle bursts – immediately followed by a vicious 
fusillade and cascade of descending magnesium flares – put paid to any hoped for 
surprise. Both front companies, resolute in the face of fierce machine-gun fire, quickly 
swept over the Vorfeldzonelinie and, topping the ridge crest, occupied the green line and 
seized Veldt Farm. The two leap-frogging companies, passing through the secured 
intermediate objective, rushed downhill to enter Mallet Copse at its southern end. Bomb 
and bayonet made short work of any occupants discovered among the haphazard warren 
of mined dugouts, corrugated metal-roofed shrapnel shelters and narrow trench sections 
before the tiny copse was cleared and its north edge gained. Any further advance from 
there through the muddy northern valley toward the red line was stopped by machine-gun 
fire originating 200 yards northward from inundated Mallet Wood. Remnants of the leap-
frogging companies, their position now rendered untenable under a rain of bullets fell 
back to “the southern edge of the copse with their left flank refused”.525 
 
 The 11
th
 Border Regiment, notwithstanding heavy casualties and resultant 
confusion, had been able to advance 500 yards and occupy dispersed positions of the 
green line intermediate objective to – 200 yards short of the red line – Mallet Copse.526 
This epic action by the „Lonsdale‟ Battalion was, as with other battalions of 25 and 97 
Brigades, underlined by many obscure human tragedies now lost to time. One on record 
                                                 
525
 See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd 
Division War Diary, p. 9. 
526
 Officer casualties for 11
th
 Border Regiment were as follows: Killed: Captains I. Benson, A.F. Sandeman, 
P.M. Martin; 2
nd
 Lieutenants R.C. Richardson, W.B. MacDuff. Wounded: Captain McConnan, 2
nd
 
Lieutenants J.M. Jamie, Fell, Hotchkiss, Malley Martin, Duff, Abbey. 34-year-old Captain Issac Benson, 
33-year-old Captain Albert Fitzroy Sandeman, 21-year-old Captain Peter Mcewan Martin, 2
nd
 Lieutenant 
Robert Cecil Richardson (age unknown) and 24-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant William Brown MacDuff have no 
known grave and are commemorated on the Tyne Cot Memorial to the Missing.  
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concerns two (George and John) of three Watt brothers from the tiny Cumbria village of 
Skelton. George Watt, the youngest, had been employed as a ploughman before the war. 
His attempt to enlist in Penrith was thwarted due to being underage. Undeterred, young 
George traveled to Carlisle and successfully enlisted there. He was, by the time of the 
night operation near Passchendaele, an experienced veteran who had recovered from 
thigh wounds received on the infamous opening day of the Somme campaign. Waiting 
with George on the jumping-off tape below the summit of Vat Cottage Ridge was his 
older brother John. Both siblings, rifles held high at the port, promptly went forward at 
zero hour. John fell wounded not long afterward. George, witnessing his brother‟s 
distress, dragged him into a nearby shell hole before moving on to be wounded a second 
time. John Watt, unable to leave the cover of the crater, was later posted as „missing‟ and 
never heard from again.
527
  
 
Plate 3.13 Watt Brothers: George right, John centre 
(Source: Bardgett, The Lonsdale Battalion) 
                                                 
527
 See Colin Bardgett, The Lonsdale Battalion 1914-1918 (Melksham: Cromwell Press, 1993), pp. 43 and 
129. 27-year-old 17322 Pte. John William Watt has no known grave and is commemorated on the Tyne Cot 
Memorial to the Missing. Pte. George Watt was evacuated after being wounded. He survived the war to 
return home and marry.  
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 17
th
 HLI (CO Lieutenant-Colonel J. Inglis)
528
 was also tasked with seizing two 
(green and red line) objectives as a result of the distance to be traversed. The Battalion‟s 
four companies were formed up, as with 16
th
 HLI and 11
th
 Border, on a two company 
frontage with two companies following behind in order to leap-frog to the final 500-yard 
red line objective overlooking low ground in the vicinity of Mallet Wood and Double 
Copse:  
The intention was to advance on this front at zero hour and 
drive the enemy from positions occupied by him on the 
[Vat Cottage] Ridge. There were [as with 16
th
 HLI and 11
th
 
Border Regiment] two objectives to be taken – a GREEN 
LINE, running approximately from VEAL COTTAGES on 
our battalion front, to a point right of No. 3 Company, No. 
2 [16
th
 HLI] Battalion, and a RED LINE running 
approximately from TOURNANT FARM to the [II] Corps 
boundary at a point opposite No. 1 Company, No. 5 [15
th
 
LF] Battalion. The 17
th
 HLI were responsible for the 
capture of the first objective from a point V.23.d.06.32 
(right of Mallet Copse) to V.23.c.19.09 (in front of and to 
the left of VEAL COTTAGES), and taking VAT 
COTTAGES. The Second objective or RED LINE was 
from V.23.c.04.91 to V.23.c.18.42. [northern slope of the 
Vat Cottage Ridge], the frontage on the final objective to 
be one of 500 yards.
529
  
 
The postwar Battalion history observed: “There were two objectives to be taken, of which 
sections were detailed as the job of the 17
th
 – a slice of which included two formidable 
„pillboxes‟ known as the Vat and Veal Cottages”.530  
                                                 
528
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Inglis. RMC Sandhurst; Commissioned HLI 1900; South Africa 1900-1902; 
Lieutenant 1906; Adjutant 1
st
 HLI 1911; Captain 1912; Major 1916; CO 17
th
 HLI July 1917.  
529
 TNA: WO/95/2400: ‟97 Brigade Operation Order No. 178‟, 27 November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary 
and WO/95/2405: 17
th
 HLI War Diary.  
530
 Arthur & Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry, p. 68. An aerial photograph taken on 
27 November provided additional intelligence about German defences in the vicinity of Vat and Veal 
cottages: „7 B.13.  V.23.c.d.29.a.b. Light good. Shows VAT and VEAL COTTAGES, MALLET COPSE 
and a considerable area north and south of the [Goudbergsraat?] road. There appears to be small posts still 
in the old trench running north from V.23.d. Probable MG position at about V.23.d.12.10 and numerous 
shell hole positions just east of this which appear comparatively dry and occupied. Area about VAT 
COTTAGES dry. Tracks lead along road southwest of this area. The location of the post reported here is 
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 Plate 3.14 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Inglis  
   (Source: Arthur & Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry) 
 
 Aligned before a start line („A‟ and „B‟ companies in front; „C‟ and „D‟ in rear) 
extending from east to west along the ascending southern slope of the Vat Cottage 
outcrop, with Vat and Veal cottages lying beyond, the 17
th
 HLI crossed the jumping-off 
tape at Zero:  
The battalion assembled on a frontage of 400 yards and at 
zero hour (1:55 a.m.) moved forward to attack. Companies 
deployed from a two platoon frontage in snake formation – 
this method having been adopted owing to the shell torn 
nature of the ground – and advanced in four waves.531 „A‟ 
and „B‟ companies were to capture the first objective, 
mopping up all occupied posts on the way, including the 
two pillboxes, while „C‟ and „D‟ were to “leap-frog” 
through them, carry the next objective and consolidate.
532
    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
apparently in two or three shell holes about V.29.a.65.80. See „Appendix to II Corps Summary No. 27, 
Preliminary Report on Photos Taken 27-11-17, II Corps Summary of Information‟, 28 November 1917, 
TNA WO/157/287, II Corps Intelligence File.   
531
 The distance between waves and companies was 20 yards and 40 yards respectively. See WO/95/2405: 
17
th
 HLI War Diary. 
532
Arthur & Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry, p. 68.   
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The early stages of the attack were carried out without any serious opposition as the 
assaulting snake columns drove past or over scattered Vorfeldzonelinie outposts. Hoped 
for complacency on the part of the enemy during the 8 minutes prior to the barrage start 
time was, as elsewhere, instantly dispelled by almost ceaseless hostile fire: “Suddenly he 
opened heavy machine-gun fire upon the advancing companies, inflicting heavy 
casualties which, in the dark and over the difficult ground, had the effect of splitting up 
the sections and creating some confusion”.533  
 
„A‟ and „B‟ companies, whose task was to “advance as far as the „GREEN LINE‟ 
capturing and mopping up all occupied points on the way”, encountered the intense 
machine-gun fire before reaching the crest of the ridge. This, coupled with severe losses 
from enfilade fire on both flanks, failed to deter survivors as they bypassed or overran 
German posts in the Vorfeldzonelinie. Determined efforts by dispersed elements of both 
companies were of little avail against merciless volleys from Vat Cottages. „C‟ and „D‟ 
companies, following close behind, did not provide any additional impetus. “Our men”, 
the battalion diarist later wrote, “gallantly pressed on against these odds; but the enemy 
machine-gun and rifle fire became so intense that their advanced positions were rendered 
humanly untenable”.534  
 
 Major-General Shute subsequently noted the result in his after-action report: “The 
17
th
 HLI … had been checked by machine-gun fire from VAT COTTAGES at a very 
early stage of the advance. Various efforts had been made to work round the flanks of 
                                                 
533
 Ibid.   
534
 TNA: WO/95/2405: 17
th
 HLI War Diary and Arthur & Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland Light 
Infantry, p. 68.   
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this strongpoint but these attempts had resulted in the loss of many officers and NCOs 
and the advance had been definitely held up”.535 Vat and Veal cottages were now 
discovered to be “heavily garrisoned” and, despite intelligence to the contrary, protected 
by barbed wire obstacles: “[S]trongpoints were found to be heavily garrisoned and wired 
and he was also found to be established in a strong line of trench also effectively wired”. 
Survivors, forced to retire in places, went to ground in the nearest shell holes and began 
the painful process of consolidation under fierce, continuous fire. Supporting artillery and 
machine-gun barrages, commencing at Zero + 8, failed to provide any further assistance 
to the stalled battalion. Failure to breach the German main line of resistance at any point 
made it unlikely that even the green line intermediary objective would be reached before 
daybreak.
536
  
 
 Four companies, organised along the same lines as 2
nd
 KOYLI, of 15
th
 LF (CO 
acting Lieutenant-Colonel H.K Utterson DSO)
537
 jumped-off without incident at 1:55 
a.m. to carry out the daunting task of forming a left flank guard: “Theirs was a difficult 
manoeuvre, a sort of echelon attack: the left company had to move only a short distance, 
                                                 
535
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd 
Division War Diary, p. 11. 17
th
 HLI sustained heavy officer casualties: Killed: 2
nd
 Lieutenants J. Osborne, 
P.N. Cunningham, R. Hislop Reid, M. Cameron, J. Miller, J. Morland; Wounded: Captain J.O. Westwater, 
2
nd
 Lieutenants R.D. Brown, G. Forsyth, G.T. M‟Intosh, R.D.W. Nicholson, R. Smith. 24-year-old 2nd 
Lieutenant John Osborne, 2
nd
 Lieutenant Peter Nesbit Cunningham (age unknown), 29-year-old 2
nd
 
Lieutenant Robert Hislop Reid, 24-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant MacDonald Cameron and 22-year-old 2
nd
 
Lieutenant John Miller have no known grave and are commemorated on the Tyne Cot Memorial to the 
Missing. 21-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant John Morland is buried in Poelcappelle British Cemetery.  
536
 WO/95/2405: 17
th
 HLI War Diary.   
537
 A/Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Kelso Utterson, Commissioned Dorset Regiment 1897; Lieutenant 1899; 
South Africa 1899-1902; Captain 1905; DSO and Major 1915; War Office 1916; Brigade Major January- 
September 1917; CO 15
th
 LF 31 October. Special thanks to Peter Hodgkinson for additional biographical 
details.  
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while the right traversed over 500 yards”.538 Thus the entire battalion would, when in 
position on the red line objective, establish a secure flank for the remaining four assault 
battalions of 97 Brigade:  
The Battalion‟s frontage in the assembly area was four 
hundred and fifty yards, but as it had to pivot on its left and 
to link the original line with the position gained by the rest 
of the brigade, its holding on the [final] objective would 
measure seven hundred yards. The orders provided that „A‟ 
(Lieutenant J.W. Brockman), „B‟ (Captain R.F. Greenhill) 
and „C‟ (Lieutenant D.H. Smith DCM) companies should 
advance to their allotted area in the objective, called the 
„red line‟, and „D‟ Company (Captain L.C. Mandleberg) 
should move in rear of „A‟ Company and be prepared to 
support any of the leading companies if they should need 
help to enable them to attain the objective. If its services 
were not used in that capacity, „D‟ was to consolidate in 
depth when the „red line‟ was taken.539  
 
The German defences opposite contained, in addition to shell hole outposts, pillboxes, 
dugouts and short trench sections, a previously identified circular strongpoint (part of the 
local Hauptwiderstandslinie defences) approximately 200 yards west of Vat Cottages.
540
  
 
 „A‟ Company, deviating right to keep touch with 17th HLI, came under intense 
machine-gun fire six minutes after Zero. All of its officers and the CSM were killed or 
wounded as they traversed the Vorfeldzonelinie. “The survivors struggled on, but suffered 
greatly and became very scattered, only about twenty NCOs and men remaining in any 
organised form”. „B‟ Company, in the centre, encountered little opposition from the 
startled German garrison before reaching its objective, while „C‟, “joined up the original 
                                                 
538
 Captain C.H. Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
 (Service) Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers 
(Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Council of the Newcastle and Gateshead Incorporated Chamber of Commerce, 
1923) p. 89.  
539
 Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers in Two Volumes Vol. 1, p. 276.   
540
 See surviving 97 Brigade intelligence „mud map‟ (10 A), TNA: WO/95/2404: 16th HLI War Diary.  
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line at TOURNANT FARM on the left, to „B‟ Co[mpan]y on the objective forming a 
defensive flank of about 250 yards”.541  
 
   Plate 3.15 Wallemolenstraat from Tournant Farm looking north: Approximate site of jumping-off    
   line boundary between 17
th
 HLI and 15
th
 LF (Source: Rob Thompson)  
 
 Unsuppressed enfilade fire from the right, where 17
th
 HLI were pinned down, had 
stopped „A‟ Company in its tracks. Survivors on the far right attached themselves to 17th 
HLI, whilst the remainder, “finding their right flank unguarded”, dug small posts to form 
a defensive flank. One platoon of „D‟ (CO 2nd Lieutenant J. Pollitt) was sent forward 
from positions behind „A‟ to get the attack going and plug a dangerous gap next to „B‟.542 
                                                 
541
 TNA: WO/95/2397: 15
th
 LF War Diary, IWM 4723: „Narrative of Operations 2/3rd December 1917, 15th 
(S) Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers‟, 4 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 
80/10/2) and Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers in Two Volumes Vol. 1, p. 276.    
542
 2
nd
 Lieutenant Scrivener („A‟ Company), who had carefully taped-out the battalion‟s jumping-off 
position before Zero, along with his batman, Pte. Poole, „showed the greatest gallantry; they attacked and 
captured a „pillbox‟ containing a machine-gun‟. Scrivener was killed as he reached the objective not long 
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2
nd
 Lieutenant Hurst‟s platoon, almost decimated by enfilade fire from Vat Cottage, 
subsequently followed to deal with the widening gap. Thus „A‟ Company, assisted by 
two platoons from „D‟, gained its share of the final objective and “was busily engaged in 
consolidating it”.543 This captured portion of red line provided an extensive panoramic 
vista, including Double Copse, Middle Copse and the hamlet of Spriet, of enemy-
occupied areas to the north. On the left, “C‟ Company‟s secured positions offered a 
considerable view of the low ground west and NW of Vat Cottage Ridge, where Lind 
Cottage, Hinton Farm, Cameron House and other fortified enclosures north of the 
Lekkerboterbeek remained, as part of the adjacent Hauptwiderstandslinie defenses, in 
German hands. Heavy indirect fire from machine-gun batteries attached to Major-General 
Franks‟ 35th Division (responsible for the left sector of II Corps) expended thousands of 
rounds into this inundated area in support of 32
nd
 Division‟s attack. “No undue retaliation 
was experienced, and the resultant disquietude of the enemy on the front enabled the 
4/North Staffordshire to capture two prisoners”.544 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
afterwards. Poole, his officer down, stalked and killed a nearby enemy machine-gunner. He also hauled 
wounded to the rear following the first courageous act. Pte. H.R. Poole was subsequently awarded the MM 
for his heroism. 20-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant John Sidney Scrivener has no known grave and is 
commemorated on the Tyne Cot Memorial to the Missing. See Latter, The History of the Lancashire 
Fusiliers in Two Volumes, Vol. 1, p. 277 and Stedman, Salford Pals, p. 156 
543
 „D‟ Company‟s two remaining platoons (CO 2nd Lieutenant Scholes) „dug themselves in about 50 yards 
south of V.29.a.33‟ after their commander was wounded …‟ 2nd Lieutenant Hurst „having only three men 
left [,] retired to the rear half of the company and as he feared that „A‟ Company‟s flank was in the air [,] he 
sent a post forward to connect with them and remained where he was in support‟. See IWM 4223: 
„Narrative of Operations 2/3rd December 1917, 15th (S) Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers‟, 4 December 1917, 
Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Files (Box 80/10/2), Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers in Two 
Volumes, Vol. 1, p. 277.  
544
 Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Davson, The History of the 35
th
 Division in the Great War (London: Sifton & 
Praed, 1926), p. 176.  The capture and retention of a particular „point about V.22.d.2.4‟ by 15th LF, II Corps 
intelligence surmised, would probably force the enemy to evacuate all the ground south of the 
Lekkerboterbeek‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: „Notes to Accompany Special Intelligence Maps of the Area 
V.15 – V.30‟ November 1917, 32nd Division Diary.   
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 IR95 (commanded by Oberstleutnant von Selle) faced four British battalions (16
th
 
HLI, 11
th
 Border, 17
th
 HLI, 15
th 
LF) as they stormed the centre sector of 38
th
 Division‟s 
line.
545
 Tenacious resistance promptly displaced initial surprise and shock.
546
 German 
batteries, replying to signals from the hard-pressed infantry, put down a defensive barrage 
3 or 4 minutes after the British bombardment opened up on all strongpoints “on and in 
front of a line 350 yards” in front of the jumping-off line: “It was not heavy and was on 
the line of the PADDEBEEK”. At Zero + 14 British batteries “formed a barrage in front 
of the first objective and then moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes to 
the final [red line] objective”. Heavy shelling of 97 Brigade‟s former frontline positions 
did not begin until Zero + 25. The first British SOS rocket, bursting at its acme into three 
lingering spheres of red-green-red, was observed around 3:30 a.m.
547
  Major-General 
Shute later summed up the troubling state of affairs, still unknown at his HQ, as follows:  
The situation in which each of the five battalions found 
themselves from about zero plus 8 onwards was an 
exceedingly difficult one. The enemy‟s machine-guns had 
gained complete fire superiority. The various local 
advances made by our troops after this period cost us 
heavily in our best officers and NCOs, who necessarily had 
to expose themselves in leading and organizing attacks on 
the different strongpoints holding up their advance.
548
  
 
Daylight would shortly reveal the extent of the British breakthrough to both sides. Time 
was running out for 32
nd
 Division: Could 97 Brigade secure its entire red line objective 
before sunrise in the face of a solidifying German defence?   
                                                 
545
IR96, occupying low ground on the immediate German right opposite Source Farm, was not attacked, its 
front being beyond designated British objectives. See Appendix 16, Part F (paras. 6 and 7).  
546
 See Appendix 16, Part E (paras. 8 to 11).  
547
 TNA: WO/95/643: „II Corps Summary of Operations for Week Ending 6 December 1917‟, II Corps War  
Diary and WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages, 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary.     
548
TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division 
War Diary, p. 11.  
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Plates 3.16 & 3.17 Panoramas from Vat Cottage Ridge. Top: North toward Mullet Farm and 
Westroosebeke. Bottom: View of low-lying region to the NW (Source: Author) 
  
4 
 
Dawn & Dénouement 
 
For a dreamer is one who can only find his way by 
moonlight, and his punishment is that he sees the 
dawn before the rest of the world.
549
 
 
 
4.1 Loss of Southern Redoubt and Hill 52  
 
Previously established signal communications infrastructures kept HQ staffs informed on 
the progress, so far as could be ascertained, of the night attack. Reports sent by a variety 
of sources (flanking units, corps headquarters, divisional observation officers, FOOs) 
supplied commanders with up to the minute observations and details of the battle now in 
progress. VIII Corps received the earliest telegraph message, recorded by signals 
personnel on the standard „C2121‟ pink message form, from 8th Division at 2:35 a.m.:  
Following from 25
th
 Infantry Brigade. aaa At 2 a.m. enemy 
coloured lights seen [,] rifle and M.G. fire opened aaa 2.2 
a.m. many lights and heavy musketry aaa Our barrage to 
time aaa Enemy‟s [barrage] opened 2.7 a.m. approx[imate] 
aaa 8
th
 Corps repeated flank divisions. 
 
A second message, arriving the same time as the first, had been dispatched by the 
gunners: “8th Divisional artillery report that at 2.0 a.m. – Considerable rifle and MG fire 
heard. 2.5 a.m. – Very heavy rifle fire and MG fire heard [.] Several lights up. 2.7 a.m.  – 
Enemy barrage came down”.550 These communiques were immediately passed on to 
                                                 
549
 Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist (1888). 
550
 BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd December 
1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele Front, 
November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers.  
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Brigadier-General Aspinall. Over three hours would expire before the BGGS VIII Corps 
received any further information.  
 
Plate 4.1 Lieutenant-General Sir Claud W. Jacob 
(Source: IWM H82158) 
 
Reports also poured in on the left in Lieutenant-General Sir Claud Jacob‟s II 
Corps sector. A complete transcript of telephone and telegraph messages, received and 
sent by 32
nd
 Division HQ while the assault was in progress, sheds light on a divisional 
commander‟s inability, despite formation-wide application of standard operating 
procedures that focused on subordination of the attack to a pre-arranged artillery plan and 
improved tactical handling of infantry, to exercise command. “It conveys very well”, as 
John Lee observed after examination of a similar document, “the chaotic environment 
generated by modern battle, the problem of contradictory and erroneous messages and the 
desperate quest for up-to-date information on how the battle was developing at the 
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front”.551 Given these circumstances, two hours would pass before Major-General Shute 
had a reasonably clear picture of the situation.
552
  The first post-zero message, 
communicated over the telephone by an anonymous artillery Major at 2:02 a.m., received 
by 32
nd
 Division HQ related the moment surprise was lost: “At 2 a.m. all quiet. No 
artillery fire: no machine-gun fire: two rifle shots: two yellow lights sent up”. A second 
telephone message, from the CO Divisional signals observing near Shute‟s Canal Bank 
HQ, followed at 2:03 a.m.: “Two orange lights at Zero plus 3. At Zero plus 4 ½ first 
green light. More green lights followed at Zero plus 5 ½. Apparent flashes of a few 
Boche guns at Zero plus 7. Our own guns started off almost all together at Zero plus 8”. 
The first telegraph report from 97 Brigade arrived at 2:22 a.m.: “HUNT started 1:55 
a.m.
553
 Rifle and machine-gun fire heavy before Zero plus 8. No Boche artillery fire 
before Zero plus 8”. More messages would follow before the situation was understood:  
Various reports
554
 reached divisional headquarters between 
between Zero and 3:55 a.m., the general tenor of which was 
                                                 
551
 See John Lee, „Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 
September 1917‟, Gary Sheffield & Dan Todman (eds), Command and Control on the Western Front: The 
British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), p. 137 
552
 „Once the battle had commenced there was little enough the individual general could do to influence its 
course and conduct. The friction of war and the fragility of most available means of communication made 
the overall situation complex and difficult and it was only by inculcating these standard procedures and 
battle drills that the British generals could commit their troops to battle with confidence‟. Ibid. p. 139.  
553
 „HUNT‟ was the designated code name for the night operation. Application of some sort of simple 
substitution code with alternative operational activity („HUNT‟) and formation/unit (YAWL: II Corps, 
ELDER: 32
nd
 Division, PRISIM: 97 Brigade, PRINT: 2
nd
 KOYLI, etc.) references prevented awareness of 
intent and unit identifications from being obtained by German „Moritz II‟ telephone listening sets and 
wireless intercept stations. For the development and use of listening apparatus and wireless interception 
technology by the British and German armies see Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British 
Military Intelligence in the First World War (London: Columbus Books, 1989), pp. 113-14, 119-22, John 
Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War (Stroud: Allen Sutton & 
Army Records Society, 1992), pp. 13-16 and James Beach, „British Intelligence and the German Army, 
1914-1918‟ (Unpublished PhD Thesis. London: University College, 2004), pp. 80-86.  
554
 For example, 14 Brigade observers, situated on Bellevue Spur, reported in a telephone message timed 
3:20 a.m.: „Z[ero] plus 17 – All enemy lights going up further back‟; „Zero plus 18 – Enemy barrage 
increased and carried to our back area‟; „Zero plus 22 – Light shelling of BELLEVUE Road and Ridge and 
GOUDBERG Valley‟; „Zero plus 26 – Enemy barrage thickened‟; „Zero plus 28 – „Enemy shelling 
MOSSELMARKT – MEETCHEELE and BELLEVUE Ridge‟; „Zero plus 29 – Enemy searchlights 
playing from WESTROOSEBEKE‟.  
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(a) That heavy machine-gun fire had been opened by the 
enemy at Zero plus 7. (b) That the enemy‟s artillery barrage 
had opened at Zero plus 12, but was not severe and was 
mostly behind our own frontline on the general line VINE 
COTTAGE – VALOUR FARM. At 3:30 a.m., an SOS was 
reported from the direction of Hill 52.
555
  
 
News concerning the assault‟s actual progress remained scanty until 3:55 a.m. The 
situation by that time, Shute and his staff would shortly discover, had gone from bad to 
worse.
556
  
 
On 25 Brigade‟s front, two platoons (one each from „B‟ and „D‟ companies) of 
2
nd
 Royal Berkshire carried on the fierce struggle to maintain their tenuous hold in 
Southern Redoubt. Hand grenades, flying to and fro in the darkness, detonated with sharp 
reports as small parties of bombers and riflemen, trampling on the dead and dying as they 
moved along trough-like depressions that made up the oblong bastion, engaged each 
other in close quarter combat.
557
 “The enemy”, Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.H. Stirling (CO 
2
nd
 Royal Berkshire) wrote afterward, “lost a great many casualties to bayonet and bomb, 
but we, unfortunately, also lost many men including the platoon [engaged in the redoubt] 
commander”.558 Sustained losses, coupled with lack of support from 2nd Lieutenant 
Upton‟s divergent platoon, resulted in remnants of both companies gradually giving way, 
under a deluge of hurled stick bombs, to increased pressure from elements of IR116. A 
final position was eventually established “close to the SW front of the redoubt where they 
                                                 
555
 See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, p. 9 and „Appendix „J‟, 32nd 
Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War 
Diary.  
556
 A 3:55 a.m. report related that 17
th
 HLI „had not yet captured‟ the first objective. See IWM 4273: 
„Summary of the Attack of the 97th Inf. Bde. and 2 Battalions of the 96th Inf. Bde. on December 2 [1917]‟, 
Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
557
 See Appendix 16, Part B (para. 15).   
558
 TNA:  WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary. 
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dug in”.559 The withdrawal “exposed the left of „D‟ company; but our troops there 
succeeded in maintaining themselves nonetheless and repelled minor attacks by which 
the enemy attempted to dislodge them”.560 Meanwhile, to the left of Southern Redoubt, 
Upton‟s platoon had “captured a portion of the [Venison] Trench connecting the Northern 
and Southern redoubts killing Germans and capturing three MGs”. This part of the 
objective, originally assigned to 2
nd
 Lincolnshire, was held and consolidated despite the 
relinquishing of nearby gains inside Southern Redoubt.
561
  
 
 British inroads at the boundary between IR116 and IR117 brought forth the 
anticipated German response, as reserves in the immediate rear deployed with heavy loss 
under a sudden British artillery bombardment starting at Zero + 8.
562
 Sketchy reports, 
dispatched under the confused conditions of a surprise night attack, also gave local 
Kampftruppenkommandeurs (KTK) cause for concern. Positions of tactical importance 
had been, as far as it was known, captured by an enemy who had demonstrated, since Sir 
Herbert Plumer‟s first great push on 20 September, exceptional ability when seizing and 
holding objectives in the aftermath of limited objective set-piece attacks. The likely 
outcome, based on previous costly experience, was far from satisfactory: German 
counter-attack troops, advancing through a morass of shell holes under a devastating 
artillery protective barrage, could expect to encounter steady machine-gun and rifle fire 
from newly entrenched British infantry. Moving uphill over broken, boggy ground in the 
                                                 
559
 Ibid.  
560
 TNA:  WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/ 2nd December 
1917‟, 13 December 1917, 8th Division War Diary.   
561
 Ibid and Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Boraston & Captain Cyril E.O. Bax, The Eighth Division: 1914-1918 
(London: Naval & Military Press reprint of 1926 edition), p. 166.  
562
 See Appendix 16, Part B (paras. 15 and 16) and Part C (paras. 12 and 13).    
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dark made the task even more difficult. Indeed, as Hauptmann Kurt Offenbacher, 
regimental historian of IR117, later acknowledged: “Only two groups eventually reached 
the breach. Further resistance was hopeless; defending the remaining ground was all that 
could be hoped for”.563 
 
 News of the surprise night attack had last reached Brigadier-General Aspinall 
(undergoing his first test as BGGS VIII Corps) at 2:07 a.m. The intervening hours that 
followed must have seemed like an eternity to those awaiting the result at Corps HQ. 
Novelist Compton Mackenzie recalled a similar interminable waiting period at Sir Ian 
Hamilton‟s MEF HQ on the night (6-7 August 1915) of the Suvla Bay landings when he 
discovered a pensive Aspinall “after giving moustaches and beards to all the ladies in the 
weekly illustrated papers was now drawing wooden lady after wooden lady of his own 
invention on sheets of foolscap”.564 A fairly inconclusive telegraph message, concerning 
the observed SOS signal near Goudberg and the slackening of enemy fire opposite 25 
Brigade, from 8
th
 Division arrived at VIII Corps HQ at 4:22 a.m. Another message, 
telegraphed by the gunners, was received eighteen minutes later: “Report from 8th 
Divisional Artillery – Message from BELLEVUE timed 3.5 a.m. – aaa “Attack 
progressing favourably”. At 5:30 a.m. 8th Division reported: “Situation report aaa No 
definite news but attack believed to have made some progress aaa Liaison officer reports 
wounded state Southern Redoubt was captured and that hostile barrage fall at Zero + 9 on 
VINDICTIVE X Roads – PASSCHENDAELE Road afterwards shortening to Southern 
Redoubt”. A fourth report was received from 8th Division at 6:50 a.m.: “Situation Report 
                                                 
563
 Hauptmann Kurt Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. 
Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1931), p. 195.  
564
 Compton Mackenzie, Gallipoli Memories (London: Cassell & Company , 1929), pp. 370-71.  
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aaa Enemy artillery more active than usual [,] particularly on tracks aaa No definite 
information from left [32
nd
] Division on operations aaa State enemy barrage came down 
9 minutes after zero and [97 Brigade] attack believed to have made progress”. Sunrise 
was one hour and seventeen minutes away when II Corps telegraphed what was known 
about 32
nd
 Division‟s situation: “Assembly for attack carried out satisfactorily with few 
casualties aaa Assault launched at 1:55 a.m. aaa Hostile M.G. fire opened 2.1 a.m. and 
artillery barrage about 2.7 a.m. aaa Attack held up in several places by M.G. fire but now 
apparently proceeding satisfactorily aaa Information still indefinite”.565  
 
The first report concerning actual progress by the infantry reached 32
nd
 Division 
HQ at 3:55 a.m.
566
 The message, “timed 3:33 a.m. from 97th Infantry Brigade”, imparted, 
“that the right of No. 4 Battalion (17th HLI) was held up by machine-gun fire and that the 
enemy was offering considerable resistance”. At 4:00 a.m. a liaison officer with 14 
Brigade reported a worrying German counter-attack on the left flank: “Otherwise all 
going well”. This was immediately followed by a query from Major-General Shute‟s HQ 
to the Divisional BGRA (Brigadier-General J.A. Tyler): “Above message read. Have you 
had that? They [batteries] have been asked by 97 Bde. to stop firing on the SOS lines on 
the left as counter-attack had been beaten off”. Over a dozen more telephone and 
                                                 
565
 BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd December 
1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele Front, 
November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers.  
566
 Visual signalling efforts, Major Evelegh (CO 32
nd
 Division Signal School) subsequently observed, 
„worked very successfully both with RFA and battalions backward, but from companies to battalions 
apparently not attempted and it is believed that in cases the Lucas Lamps were left behind by the company 
signallers, although they were the only portable means to communicate except runners. The latter organised 
on a „relay system with relay posts and linesmen‟s posts coinciding as far as possible‟ proved „extremely 
reliable if somewhat slow form of communication‟. Few messages were dispatched by pigeon, but „those 
that were arrived in good time, except in the case of some units which tried to fly them during the hours of 
darkness‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report: „Appendix „I‟: Communications‟, December 1917, 
32
nd
 Division War Diary.  
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telegraph messages concerning the progress of the attack from various (FOO, RE, 
interviewed wounded, etc.) were exchanged during the next forty-six minutes. News 
about the situation at Hill 52 was confirmed at 4:59 a.m., when 97 Brigade telephoned to 
report the situation as related by a previously quoted eyewitness:  
Wounded RE officer [Lieutenant Spottiswoode] left HILL 
52 between 2:30 a.m. and 3 a.m. after having planned a 
strongpoint there. He marked out trench for the strongpoint 
and left the [2
nd
] K.O.Y.L.I. at work on this trench and 
others [.] [They?] had gone past towards their objective and 
as far as he could tell [,] thought they would get on it. He 
also came across some of the 16
th
 HLI. 
 
This heartening disclosure, based on the observations of an injured sapper almost three 
hours after Zero, would later prove to be sadly out of date.
 567
  
 
 Severe enfilade machine-gun fire hampered efforts by 2
nd
 KOYLI to consolidate 
Hill 52. A continuous hail of bullets rained down from Venison Trench, opposite which 
the neighbouring 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade had gone to ground following a bloody repulse just 
100 yards beyond the jumping-off tape, on to „D‟ and „B‟ companies and attached 
sappers of 219
th
 Field Company RE. Captain J. Hassell (OC „B‟ Company), in command 
of mixed remnants on the key promontory, did his best to ensure the position was made 
secure against counter-attack from his newly-established HQ trench: “2nd Lieutenant 
Corcoran here joined him with the remains of his platoon, reporting that he had got to the 
objective, two pillboxes (V.24.c.5.0 ½) and had been driven back by superior numbers”. 
Hassell, fearing an imminent German riposte, placed all available elements from the other 
three companies under Corcoran and “ordered him to again advance and take the two 
                                                 
567
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. See fn. 509.  
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pillboxes. In the meantime, consolidation was taking place [on the hill] at V.30.a.5.7. The 
Royal Engineer officer was wounded during the advance, but work was carried on by his 
men”.568 
 
 2
nd
 Lieutenant Corcoran‟s advance had not progressed very far before it 
encountered the first local counter-attack at 3:30 a.m.
569
 Files and blobs of Feldgrau clad 
troops, wearing the distinctive „coal scuttle‟ steel helmet, were distinguished moving 
across the multitude of shell holes in the crepuscular half-light before dawn. This was too 
much for the exhausted and almost leaderless British infantry. Picks and shovels were 
downed as groups of overwrought men made their way to the rear. Captain Hassell did 
what he could to rally them, but the rot had set in:  
At this time a counter-attack on a large scale appeared to 
develop to his front with the result that the troops of the 
[2
nd
] Yorkshire Light Infantry and [16
th
] Highland Light 
Infantry and [11
th
] Border Regiment passed through his line 
of consolidation, carrying his own men with them. He was 
unable to rest the retirement until the „jumping-off‟ tape 
line was reached. He here re-organised the men and 
discovered they consisted of every battalion of the [97] 
Brigade except the 17
th
 High[land] L.I. He attempted to get 
them to advance again but, failing in this, he distributed the 
men along a line and consolidated … This line was held 
until daybreak. 
  
Sergeant Horne („D‟ Company) and his small party, while still labouring to consolidate 
advanced positions 80 yards beyond the two resisting pillboxes, had been forced back 
                                                 
568
 Ibid: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, p. 10 and TNA: 
WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI War Diary.  
569
 2
nd
 Lieutenant Corcoran (age unknown) was killed sometime afterward. He is buried in Duhallow ADS 
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with several casualties. “He withdrew his party to a trench in rear where he found three 
officers and twenty other ranks of the [16
th] High. L.I. …”570  
 
In the meantime, at 5:25 a.m. 97 Brigade reported that 11
th
 Border Regiment had 
“occupied Mallet Copse and formed a defensive flank towards VEAL COTTAGES 
where the advance of 17
th
 HLI had been checked by heavy machine-gun fire”, while 15th 
LF had “secured their objective”. Stokes mortars, it was also related, had been dispatched 
under the personal command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Inglis “to deal with VEAL 
COTTAGES and to assist in the advance of 17
th
 HLI”. The situation at that time, as far as 
it was known at 32
nd
 Division HQ, was as follows:  
The Right Battalion (2
nd
 KOYLI) was in position on Hill 
52 and consolidating. 
 
No. 3 Battalion (11
th
 Border Regt.) and No. 5 Battalion 
(15
th
 Lanc. Fusiliers) had secured their objectives.  
 
The advance of No. 4 Battalion (17
th
 HLI), however, 
seemed to be definitely checked by machine-gun fire from 
VEAL COTTAGES.  
 
The situation of No. 2 Battalion (16
th
 HLI) was unknown.  
Major-General Shute, recently apprised of the situation and still certain of the positive 
reports about Hill 52, now fixed his focus elsewhere. He quickly recognised that a 
dangerous gap (formed by the failure of the 17
th
 HLI to get forward) had developed 
between the 11
th
 Border Regiment and 15
th
 LF.  A telegraph message, forwarded to 97 
Brigade at 5:30 a.m., attempted to get the stalled attack of the centre left battalion going 
again: “Instruct 11th Border Regt. and 15th LF to join hands on [final] objective of 17th 
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HLI else garrison at VEAL COTTAGES will escape. Remaining companies of 17
th
 HLI 
should also work around VEAL COTTAGES”. 571 
 
 A profusion of back and forth reports and queries continued to keep 32
nd
 Division 
signals office busy in the hours after the dispatch of the 5:30 a.m. message to 97 Brigade.  
At 7:10 a.m., seventeen minutes before sunrise, 32
nd
 Division HQ discussed possible 
artillery targets and the general situation with 97 Brigade:  
[Div. HQ] Are you being bothered from VALUATION 
HOUSES or MALLET WOOD? The Divisional 
Commander wants to know if Genl. BLACKLOCK would 
like an artillery concentration on either or both.  
 
[97 Bde] Genl. BLACKLOCK would like to wait until he 
gets more news before he decides that question. 3  
companies of 15
th
 Lancs. Fus. are on their objective. 17
th
 
HLI held up at VEAL COTTAGES. Borders 100 yards 
other side of MALLET COPSE. No. 1 [2
nd
 KOYLI] had 
got TEALL COTTAGE about Hill 52. Nothing known 
about No. 2 [16
th
 HLI] Battalion. Up to 4:30 [a.m.] no 
message from them. You know they were 300 yards from 
their starting point. 
 
A telegraph message from II Corps intelligence (“Mr MONTGOMERY”) arrived while 
this telephone conversation was in progress: “4 prisoners 95 I.R. 5th Coy. captured in 
enemy frontline. Spot unknown but prisoner past to the east of VELDT FARM on the 
way to the trenches. Order of battle east to west 94, 95, 96 I.Rs. States attack was a 
surprise. Orders to hold frontline”. One more message passed through the divisional 
signal office before daybreak: “Wire timed 7:15 a.m. from CRA. Situation normal”.572   
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Major-General Shute‟s vaunted night attack scheme appeared, if received reports 
were correct, to have achieved some success. His 32
nd
 Division had, it seemed, gained 
most of its final red line objective. No doubt the planned pincer movement, to be carried 
out by 11
th
 Border Regiment and 15
th
 LF, would cut-off and overwhelm the strongpoints 
holding up 17
th
 HLI. Nothing yet had been heard from 16
th
 HLI, but the 2
nd
 KOYLI were, 
it was still believed, firmly established on Hill 52 at first light. 
 
4.2 Dawn 
Sunday 2 December 7:27 a.m.: Sunrise heralded a fine day with strong 20 to 30 mph 
westerly and NW winds. Both RE 8 two-seater contact aircraft, scheduled to be airborne 
over the attack area by 7:30 a.m., remained grounded at the aerodromes of No. 7 and No. 
21 corps squadrons due to the rough – “a strong gusty wind” – local atmospheric 
conditions.
573
 A fighter pilot of No. 65 Squadron, struggling through a “perfectly 
shrieking wind” whilst on offensive patrol later that morning, encountered no enemy 
aircraft, “hardly any „Archies‟ no MG – no signs of a push”.574 Visibility remained fair 
under a relatively clear sky. The weather continued to be “very cold throughout the day. 
A little snow fell in the early morning”. An artillery officer, stationed westward near the 
Steenbeek, noticed hard frost in the emerging forenoon light: “All the water in the crump 
holes was frozen over and a bitter north wind was blowing”.575 To the east, remnants of 
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eight battalions remained alert to anticipated German counter-attacks while consolidating 
a ragged front. Heavy casualties among officers and NCOs deprived these units of 
leadership when it was most needed. The general view from new positions, relative to 
depth of advance, after dawn varied: a dreary, pockmarked expanse opposite Exert Farm; 
due east to the near edge of sloping dead ground from a captured portion of Venison 
Trench; north and NW into low-lying ground opposite Poelcappelle from the western 
extremity of Vat Cottage Ridge or, by comparison, more limited vistas – the next shell 
hole, bomb stop, nearby trench, pillbox, gun pit or spinney – in sectors where the surprise 
night attack failed to make significant headway. Irregular rifle and machine-gun fire, 
along with desultory rifle grenade and shell bursts, echoed across the raw shambolic 
wilderness. Seemingly random individual figures and remote groups or columns, taking 
belated advantage of the rapidly fading darkness, dashed from shell hole to shell hole or 
plodded slowly along some distant skyline. Such activity, when within range, brought 
forth an immediate response from snipers or artillery. Other figures, torn, riddled and 
lying in heaps or half in and out of the numerous craters, added to the already desolate 
scene. Overall, a nauseating stench of rotting, sodden battle detritus, blood and poisoned 
earth combined with a sickly odour of cordite and high explosive pervaded the frigid 
atmosphere.  
 
4.3 25 Brigade 
 
Four more situation reports (two telegraph and two telephone) were received at VIII 
Corps HQ between 6:45 and 7:45 a.m.: “6:45 a.m. from I.O. 8th Division (Thro‟ „I‟ 8th 
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Corps). 4 prisoners 94
th
 I.R. captured by left [32
nd
] Division aaa Relieved 357 [IR] last 
night aaa 3
rd
 Battalion in line reinforced by 3 coys. 1
st
 Bn”; “6:55 a.m. from Second 
Army. Morning Report aaa 8
th
 19
th
 1
st
 and 2
nd
 ANZAC corps report situation unchanged 
aaa Our troops attacked north of PASSCHENDAELE this morning aaa Attack believed 
to be proceeding satisfactorily”; “7:40 a.m. from 21st Squadron RFC (telephone). Too 
rough to get up at present. Will go out as soon as it is possible”; “7:45 a.m. from 8th 
Division (telephone). No more information than that already sent in. Have told [25] 
Brigade to send in report on situation”. News, reasonably accurate as it turned out, of 25 
Brigade‟s plight finally arrived at 8:00 and 8:20 a.m.: “Following from 25th Inf. Bde. aaa 
Verbal message timed 6:20 a.m. One coy. left battalion held up in front of Vension 
Trench aaa Left of centre battalion believed to have been held up”; “6:20 a.m. 8th 
Division (Telephone).  Situation aaa We have probably got the Southern Redoubt and a 
little of the trench north of it. Line probably runs through practice trenches to our original 
line. 32
nd
 Division off Hill 52 and 8
th
 Division believes out of TEALL COTTAGES   
[sic]. This is all presumption”. A telegraph from 8th Division, also received at 8:20 a.m., 
cast some doubt on the accuracy, as far as the contents concerned 25 Brigade, of the two 
previous updates: “Report timed 7:10 a.m. states aaa Enemy artillery fire very much 
increased during last half hour aaa Have asked for counter-battery aaa Impression aaa 
Left and centre move obscure and nothing received from them aaa Centre possibly 
successful aaa Left probably not”.576  
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 At dawn troops on the right of Southern Redoubt (one platoon of „D‟ Company 
2
nd
 Royal Berkshire had dug in on the SE edge of the earthwork) “found themselves 
without officers and with their left flank in the air” (Map 11). Groups of German infantry 
could be discerned entering the abandoned redoubt round their left flank, “and after 
inflicting casualties on the enemy”, the hard-pressed Berkshire platoon withdrew “to gain 
touch with the troops [„B‟ Company] SW of the redoubt…” IR116 had regained its lost 
bastion. Its postwar regimental historian subsequently observed: “Hard work was done 
and the line again in our possession at approximately 10:00 a.m. Enemy losses, dead and 
wounded, were great with twenty prisoners being left in our hands, but many good 
Kamerads on our side were missed”.577 2nd Lieutenant Upton‟s platoon, still occupying a 
section of Venison Trench NW of Southern Redoubt, also engaged this counter-attack 
from the left. Galling fire from a strongpoint on their immediate left was “suppressed 
chiefly with rifle grenades”. The threat to both flanks, reduced state of his platoon and 
continued isolation worried Upton. A hurriedly scribbled message, dispatched by runner 
to Battalion HQ, spelled out their perilous position.
578
  
 
At 8:00 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling (CO 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire), taking 
advantage of the slackening enemy bombardment on the Passchendaele – Westroosebeke 
Road, made his way to Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S. Irwin‟s (CO 2nd Lincolnshire) 
Mosselmarkt HQ:  
On my way I found a wounded orderly from „B‟ 
Co[mpan]y and got from him a message, timed 3:45 a.m., 
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saying that „B‟ Coy. was in position and all was well. This 
was the first report I had received from an officer. On 
reaching MOSSELMARKT, OC 2
nd
 Lincolns told me that 
his Battalion and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade had not reached their 
objective. I therefore took advantage of the quietness [sic] 
then prevailing to go forward to try and ascertain the 
situation on my own front and got forward through an old 
outpost line to the [Venison] trench joining the two 
redoubts where I saw some of our stretcher-bearers at work. 
On approaching the trench, however, I found it occupied by 
the enemy.  
 
Stirling, returning to his HQ around 10:00 a.m., was handed a message, which gave him 
“the impression that the enemy was working round my right”.579 His response, 
considering what was known about the situation at the time, was immediate: “I, therefore, 
sent my support [„A‟] coy, which had been much reduced by casualties from the heavy 
shellfire to work forward to cover my right at the same time warning the Lincolns and 1
st
 
R.I. Rifles of what I thought was going on”. At this point three incidents occurred: The 
OC „A‟ Company, Battalion HQ would discover sometime later, was wounded while 
leading his men to the right; Stirling received the message from 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton 
“informing him of his isolated position & strength and that he was much worried from 
both flanks”; Captain Flint (CO „C‟ Company) for whom Stirling had sent for, arrived at 
Battalion HQ to report that the right flank was “fairly established and in touch with 33rd 
Division”. The last two updates now made it clear that 2nd Royal Berkshire‟s support 
company had been ordered to the wrong part of the line.
580
  
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin had not received any reports about his Battalion‟s 
progress since the hour before dawn:  
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Owing to officer casualties
581
 the first report received by 
me was in reply to a message I had sent forward. This was 
received around 6:20 a.m. and said that our advance had 
gone through the outpost line and had dug in 30 yards from 
enemy main trench. At 8:00 a.m. I sent up an officer to 
reconnoitre who confirmed above report & stated that 
advanced line was successfully dug in with left post near 
road (on left of Battalion front) in touch with RIFLE 
BRIGADE [,] but the connection with [2
nd
] Berkshire on 
our right was uncertain.  
 
Irwin, therefore, remained unaware that 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton‟s beleaguered platoon was 
in front of his right occupying part of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire‟s assigned objective in Venison 
Trench. At 10:00 a.m. he was informed “that all officers of assaulting companies were 
casualties”, so he dispatched a junior officer from the reserve company “to take command 
and re-organise”. A sniper later accounted for this unfortunate subaltern as he attempted 
to carry out his duties.
582
 
 
 On the left, surviving elements from „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ companies of 2nd Rifle 
Brigade clung to outposts consisting of three to six men each just 100 yards from their 
start line. The enemy‟s “attitude”, the battalion adjutant (Lieutenant Anderson) noted, 
“was aggressive. Several attempts were made to raid our posts but these were driven off. 
There was also a considerable amount of bombing and rifle bombing from the enemy‟s 
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forward posts”.583 Lieutenant Nettleton, having done all that he could to organise some 
sort of coherent line, returned to the crowded HQ at Meetcheele before daybreak:  
Back at Battalion HQ, however, we were out of sight of the 
enemy by eight o‟clock. I was sent out to look for some 
more accommodation to relieve the congestion in and 
around our pillbox. I found another pillbox about two 
hundred yards down the road but it was choked with dead 
Germans. They must have been caught by the Canadians 
and bombed as they were trying to escape. We had to pull 
out more than a dozen corpses before we could get into it. 
However, when we got it cleared, it gave us room to sit 
down and have breakfast and, as there was nothing anyone 
could do outside, we passed the day in comparative peace. 
Only comparative though – there was shelling going on all 
the time and the Boche seemed to have got our pillbox 
taped. One shell hit the back wall of the pillbox and burst 
along the trench outside, causing several casualties. One 
man caught most of the blast and had one side of his body 
ripped to pieces. While the stretcher-bearers were trying to 
bandage him up, he was screaming and groaning, but not 
because of his terrible wounds. He had got a splinter in the 
foot away from the side that had been blasted and it 
appeared to have broken his toe and it was that he was 
groaning about. I suppose the side of his body that had been 
torn to bits was so numb that he did not realise what had 
happened. But it sounded odd to hear him crying, “Oh, my 
toe, oh my toe” when that was such a minor part of his 
injuries. Luckily we were able to evacuate him without 
having to wait for nightfall, but I don‟t think he can have 
survived.
584
 
 
This horribly injured man, a victim of a waning, but still deadly German bombardment, 
was one of the many wounded who were fortunate enough to be removed from the 
battlefield during an almost routine, albeit short-lived, period of joint co-operation 
between enemies.  
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 Published German regimental accounts often speak of the mutually recognised 
Sanitätspause (cease-fire to allow the collecting of the dead and wounded.) with their 
British opponents. A German officer wrote of an earlier arrangement the previous 
November near Passchendaele: “Only between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., the so-called 
„medical pause,‟ could I get around the sector without difficulty. This was the time when 
both sides observed the unwritten rule that there would be no firing to permit the 
recovery of the wounded”.585 Identical activity commenced on 25 Brigade‟s front one 
half hour after dawn: “At about 8 a.m. stretcher parties of both sides were at work and the 
shelling, which had, up to that time, been heavy; slackened somewhat”.586 Red Cross 
flags and armbands, white handkerchiefs attached to sticks and other overt displays were 
sufficient to communicate the intentions of medical personnel and stretcher parties to 
both sides. Even the garrison of Teall Cottage, just beyond the left flank where similar 
mutual succour of casualties occurred opposite 97 Brigade, held their fire:  
The team working that machine-gun in Teall Cottage 
allowed wounded men to be brought in so long as stretcher-
bearers did not get too near the post. At the same time they 
could see the encouraging spectacle of their own 
countrymen going through our lines as prisoners. The latter 
were in sad condition; their morale was gone: but the 
machine-gunners in Teall Cottage were in rare form!
587
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Wounded were carried on litters to the nearest RAP, where they were treated and sent 
down the line as rapidly as possible under sporadic shellfire. One regimental medical 
officer (Captain A. Cowe of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire) was killed while carrying out his duties.
588
 
 
 Brigadier-General Coffin was pessimistic about continuing the attack on the 
centre and left of 25 Brigade‟s front. This grim forecast, passed on to 8th Division HQ for 
consideration, was based on direct observation from Mosselmarkt and subsequent 
consultations with Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin and Lieutenant Anderson (acting CO 2
nd
 
Rifle Brigade). Northern Redoubt, the GOC 25 Brigade observed, could only be attacked 
in conjunction with an attack on Teall Cottage. This “required fresh troops as those now 
engaged have had considerable losses particularly in officers”. Forming-up would “have 
to be at night”, as the jumping-off positions were in full view of the enemy. A daylight 
attack, he also observed, appeared to be “difficult and hazardous”.589  
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, now aware his reserve company had been dispatched 
to the wrong place, became concerned about the Sanitätspause still in progress: “At this 
time [10:00 a.m.] I sent out orders to all [company] commanders to stop the enemy‟s 
stretcher-bearers from moving in the open, as they appeared to be taking advantage of 
their freedom to approach our line”.590 IR117’s regimental history provides evidence that 
his suspicions were correct:  
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The morning came, and with it, unbelievable behaviour by 
the English. Troops of Sanitäts Komp. 45 assisted with 
bandaging and cared for our own and the enemy wounded.  
English stretcher-bearers also provided aid. Our Sanitäts 
helpers discovered there were approximately 150 English 
in the vicinity of the breach, and altogether about 600 
between and behind their own position. There was no 
reaction, despite considerable local superiority, when Gef. 
Speiz (9
th
 Company) led eight prisoners away.
591
  
 
The situation could not continue. Brigadier-General Coffin noted the swift retribution that 
followed: “At one time the enemy, under cover of a Red Cross flag, sent a large body out 
to try and reconnoitre our positions. This effort was treated as it deserved to be”.592  
 
 For the Germans, the situation at the breach had gone from seemingly “hopeless” 
to hopeful, as three companies of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire, unaware of 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton‟s 
hard-pressed platoon in front, remained in position just 30 yards from Venison Trench. 
Fierce enemy resistance, consequent confusion and heavy losses amongst officers and 
NCOs contributed to collective weariness and inactivity – “unbelievable behaviour by the 
English” – despite their almost overwhelming local superiority. IR117’s   
Kampftruppenkommandeur immediately recognised the opportunity to exploit British 
lassitude: “Hauptmann von Arnim now realised he only had 80 to 90 rifles, 10 machine-
guns, with limited supplies of ammunition, available. The enemy, however, appeared to 
lack will to continue the struggle. He left Vzfw. Woeste (2
nd
 Company) in charge as he 
raced to the rear to organise a systematic counter-attack”.593 Woeste then observed 
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IR116’s effort to recapture Southern Redoubt. “He seized this moment to order an all-out 
attack” at 12:00 p.m. (German time). “Taking prisoners as the English hurriedly 
withdrew, the Hauptwiderstandslinie was reached and contact made” with previously 
isolated elements of 9
th
 Company.
594
  
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, now certain his right flank was secure, gave orders to 
withdraw 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire‟s misdirected support company and sent off Captain Flint 
“to find out the situation on the left”.595  Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin, in an attempt to 
clarify the situation on his right, “went round to the OC [2nd] Berkshires”, who, having 
received 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton‟s written message, related that “he had a post reported in 
enemy trench in advance of my right one near road about W.25.c.2.3. This meant a gap of 
about 150 yards. This [,] however [,] was covered by the original [Lincolnshire] outpost 
in rear”. Stirling‟s account of this meeting, which took place at approximately 11:30 a.m., 
noted: “OC 2nd Lincolns arrived at my HQ and informed me that he had definitely 
established that his B[attalio]n was dug in close up to the German trench between the two 
redoubts. He [Irwin] awaited [sic] until Captain Flint returned about 12:30 p.m. with the 
report that the Lieutenant [Upton] was in command of elements of B, C & D coys. dug in 
near the southern and south-western edges of Southern redoubt”. Stirling then informed 
Irwin that he planned to withdraw Upton‟s isolated Venison Trench outpost after dark in 
order to “fill up the gap between our two battalions”. Runners were dispatched with 
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orders for the eventual retirement not long afterward. Half past twelve also heralded an 
intensified bombardment by German batteries. Hostile shells pounded 2
nd
 Royal 
Berkshire‟s pillbox HQ (situated along the Passchendaele – Wetroosebeke Road just 
north of Passchendaele village) for the next three hours and forty minutes; no more 
information was received from the frontline. “I was”, Stirling wrote later, “also unable to 
send out any further orders or reconnaissance farther”.596   
 
 Meanwhile, wireless intercept stations dispatched their findings with surprising 
alacrity to Corps‟ „I‟ sections, which, in turn, passed on the information to VIII and II 
corps HQ. Some idea of the German predicament was thus discerned, although the 
immediate value of such intelligence was, to a certain extent, limited.
597
 Three recent 
intercepts crossed Captain Eric Chaplin‟s (ADC to Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston) 
desk at VIII Corps HQ between 8:30 and 11:00 a.m.; the enemy, their contents inferred, 
appeared to be undergoing a serious ordeal: “8:30 a.m. Second Army „I‟ (Through 8th 
Corps I). Group 200 two messages from GC to NZ aaa First message reads aaa Sofort 
reserve Kompagnie dem b verfurgung stellen aaa German time of message 8:10 a.m. aaa 
Second message reads aaa STAB 94 und dritte Kompagnie im marsch zum b rest of 
message jammed out aaa German time of message 7:00 a.m.”; “10:30 a.m. WIO Bar 
(Thro‟ 8th Corps I). Group 200 sends IN VORDERE LINIE MUNITION 
ERFORDERLICH”; “11:00 a.m. WIO BAR (Thro‟ 8th Corps I) Group 200 sends Coy. 
                                                 
596
 TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary and WO/95/1730: 
„Report on Action of Battn from 2:30 p.m. 1.12.17 – M.N. 2/3 .12. 17‟, 2nd Lincolnshire War Diary.  Two 
pigeon messages, relating the 12:30 p.m. heightening of the German bombardment, were sent off by the 
artillery liaison officer attached to 2
nd
 Lincolnshire HQ. The pigeon loft recorded the dispatched bird‟s 
arrival at 3:40 p.m.  See original message forms found in TNA: WO/95/1677: 8
th
 Division War Diary.  
597
 The primary drawback was due to the „fact that the Germans normally used wireless only for 
communication of immediate, and therefore, perishable messages from Army headquarters downwards‟. 
See Beach, „British Intelligence and the German Army, 1914-1918‟, p. 87.   
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Commander 12
th
 Coy. reports 5 wounded 9
th
 Coy. not yet returned up to the present 7 
wounded aaa Group 205 sends 2
nd
 Coy. Commander wounded Bn. Commander wounded, 
present frontline Company Commander killed. Group 205 sends troop has advanced as 
far as line GH K F – 41”.598   
 
 More conventional communication channels (from neighbouring corps and 
divisional HQs, attached divisional HQs, corps sub-sections, observers, etc.) supplied 
VIII Corps with additional telegram and telephone messages between 9:00 a.m. and 
noon. The general situation, despite the grounding of aerial contact patrols, was 
becoming steadily clearer to Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston‟s staff: “9:00 a.m. From 
21
st
 Sqd. RFC (telephone). Two machines doing [artillery] flash reconnaissance. Still too 
rough for contact patrol”; “9:10 a.m. from 2nd Corps. Corps observers report a lot of 
movement is taking place around VALUATION HOUSES V.24.a.1.6 as if to meet an 
attack on Hill 50”; “9:30 a.m. from 2nd Corps „I‟ (Thro‟ 8th Corps I) 4 prisoners 94th I.R. 
captured near VOX FARM [,] 3 of the 3
rd
 Coy. and 1 of the 12
th
 Coy. state 12
th
 Coy. 94
th
 
I.R. relieved 237
th
 Regt. [199
th
 Division] in frontline on 29
th
 or 30
th
 [November] aaa They 
mention 133
rd
 I.R. as being in ROULERS. This is not confirmed”; “10:30 a.m. from 2nd 
Corps „I‟ (Thro‟ 8th Corps I) Wind too puffy for contact patrols but situation appears to 
be that we hold [Southern] redoubt in W.25.c and about 100 yards of [Venison] trench 
running N.W. aaa Our [8
th
 Division] line apparently runs through practice trenches in 
V.30.b to original jumping-off line near Teall Cottages”; “10:40 a.m. from 8th Division. 
Following from 25
th
 Infantry Brigade aaa Line now runs all objectives on right to 
                                                 
598
 See BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd 
December 1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele 
Front, November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers.  
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W.25.a.15.30. 150 yards approximately S.E. of Northern Redoubt thence Teall Cot. 
exclusive”.599 At 11:00 a.m. 8th Division notified VIII Corps of Brigadier-General 
Coffin‟s reservations about continuing the operation on the left and centre of 25 Brigade. 
Major-General Heneker added that he concurred with his subordinate‟s views. Another 
telegraph message (received at 11:15 a.m.) from II Corps recounted more unsatisfactory 
news from the left:  
Situation appears that we [32
nd
 Division] hold line from 
Teall Cott. to VOID FARM exclusive [,] southern edge of 
MALLET COPSE – VEAL COTTAGES exclusive – 
V.23.c.0.3 – V.22.d.8.0. [objective assigned to 15th LF] – to 
old frontline at V.28.b.5.4. aaa We captured Hill 52 but 
heavy enfilade fire from VENISON TRENCH and a 
counter-attack from NE drove us back aaa Measures are 
being taken to recapture Hill 52.  
 
No advance by nearby Eingreifdivisionen had been detected since mid-morning: “Noon 
from [Second] Army Report Centre. No troop movement of parties larger than 10 seen in 
WESTROOSEBEKE area and 2 miles east of it. This message was dropped from an 
aeroplane, timed 10 a.m.”.600 The German defenders, it could be reasonably surmised, 
were still relying on local reserves to contain the British attack.  
                                                 
599
 Ibid.  
600
 Ibid. This aircraft had, before jettisoning the message over Second Army Report Centre, probably been 
on offensive patrol or flash-spotting duty, as specially designated RE 8 contact machines from both (No. 7 
and 21) corps squadrons were still grounded by strong winds.  
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Plate 4.2 Lieutenant-General Sir Alymer Hunter-Weston 
with GOC 33
rd
 Division Major-General R.J. Pinney 
(Source: IWM Q6543) 
 
4.4 97 Brigade  
 
Thirty-five minutes (7:10 to 7:45 a.m.) passed before Major-General Shute learned about 
the loss of Hill 52. His immediate concern was focused on the artillery‟s ability to engage 
Valuation Houses, “where considerable movement of the enemy was reported”, and the 
troublesome centre of resistance at Mallet Wood: “7:20 a.m. Verbal. To Div. Arty. [Div. 
HQ] What are the heavies doing now? [Reply] They are doing harassing fire as usual. 
[Div. HQ] What are the field artillery doing now? [Reply] They are not firing at all. [Div. 
HQ] The field artillery are to put a good heavy concentration on to VALUATION 
HOUSES and MALLET WOOD”; “7:35 a.m. Verbal. To CRA. At 7:30 a.m. artillery 
ordered to have a heavy concentration on VALUATION HOUSES and MALLET 
WOOD”. Mallet Wood, the CRA responded one minute later, “is within [our] SOS 
lines”. Shute, not wanting to risk shelling his own men, then directed that the hornet‟s 
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nest at Mallet Wood should be ignored while all field gun batteries were directed on to 
Valuation Houses.
601
  
 
            Brigadier-General Blacklock telephoned with unpalatable news at 7:45 a.m.: 
“GOC 97th Brigade telephones that they have been driven out of TEALL COTTAGE and 
VEAL [COTTAGES] and HILL 52. The attack appears to be considerably disorganised 
and they are trying to rectify this”. Major-General Shute was unequivocal in his reply: 
“Absolutely necessary that TEALL COTTAGE and VEAL and HILL 52 should be 
regained.
602
 Do this with your reserve Battalion assisted, if safety permits, by fire from 
your special battery
603
 and Stokes mortars. Any more considerable barrage is impossible 
owing to your uncertainty as to the position of your troops”. The first phase of 97 
Brigade‟s attack had, accept where the advance was held up at Teall Cottage and Vat 
cottages, reached or moved beyond the „200 yard‟ or yellow line, which delineated the 
northern boundary of the Vorfeldzonelinie. This apparent half success could, Shute 
hoped, be followed up and the dire situation turned around by on-the-spot re-organisation 
of the five assault battalions and commitment of 16
th
 NF (Blacklock‟s sole reserve or 
„counter-attack counter-attack battalion‟) from positions situated on the right of the 
Brigade front by Virile Farm.  
 
                                                 
601
 See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, p. 10 and „Appendix „J‟, 
32
nd
 Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division 
War Diary. At 7:45 a.m. II Corps Main Dressing Station also reported the arrival of 1 officer and 105 ORs 
wounded up to 7:00 a.m.; no German prisoners had been brought there up to that time.  
602
 Veal Cottages was, of course, not even temporarily seized on 2 December.  
603
 „Special battery‟ as per O.O. No. 138 (27 November 1917): „The C.R.A. will detail an R.F.A battery 
commander to be attached to headquarters 97
th
 Infantry Brigade. This officer‟s battery will, when required, 
be at the direct disposal of the G.O.C. 97
th
 Infantry Brigade‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: „32nd Division 
Operation Order No. 138‟, 32nd Division War Diary.  
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 Survivors of 2
nd
 KOYLI, intermixed with stray elements of other battalions 
following the general retirement, remained in position along their original jump off line 
until after sunrise. At dawn, „A‟ Company‟s outposts, situated east of the Passchendaele – 
Westroosebeke Road, were kept under heavy, sustained machine-gun fire, which would 
continue throughout the day, from Venison Trench, while Sergeant Hayward (de facto 
commander of „C‟ Company) “could see no one near him and only having seven men 
with him” withdrew his isolated outpost to the left rear and dug in. Captain Hassell, the 
last unwounded company officer, could only find twelve men from the battalion.
604
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Lamotte gathered in eleven more men who he immediately placed, 
along with a Sergeant and six men from Battalion HQ, under Hassell‟s command. Re-
organisation commenced at 8:00 a.m., as the tireless Hassell “collected all the men of the 
Yorkshire Light Infantry in the area”. He eventually succeeded in arranging his reduced 
command into “three posts of ten in each under one Sergeant”. Two of the three posts 
included a Lewis Gun and formed the advance line of posts as far as Teall Cottage.
605
  
 “Pitifully thinned” elements of 16th HLI managed to retain a small salient east and 
west of the tactically important Void Farm throughout the remainder of the night.
606
 
                                                 
604
 Officer casualties sustained by Captain Hassell‟s „B‟ Company, in addition to 2nd Lieutenant Corcoran, 
were 2
nd
 Lieutenant A.W. Stark wounded and 2
nd
 Lieutenant E. Cain missing. 2
nd
 Lieutenant Edward Cain 
(age unknown) has no known grave and is commemorated on the Tyne Cot Memorial to the Missing.  
605
 Captain Hassell later observed: „At the time it was thought that only the twenty-three men found at dawn 
were survivors, but from later knowledge it is quite clear that the other men of the battalion got mixed-up 
with and assisted other units of the Brigade to hold the line retired to. No report was received from any 
detached party, notwithstanding that the sending of reports had received special training and emphasis 
during training out of the line‟. TNA: WO/95/2402: 2nd KOYLI War Diary. 
606
 Lieutenant Kerr 219
th
 Field Company RE (see fn. 519), unable to „get in touch with anyone who could 
tell me the situation‟, left Vox for Void Farm sometime after 2:30 a.m. Proceeding due north he 
encountered 3 „Borders‟ and a „Captain Maddison‟ (sic Captains Sandeman or Martin? See fn. 526) who 
was killed before he could be queried. The nonplused sapper subaltern, finding the situation at Void Farm 
„a bit muddled‟, returned to discover Vox Farm in good state of defence, the men, who „wanted a bit of 
swearing‟, eventually digging „right down 6‟ in the trench‟ before dawn. Kerr also claimed to have set out 
for 16
th
 HLI HQ „about 1 hour after Zero‟, but made no mention of arrival until sometime after 6:00 a.m. 
when he „reported to the Major [Scott] there, telling him exactly what I had done and asking him if he 
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Exposed flanks on left and right halted any further movement beyond the dotted green 
line. Captain Alexander (CO „C‟ Company), concerned about the open right flank, led 
what remained of „A‟ and „B‟ companies toward Teall Cottage where they dug in.607 
German reconnaissance aircraft were, as on 10 November, observed, “flying low over our 
positions, but there was little enemy artillery activity”. Five officers and approximately 
seventy men were left, out of a pre-battle complement of twenty officers and 469 ORs, to 
defend newly won gains at the sharp end. Word of their positions and plight remained 
unknown at Division and Brigade HQs.
608
  
 
Plate 4.3 Captain J.A. Alexander 
(Source: UGA Roll of Honour <http://www.gla.ac.uk/honour/>) 
                                                                                                                                                 
wanted anything further‟. He subsequently reported to 97 Brigade HQ (Kronprinz Farm) at 12:15 p.m. The 
Brigade Major, he added, „did not know at the time we had VOX FARM‟. See IWM 4723: „STATEMENT 
BY LIEUT. KERR R.E.‟ Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
607
 This gallant officer subsequently vanished, 16
th
 HLI‟s diarist noting: „During this operation Captain 
Alexander was found to be missing. It is believed that he was caught by a shell while visiting the shell hole 
posts‟. 37-year-old Captain James Alexander has no known grave and is commemorated on the Tyne Cot 
Memorial to the Missing.  
608
 See TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI War Diary, WO/95/2404: 16
th
 HLI War Diary and Thomas 
Chalmers (ed), A Saga of Scotland: History of the 16
th
 The Highland Light Infantry-City of Glasgow 
Regiment (Glasgow: John M‟Callum & Co., 1930), pp. 110-11.  
Chapter 4 
 257 
 Four depleted companies of 11
th
 Border Regiment, two occupying the dotted 
green line intermediary objective and two (approximately 3 officers and 100 ORs) still 
clinging to the southern fringe of Mallet Copse, maintained their positions until just 
before sunrise, when unrelenting enfilade machine-gun fire and hostile infantry probes, 
the latter also supported by rifle and rifle grenade fusillades, from Mallet Wood forced 
back what was left of the leap-frogging companies. Worn survivors and walking 
wounded, retiring from the splintered, debris-strewn desolation of the copse, staggered 
back as far as the dotted green line, where they joined companies of the Battalion‟s first 
wave.
609
   
 
 Intense machine-gun fire from the wired and heavily garrisoned strongpoints at 
Vat and Veal cottages continued to hold up the advance of 17
th
 HLI after dawn. Attempts 
to outflank these two centres of resistance only resulted in more casualties. “The 
Battalion hung on all night in its isolated positions, and orders were received that the 
attack would be resumed in the morning, but this order was afterwards cancelled”. Dawn 
brought diminished shelling, “but enemy machine-gunners and snipers kept up a 
harassing fire from their well-established posts against our men in their exposed and 
isolated positions”.610 
 
 On the left, three companies („A‟, „B‟ „C‟), supported by two platoons from the 
reserve („D‟) company, of 15th LF maintained a left flank guard along the final red line 
                                                 
609
 TNA: WO/95/2403: 11
th
 Border War Diary and IWM 4723:„Preliminary Report on Operations, 
December 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd‟, 4 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
610
 TNA: WO/95/2405: 17
th
 HLI War Diary and J.W. Arthur & I.S. Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland 
Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Battalion): Record of War Service 1914-1918 (Glasgow: 
David J. Clark, 1920) p. 68.  
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objective for 97 Brigade. “Things had not gone so well on the right. The 17th Highland 
Light Infantry had been held up by German machine-gun fire and there was a risk of a 
dangerous gap occurring between the 15
th
 Lancashire Fusiliers and the 11
th
 Border 
Regiment”. Major-General Shute‟s 5:30 a.m. order for a pincer movement behind Vat 
and Veal cottages “proved to be impossible owing to continued machine-gun fire; and by 
11:15 a.m., the 15
th
 Battalion had to bend its right flank back somewhat, so as to establish 
touch with the Highland Light Infantry and thus prevent enemy penetration”.611  
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Scully MC (CO 16
th
 NF),
612
 housed with his staff in a 
filthy, congested pillbox on the right of 97 Brigade front near Virile Farm, anxiously 
awaited word about the night operation.
613
 His battalion, detached from 96 Brigade as 
reserve or „counter-attack counter-attack battalion‟ remained stationary until 3:00 a.m., 
when, not having heard anything, “sections closed in on their Coys. ready to advance if 
called upon”. A message received from Lieutenant Ross (11th Border Regiment) at 3:15 
a.m. reported “he was just E[ast] of Mallet Copse”. At 5:30 a.m. it was reported “that the 
                                                 
611
 TNA: WO/95/2397: 15
th
 LF War Diary and Major-General J.C. Latter, The History of the Lancashire 
Fusiliers in Two Volumes Vol. 1 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1949). p. 277.  Lieutenant-Colonel Utterson 
(CO 15
th
 LF) attempted to retrieve the situation with his remaining reserves: „About 8-0 a.m. I went 
forward to „C‟ [left] Company and finding there was a gap between „B‟ [centre] and „D‟ [support] 
companies [,] brought up one of „C‟ company‟s reserve platoons to reinforce „B‟ Company and ordered OC 
„B‟ Company to prolong his line to the right and to get in touch with the battalion [17th HLI] on his right 
and failing that with „D‟ Company [,] with the object of preventing a counter-attack from Veal and Vat 
Cottages. I sent word to OC „D‟ Company to detach two platoons to assist the 17 th HLI in taking VEAL 
COTTAGES. By the time the message reached him he had only two platoons left and the attack on VEAL 
COTTAGES appeared to have failed. He accordingly did not attack‟. See IWM 4723: „Narrative of 
Operations 2/3
rd
 December 1917, 15
th
 (S) Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers‟, 4 December 1917. Brigadier-
General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
612
 Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur John Scully (Manchester Regiment). Appointed CO 16
th
 NF March 1917. 
613
 Major Evelegh (CO 32
nd
 Division Signal School) subsequently remarked: „A Power Buzzer and 
Amplifier Station was established at VIRILE FARM in the frontline, but the power being forward [with the 
assaulting infantry] to work back to it did not reach their objective and so this means was not used‟. The 
amplifier, however, worked throughout the day, overheard every single telephone conversation and 
message that was sent to KRONPRINZ [FARM] or forward of it‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action 
report: „Appendix „I‟: Communications‟, December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary.  
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11
th
 Border Regt. were [sic] holding the line just S[outh] of MALLET COPSE”. The 
general situation, still unclear before dawn, led to the dispatch of two (“one SE and one to 
the SW of Mallet Copse”) patrols to gain touch with the forward battalions. “By morning 
it was known that the 11
th
 Bn. Border Regt. was digging in [south of Mallet Copse] some 
400 or 500 [yards] in front, but they were not in touch with the Bns. on their flanks”. An 
existing gap, approximately 100 yards on their left, appeared to be occupied by elements 
of 17
th
 HLI. On the right, 17
th
 HLI “were holding a line of shell holes approx. VOX FM – 
VOID FM to SE corner of MALLET COPSE where they were in touch with 11
th
 Border 
Regt.” Scully‟s two left companies were ordered to stand by and “be ready to support this 
line” if necessary. 614 
  
 Crews operating the 144 Vickers machine-guns (organised into close defence, 
barrage and area concentration batteries) were in place and ready, despite “darkness, state 
of ground and hostile shelling”, by 5:00 p.m. on 1 December.  At Zero + 8 minutes all 
guns fired on their previously assigned barrage lines. Opportunities for indirect 
concentration fire occurred and were acted upon: “At about 5:15 a.m. information was 
received that parties of the enemy were moving from the direction of 
WESTROOSEBEKE toward VALUATION HOUSES. K and L batteries were ordered 
by telephone to concentrate on the area about VALUATION HOUSES: the batteries 
opened fire at the rate of 100 rounds per minute at interval of three minutes”. Hostile 
shelling was “fairly heavy, especially on „A‟, „B‟, „C‟ batteries about the MEETCHEELE 
                                                 
614
 TNA: WO/95/2398: 16
th
 NF War Diary, IWM 4723: „32nd Div. No.G.S.1499/3/33‟, 5 December 1917, 
Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2) and Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
 (Service) 
Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, p. 88.  
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[BELLEVUE] SPUR. „C‟ Battery at one time had six guns knocked out, but subsequently 
got four of them into action again, which was a very creditable performance”.615  
 
 Major-General Shute later remarked to his postwar audience of senior officers: 
“Don‟t believe in commanders being able to see unless they also do their work in safety 
... Better to drive from the box than sit on the necks of the leaders”.616 No doubt 
disappointed and concerned over the loss of Hill 52 and the holdup at Vat and Veal 
cottages, he attempted to influence events from a distance, as telegraph and telephone 
messages were exchanged in rapid succession within the confines of 32
nd
 Division‟s 
Canal Bank HQ dugout: 
From CRA. 200 or 300 Boche seen moving from depot at 
Spriet toward VALUATION HOUSES (V.17.d.1.9.). 
Batteries are firing on them. The heavies have been told.  
 
To 97
th
 Brigade. Verbal. Observers report party of enemy 
about 300 strong are moving from V.17.d.1.9. towards 
VALUATION HOUSES We are getting heavies on them 
and we have a concentration on VALUATION HOUSES 
now.  
 
Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s HQ subsequently telephoned (7:56 a.m.) with an ad hoc 
plan to get the attack going again:  
97 Brigade: Situation is that 97
th
 Brigade have been biffed 
out of TEALL COTTAGE and HILL 52. Situation of No. 2 
Battalion (16
th
 HLI) is uncertain. At 9:20 a.m. they are 
going to attack with reserve battalion and Nos. 1 and 2 
battalions (2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI) and try to push 
forward. 
  
                                                 
615
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action Report, „Appendix „H‟: Action of Machine-guns During Operations 
near Passchendaele, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 December‟, 16 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary.  
616
 JSCSC: Major-General A.H. Marindin Papers: „Senior Officers‟ School: Lecture Delivered by Major-
General Sir C.D. Shute, KCG, KCMG November 1920‟. 
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Div. HQ: The Divisional Commander wishes a strong 
counter-battery shoot to start at 9:15 a.m.  
 
97 Brigade: General Blacklock is arranging what he can 
about a barrage [,] but owing to uncertainty of positions 
occupied by them, a general barrage is unlikely.
617
  
 
Widespread disorganisation, along with the dearth of necessary junior leadership at a 
critical juncture, were just two of the obstacles 97 Brigade had to contend with before 
sorting out its battalions for another effort. Nothing had been heard from 16
th
 HLI and, 
more importantly, absence of a general artillery barrage would leave the infantry 
unprotected and exposed in broad daylight. Previous experience demonstrated that such 
attacks, when hurriedly organised and executed, almost certainly failed in the face of a 
forewarned and alert enemy. Nevertheless, the same “uncertainty” regarding 97 Brigade‟s 
new positions prevailed across no man‟s land, so German batteries, unsure of their own 
infantry‟s whereabouts, had to resort to steady interdiction fire of the British rear area. 
This undoubted advantage, however, was likely to be moot if the attackers, lacking 
appropriate artillery assistance, were unable to reform and capture strongpoints like Vat 
and Veal cottages.  
 
 32
nd
 Division HQ received additional eyewitness accounts concerning the attacks‟ 
limited progress and reports on the current state of overland communications at 8:00 
a.m.:  
From Capt. Knox [situated at the CMDS to interview 
incoming wounded]. Wounded 17
th
 HLI man states his 
company (left) was held up at 3:30 a.m. and did not get to 
VAT COTTAGES. Right company also held up. No enemy 
                                                 
617
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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artillery barrage worth speaking of [,] but MGs from 
direction of VAT COTTAGES. 16
th
 HLI have taken 1
st
 
objective and were going well and consolidating. 16
th
 NF 
got most of the barrage but they say barrage was not heavy. 
From CRE [Lieutenant-Colonel Pollard]. Following 
telephone message from OC 206
th
 206
th
 Field Coy. timed 
7:30 a.m. begins. No. 6 track is in good condition up to 
VIRILE FARM with 4 exceptions between VINE 
COTTAGE and VIRILE FARM [,] which are being 
repaired at 6:20 a.m. Casualties up to 6:30 a.m. – NIL. No. 
6 track only little shelled since Zero. Situation at 6:50 a.m., 
fairly quiet, though heavy shelling was seen near VAPOUR 
FARM at 6 a.m.  
 
From CRE. Following telephone message received from 
OC 218
th
 Field Company RE at 7:25 a.m. Condition of 
KRONPRINZ TRACK at 6:15 a.m. 2/12/17. In good order 
up to 200 yards beyond MURRAY SWITCH D.4.a.3.1 at 
6:15 a.m. Far end of the track just south of VAPOUR 
FARM was being heavily shelled. Maintenance party 
ordered to proceed to VAPOUR FARM 6:20 a.m. 
Casualties 6 a.m. – NIL. Situation fairly quiet.  
 
8
th
 Division was informed about the uncertain state of affairs at 8:10 a.m.: “We believe, 
but are not quite sure, been biffed out of HILL 52 and TEALL COTTAGES”. 97 Brigade 
fielded a verbal query for more news at the same time: [Div. HQ] “Do you know 
sufficiently well where your No. 1 and No. 2 battalions (2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI) are for 
us to safely put a barrage on the final objective for your attack at 9:20 a.m.?” [97 Bde] 
“Put it just clear of the final objective except possibly in the case of VOID FARM, we 
may be there”.618 [Div. HQ] “The Divisional Commander thinks Stokes Mortar barrage 
would be a good thing”. 97 Brigade confirmed this was being arranged for and added that 
no news had come in from the left flank.
619
   
 
                                                 
618
 16
th
 HLI had indeed reached Void Farm before dawn.  
619
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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 Major-General Shute made a lengthy telephone call to II Corps HQ at 8:30 a.m. 
Circumstances and events, placed in the best possible light, preceded a basic outline of 
rushed plans to resume the attack:  
We are not so successful as we hoped. We had a good deal 
of fighting – hand to hand. The Bosch artillery barrage has 
never been bad. That is proved by the fact that the troops 
working on the tracks had no casualties. We got up to our 8 
minutes without any artillery barrage and inconsiderable 
machine-gun fire. After that the machine-gun fire seems to 
have got worse. We [15
th
 LF] are well up on the left and 
seem to have got on our objective. The next Battalion [17
th
 
HLI] got hung up about its intermediate objective. No. 3 
Battalion [11
th
 Border Regiment] got right up to its 
objective. No. 2 Battalion [16
th
 HLI] only got about 
halfway we gather, and I am not very sure they are even 
about that. The right Battalion [2
nd
 KOYLI] got HILL 52 [,] 
but early this morning got pushed of it. I also hear that the 
[2
nd
] Rifle Brigade have not got on (this from the 8
th
 Divn.) 
but no one is quite sure. We have ordered a further attack to 
be made all along the line at 9:20 a.m. and we have asked 
the counter-battery people to bring down their fire at 9:15 
a.m. We are getting our own artillery fire also on the old 
objective line. The [enemy] artillery fire has not been bad 
all through. I think it has been a fight for a series of 
machine-gun emplacements. I propose tonight to relieve the 
right sector by two battalions of the 14
th
 Bde. [,] which will 
attack through them tonight. Genl. Blacklock will then hold 
the left half of the divisional front with his brigade, pushing 
on again to his final objective where he is not on it – the 2 
Bns of 96 Brigade [15
th
 LF and 16
th
 NF] will be relieved 
and sent back to CANAL BANK. Nothing of this is certain. 
Our lines are holding to Bde. HQ, but forward of that it is 
very difficult.
620
  
 
Five minutes later (8:35 a.m.) 97 Brigade was verbally informed that the new barrage 
would be brought down “150 yards outside the original final objective” of 2nd KOYLI 
and 16
th
 HLI. Counter-battery fire, it was also related, had been scheduled to commence 
five minutes before Zero. “The infantry will start at 9:20 and the artillery at 9:15 [a.m.]. 
                                                 
620
 Ibid.  
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Brigadier-General Blacklock replied that he was “quite satisfied” with these 
arrangements.
621
  
 
 Six telegraph messages came in or were sent off during the eleven minutes 
between 8:39 and 8:50 a.m.: The first, “From 8th Divn. Following from 25th Inf. Bde. 
Verbal message timed 6:20 a.m. One Coy. left Bn. [2
nd
 Rifle Brigade] held up in front of 
VENISON TRENCH. Left of centre Bn. [2
nd
 Lincolnshire] believed to have been held 
up”; the second, “To 97th Bde. RA reports 7:45 a.m. 200 hundred to 300 infantry were 
seen by an artillery officer at HUBNER FARM to be moving from the depot at 
V.17.d.1.9. [Spriet] towards VALUATION HOUSES. An 18-pdr battery at once fired on 
them and the HA were informed”. The third shared intelligence, gathered from the four 
prisoners captured near Vox Farm, with II Corps HQ. The fourth, received from the 
divisional artillery at 8:40 a.m., confirmed that the Germans were on Hill 52: “FOO No. 2 
Group timed 8:50 a.m. reports enemy in possession of Hill 52. Enemy seen moving on 
the crest towards VALUATION HOUSES, VOLT FARM and VOID FARM. These were 
fired on by our 18-pdr with direct observation and scattered”.  The fifth, again from 8th 
Division, reported an increase in German shelling with counter-battery fire being asked 
for. General impressions of 25 Brigade‟s situation: “Right probably successful. Left and 
centre more obscure and nothing received from them. Centre possibly successful. Left 
probably not”. The sixth, a general situation report, was telegraphed to II Corps and the 
neighbouring 35
th
 Division at 8:50 a.m.:  
Situation 8:30 a.m. as far as known. No. 1 Bn. [2
nd
 KOYLI] 
took TEALL COTTAGE and HILL 52 but has been driven 
back again. No. 2 Bn. [16
th
 HLI] uncertain but probably on 
                                                 
621
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line short of VOID FARM. No. 3 Bn. [11
th
 Border 
Regiment] on objective. No. 4 Bn. [17
th
 HLI] held up in 
front of VEAL COTTAGES. Resistance mainly machine-
gun fire. Artillery fire not very heavy. Attack to retake 
HILL 52 and final objective of No. 1 and No. 2 Bn. will be 
launched at 9:20 a.m. No. 3 and No. 5 [15
th
 LF] battalions 
[will] work round VEAL COTTAGES.  
 
Major-General Shute had done all that was possible to get 97 Brigade moving again.
622
 
The attackers, exhausted and disorganised after previous exertions, required immediate 
re-organisation and ruthless persuasion to push on and gain the objectives: “Don‟t admit 
your men are tired. When the enemy is beat all must go on until they drop”.623 Provided 
all this could be done, and acting on the assumption that 11
th
 Border Regiment and 15
th
 
LF were in a fit state and situated to successfully outflank Vat and Veal cottages, 97 
Brigade should be able to follow up and regain Teall Cottage and Hill 52. If not, a 
contingency plan, whereby two fresh battalions of Brigadier-General Lumsden‟s 14 
Brigade would attack, in conjunction with the left of 97 Brigade, through the latter 
brigade‟s right front after dusk thus providing another opportunity to take advantage of 
the relative darkness of a moonlit night.  
                                                 
622
 A commander acting as rapidly as possible under prevailing circumstances, Major-General Shute related 
in the aforementioned postwar lecture (see fn. 122) could surmount his own remoteness from the sharp end 
along with the inherent chaos of the distant battle: „Any fool can solve a military problem in several days or 
hours. It will then be too late. [It] must be decided at once. Then, if only nearly right, if carried through 
with determination overcoming all obstacles, all will be well. „Look before you leap but if you‟re going to 
leap don‟t look too long‟… Here is where a bad commander fails. All right as long as all goes „according to 
plan‟. But if his attack or a neighbouring attack fails or succeeds more than was anticipated, or if he is 
confronted with some other unexpected situation, he does not know what to do. He does nothing. The 
golden chance is fleeting. He is done. Every possible quality of a commander is contained in this: „Act 
according to circumstances‟. See JSCSC: Major-General A.H. Marindin Papers: „Senior Officers‟ School: 
Lecture Delivered by Major-General Sir C.D. Shute, KCG, KCMG November 1920‟.  
623
 Ibid. This uncompromising perspective was demonstrated five months earlier near Nieuport on 10 July 
when Major-General Shute had to be restrained, following the recapture of lost trenches in the immediate 
aftermath of a devastating German riposte, by the GOC XV Corps from pushing on with a hasty follow-up 
night attack to seize Lombartzyde. Further operations to capture the seaside village were contemplated –  
but not sanctioned –  for early August, as the GOC 32nd Division „to whom the events of July 10 – and 
notably, the first loss of trenches ever admitted by the division – were not palatable‟.  See CAC: RWLN 
1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 11 July 1917 and Chalmers (ed) A Saga of Scotland, pp. 104-05.    
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 Plate 4.4 Brigadier-General F.W. Lumsden VC 
(Source: Illustrated London News) 
 
 Brigadier-General Lumsden and 14 Brigade were placed on alert and received 
copious dictated instructions during a telephone call from Major-General Shute at 9:10 
a.m.:  
You know what the situation is. As far as I can gather the 
right of the 97
th
 Brigade have been biffed back to their 
frontline; on the left they are somewhere near their 
objective. They are going to re-attack at 9:20 a.m. They 
may or may not in the course of the day improve their 
position. I will read you a draft order, which will be going 
out:  
 
Para. 1. The following moves will take place tonight 2/3
rd
 
December: 
 
1. Two battalions of 14
th
 Brigade now at BELLEVUE and 
WURST will form up by 10 p.m. in rear of the sector held 
by the 2 right Battns of the 97
th
 Bde viz., from TEALL 
COTTAGE – V.29.b.60.55. These two battalions will 
attack at 10:30 p.m. through the 2 right battalions of 97
th
 
Brigade, and will capture and consolidate a fresh objective 
from V.24.d.6.2. to the crossroads V.24.a.75.15. to 
V.23.d.85.95.  
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2. 2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI will remain in their then 
positions until this objective is gained and will then 
concentrate in our old frontline.  
 
3. From 10 p.m. the 2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI will pass to 
the command of GOC 14
th
 Infantry Brigade until they are 
concentrated in our frontline as mentioned in para. 2.  
 
4. As soon as the 2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI are back in our 
old frontline, they will, under the orders of the 97
th
 Brigade, 
relieve the 15
th
 Lancs. Fus. and 16
th
 North‟d. Fus., which 
two battalions will move back to a camp in the 
neighbourhood of IRISH FARM.  
 
5. The battalions of the 14
th
 Brigade now at WURST & 
BELLEVUE will be replaced at these places by the 
remaining two battalions of the 14
th
 Brigade.  
 
6. At 10 p.m. tonight the GOC 14
th
 Brigade, with 
headquarters at KANSAS (Adv. HQ at VIRILE FARM) 
will be in command of the right sector from TEALL 
COTTAGE to V.29.b.6.55. GOC 97
th
 Brigade, with 
headquarters at KRONPRINZ [FARM] will be in 
command of the left sector.  
 
I want you to think over that and let me know your ideas. 
You have got to relieve and it is better to attack straight 
through them than to relieve and attack again. What it is 
necessary to know is whether you consider the task too 
difficult for you to carry on.
624
  
 
Brigadier-General Blacklock telephoned Division HQ ten minutes later (9:20 a.m.); 97 
Brigade would be unable to recommence the attack due to rampant disorganisation and 
serious loss of officers: “Message from 97 Brigade to the effect that they could not 
assemble their two right battalions for the attack and they want the barrage to cease.
625
 
                                                 
624
 These verbal orders, subsequently communicated to II Corps HQ at 9:28 a.m., were in keeping with 
„32nd Division Instructions No. 11, Special Instructions to GOC Brigade in Divisional Support [14 th 
Infantry Brigade] and GOC Brigade in Divisional Reserve [96
th
 Infantry Brigade‟ of 30 November. See 
Appendix 8 a & b.   
625
 The 32
nd
 Division DMGO‟s after-action report noted: „At 9 a.m. orders were received from GOC 97th 
Infantry Brigade to fire on barrage lines from 9-20 a.m. to 9-45 a.m. in order to support a fresh attack. This 
order was cancelled at 9:15 a.m.‟ See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action Report, „Appendix „H‟: Action of 
Chapter 4 
 268 
Their Nos. 1 & 2 (2
nd
 KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI) are too disorganised to assemble for the 
attack, therefore the barrage has been stopped for ten minutes”. Shute‟s growing 
impatience and obvious displeasure are evident in the subsequent verbal exchange with 
the GOC 97 Brigade:  
Shute: Will you be ready in ten minutes?  
Blacklock: At present it cannot be said when they will be 
ready to attack. 
 
Shute: Will you be able to fix an hour for the attack? Do 
you know where they are? 
 
Blacklock:  Line runs from VOX FARM S.W. corner of 
VOID FARM to S.W. corner of MALLET COPSE.
626
  
 
Shute: Then you haven‟t got anywhere near VEAL and 
VOX?
627
 Well you have got to get on today on your right 
and I will probably want you to hand over command of the 
right sector to the 14
th
 Infantry Brigade. You will move 
your Brigade into the left sector and let the 15
th
 Lancs. Fus. 
and 16
th
 North‟d Fus. march away tonight. You will have 
your Brigade to hold the left sector and to get on to your 
objective. All these valuable hours of darkness between 2 
a.m. and 6 a.m. have been wasted by your Battalion 
Commanders not getting their battalions on.
628
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Machine-guns During Operations near Passchendaele, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 December‟, 16 December 1917, 32nd 
Division War Diary.  
626
 11
th
 Border Regiment‟s retirement from Mallet Copse was still unknown at this time.  
627
 Reproduced from original transcript. Vox Farm, as related by Brigadier-General Blacklock in the 
previous exchange, had been secured. Major-General Shute may have meant Vat instead of Vox or his 
recorded reference to the latter was the result of a clerical error during transcription or subsequent 
„Telephone and Telegraph Messages‟ appendix compilation.  
628
 Major-General Shute‟s account of this episode (related in his after-action report of 11 December) differs 
from surviving telephone and telegraph transcripts: „On receipt of this information‟ i.e., the cancellation of 
the 9:20 a.m. attack, „the Divisional Commander informed the GOC 97th Infantry Brigade that he must fix 
an hour in the afternoon to resume his attack and pointed out it was of special importance to capture HILL 
52 and the high ground about VOID FARM‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, 
Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary, p. 17.  
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A chastened Blacklock then asked if it was possible to resume operations in the 
afternoon; Shute replied that he could.
629
 The GOC 32
nd
 Division‟s hastily improvised 
contingency plan, to be put in motion if 97 Brigade failed to press on during the 
afternoon, was somewhat intricate and ambitious given prevailing circumstances: Two 
battalions of the support brigade were, after nightfall, to pass through two stalled, 
disorganised assault battalions, reeling from heavy casualties, on the right of the attacking 
brigade and seize a newly designated objective line. The relieved battalions would, 
following the capture of their former objectives by the support battalions, then shift from 
the old frontline – one to the left and one in immediate reserve about Virile Farm – in 
order to relieve two battalions previously loaned by the reserve brigade, which, in turn, 
were to march back to reserve positions west of the Zonnebeke – Langemarck road. All 
of this, it should also be noted, was to occur under the bright light of a waning gibbous 
moon while in close contact with agitated and watchful foe.  
 
 The observed threat from German troops, still massing in the vicinity of Valuation 
Houses, opposite the right centre of 97 Brigade worried 32
nd
 Division HQ during a brief 
span of minutes between 9:25 and 9:28 a.m.; the gunners, as related in subsequent 
telephone and telegraph reports, appeared to engage this menace with desired effect: 
Division HQ to II Corps: “Much movement around VALUATION HOUSES. Are the 
heavies on to it?” [II Corps] “Corps have told the gunners”; To CRA: “Corps observers 
report great deal of movement around VALUATION HOUSES at 9:10 a.m.”; From 
                                                 
629
 Ibid: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 
1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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CRA: “FOO No. 4 Group reports that he scattered Germans moving from depot towards 
VALUATION HOUSES. FOOS Nos 3 & 4 groups have engaged enemy moving from 
direction of VALUATION HOUSES to V.24.a.4.2.”; From CRA: “Officer of No. 4 
Group at HUBNER FARM has seen parties of men moving along the road from 
VALUATION HOUSES to VOLT FARM, behind which they appear to be collecting. 
Two 18-pdr batteries have engaged them with direct observation”.630  
 
 At 9:45 a.m. 32
nd
 Division HQ telegraphed II Corps, 8
th
 Division and 35
th
 
Division about the delay of 97 Brigade‟s renewed attack: “Attack on HILL 52 postponed 
from 9:20 a.m. to a later hour”. Captain Knox telephoned fifteen minutes later (10:00 
a.m.) with additional eyewitness accounts from the wounded: “It is reported that the 16th 
HLI have had to retire and they were last seen in the old Bosche frontline consolidating. 
They had gained their first objective [dotted green line], but were too weak to hold it.
631
 
An officer says the Bosche never waited for them. Whenever they got near they took up 
their guns and ran.
632
 I cannot get any information about the 17
th
 HLI”.633 
 
 97 Brigade telegraphed probable losses sustained by their right centre battalion 
shortly after the last report from Captain Knox: “11/Borders report timed 8:35 a.m. 
Casualties estimated at 10 [officers] and 150 [ORs]”. 32nd Division HQ then received a 
                                                 
630
 Ibid.  
631
 This information, provided by a wounded informant, appears, so far as can be ascertained, to have been 
spurious, as remnants of 16
th
 HLI were still established about the dotted green line east and west of Void 
Farm at this time. The Battalion war diary also fails to record any sort of morning withdrawal to the 
original German frontline.  
632
 The perceived German retirement was, according to OHL’s recently introduced „elastic arrangement‟, 
the desired response of a hard-pressed Vorfeldzonelinie garrison. See Chapter 1, pp. 38-39.  
633
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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lengthy situation report, communicated over the telephone by one of Brigadier-General 
Blacklock‟s staff officers, at 10:05 a.m.  
Situation on the right of 25
th
 Brigade – Attack commenced 
quite satisfactorily. They had a very bad time before our 
artillery barrage opened and they had a good many 
casualties chiefly by machine-guns in VENISON 
TRENCH, which enfiladed the left company of the centre 
[sic] [2
nd
 Rifle Brigade] battalion and our right [2
nd
 
KOYLI] battalion. Our right held on to HILL 52 for a good 
time and apparently the left of the 25
th
 Brigade held on 
fairly well everywhere, but when the Germans counter-
attacked, they were not strong enough, owing to casualties 
by machine-gun fire, to hold their ground. They both fell 
back and the line at present, taking it from the 25
th
 Brigade 
– W.25.a.3.1. – line runs due west to south of TEALL 
COTTAGE where they are in touch with the 16
th
 North‟d 
Fus. The 16
th
 North‟d Fus. have one company pretty badly 
knocked about and three companies moderately knocked 
about. 2
nd
 KOYLI can only muster 2 officers and 20 OR 
and are somewhere south of the first O in VOCATION 
FARM. The situation on the left of 2
nd
 KOYLI is being 
ascertained. Battalion commanders have been sent to find 
out the situation. They are sending out patrols to try and get 
the line established in VOCATION and VOID farms. They 
are just in MALLET COPSE with left refused, and on the 
left some of the 17
th
 HLI are due east of VEAL 
COTTAGE. It is thought that No. 5 [15
th
 LF] battalion are 
on their objective still, and that they have pushed out 
patrols and joined hands north of VEAL COTTAGE with 
the 17
th
 HLI. The right of the 17
th
 HLI has pushed forward 
level with VEAL COTTAGE, but fell back southwestwards 
and are not now level with VEAL COTTAGE.
634
  
  
Division HQ, unclear about certain aspects not related in this update, pressed for more 
details: “It is not understood where 17th HLI are. Have we got VAT COTTAGES? Can 
we put artillery on VEAL COTTAGES? Can you get Stokes Mortars on to them?” 97 
Brigade replied that attempts had been made to register mortar assets on both objectives. 
                                                 
634
 Ibid. Brigadier-General Blacklock ordered battalion commanders to „clear up the situation‟ at 8:00 a.m. 
Daylight made the task of going forward almost impossible. See IWM 4732: „Summary of the Attack of the 
97
th
 Inf. Bde. with 2 Battalions of the 96
th
 Inf. Bde. on December 2 [1917]‟, Brigadier-General T.S. 
Lambert Papers (Box 10/80/2).  
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Further queries followed: “Can you tell me how far the 15th LF have got? You think they 
have got the southern edge of DOUBLE COPSE. They are not in MALLET COPSE”.635  
The last part of this exchange clearly confirmed to Division HQ that 11
th
 Border 
Regiment, unable to secure Mallet Copse in its entirety, was still holding on just inside 
the shell-shattered spinney.   
 
 Brigadier-General Blacklock, leaving the security of his pillbox HQ at Kronprinz 
Farm, had previously gone forward to discover the whereabouts of the current frontline. 
During this absence, 32
nd
 Division HQ, in an attempt to subdue enemy resistance at Veal 
Cottages and Mallet Copse, telephoned a new artillery support scheme to 97 Brigade at 
10:30 a.m.: “We are going to help you with artillery on to MALLET COPSE and 
possibly on to VEAL COTTAGES if you are not too close. We must wait until Genl. 
Blacklock comes back and tells us where you are exactly. We will put artillery 
concentrations (How[itzer]s) on to anything you like. If you are being stopped by sniping 
from machine-guns then you must get on and blow them out”.636  
 
 Major-General Shute updated II Corps about the general situation of 97 Brigade 
by telephone at 10:35 a.m.: “I can tell you roughly our line. From TEALL COTTAGE 
(exclusive) VOX FARM (inclusive) southern edge of MALLET COPSE [and] VEALL 
COTTAGES (exclusive) then up to the edge of DOUBLE COPSE. A tremendous lot of 
MG fire from VENISON trench enfiladed the KOYLI on HILL 52”. Another verbal 
                                                 
635
 Ibid.  
636
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exchange with 14 Brigade, where the proposed contingency plan along with 97 Brigade‟s 
current status was discussed, took place ten minutes later:  
14 Brigade: As far as he [Brigadier-General Blacklock] 
knows, the position of 97
th
 is – His two right battalions [2nd 
KOYLI and 16
th
 HLI] are back on their original frontline. 
No. 3 Battalion [11
th
 Border] is 200 yards south of 
MALLET COPSE. No. 4 Battalion [17
th
 HLI] is 200 yards 
south of VEAL COTTAGES. No. 5 Battalion [15
th
 LF] is 
on its final objective he thinks. You assume that your 
proposed attack will be carried out with his attack. 
 
Div. HQ: The Divisional commander says “YES” if 
Gen[era]l. Blacklock can do it, but his plans are very 
uncertain until the position of the 97
th
 is cleared up. There 
is another possibility. It may turn out more advisable for 
you to attack on the front of Nos. 2 [16
th
 HLI] & 3 Bns 
instead of Nos. 1 [2
nd
 KOYLI] & 2 and go right through to 
the final objective.
637
 To carry out the attack it is essential 
for the 97
th
 to attack on your left. That is the original 
proposal if you were to attack on the front of the other two 
battalions. It may not be so essential now, but you would 
want your right covered.  
 
14 Brigade: We are waiting for Gen[era]l. Blacklock to 
come back to find out what his dispositions are. 
  
Div. HQ: Do you consider it more advisable to relieve and 
then attack or form up behind the troops who are there and 
go through them? 
  
14 Brigade: The point is that they will be better organised 
tomorrow night. What he [Brigadier-General Lumsden] 
would like to do is to relieve the line tonight and attack 
tomorrow night. He would rather takeover the line one 
night and attack another, but in the event of having to do 
both on one night, he would rather attack through them.
638
  
 
                                                 
637
 This „more advisable‟ second option would, if pressed on through 16th HLI and 11th Border Regiment, 
place both assault battalions of 14 Brigade to the NW of German occupied Hill 52. Major-General Shute, as 
we shall see, thus appears to have entertained hopes that Hill 52 would be regained before this stage of the 
renewed assault commenced.  
638
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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Lumsden had made his operational preferences clear to Division HQ; the final decision 
for a resumed attack on the night of 2 or 3 December remained pending, as 97 Brigade 
attempted to sort out its battalions before commencement of the contemplated afternoon 
attack.  
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Pollard (CRE) telegraphed more news about the condition of 
duckboard tracks at 10:42 a.m.: “Following message by orderly from 219th Field Coy. 
timed 9:40 a.m. today begins. MOUSETRAP TRACK in good order. All breaks forward 
of WALLEMOLEN repaired by 3 a.m. No breaks to rear of WALLEMOLEN at 8:30 
a.m.”  One of Major-General Shute‟s staff officers articulated the desire to press on with 
the attack after dark to Brigadier-General „Sammy‟ Wilson (BGGS II Corps) at 10:58 
a.m.: “My General feels he must do something tonight because the enemy is so 
disorganised that he thinks tonight is the time to do it. The [Second] Army think it is very 
important to get hold of HILL 52 tonight. My General thinks so also. VENISON 
TRENCH ought to be hammered [by artillery] today: we got beyond HILL 52 today but 
then got badly done in by machine-guns from there”. A ninth report, based on prisoner 
interviews, from Captain Knox (11:00 a.m.)
639
 was succeeded by a telegraphed situation 
report
640
 from VIII Corps at 11:02 a.m.
641
  
 
                                                 
639
 „There are two wounded Germans here [CMDS]. (1) belongs to 3 Coy. 1st Bn. 94th I.R. 38th Division. He 
has been two days in the line and fourteen days in Flanders: he came to here from before ARRAS. The 
attack this morning was unexpected [my emphasis]. He has not heard of any attack against us. He is 21 
years of age and seems quite willing to answer any questions. (2) 5 Coy. 2
nd
 Bn. 95
th
 I.R. 38
th
 Division‟.  
640
 Originally telegraphed by „2nd Corps „I‟ (Thro‟ 8th Corps I)‟ at 10:30 a.m. See above.  
641
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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 Sometime before 11:00 a.m., a mud-spattered Brigadier-General Blacklock 
returned to Kronprinz Farm from his reconnaissance of 97 Brigade‟s muddled frontline. 
A Brigade staff officer (Captain H. Wailes) answered a telephone call from 32
nd
 Division 
HQ shortly afterward at 11:05 a.m. The latter wanted to know if the doughty Brigadier 
had been made aware of the new barrage arrangements:  
Div. HQ: Did you give Gen[era]l. Blacklock the Divisional 
Commander‟s message?  
 
Captain Wailes: With regard to How[itzer]s he [Brigadier-
General Blacklock] said he did not want them, but would 
do it with Stokes. He thinks he is in VOID FARM and 
VELDT FARM, V.23.d.7.6.
642
 and at southern edge of 
MALLET COPSE.
643
 We had not got VAT COTTAGES or 
VEAL COTTAGES. He would like to see Scott [CO 16
th
 
HLI] before he decides. He feels sure he cannot use How 
[itzer]s. He had a lot of casualties to trench mortar 
personnel and finds it difficult to collect them. The Bosche 
is holding VAT COTTAGES.  
   
Div. HQ: You mean you are to the south of VAT 
COTTAGES? You had a message timed 8:40 from 2
nd
 
KOYLI saying 12 officers and 300 OR casualties.
644
  
 
Major-General Shute later observed that the frontline, based on information received at 
the time, appeared to run from “about 200 yards south of TEALL COTTAGES to VOX 
FARM inclusive thence to VOID and VELDT farms thence to southern edge of 
MALLET COPSE where it turned south and ran almost to our old frontline where it 
                                                 
642
 Veldt Farm and vicinity, situated on the boundary between 16
th
 HLI and 11
th
 Border Regiment, was still 
in enemy hands. 
643
 Brigadier-General Blacklock was, despite his recent reconnaissance, still unaware of 11
th
 Border 
Regiment‟s pre-dawn withdrawal from the southern edge of Mallet Copse.  
644
 The puzzling non sequitur found in the last exchange is reproduced from the original telegraph and 
telephone transcripts. See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone 
and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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turned west and ran to the south of VAT COTTAGES then turning north again to about 
point [opposite Double Copse] V.22.d.8.2”.645  
 
 Another telegraph (received at 11:15 a.m.) from Lieutenant-Colonel Pollard 
informed Division HQ that the “GENOA – STROOMBEEK” beech slab corduroy road 
had been kept open all morning by the 14
th
 Worcester (63
rd
 RND pioneer battalion). At 
11:20 a.m. the 32
nd
 Division DMGO was ordered to “put down from 12 noon to 12:30 
p.m.” a machine-gun barrage “to catch any enemy who might be assembling for a 
counter-attack” Three more messages, concerning 8th Division‟s imminent relief after 
nightfall, current disposition of 25 Brigade‟s frontline and Brigadier-General Coffin‟s 
dim forecast for the continuance of operations, followed between 11:20 and 11:25 a.m.
646
  
 
 A note, collated and dispatched by the ADMS, listing casualties (20 officers and 
288 ORs) received at the ADS up to 10:25 a.m., was delivered to 32
nd
 Division HQ at 
11:40 a.m. Another situation report, relating the German attempt to work around the right 
of 25 Brigade, was received from 8
th
 Division 25 minutes later at 12:05 p.m. Meanwhile, 
14 Brigade‟s pending deployment remained an uncertainty; Brigadier-General Lumsden‟s 
HQ received the following verbal message (12:05 p.m.) from Division HQ: “The 
probability is that you won‟t relieve or attack tonight, but you will have to be ready. At 
any rate, your officers will have to go up and reconnoitre tonight”. 97 Brigade telephoned 
with a general situation report at 12:15 p.m. This information, recorded at the receiving 
                                                 
645
 Ibid: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, p.17. 
646
 Ibid and „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 
December 1917.   
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end during real-time transcription, raised expectations that the attack would be continued: 
“You think you can get on to your line. You are going to use Stokes guns. As regards the 
situation at VOID FARM you are on one outskirt and the Boche the other. You are going 
to include VOID FARM in your line. You are in rather a difficulty about No. 2 Battalion 
(16
th
 HLI). They have no officers left except one subaltern”. Shute, convinced that 97 
Brigade was capable of one more effort, replied: “I think I am going to leave you in 
tonight, so would you rather attack in the afternoon or at night?” [97 Brigade] “General 
Blacklock said he would rather do it at night”. [Shute] “Very well then. Arrange to do it 
at night. Would it be any good to you to see me either at your headquarters or for you to 
come and meet me at General Lumsden‟s Headquarters?” Brigadier-General Blacklock 
replied that he preferred 14 Brigade HQ for a meeting venue. “Very well then”, Shute 
concluded, “I will come up there now. I can get to KANSAS at about 1:15 p.m.”.647 
Word of this meeting was communicated to 14 Brigade five minutes later at 12:20 p.m.
648
  
 
 
4.5 Dénouement  
 
Both 8
th
 and 32
nd
 divisional staffs had formulated, regardless of high winds that still 
grounded designated contact aircraft, a fairly accurate picture of the general situation by 
half-past twelve. Brigadier-General Coffin, taking into account heavy losses amongst 
regimental officers and NCOs, made it clear that continued operations against Venison 
Trench and its redoubts were, in his considered opinion, dependant on fresh troops and 
the capture of Teall Cottage. Nevertheless, any success by day or night was, he 
concluded, highly improbable. Major-General Heneker backed Coffin‟s on-the-spot 
                                                 
647
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648
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judgement in a report to VIII Corps HQ at 11:00 a.m. His semi-fatalism, apparent since 
the operation‟s inception, was also shared by trusted subordinates like Coffin, who saw 
no point, given earlier predictions and evident deplorable consequences, in pressing on. 
Major-General Shute did not share this viewpoint. The controversial operational 
approach had been his brainchild from the start. Confidence of impending success 
(unabashedly declared to Sir Henry Rawlinson among others)
649
 and consequent 
uncomfortable recognition that such boasts may have been ill-founded, reveal, in 
subsequent actions and words, an overriding personal stake in a successful outcome even 
after hoped for surprise was lost.  
 
 25 Brigade struggled to retain its small territorial gains throughout the afternoon 
(Map 12). German forays, under cover of bombs and rifle grenades, against the left flank 
“were all repulsed without difficulty” and touch maintained with 2nd KOYLI. Lieutenant-
Colonel Stirling, still confined to his HQ by the hostile bombardment, remained out of 
touch with companies of 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire. 2
nd
 Lieutenant Upton and his detached 
party, isolated in their short stretch of Venison Trench, received word by runner of their 
impending withdrawal after dark. Along the centre and left, advanced companies of 2
nd
 
Lincolnshire and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade remained in place under relentless shellfire while 
losses steadily mounted. Lieutenant Anderson recalled: “Except for a few hours during 
the morning, it was practically impossible, owing to the accurate sniping, to get from post 
to post”.650  
                                                 
649
 See CAC: RWLN 1/9: Rawlinson Diary, 19 November 1917 and IWM: P363: Strickland Diary, 21 
November 1917. 
650
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/2nd December 1917‟, 
13 December 1917, 8
th
 Division War Diary, TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd 
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 8
th
 Division‟s IO reported on the current haul of prisoners (3 officers, 16 NCOs, 
32 men) and the recently determined German order of battle (“N to S, 96, 95, 94, 117, 
116, 115”) to VIII Corps at 1:00 p.m. “Evidence as to the enemy‟s intention”, he added, 
“varies too much to form an opinion”. Second Army Report Centre telegraphed a general 
situation report concerning what was known of 32
nd
 Division‟s frontline at 1:50 p.m. Two 
more messages, passing on intelligence culled from the captured Feldwebel of IR94
651
 
and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade‟s estimated (approximately 200 men) losses, came across Captain 
Chaplin‟s desk at 1:50 and 2:30 p.m. The situation remained, VIII Corps HQ receiving no 
additional reports until 4:30 p.m., obscure after this.
652
  
 
 Major-General Shute, having made his way due east through St Jean and Wieltje 
along designated corps/divisional roads and tracks, arrived amidst the ubiquitous supply 
dumps and steady, two-way traffic of Kansas Cross at 1:15 p.m. Joining Brigadier-
General Blacklock and Brigadier-General Lumsden in the latter‟s pillbox HQ, he wasted 
no time in issuing instructions “as to the action to be taken” by 97 and 14 brigades: The 
former brigade was “to establish itself on the line TEALL COTTAGES inclusive – HILL 
52 inclusive – VOID FARM and MALLET COPSE inclusive – V.23.c.2.4. after darkness 
and to push on thence, if possible, to the line of its final [red line] objective”.653 The latter 
brigade was now detailed “to attack through the 97th Infantry Brigade on the night of 
December 3/4 and to [sic] capture any portions of the final objective which the 97 
                                                                                                                                                 
Royal Berkshire War Diary and TNA: WO/95/1731: „Report of the part played by the 2nd Battn. The Rifle 
Brigade in the Operations at Passchendaele‟, 6 December 1917, 2nd Rifle Brigade War Diary. 
651
 See Chapter 3, pp. 178-79.  
652
 BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd December 
1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele Front, 
November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers.  
653
 See Appendix 10 for 97 Brigade O.O. 181 issued later that afternoon at 3:50 p.m.  
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Infantry Brigade might have failed to secure on the previous night”. Shute, in his 
subsequent after-action report, noted that “no definite orders as to the scope of these 
operations could be given to the 14
th
 Infantry Brigade until the result of the operations to 
be undertaken by the 97
th
 Brigade was known, but GOC 14
th
 Infantry Brigade was 
directed to send officers up to reconnoitre the line and be prepared to carry out an 
operation on the line indicated as soon as the situation of the 97
th
 Infantry Brigade was 
known”.654 Following this, the GOC 32nd Division, all matters being settled for the time 
being, departed for the return journey to Canal Bank.
655
   
 
 One written note and two telephone messages were received at 32
nd
 Division HQ 
during Major-General Shute‟s visit to Kansas Cross. The note, eighth in a series sent off 
by Captain Knox from the CMDS, further demonstrates the often dilatory and inaccurate 
nature, given passage of time and understandably limited combatant perspective, of 
information gleaned from interviews of the recently accessible wounded: “A CSM 16th 
HLI states that they had reached their first objective early this morning, but were heavily 
counter-attacked and had to fall back. A man of the Borders says the Borders were being 
counter-attacked from all sides at 9 a.m. this morning, but were holding all they had 
gained. He said they had reached their final objective…” The contents of two wireless 
intercepts, telephoned by II Corps at 1:56 p.m., further emphasised the growing peril of 
counter-attack: “German wireless message received orders forward zone to be taken at 
once and the line to be straightened out. Second message calls for more ammunition”. 
                                                 
654
 14 Brigade telephoned 32
nd
 Division HQ earlier (12:58 p.m.) with the following query: „In view of what 
is coming off, are we to provide 50 men from the [1
st] Dorsets as carrying party asked for by ADMS?‟ The 
50 in question were subsequently detached from 96 Brigade.  
655
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd 
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The danger was further stressed by the same source at 2:18 and 2:33 p.m.: “Corps 
observers report several parties of about 100 all told at VALUATION HOUSES going 
toward line at 1:40 p.m. The Corps have told the artillery” and “XIX Corps report there is 
a large concentration at V.24.a.0.5. [vicinity of Valuation Houses]”.656  
 
 Major-General Shute, back at his HQ by 2:40 p.m., was immediately brought up 
to date about the contents of a telegraph (received at 2:00 p.m.) from 97 Brigade:  
Situation appears to be as follows: We hold the line from 
S[outh] of TEALL COTTAGES along old frontline to 
VOCATION and VOX [farms] both inclusive along 
western edge of VOID [FARM] to 50 yards S[outh] of 
MALLET COPSE, thence south of VAT COTTAGES 
through fork roads to enclosure at V.22.d.5.2. inclusive, 
then SSW along objective to TOURNANT FARM. 
Possession of TEALL COTTAGE doubtful.  
 
A second situation report, related by telephone, was communicated by 97 Brigade at 2:35 
p.m.: “97th Brigade reports – In occupation of VOX, VOCATION and VOID farms: 
continuous line running south of MALLET COPSE to the left in touch all the way. Also 
in possession of VEAL COTTAGES”. The overall situation, as it now appeared to the 
GOC 32
nd
 Division, was that 97 Brigade had managed to secure and hold (with the 
exception of Hill 52 and Vat Cottages) on to objectives as far as the dotted green line.
657
 
 
 II Corps HQ received another lengthy telephone message (relating the results of 
the Kansas Cross conference) from Major-General Shute minutes after the latter digested 
the contents of 97 Brigade‟s report:  
                                                 
656
 Ibid: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 
1917‟, 11 December 1917.  
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I don‟t think Gen[era]l Blacklock will be able to attack till 
3 or 4 in the morning because he has to collect his fellows. 
Tomorrow night [forthcoming attack by 14 Brigade] we 
may be a bit earlier. He cannot be earlier than 3 or 4. He 
won‟t attack before ½ past 2. I rather want him to attack 
before they attack him. If they do relieve they had better 
finish it by 2 p.m. We hope to get on the line of VEAL, 
VOID and down on to HILL 52. The thing is there is such a 
lot of machine-guns. It is almost impossible to get a 
sufficient amount of artillery fire to knock-out the machine-
guns. There has been very little fire (artillery). Its been the 
machine-guns that are the trouble. Tomorrow night we 
shall finish the show with the 14
th
 Bde.  
 
Shute (following a short verbal situation update to his CRA)
658
 next telephoned 
Brigadier-General Blacklock with a query about who actually held Veal Cottages at 2:57 
p.m.: [Shute] “We have this message [received at 2:35 p.m.] from the 97th Brigade. Is that 
right?” [Blacklock] “It is not VEAL COTTAGES but it is TEALL COTTAGE. 40 
prisoners taken there”. Teall Cottage, contrary to this claim, still remained in German 
hands. The origin of the report concerning its capture, difficult to trace after passage of 
time, certainly conveyed a false impression of mounting success at 32
nd
 Division HQ.
659
 
Shute, no doubt pleased by what appeared to be an improvement of the general situation, 
telephoned II Corps HQ again (2:59 p.m.) to relate the news: “We are in occupation of 
VOID FARM and have a continuous line from there running westwards south of 
MALLET COPSE. We are in touch all the way. Have just taken TEALL COTTAGE and 
40 prisoners”.660  
                                                 
658
 „We are said to be in possession of VEAL COTTAGES and VOID FARM. It is not confirmed yet‟.  
659
 It is possible that the report confirming the seizure of Teall Cottage was directly related to the right 
flanking movement  by remnants of „A‟ and „B‟ companies (under the command of Captain J. Alexander) 
16
th
 HLI. A third company (as per Major-General Shute‟s 7:45 a.m. verbal order to 97 Brigade) was also 
sent forward by 16
th
 NF (reserve or „counter-attack counterattack battalion‟) to support vain efforts to seize 
the troublesome strongpoint.    
660
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. Further confirmation of 97 
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 Diligent Captain Knox had, in the meantime, dispatched a ninth note (received by 
32
nd
 Division HQ at 2:50 p.m.) relating more battlefield impressions of the wounded:  
An officer of the 16
th
 HLI states that as far as he knew, the 
situation was as follows: At 9 a.m. KOYLI south side of 
HILL 52. 16
th
 HLI at first objective. Borders on final 
objective. He thinks direction kept was bad: the KOYLI 
went too far to the right and one Coy. of 16
th
 HLI was 
reported at TEALL COTTAGE. Estimates casualties in his 
Battalion at 200. He states the Bosche put up no fight, 
whenever the got near him he ran. A man of the Borders 
states that at 9 a.m. Borders on final objective and were 
digging. They had beat-off several counter-attacks.  
 
The growing mass of German counter-attack troops, congregating between Valuation 
Houses and Mallet Copse, became a serious source of concern to Major-General Shute 
and his staff following receipt of a telegraph report sent by divisional artillery observers 
at 3:20 p.m. Parties of enemy infantry could be discerned “doubling down from 
VALUATION HOUSES to VOLT FARM and thence into valley to east of VOLT 
FARM”.661 Three 18-pdr batteries had already begun to engage the area of this dangerous 
build-up, when the GOC 32
nd
 Division ordered (3:20 p.m.) a machine-gun barrage and 
area concentration with heavy guns to commence at 3:50 p.m.
662
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brigade‟s reported frontline was telegraphed by 32nd Division HQ to II Corps, 8th Division, 35th Division, 
14 Brigade and 96 Brigade respectively at 3:45 p.m.  
661
 News of this mounting threat was subsequently telegraphed to 97 Brigade, 8
th
 Division, 14 Brigade and 
II Corps respectively at 3:45 p.m.  
662
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, p. 13 and „Appendix „J‟, 32nd 
Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War 
Diary. Machine-gun companies tasked with indirect fire support had (acting on information received at 
2:30 p.m.) previously strafed the German build-up: „[I]information was received that enemy were 
concentrating in the vicinity of VALUATION HOUSES. E, F, G and H batteries were ordered to engage 
this target, the batteries opening fire at 3-5 p.m. at the rate of 100 rounds per minute for five minutes and 
afterwards for 1 minute at intervals of 3 minutes‟. See Ibid: After-action Report, „Appendix „H‟: Action of 
Machine-guns During Operations near Passchendaele, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 December‟, 16 December 1917.  
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4:10 p.m.: Darkness (sunset was at 3:46 p.m.) already started to cloak the 
battlefield when Major-General Shute received further welcome news, later determined 
to be false, from 97 Brigade HQ: “Col[onel] Scully [CO 16th NF] reports that he has got 
HILL 52 with one company”.663 The GOC 32nd Division, his right now apparently made 
secure by the recent capture of Teall Cottage and Hill 52, replied that this feat was “good 
work” and close support for Scully “should be arranged”. He later observed: “The 
situation then at 4:10 p.m., as far as known at Divisional HQ, seemed to be rapidly 
improving. Although the situation of the 17
th
 HLI in front of VAT COTTAGES remained 
unsatisfactory, it was considered that with HILL 52, VOID FARM and MALLET 
COPSE
664
 in our possession, the ultimate capture of VEAL and VAT cottages would be 
accomplished”.665  
 
                                                 
663
 16
th
 NF‟s war diary and after-action report, along with the published postwar battalion history, fail to 
mention the recapture of Hill 52. Major-General Shute‟s earlier verbal order (timed 7:45 a.m.) to 97 
Brigade („Absolutely necessary that TEALL COTTAGE and VEAL and HILL 52 should be regained. Do 
this with your reserve Battalion assisted, if safety permits, by fire from your special battery and Stokes 
mortars‟) was followed by orders for a second attack on the key promontory. Three companies remained in 
the vicinity of Lieutenant-Colonel Scully‟s Battalion HQ at Virile Farm at this time. One company (either 
„A‟ or „B‟) had previously been sent off to recapture Teall Cottage, so only one of three remaining 
companies was available to carry out the task. Scully confirmed after dusk that this company had been 
dispatched to Hill 52. Captain Howard (2
nd
 KOYLI diarist) subsequently related the outcome: „At about 
10:30 a.m. on the 2
nd
, he [Captain Hassell] received instructions to recapture HILL 52 with the assistance of 
one company of the 16
th
 Northumberland Fusiliers. This company failed to materialise, but he advanced his 
line by the process of dribbling some 200 yards‟. Shute later observed: „We were never in possession of 
HILL 52 after we had been driven off it by the enemy‟s big counter-attack at 3:30 a.m.‟. See TNA: 
WO/95/2398: 16
th
 NF War Diary, WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part IV, Narrative Dealing with the 
Retirement of the 97
th
 Infantry Brigade‟, p. 16 and „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary, WO/95/2402: 2nd KOYLI War 
Diary, IWM 4723: „32nd Div. No.G.S.1.1499/3/33‟, 5 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert 
Papers (Box 80/10/2) and Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
 (Service) Battalion Northumberland 
Fusiliers, p. 89.  
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 The southern edge of Mallet Copse was, as related above, already lost by this time, the survivors of both 
companies of 11
th
 Border Regiment having retired from there to the dotted green line just before daybreak.  
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 See TNA: WO/157/288: „Calendar for December 1917: Times Calculated for Second Army Front and 
Greenwich Mean Time‟, II Corps Intelligence File, WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of 
Events‟, p. 13-14 and „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 
11 December 1917, 32
nd
 Division War Diary.   
Chapter 4 
 285 
 The now obvious German build-up for a local counter-attack (Gegenangriff ) still 
relied on units organic to both the 25
th
 and 38
th
 divisions; assistance (Gegenstoss) from 
nearby Eingreifdivisionen had, so far, been unnecessary. Large bodies of infantry, 
directed by Kampftruppenkommandeur’s of IR116 and IR117, deployed in the area east 
of Southern Redoubt for an all-out assault against 25 Brigade. Reported activity in the 
vicinity of Valuation Houses was the result of an order issued by IR95’s regimental 
commander that morning:  
Oberstleutnant von Selle (HQ in Westroosebeke) realised 
the critical situation at the Feldherrnhügel.
666
 At 8:30 a.m. 
[German time] he ordered Leutnant d.R. Martini – the most 
senior officer present – to attack from the left wing near the 
Nordhof [Void Farm], in order to push back the enemy 
breakthrough. The order was extremely difficult to execute 
because the enemy could spot any movement in the 
daylight. The task [approach] was only accomplished by 
having men crawl forward a few at a time. Martini, 
although delayed until the afternoon, was able to achieve 
this deployment. The enemy, unwilling to surrender his 
gains, proceeded to strengthen the newly captured 
positions.
667
 
 
Embattled survivors of 16
th
 HLI, defending the salient east and west of Void Farm, began 
to feel the pressure as early as 2:00 p.m. (German time) when Martini, “with Leutnant 
                                                 
666
 Feldherrnhügel, or „General‟s Hill‟, situated on the southern outskirts of Westroosebeke, was known to 
the British as „Hill 50‟. According to the history of Bavarian RIR12, responsible for the sector SW of 
Westroosebeke during the previous October, the „Feldherrnhügel‟ got its high-sounding name during the 
first months of the Flanders campaign. From here, the top-brass had acquired a commanding view over the 
battlefield when our most advanced units were 6 to 8 kilometres further forward. From here, imaginative 
War Correspondents had sent their lively reports to the waiting world. But the Feldherrnhügel has had its 
day. An insignificant regimental staff inhabiting it amidst the tumult of battle and the War Correspondents 
have disappeared. The breakthrough on the Italian front near Tolmein and Karfreit [Caporetto] and the 
crossing of the Tagliamento: these were more worthy stories. Wonderful countryside, victory after victory, 
immeasurable amounts of war booty, supplies and prisoners. Even the military communiqués had almost 
nothing but the most meagre reports of the violent events amidst the desolation and ravaged battlefields of 
Flanders… Only in the Flanders Positions were a few dugouts to be found, one on the Feldherrnhügel, 
which had to be continually pumped out in order to render it usable‟. See Major a.D. Ernst Demmler, et al, 
Das R. B. Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 12 (Munich: Verlag Max Schid, 1934) pp. 238 and 240 and 
accompanying pocket map in Werner Beumleburg, Flandern 1917 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1928).   
667
 Major A.D. Buttmann, Kriegsgeschichte des Koninglich Preusischen 6. Thüringishen Infanterie 
Regiment Nr. 95: 1914-1918 (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), p. 253.  
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d.R. Klopple and 12
th
 Company, counter-attacked the enemy” as a preliminary to the 
main operation scheduled to commence at 4:15 p.m. British time. “Step by step, with 
heavy hand grenade fighting, they slowly but surely, as planned”, secured the left flank of 
IR95 NW of Hill 52.
668
 Captain Hassell‟s advanced posts bore the brunt of this concerted 
preliminary effort. Captain Howard (2
nd
 KOYLI‟s diarist) noted in his after-action report: 
“At 3:30 p.m. on the 2nd, the enemy counter-attacked and drove his [Hassell] advanced 
posts back to their original position, approximately the assembly tape”.669  
 
Plate 4.5 Map overlay: Vicinity of Virile, Vocation and Vox farms from the air 
(Source MMP) 
 
German troops braced themselves under a fierce barrage (starting at 3:50 p.m.) of 
artillery and indirect machine-gun fire as the minutes leading up to the localized 
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669
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nd
 KOYLI War Diary.   
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Gegenangriff ticked by. Some were dismayed at the prospect of leaving existing cover to 
advance in the fading light.
670
 Their commanders, unwilling to sanction the loss of further 
territory, had once again demonstrated a steely determination to retain the northern 
portion of the Passchendaele Ridge at all costs. IR95’s postwar historian baldly 
articulated contemporary perceptions of this contested high ground‟s crucial importance: 
“The enemy could redeem past failures if he captured the Höhenrücken of the 
Feldherrnhügel. Yes. If it wasn‟t for the damned Germans – the Huns; they forgot that 
we fight for the safety of our home and country”.671 Brigadier-General Coffin, discerning 
the clamour of a new German preparatory barrage, later wrote: “At 4:10 p.m, the enemy‟s 
shellfire became intense and the SOS signal was sent up by the [32
nd
] Division on our left 
at 4:15 p.m.”.672  
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 TNA: WO/157/120: „Annexe to Second Army Summary Dated 19th Dec[embe]r 1917: Translation of 
the closing pages of a diary taken from a dead German (probably a warrant officer of the 3
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th
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1914-1918, p. 253.  
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 TNA: WO/95/1727: „Report on Operations‟, 7 December 1917, 25 Brigade War Diary. Brigadier-
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Plate 4.6 Panorama looking south from site of Mullet Farm toward Vat Cottage Ridge (Source: Rob 
Thompson)  
  
5 
 
Counterblow & Aftermath 
 
 It is an easy thing for one whose foot is on the outside of 
calamity to give advice and to rebuke the sufferer.
673
 
 
 
5.1 Counterblow 
 
Massed German batteries commenced a roaring counter-attack preparatory deluge of 
projectiles on to British positions NE and NW of Passchendaele at 4:10 p.m. on 2 
December. Drifting banks of acrid, cordite-tinged smoke from the steady bombardment 
obscured the blighted region of unending shell craters, choked watercourses, shivered 
coppices and dispersed concrete pillboxes. Almost leaderless companies, platoons and 
sections, exhausted, wet-through and cowering under the ceaseless rain of hostile shells, 
steadied themselves for the expected counter-attack. One high-velocity missile detonated 
inside the pillbox HQ of 16
th
 HLI with a particularly horrifying effect: “A shell passed 
through the slot, killed several men seated in a row on a form in its path, and finally 
exploded in an emplacement, rendering all the occupants in a greater or lesser degree 
casualties”.674 Nine, including two officers (2nd Lieutenant T. Ferris and FOO 2nd 
Lieutenant V.J. Horton) and 7 ORs were killed and six wounded.
675
 Major Scott (acting 
CO), Lieutenant J. McLellan MC and another TMB officer were among the injured. “It is 
amazing the HQ was not entirely wiped out”.676   
                                                 
673 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound (Unsourced quotation variant). 
674
 Thomas Chalmers (ed), A Saga of Scotland: History of the 16
th
 The Highland Light Infantry-City of 
Glasgow Regiment (Glasgow: John M‟Callum & Co., 1930), p. 111.  
675
 29-year-old 2
nd
 Lieutenant James Ferris (16
th
 HLI attached 97 TMB) has no known grave and  is 
commemorated on the Tyne Cot Memorial to the Missing. 2
nd
 Lieutenant V.J. Horton (age unknown) of 
„D‟ Battery, 161 Brigade RFA is buried in Duhallow Cemetery.  
676
 Chalmers (ed), A Saga of Scotland, p. 111. 
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 This truly devastating barrage, fired with effect by hundreds of field and heavy 
guns ringing the Passchendaele Salient, had little impact on the ability of gunners 
supporting 25
 
Brigade to respond in kind. The current situation had occurred dozens of 
times since Sir Herbert Plumer‟s first push on 20 September: Strictly limited objectives, 
captured and consolidated by the infantry, remained suitably protected by batteries 
deployed and ready to engage any counter-stroke. Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling (CO 2
nd
 
Royal Berkshire) ordered an SOS signal to be discharged immediately after the one sent 
up by 32
nd
 Division at 4:15 p.m. The evolving counter-attack, he later discovered, 
appeared to be primarily directed against the vicinity of Southern Redoubt, where 2
nd
 
Lieutenant Upton‟s platoon still held on to a section of Venison Trench 50 yards north of 
the lost earthwork. In the centre, Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin (CO 2
nd
 Lincolnshire 
Regiment) recalled “an intense barrage was put down. SOS went up on 32nd Div[ision] 
front and on Berkshire front, but no infantry action developed on my front”. Hundreds of 
high explosive shells, fired at once in response to Stirling‟s flare, blanketed pre-
determined SOS lines along with an accompanying indirect machine-gun barrage before 
the German infantry could fan-out into any sort of assault formation. Survivors went to 
ground or fled to the rear. Brigadier-General Coffin subsequently observed: “Although no 
action followed on the part of the enemy‟s infantry, it is believed that they were forming 
up in considerable strength opposite our front and that they were scattered by our artillery 
fire. The wide front over which the lights were sent up led me to believe that the enemy 
was about to carry out an attack on a large scale”. 25th Division’s local Gegenangriff, as 
far as 8
th
 Division was concerned, appeared to be over before it could unfold: “By 5 
o‟clock the enemy‟s barrage was dying down and unusual quietness prevailed”.677  
                                                 
677
 TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary, WO/95/1730: 
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 On 97 Brigade‟s front, reduced elements of 11th Border Regiment, clinging to 
green line positions inside the Hauptwiderstandslinie south of Mallet Copse, and 16
th
 
HLI, defending a small salient east and west of Void Farm, bore the brunt of the 
developing German counter-attack. 2
nd
 KOYLI had been driven off Hill 52 and 17
th
 HLI 
stopped dead in front of Vat Cottages on their right and left respectively. The equally 
hard-pressed IR95 was, having lost all of its outpost zone and a considerable portion of 
the main line of resistance, ordered to “straighten out the line” by forcing the beset 16th 
HLI and 11
th
 Border Regiment back as far as the Vorfeldzonelinie’s forward edge.678 
Leutnant Martini, his left flank made secure by the 2:00 p.m. preliminary operation, sent 
his men forward from the vicinity of Volt Farm: “The [main] counter-attack began in 
broad daylight at 5:15 p.m. [German time] when 11
th
 and 12
th
 companies with two 
Truppes of 9
th
 Company attacked the enemy. At the same time, annihilation fire was 
called for and placed on the right positions”.679   
 
 16
th
 HLI, its forward posts overrun by advancing German troops, put up a stout 
resistance: “About 4 p.m. the enemy infantry were observed to be concentrating on N 
                                                                                                                                                 
„Report on Action of Battn from 2:30 p.m. 1.12.17 – M.N. 2/3 .12. 17‟, 2nd Lincolnshire War Diary, 
WO/95/1727: „Report on Operations‟, 7 December 1917, 25 Brigade War Diary and Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.H. Boraston & Captain Cyril E.O. Bax, The Eighth Division: 1914-1918 (London: Naval & Military Press 
reprint of 1926 edition), p. 166. Reference to the attempted riposte in consulted German regimental 
histories is sparse. Mention is made of Hauptmann von Arnim‟s (Kampftruppenkommandeur of IR117) 
return to the rear to „organise a systematic counter-attack‟ prior to the recapture of Southern Redoubt on the 
morning of 2 December. The narrative then claims, „Heavy fighting started again at 5:00 p.m.‟ [German 
time], but provides no further details of a localized counter-attack. See Hauptmann Kurt Offenbacher, Die 
Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3.Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117 
(Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1931), p. 196.  
678
 Counter-attack orders (dispatched by wireless) to regain the line as far as the Vorfeldzonelinie had been 
intercepted during the afternoon, the information being passed on by II Corps at 1:56 p.m. See TNA: 
WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 
December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
679
 Major A.D. Buttmann, Kriegsgeschichte des Koninglich Preusischen 6. Thüringishen Infanterie 
Regiment Nr. 95: 1914-1918 (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), p. 254.   
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side of Mallet Copse and about V.24 central. Our SOS was fired by Lieut[enant] 
Charlton, and our barrage was probably put down. The enemy infantry attacked our 
positions about 4:30 p.m., but were driven off by Lewis Guns and rifle fire with the 
assistance of one Vickers gun, which had been brought up”.680 On the left, Leutnant 
Martini‟s counter-attack forced back 11th Border Regiment to its original jumping-off 
line.
681
 Major-General Shute, while clearly dubious about calculated German strength, 
readily confirmed the punishing ordeal that preceded the Lonsdales‟ general retirement in 
his subsequent after-action report:   
The enemy‟s counter-attack was made through MALLET 
COPSE against 11
th
 Border Regt. who estimate the 
probable strength of the enemy who attacked at 300. This 
number is probably exaggerated, but the enemy had 
undoubtedly been collecting in some numbers in the 
vicinity of MALLET COPSE all day. The 11
th
 Border 
Regiment had done well in the early morning fighting … 
The losses of this Battalion were considerable, especially in 
officers and NCOs and by 4:10 p.m. 15 of the officers and 
most of the NCOs had been hit and the men were 
practically without leaders. At 4:10 p.m. the enemy put a 
barrage well in rear of 11
th
 Border Regt. and counter-
attacked under cover of rifle and rifle grenade fire. Our 
men fell back in front of this attack to our old frontline.
682
  
 
16
th
 HLI, its flanks exposed by the earlier repulse of 2
nd
 KOYLI on the right and the 
withdrawal of 11
th
 Border Regiment on the left, stubbornly clung to positions around 
Void Farm. Situated about the forward edge of the Hauptwiderstandslinie, further efforts 
                                                 
680
 TNA: WO/95/2404: 16
th
 HLI War Diary.  
681
 See Appendix 16, Part E (para. 13).  Enemy movement was also discerned opposite the left centre. 
Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s subsequent after-action report noted: „At 4:15 p.m. 2 companies of the 
enemy [,] ??? about 200 men [,] advanced on Veal Cottage and thence to Vat Cottage‟. See IWM 4723: 
„Summary of the Attack of the 97th Inf. Bde with 2 Battalions of the 96th Inf. Bde. on December 2 [1917]‟, 
Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
682
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part IV, Narrative Dealing with the Retirement of the 97th 
Infantry Brigade‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. Major-General Shute‟s doubt about enemy 
numbers was probably based on the CO 16
th
 NF‟s subsequent after-action report‟. See fn. 840 part b.  
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to eliminate this troublesome „Engländernest’ met with fierce rifle, rifle bomb and 
machine-gun fire.
683
  
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Scully (CO 16
th
 NF) was informed of Lieutenant Charlton‟s 
SOS signal at 4:15 p.m. About 200 stragglers, many of them wounded, were then 
observed “returning in numbers” toward Virile Farm. Scully immediately sent his two 
remaining companies forward with instructions “to take with them every man of any 
regiment. He set the example; he brought out every available man of headquarters and led 
the way. It was an advance into the unknown, for no information had been received all 
day…”684 The result, given the “sea of mud, and the leaden sleet of bullets from the pill-
boxes”, was a limited advance “in the late afternoon twilight”685, which failed to retrieve 
a confused situation:  
Lieut. Col. Scully at once ordered „C‟ and „D‟ Coys, which 
were in the vicinity of B[attalio]n. HQ, to advance; the men 
got out of their trenches and moved forward [,] keeping a 
good line under fairly heavy machine-gun fire. Runners and 
signallers of Bn. HQ details were sent forward with them. 
They advanced about 300 [yards] in front of VIRILE 
FARM and dug themselves in. The line thus forward ran 
from VOX FARM on the right to about V.29.b.40.70. when 
it bent back to the original line. The enemy attack did not 
get through our barrage.
686
 
 
                                                 
683
Engländernest: An improvised but strong defensive position dug by infiltrating British troops. A 
Bavarian regiment noted the previous year: „Once they had established themselves the British could prove 
very hard to dislodge, for they might have their Lewis guns and trench mortars with them, and they were 
astonishingly speedy diggers‟. See Christopher Duffy, Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 
1916 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), p. 274.  
684
 Captain C.H. Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
 (Service) Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers 
(Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Council of the Newcastle and Gateshead Incorporated Chamber of Commerce, 
1923) p. 89 and IWM 4723: „32nd Div. No.G.S.1499/3/33‟, 5 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. 
Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
685
 Ibid and Michael Stedman, Salford Pals: A History of the Salford Brigade – The 15th, 16th , 19th and 20th 
(Service) Battalions the Lancashire Fusiliers 1914-19 (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 156.  
686
 TNA: WO/95/2398: 16
th
 NF War Diary.  
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Scully subsequently reported that the enemy “did not follow up” the retiring troops, nor 
did he see any Germans. His primary concern, as he led his men forward into the void, 
was for his companies‟ vulnerable flanks: “In view of the fact that the enemy were in 
possession of HILL 52 and that there were no organised troops to hold our frontline, the 
OC 16
th
 North‟d Fusiliers decided that any further advance of his Battalion would expose 
our line to attack from the direction of Hill 52 and that, moreover, both his own flanks 
would be exposed as he advanced”.687 IR94’s postwar historian, writing of Scully‟s 
forlorn progress, remarked: “At 5:00 p.m. [German time] the English attacked again in 
many waves in an attempt to capture the area on the right flank. A timely response with 
rifle and machine-gun fire prevented this”.688 The new position, a shallow bight of 
ground 300 yards from the original start line with both flanks refused, was rapidly 
consolidated in the growing darkness.  
 
Plate 5.1 Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Scully 
(Source: Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
 (Service) Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers)  
                                                 
687
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part IV, Narrative Dealing with the Retirement of the 97th 
Infantry Brigade‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary, p. 17.  
688
 Alexander von Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 
im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag von Klasing & Co., 1921), p. 238.  
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 2
nd
 KOYLI, having been previously forced back to its jumping-off line at 3:30 
p.m., did not experience any further attacks after 4:15 p.m.
689
 The Germans, satisfied 
with regaining the Vorfeldzonelinie below Hill 52, focused their efforts on strengthening 
shell hole posts and sections of trenchline. 17
th
 HLI, still stalled in front of Vat Cottages, 
failed to maintain any of the small gains made beneath the dominant strongpoint:  
It was obvious that a hostile counter-attack might be 
expected and this took place about 4 p.m. on the afternoon 
of the 2
nd
, preceded by an intense artillery barrage. What 
exactly happened is not very definite, but it is clear that the 
line [came] under the enemy barrage, and owing to 
difficulties of communication and the heavy casualties 
amongst officers and NCOs, was found farther back toward 
our original position. It appears that, following the barrage, 
the enemy attacked with one battalion, which considerably 
cut-up by our counter-fire, came within a certain distance 
of our positions and then broke and retired. The attack and 
counter-attack, therefore, though not exactly a failure, had 
on account of unexpected difficulties, only partially 
succeeded”.690  
 
17
th
 HLI‟s return to the jumping-off line, its postwar historians note, was “almost 
general”, some outposts “still hanging on to the advanced positions on the 3rd”.691 On the 
far left, 15
th
 LF repelled vigorous attacks against a refused right flank extended during the 
late morning to connect with 17
th
 HLI.
692
 Counter-attacks originating north and NW of 
the Battalion‟s line failed, as predicted, to materialise due to impassable ground 
conditions.
693
  
 
                                                 
689
 TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI War Diary.  
690
 TNA: WO/95/2405: 17
th
 HLI War Diary.  
691
 J.W. Arthur & I.S. Munro (eds), The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of 
Commerce Battalion): Record of War Service 1914-1918 (Glasgow: David J. Clark, 1920) p. 69.  
692
 Major-General J.C. Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers in Two Volumes Vol. 1 (Aldershot: 
Gale & Polden, 1949). p. 277.  
693
 See TNA: WO/95/2400: „Notes to Accompany Special Intelligence Maps of the Area V.15 – V.30‟ 
November 1917, 97 Brigade War Diary.   
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 VIII Corps HQ first received notification that something was afoot at 4:20 p.m.: 
“From II Corps. SOS went up on right of II Corps 4:10 p.m.”. 8th Division followed with 
another report ten minutes later: “SOS went up on our front at 4.3 p.m.”.694 II Corps 
telegraphed another message, confirming plans to resume operations during the early 
hours of 3 December, at 4:40 p.m.:  
32
nd
 Division will consolidate the line now held between 
TEALL COT (V.30.b.15.50.) and TOURNANT FARM in 
V.28.b.4.1. aaa The 32
nd
 Division will [,] on the night of 
2/3 December [,] carry out a minor operation with a view to 
capturing VEAL COT. and HILL 52 and improving the 
siting of the line held in the vicinity of these places aaa The 
zero hour for this operation will be settled by the GOC 32
nd
 
Division, but will not be before 3:30 a.m. on the morning of 
3 Dec. aaa as soon as the exact hours is decided [,] the 32
nd
 
Div. will inform II Corps HQ, II Corps HA, and 8
th
, 14
th
 
and 35
th
 div[isions] direct aaa 7 Sqd. RFC will arrange for a 
contact aeroplane to fly over the front in question at 7:30 
a.m. on 3
rd
 Dec. and call for flares [,] and also arrange for 
an aeroplane to be in the air from dawn 3
rd
 Dec. to give 
warning of counter-attacks and to receive messages from 
B[attalio]n HQ.
695
 
  
Three more reports from the CHA (“counter-batteries carried out 4 concentrations and 
intense neutralization throughout the day aaa SOS calls 4.3 and 4:27 p.m. were 
answered”), 33rd Division (“Intermittent shelling of Passchendaele all day aaa Heavy 
shelling of D.15 at 2:30 p.m. aaa Wind NW aaa SOS left of Passchendaele at 4.3 p.m. aaa 
Prisoners total 2”) and II Corps (“32nd Div. report time 3:45 p.m. aaa TEALL COTTAGE 
recaptured with 40 prisoners aaa Line now reported to run TEALL COT. inclusive 
VOCATION and VOX FARMS both inclusive [,] VOID inclusive thence along southern 
edge of MALLET COPSE, south of VAT COTTAGES to about V.23.c.0.2. aaa VAT 
                                                 
694
 BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd December 
1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele Front, 
November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers.  
695
 Ibid and TNA: WO/95/643: „Secret Priority G.520‟, 2 December 1917, II Corps War Diary.  
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COT. held by M.G.s and wired”) followed before news of the German counter-attack was 
received from 8
th
 Division at 5:05 p.m.: “25th Brigade report enemy attacking believed in 
some force aaa Report time 4:20 p.m.”.696 
 
 Major-General Shute, certain that Hill 52, Void Farm and Mallet Copse were in 
British hands, still anticipated the eventual capture of Vat and Veal cottages when an 
SOS signal was reported (4:07 p.m.) from the direction of Mallet Copse.
697
 A telephone 
message to Brigadier-General Tyler (BGRA 32
nd
 Division) followed three minutes later: 
“SOS on 97th Brigade front at MALLET WOOD. They are coming through MALLET 
WOOD. We occupy HILL 52”. This report, its sender obviously unaware of the dire 
circumstances, appears to relate the earlier observed trickling of enemy troops from the 
direction of the inundated weald, so no word of the developing counter-attack reached 
Division HQ during this time. Indeed, the usual reports, orders and queries continued to 
flow as 38
th
 Division’s riposte developed: Captain Knox forwarded further interview 
results (reasonably accurate as it turned out) gathered from wounded survivors at 4:00 
p.m.: “A man of 16th HLI states that his Battalion are holding VOID FARM. A man of 
the Borders states his Battalion is holding VELDT FARM. A man of 17
th
 HLI states his 
Battalion holds approximately the line of 1
st
 objective. A man of 15
th
 Lancs. Fus. states 
they hold final objective. Very few give any idea of time”. Concerns about the timing of 
97 Brigade‟s forthcoming resumption of operations were expressed during another 
                                                 
696
 BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd December 
1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele Front, 
November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers.  
697
 32
nd
 Division‟s DMGO wrote afterward: „At 4-06 p.m. [sic] all [barrage machine-] guns replied to the 
SOS, „fire being opened within 30 seconds‟. See TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action Report: „Appendix „H‟: 
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nd
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telephone call at 4:20 p.m.: “Attack is not to be before 3:30 a.m. – Order from the [II] 
Corps – on account of something else on the right.698 We have got to tell them exact. Will 
you let us know as soon as you know?” Previous anxiety over retention of objectives 
gained was exacerbated by a telegraph message received three minutes later: “Wire timed 
4:23 p.m. From 97
th
 Brigade. SOS 4:23 p.m.”699 
 
 The exchange of messages continued as before, 14 Brigade, making preparations 
to attack through 97 Brigade on the night of 3/4 December, being queried by telephone 
about recent troop movements at 4:30 p.m.: [Div. HQ] “Which of your battalions are 
moving up tonight?” [14 Bde] “2 companies of 15th HLI have moved to Meetcheele at 
request of 97
th
 Bde”. [Div. HQ] “What is this about do you know? Nothing is going 
wrong?” [14 Bde] “Latest report from 97th Brigade is that they are on HILL 52. They 
have also got TEALL COTTAGE and 40 prisoners and they have also VOID FARM. 
That was before the SOS sent up”. A final note from Captain Knox was delivered at 4:49 
p.m.: “A Captain of the 17th HLI states that the situation on the left was as follows at 12 
noon: 15
th
 LF in original front line.
700
 Left Coy. of 17
th
 HLI in original line. Right Coy. 
17
th
 HLI slightly advanced on line approximately of VAT COTTAGES, but he does not 
know situation on right”.701  
 
                                                 
698
 „[S]omething else on the right‟: A possible reference to renewed activity contemplated by 8th Division.  
699
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, p. 25 and „Appendix „J‟, 32nd 
Division: Telephone and Telegraph Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War 
Diary.  
700
 The informant was probably basing his statement on earlier proximity to 15
th
 LF‟s refused right flank.  
701
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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 Lack of any available news following the observed SOS signal led 32
nd
 Division 
HQ, at the GOC 97 Brigade‟s request, to order batteries (engaging enemy movements 
since 3:20 p.m.) to reduce rates of fire: “To CRA. [Brigadier-] General Blacklock thinks 
you should go back to normal rates. You should search all around VALUATION 
HOUSES, etc.”. A telegraph (5:05 p.m.) reporting the SOS signal on 8th Division‟s front 
preceded an inconclusive telephone conversation (copied down at the receiving end 
during real-time transcription) between Major-General Shute and Blacklock at 5:10 p.m.:  
I have just wired to you that the SOS has gone up on the 8
th
 
Division front. You have heard from the wounded that 
certain parts of your front have had to give way. You think 
it is the front of the 17
th
 HLI. Have you heard anything 
about the Borders? What time did this [counter-] attack 
take place? You have stopped firing on SOS lines: fairly 
quiet now. A certain amount of machine-gun fire from 
VALUATION HOUSES, artillery fire has died down. Do 
you know what is happening on the right? You have sent 
out patrols to VINDICTIVE CROSSROADS and to 
VIRILE FARM for information to try and find out your 
right and what is going on your front.
702
  
 
Shute later observed: “This information was regarded as unreliable by the 97th Infantry 
Brigade who thought that the attack was on the front of the 17
th
 HLI.” The somewhat 
mollified GOC 32
nd
 Division‟s focus now shifted to where his line joined Brigadier-
General Coffin‟s 25 Brigade. He telephoned (5:19 p.m) 8th Division in order to find out 
whether or not his neighbours were aware of their left battalion‟s (2nd Rifle Brigade) 
situation opposite Northern Redoubt. The GOC 97 Brigade was rung up a second time 
(5:32 p.m.) after a short conversation with Major-General Heneker‟s HQ:  
Shute: The information from the 8
th
 Division is that their 
line runs D.6.b.9.1. – E.1.a.2.8. –  W.25.c.3.1., W.25.c.2.4. 
                                                 
702
 Ibid.  
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– W.25.c.1.9. – V.30.b.7.3. – V.30.b.1.4., which is 
practically TEALL COTTAGE with a post at V.30.b.8.5.
703
  
 
Blacklock: The five commanding officers are now with 
their B[attalio]ns. Officers are trying to find out the 
situation. 16 MGs of 96
th
 Bde are at VIRILE FARM: 8 of 
them are going to be employed for the close defence of the 
line.
704
 [I am going] to get in touch with Colonel Scully. 
 
Shute: He has got on to HILL 52 hasn‟t he? Have you 
found any of the KOYLI yet? 
 
Blacklock:  Not any more yet.  
Shute: When do you think we will get news of what did 
happen?  
 
Blacklock‟s response is not recorded. 8th Division telephoned confirmation of the 
German counter-attack on their front at 5:50 p.m.: “25th Brigade report enemy attacking, 
believed in some force. Report timed 4:20 p.m.”.705  
 
 8
th
 Division HQ telegraphed a report detailing what was known of the general 
situation on its front: “Hostile artillery fairly quiet till 11:40 a.m. then heavy barrage 
round KOREK – GRAVENSTAFEL area. SOS went up at 4:10 p.m. Situation now 
reported quieter. Prisoners captured now 3 officers and 52 ORs”.706 Twenty-five minutes 
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 The original report, received by VIII Corps HQ at 5:35 p.m., began: „SOUTHERN REDOUBT now 
reported held by enemy…‟ See BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on 
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nd
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would pass before Major-General Shute received another telephone report (6:15 p.m.) 
from 97 Brigade:  
Situation as follows: When [counter-] attack started 
Colonel Scully sent two platoons to HILL 52, where he had 
already one company.
707
 He is up there now, no reports 
received from him, but I think it is fairly alright there. [He 
sent] 2 more platoons to the Borders, who are well forward 
in MALLET COPSE and probably suffered a good deal, 
but wherever they are they are probably very thin. 17
th
 HLI 
men doubtful part of the line. I have not been able to get 
any news of them. It seems that there line may be 
anywhere. The 15
th
 [LF] on the left report their left 
company is on objective and possibly their other two 
companies are there. It is possible that the people on their 
right [17
th
 HLI] brought them back. Otherwise all clear.  
 
Major Scott 16
th
 HLI and McLellan 2
nd
 in command, have 
been wounded, which only leaves the Adjutant with the 
Battalion. All battalions have suffered heavy casualties in 
officers. The General [Blacklock] thinks this operation 
would be very difficult to carry out, as he has not got 
officers to collect the men. With the help of his MGs he can 
take on holding the line, but might like an extra two 
companies sent to him in case he wants them on the left. He 
won‟t ask for them unless he cannot possibly help it. Left 
company of 15
th
 [LF] has two machine-guns with it. Major 
Scott, who was taking orders to Col. Scully from him has 
been wounded. TM Battery commander killed. Genl. 
Blacklock will push out where he can but cannot take on 
minor operation.
708
 
 
The situation was more serious than this report made out: Hill 52 had been lost before 
dawn; 16
th
 HLI held on to an exposed salient around Void Farm; remnants of 11
th
 Border 
Regiment and 17
th
 HLI were, except for a few outposts, back on their original jumping-
off line. 15
th
 LF successfully secured its entire objective, but had to extend a refused right 
flank to 17
th
 HLI, while 16
th
 NF‟s afternoon advance came nowhere near Hill 52 and 
                                                 
707
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708
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
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Mallet Copse. 97 Brigade HQ‟s ignorance over the true state of affairs is explicable when 
one considers the often fragmentary and contradictory nature of reports coming in. 
Brigadier-General Blacklock, nevertheless, now recognised his shattered battalions could 
do no more; the proposed pre-dawn minor operation to secure what remained of the red 
line objective was beyond their capabilities.   
 
 32
nd
 Division HQ received a slightly reassuring telegraph from 14 Brigade at 6:30 
p.m.: “15th HLI reports 5:50 p.m. Situation apparently normal. The 2 companies have not 
been sent to MEETCHEELE. Apparently calm all along the front”. 8th Division followed 
with a telegraph reiterating previously confirmed (by telephone at 5:19 p.m.) map 
reference coordinates of 25 Brigade‟s current line.709 Hill 52, overlooking the Paddebeek 
valley south of Vat Cottage Ridge, remained the key feature north of Passchendaele. The 
tactically important hillock and its environs, so Brigadier-General Blacklock believed, 
had been retained despite the recent German counter-attack. Subsequent post-dusk 
discussion between 32
nd
 Division and 97 Brigade HQs took place under this 
misconception:  
6:55 p.m. Verbal. [Div. HQ] To 97
th
 Bde. 97
th
 Brigade will 
establish itself tonight on the line TEALL COTTAGE 
(inclusive) HILL 52 (inclusive) VOID FARM (inclusive) 
MALLET COPSE – VEAL COTTAGES (inclusive) – 
V.23.c.2.4. This line to be strongly consolidated. Battalions 
and companies to be re-organised. Guides to learn position 
of their units so as to be able to lead up reliefs tomorrow 
night. Two companies cannot be placed at your 
[Blacklock‟s] disposal in view of tomorrow‟s relief. If you 
require more troops you should keep KOYLI in reserve 
behind the left about TOURNANT FARM. Machine-guns 
                                                 
709
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to be moved up to defensive positions in the line indicated. 
Corps has been informed that 3:30 a.m. is the time the 
VEAL COTTAGE thing will be done. The General 
[Blacklock] has had that? 
 
97 Bde: Genl. Blacklock spoke to Major Turner 
[unidentified] about it. 
 
Blacklock, armed with new information concerning the state of his Brigade and clearly 
apprehensive about security of the line, took up the receiver and, with a characteristic 
directness, spelled-out the unpleasant operational particulars (the first part copied down at 
the receiving end during transcription) to his superiors:  
Div. HQ: Genl. Blacklock speaking now: You are afraid of 
the responsibility of the line: You are very weak on your 
left and very disorganised. Major Scott [CO 16
th
 HLI] and 
other Colonel
710
 who were running the show have been 
knocked out. Borders back in our frontline. Do you mean to 
say you are back on your frontline everywhere? I never 
heard that before.  
 
Blacklock: They [Germans] came right through down to 
our old frontline. VOID FARM has gone back to 
VOCATION [FARM].
711
  
 
Div. HQ: Is the Boche in our frontline? 
 
Blacklock: He is back in his forward zone in the areas of 
No.3 [11
th
 Border Regiment] and No. 4 [17
th
 HLI] 
battalions.  
 
Div. HQ: Are we behind our old frontline do you know? 
You cannot get on to the old [red line] objective. Are you 
sure you have any line of defence at all now?
712
  
 
                                                 
710
 Consulted war diaries and regimental histories shed no light on the identity of the „other Colonel‟ 
referred to.  
711
 16
th
 HLI, contrary to Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s belief that a withdrawal to Vocation Farm had 
occurred, still maintained posts around Void Farm after dusk.  
712
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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Major-General Shute, finally acquiescing to Blacklock‟s on-the-spot estimation, 
concluded it was “impracticable to resume the offensive with the 97th Infantry Brigade”. 
A rash scheme to carry on with Brigadier-General Lumsden‟s 14 Brigade was pondered 
shortly afterward: “The question of moving the 14th Infantry Brigade forward at once and 
attacking with them through 97
th
 Infantry Brigade was considered, but this course was 
rejected, as it was considered that the assembly of the Brigade and the delivery of an 
attack in the dark without adequate reconnaissance was an operation not offering the 
necessary chances of success”.713  
 
 Major-General Shute telephoned II Corps at 7:08 p.m.; nothing else remained but 
to inform his superiors about the retirement:  
I have bad news for you. We were counter-attacked and 
except for holding HILL 52, where we have got a couple 
companies, we are back on our frontline. I had sent out my 
orders when I had got this news through, but I‟m afraid it is 
no good trying to carry out your orders.
714
 I do not think we 
can do anything until tomorrow. I think we can do it then 
with another brigade on the line where we started from 
except on HILL 52. The Bosche is very close up to our old 
line. If I had known this earlier, I would have relieved 
tonight. I do not think we are at VOX [FARM].
715
 This is 
the first news I have had: I presume it was that SOS. What I 
can do tonight is to push that line forward a little if I can.
716
  
 
The doleful situation, Shute was fairly certain, could be turned around by another effort 
the following night: “The Divisional commander, therefore, decided to attack with 14th 
Infantry Brigade and two battalions of the 96
th
 Infantry Brigade on the night December 
                                                 
713
 Ibid: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, p. 14.  
714
 Telegraphed by II Corps at 4:40 p.m. See above.  
715
 Vox Farm remained in British hands.  
716
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
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3/4". Orders “indicating the situation which had arisen on the front of 97th Infantry 
Brigade and the operation to be undertaken” were subsequently issued to Brigadier-
General Lumsden, who was asked to “submit his plans at once…”717  
 
Hours had passed since the start of the German counter-attack. Earlier reports, 
based on sketchy information and erroneous conclusions, concerning the extent and 
consequences of the recently reported withdrawal resulted in a heated telephone 
exchange (7:20 p.m.) between Major-General Shute and Brigadier-General Blacklock: 
Shute: Why did you not report that you had been biffed 
back by that counter-attack? No message came through to 
us. No. It was not reported to Col[onel] MacNamara [sic]
718
 
nor to me. Are you in TEALL COTTAGE? Are you 
holding HILL 52? Is it to be understood that you have not 
got VOX FARM? On the left are you beaten back behind 
our old frontline? On their old frontline. What attacked you 
and at what time? Why did they have to come back then? 
Had you no MGs or Lewis Guns or Stokes Mortars? Well 
why didn‟t they fire?719  
 
Blacklock‟s replies to this relentless cross-examination are not recorded in the surviving 
transcripts, but it is easy, given the heavy casualties, ensuing disorganisation and how 
much still remained unknown in the chaotic aftermath of the German counter-thrust, to 
commiserate with the censured Brigadier.
720
 Shute, his ire aroused by what appeared to 
be an avoidable setback and (taking into account the local dominance of enemy machine-
                                                 
717
 Ibid: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, p. 14.  
718
 Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. McNamara (GSO 1).  
719
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. 
720
 „The ramifications of casualties are great. Strength, equipment and leaders are lost. Apart from its 
physical impact, [hostile] fire contributes to the dispersion and dislocation of surviving troops. In concert 
with terrain, reduced visibilty and noise it creates a chaotic environment‟. See Roger Noble, „Raising the 
White Flag: The Surrender of Australian Soldiers on the Western Front‟, Revue Internationale d’Histoire 
Militaire, No. 72-1990, p. 57.  
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guns) wanting to husband 14 Brigade for the next effort, then informed Blacklock of his 
intention to keep the worn-out 97 Brigade in the line for two more nights: 
Well then, the only possible way of facing the situation is 
that you have to improve your position as you can during 
the night. It is impossible to relieve you and it is impossible 
to reinforce you. You are practically right back into your 
old line. That‟s what it comes to. There is nothing more to 
say except that you must hold on to what you have got. 
They [battalions] had evidently not consolidated their line, 
MGs were not in position and Stokes mortars were not 
firing and, of course, as a result they simply came straight 
back as soon as they were attacked. The only thing to do is 
improve your line and get it thoroughly organised. You are 
to try and get VAT COTTAGES if you can and Lumsden 
will have to make the same attack tomorrow.  
 
The discussion concluded with a query as to where the GOC 97 Brigade would like his 
SOS lines placed. Shute closed with a terse statement of expectations: “You will have to 
hold your line throughout tomorrow and I will order Lumsden to attack through you 
tomorrow night”.721 
 
 On 25 Brigade‟s front, efforts to form a “continuous and connected” line 
proceeded after dusk (Map 13). Moonrise was at 7:28 p.m., so several hours of darkness 
remained to organise and improve positions just opposite Venison trench and the 
redoubts.
722
 Brigadier-General Coffin, “Knowing that his line was but thinly held, owing 
to casualties which had been sustained, decided to order the 3 remaining companies of 
                                                 
721
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Appendix „J‟, 32nd Division: Telephone and Telegraph 
Messages 2 December 1917‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary. A subsequent complaint about 
perceived failure of 14 Brigade‟s Stokes mortars to deploy near Tournant Farm (see Chapter 2 pp. 125-26) 
was made by the CO 15
th
 LF. Brigadier-General Lumsden replied that the battery was in place by zero + 2 
hours, the officer in charge testifying that he reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Utterson at 4:30 a.m. Major-
General Shute, based on Lumsden‟s response, rejected Utterson‟s claim. See IWM 4723: „32nd Div. 
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General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2) and Appendix 8.   
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 Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, p. 167 and TNA: WO/157/288: „Calendar for December 1917: 
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the 2
nd
 West Yorkshire Regt. to move up to BELLEVUE.
723
 At the same time, the 41
st
 
Infantry Brigade [14
th
 Division] were informed of the situation and warned to be ready to 
reinforce if required”. These precautions, implemented during the German counter-attack, 
turned out to be unnecessary: “At 5 p.m. the enemy‟s barrage began to die down … 
Information was also received that our line was intact and at 5:20 p.m. a message was 
sent informing the 2
nd
 West Yorkshire Regt. that the 3 companies were not now 
required”.724  
 
Sporadic flare-ups continued as the enemy, alarmed by the close proximity of the 
new British frontline to the Vorfeldzonelinie, engaged any signs of activity with rifle and 
machine-gun fire: “Heavy fighting started again at 5:00 pm. [German time]. It was 
especially severe for 12
th
 Company. By sheer luck this unit had been issued new hand 
grenades and was thus well equipped to resist. Arrival of darkness also assisted the 
beleaguered men”.725 25 Brigade‟s situation remained, despite enemy efforts, relatively 
secure following the attempted counter-attack. Battalion commanders, anticipating the 
promised relief by 41 Brigade (7
th
 King‟s Royal Rifle Corps, 8th King‟s Royal Rifle 
Corps [KRRC], 7
th
 Rifle Brigade, 8
th
 Rifle Brigade) eagerly awaited the appearance of 
advanced parties from the incoming battalions.
726
 Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling recalled: 
“All guides for the relief who tried to reach Bn. HQ up to date having been [sic] 
casualties, I sent down Lieutenant Burne (Signal Officer) with guides from HQ details at 
                                                 
723
 The fourth company of 2
nd
 West Yorkshire (23 Brigade) had previously (night of 1 December) been 
dispatched to 25 Brigade reserve to replace a company –  kept forward following heavy losses from 
shellfire by 2
nd
 Lincolnshire‟s incoming „C‟ Company –  of 1st RIR. See Chapter 3, p 157.  
724
 TNA: WO/95/1727: „Report on Operations‟, 7 December 1917, 25 Brigade War Diary.  
725
 Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich 
Hessisches) Nr. 117, p. 196.  
726
 See TNA: WO/95/1677: „8th Division Instructions No. 2‟, 25 November 1917, 8th  Division War Diary.  
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about 6:45 p.m. to meet incoming unit, at the same time collecting more guides from 
coys. [to] take the 8
th
 Bn. KRRC forward from Bn. HQ”. 2nd Lieutenant Upton had not 
reported in yet, but it was hoped he would be able to extricate his small party from 
Venison Trench before 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire‟s relief was complete.727  
 
At Volgeltje Chateau, Brigadier-General Aspinall (BGGS VIII Corps), still 
awaiting word about the general situation after nightfall, received two telegraphed 
situation reports from 8
th
 Division at 5:55 and 6:40 p.m respectively: “Following from 
25
th
 Infantry Brigade. Timed 5:10 p.m. aaa Situation appears to be quietening down aaa 
Another wire timed 5:35 p.m. reads aaa Situation quiet but still obscure”; “Reference 
Corps Commander‟s enquiry: Heavy MG fire, which opened at Zero in bright moonlight 
appear [sic] to be cause of failure left battalion”. Another telegraph, this time from II 
Corps reported, “No change in the situation in Goudberg sector”. Relative peace, readily 
discerned by a measurable decline in artillery and small arms fire, seemed to reign on 8
th
 
Division‟s front when the neighbouring 33rd Division telegraphed, “Front now reported 
quiet” at 7:00 p.m.728 Additional confirmation of what was already known at 32nd 
Division HQ was telegraphed by its supporting gunners twenty minutes later: “No. 2 
FOO Group reports situation approximately back in old frontline from VIRILE FARM to 
V.29.a.5.3. Situation on the left [vicinity of Hill 52] not clear. Front quiet. Timed 7 
p.m.”729  
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 TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary.   
728
 BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 2nd December 
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Advanced companies of Brigadier-General P.C.B. Skinner‟s 41 Brigade “reached 
WATERLOO about 8:30 p.m.” and the expected relief of 25 Brigade “was carried out by 
small parties and was completed without any great difficulty…”730 On the right, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, overseeing the relief of 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire, recorded in his 
after-action report: “At about 9 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. 2nd L[ieutenan]t Upton reported with his 
party at Bn. HQ having succeeded in extricating himself. I sent him forward to a position 
[gap between 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire and 2
nd
 Lincolnshire] where he later reported himself 
to be”. Upton and his men, gaunt, muddy and bloodstained, had held on to their short 
section of Venison Trench for almost twenty hours. Heavy losses amongst officers and 
men left Stirling with no choice but to order them back to help constitute a “continuous 
and connected line” until the arrival of 8th KRRC. “The relief occurred without further 
incident”.731 In the centre, 2nd Lincolnshire was able, like 2nd Royal Berkshire, to 
disengage unmolested. Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin subsequently wrote: “Two companies of 
8
th
 R[ifle] B[rigade] relieved the Battalion that night. One company taking over the 
advanced outpost line, the other company relieving my reserve coy. The relief was 
complete between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m.” 732 On the left, posts occupied by elements of 2nd 
Rifle Brigade were also taken over by 8
th
 Rifle Brigade. “Relief was carried out 
individually by small bodies of men and few casualties were sustained”. 1st RIR, in 
                                                 
730
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/2nd December 1917‟, 
13 December 1917, 8
th
 Division War Diary. Relieving troops of 41 Brigade remained under Major-General 
Heneker‟s command until 12:00 p.m. on 3 December. See TNA: WO/95/1873: „VIII Corps G. 2236‟, 29 
November 1917, 14
th
 Division War Diary.  
731
 TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary and Boraston & 
Bax, The Eighth Division, pp. 166-67.    
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 TNA: WO/95/1730: „Report on Action of Battn from 2:30 p.m. 1.12.17 – M.N. 2/3 .12. 17‟, 2nd  
Lincolnshire War Diary. 
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immediate support since the night of 1/2 December, remained in position until replaced 
by an incoming battalion of 41 Brigade.
 733
  
 
Major-General Shute‟s determination to resume the attack on the night of 3/4 
December was almost certainly influenced by the mistaken belief that Hill 52, 
notwithstanding reported reverses on the right and left, was still held by “a couple of 
companies”. Retention of its tactically valuable false crest and NE slope would, it 
appeared, further facilitate another attempt to gain Vat Cottage Ridge. A telephone call 
(7:55 p.m.) to 14 Brigade HQ revealed, regardless of prevailing uncertainties, the GOC 
32
nd
 Division‟s intent:  
Shute: You have just heard the news [retirement of 97 
Brigade]. We have just heard it also. Yes. It will be another 
scheme and it will be more troops. Yes. It is the whole 
thing over again. That is how it stands at the moment. We 
have only just got this news, so it is rather hard to answer 
now. You know the orders for the battalion [15
th
 HLI] at 
BELLEVUE occupying MEETCHEELE – 
MOSSELMARKT Spur.
734
 Well it is to be ready and alert 
as the whole of that front is pretty rocky. You will have two 
battalions up there tonight.
735
 
 
Meanwhile, in response to Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s request, “artillery and 
machine-guns were ordered to bring SOS lines back to cover the positions now held by 
97
th
 Infantry Brigade”. Re-organisation and reliefs duly commenced in close proximity to 
the enemy, while Brigadier-General Lumsden and his staff, still situated at Kansas Cross, 
                                                 
733
 TNA: WO/95/1731: „Report of the part played by the 2nd Battn. The Rifle Brigade in the Operations at 
Passchendaele‟, 6 December 1917, 2nd Rifle Brigade War Diary and James W. Taylor, The 1st Royal Irish 
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drew up plans for the proposed operation. Shute and his GSO 1 Lieutenant-Colonel 
MacNamara simultaneously prepared their own yet to be sanctioned proposal for the 
continuance of operations. Preparations to resume the attack on the following night 
would, nonetheless, progress in anticipation of the hoped for assent from II Corps.
736
  
 
 Erratic machine-gun and rifle fire exchanges erupted under the momentary glow 
of descending flares as inter-battalion reliefs and adjustments were carried out along 97 
Brigade‟s indiscriminate frontline.737 Ration carrying parties for units tasked to remain in 
that line, well underway before the onset of darkness, were overseen by dedicated 
transport officers and quartermaster sergeants [QMS]: “Up the long, perilously exposed 
tracks hot meals were carried: the fatigue of the carry alone was enough for normal men”. 
The hazards of negotiating winding, broken duckboard paths leading to and from the 
forward zone were further demonstrated by the fate of those directly responsible for 
delivering rations to 16
th
 NF: “Tragedy hovered over the trip. On the night of 2nd 
December, Second-Lieutenant Collings, the Transport Officer, accompanied by QMS 
Hood, reached Battalion HQ [at Virile Farm] in fulfilment of their duty. They left, were 
guided on to the track, but were never seen again”.738 Men were withdrawn and 
reorganised as far as possible into their respective units during the hours after sundown. 
No amount of re-organisation and adjustment could make up for the severe losses 
sustained by 2
nd
 KOYLI; surviving elements were withdrawn, their place between Teall 
Cottage and Hill 52 taken over by the previously dispatched companies of 16
th
 NF, to 
                                                 
736
 Ibid: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, pp. 14-15.  
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 See Appendix 11 for ‟97 Brigade Order No. 182‟ issued at 9:30 pm on 2 December.  
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 Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
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2
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Irish Farm before dawn on the 3
rd
.
739
 16
th
 HLI still resolutely clung to the salient about 
Void Farm. Its injured commander (Major Scott), seriously wounded by an enemy shell, 
“reported at Brigade HQ and command of the Battalion was transferred to OC 16th 
Northumberland Fusiliers…”740 Lieutenant-Colonel Scully‟s responsibilities were now 
two-fold: Take both battalions (16
th
 HLI and 16
th
 NF) in hand to consolidate any 
territorial gains before sunrise.
741
 Remnants of 11
th
 Border Regiment, now reformed on 
the jumping-off line, fortified positions from the left of Virile Farm to the boundary with 
17
th
 HLI. On the left and far left, 17
th
 HLI, uncertain of the location of advanced posts 
still holding out beyond the old frontline, and 15
th
 LF, “dug in and consolidated on its 
objective”, laboured throughout the night to preserve a connected line.742 Sir Henry 
Rawlinson expressed dismay about the unsatisfactory operational outcome in his diary 
that evening:  
The 32 and 8 Div[isions] attacked at 1:55 AM this morning 
with limited objectives and though they won some ground 
[,] they did not get very far forward – In the afternoon at 
4:15 PM [,] the Bosch put in a strong counter-attack and 
drove us back to our original line [,] which is very 
disappointing – We cannot [,] I fear [,] continue the 
offensive [,] as we have no fresh div[isions] and 
reinforcements are coming in but [unintelligible] so I have 
told corps to consolidate the line they are now on with a 
view of making it quite secure against attack.
743
  
 
Sir Douglas Haig prematurely remarked – based on early reports – that the night 
operation appeared to be a conditional success: “Second Army carried out an operation 
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 TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
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 TNA: WO/95/2404: 16
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on north end of the Passchendaele ridge in the moonlight on a front of about 4000 yards 
[sic] by the 8
th
 and 32
nd
 divisions. The object was to obtain certain points, which gave the 
enemy observation westwards onto our communications. All were captured except one 
and our troops are now within a hundred yards of it”.744 Major-General Shute‟s request to 
resume the attack on the night of 3/4 December had been passed on to II Corps HQ, 
which in turn asked Second Army for sanction. The final decision was out of 
Rawlinson‟s hands. It was now up to Haig, no doubt made aware of the actual situation 
by the morning of the 3
rd
, to determine whether or not further efforts and consequent 
losses would be worth any sort of tangible attainment of objectives.  
 
 
5.2 Aftermath 
 
Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston motored to Lieutenant-General Jacob‟s (GOC II 
Corps) HQ at Lovie Chateau on the morning of 2 December. Lunch with Major-General 
Heneker in his Canal Bank dugout followed during the early afternoon. The GOC VIII 
Corps then returned to Lovie Chateau for a conference with Sir Henry Rawlinson at 3:00 
p.m. Meanwhile, mixed reports, received by VIII Corps HQ between 2:35 a.m. and 4:00 
p.m., told of hold ups at some points and objectives gained at others. “The situation 
remained obscure until 4:30 p.m. at which hour reports had been received that the SOS 
had been sent up on the entire front of the attack, and, shortly afterwards, a report was 
received from II Corps that they had re-captured TEALL COTTAGE with 40 prisoners at 
3:45 p.m. but that VAT COTTAGES were held by the enemy with machine-guns”. 8th 
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Division HQ telephoned the latest map coordinates of 25 Brigade‟s frontline, along with 
intelligence confirming the enemy had recaptured Southern Redoubt, at 5:30 p.m. 
Another report, telegraphed by II Corps at 7:45 p.m., divulged the regrettable news that 
97 Brigade had been driven back to the jumping-off line, “with the possible exception of 
two companies holding the near lip of HILL 52, and some little ground on the extreme 
left”. At 8:30 p.m. II Corps reported “the enemy had delivered a heavy counter-attack 
against the left and centre [of 32
nd
 Division], which had succeeded in driving the 
attacking troops back to the original frontline. It was, however, thought that TEALL 
COTTAGE and HILL 52 were in our hands and the ground had been gained on the left of 
the attack”. Heneker, never hesitant about expressing a viewpoint to superiors, had 
already passed on Brigadier-General Coffin‟s morning pronouncement that “Northern 
Redoubt could only be attacked in conjunction with an attack on TEALL COTTAGE and 
HILL 52”. Available documentary evidence fails to confirm whether or not VIII Corps, 
now that both neighbouring objectives were reported captured, contemplated or 
approached Second Army about renewing operations with fresh troops the following 
night. Such a proposal, if put forward, was probably dependant on authorization for 
Major-General Shute‟s earlier attack recommendation.745 
 
 
 The disastrous operational outcome, predicted by Major-General Heneker during 
the course of planning discussions in mid-November, led to a thinly veiled recrimination 
in the guise of a verbal report: “In the evening, following on a telephone conversation 
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with the Corps Commander, [the] GOC 8
th
 Division reported he considered that heavy 
machine-gun fire, which opened at zero hour, in bright moonlight, had hindered the 
advance on his left flank”.746  Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston, who had backed 
Major-General Shute‟s controversial attack scheme, could hardly have failed to miss his 
subordinate‟s point. Heneker‟s subsequent diary entry reveals outrage and disgust over 
the perceived waste and futility: “Attacked at 1:55 a.m. 32nd Division got nowhere and 
are back on original frontline owing to heavy casualties from M.G. fire. I took a bit of 
ground but not all my objectives. Just as I said. Damnable operation. Lost 600 officers 
and men and did little. Tillett, commanding 2
nd
 Devons, mortally wounded.
747
 Brand, 2
nd
 
Rifle Brigade, badly wounded but I hope he will recover”.748  
 
 II Corps HQ reported the situation of the current frontline, based on information 
received up to 10:00 p.m., as “still obscure but it is probable we still hold the line from 
HILL 52 to TEALL COTT [AGE] inclusive”.749 Further information dispatched from the 
forward zone or, weather permitting, resulting from the early morning flyover by the 
designated contact aircraft from No. 7 Squadron, was expected to clear up indefinite 
aspects of earlier reports. Major Nosworthy (GSO Intelligence) advised those authorised 
to review his evening summaries that a “map would be issued with tomorrow‟s summary 
showing our new frontline and the dispositions of the enemy‟s troops opposed to us”. A 
recently acquired German map, he added, “captured by the [VIII] Corps on our right 
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shows the positions of various headquarters of the division in reserve to the 
WESTROOSEBEKE – PASSCHENDAELE sector and the actual and proposed positions 
of readiness of the battalions. Copies of this map will be issued to all concerned”.750  
 
 41
 
Brigade completed its relief of 25 Brigade by 2:40 a.m. on 3 December.  
Casualties were reported to be “slight”, even though popular Major and acting 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Maxwell (CO 8
th
 KRRC) was mortally wounded while making 
his way up the Gravenstafel – Bellevue Road.751 On 97 Brigade‟s front, Lieutenant-
Colonel Scully, uneasy about the vulnerable salient around Void Farm, ordered 16
th
 HLI 
to retire before sunrise: “Next morning at 5 o‟clock the survivors of 16th HLI were 
ordered to withdraw from their isolated posts at Void Farm and, under Captain A. Fraser, 
came into the line with the other divisional units. Although sorely beset, they had obeyed 
orders and clung to their shell holes for 28 hours”. Exhausted survivors took their place 
on the original jumping-off line by 6:00 a.m.
752
 Some, cut-off or too far forward, were 
unable to make their way back before daylight. Twenty-year-old 40717 Private William 
Gilmour of „C‟ Company found himself, along with several companions, unable to fall 
back from the shelter of their shell hole outpost.  The coming of dawn and rifles made 
useless by glutinous mud left no alternative but surrender to cautiously advancing 
German infantry. Gilmour and the others were quickly disarmed and led off under armed 
escort to nearby Roulers.
753
  
                                                 
750
 Ibid.  
751
 12 ORs of 7
th
 Rifle Brigade, 8
th
 Rifle Brigade and 8
th
 KRRC were killed during the relief. 36-year-old 
Major John Maxwell MC DOW on 4 December. He is buried in Ypres Reservoir Cemetery. See Geoff‟s 
CWGC 1914-21 Search Engine <http://www.hut-six.co.uk/cgi-bin/search14-21.php>  
752
 TNA: WO/95/2404: 16
th
 HLI War Diary and Chalmers (ed), A Saga of Scotland, p. 111.   
753
 The Red Cross subsequently informed Pte. Gilmour‟s parents –  the latter having first received word 
their only son was „missing presumed killed‟ –  that he had been made prisoner. William Gilmour spent the 
Chapter 5 
 317 
 
Plate 5.2 Private W. Gilmour 
(Source: Dr George Gilmour) 
 
 Monday 3 December: The sun rose at 7:29 a.m. to impart a clear, cold day with 
strong winds.
754
 Anxiety for the frontline opposite Venison Trench diminished – 
“Intermittent shelling of Passchendaele and surrounding areas” was reported by 33rd 
Division, while 8
th
 Division noted “situation quiet” – as the hours before dawn passed 
without serious disturbance in VIII Corps‟ sector.755 II Corps HQ, still in the dark about 
97 Brigade‟s frontline, reported: “Situation quiet on left [35th] divisional sector aaa 
Report from right [32
nd] Division sector is not yet received” at 5:50 a.m.756 Previously 
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grounded contact aircraft were skyward not long after first light: “High wind interfered 
with work, though contact patrols and a certain amount of artillery and photographic 
work was carried out” by corps squadrons. “Vertical photographs over the enemy area 
were unsuccessful…” 757 Reports that Hill 52 and Teall Cottage remained in enemy 
hands were confirmed by II Corps sometime before 10:00 a.m.: “Line runs from point 
150 yards south of Teall Cot[tage] along original frontline to VOX FARM inclusive”.758 
The crew of the low-flying RE 8 contact aircraft from No. 21 Squadron, discharging a 
fuselage-mounted Klaxon Horn while sweeping over Venison Trench and its redoubts at 
9:40 a.m., observed a pell-mell collection of outposts close up or inside the 
Hauptwiderstandslinie:  
Contact plane reports our troops seen in whole of Southern 
Redoubt in W.25.c. and in trench connecting same to 
Northern Redoubt in V.30.b. aaa Our troops also located in 
southern portion of Northern Redoubt and in a newly dug 
post [at] V.30.b.55.55. aaa Northern portion of Northern 
Redoubt contains several bombing blocks and all of this 
portion appears to be occupied by Germans aaa Observer 
has no doubt as to corrections of his observations. Colours 
of uniform were clearly distinguishable aaa There was no 
khaki visible in the northern portion of Northern Redoubt 
and no field grey in line occupied by British aaa Inference 
therefore is that all troops seen were alive but they lighted 
no flares and made no signs to aeroplane.
759
  
 
Failure to discern lit flares or manipulated Watson Fans combined with high speeds; 
hostile ground fire and consequent fleeting opportunities for direct observation made 
accurate assessments difficult even at low altitudes. Southern Redoubt had been 
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recaptured by IR116 during the late morning of 2 December, so it must be surmised that 
any observed khaki clad only the dead and wounded left behind in its environs. Infantry 
outside the redoubt, reluctant to expose new positions to the enemy, shrank from making 
their presence known to designate contact aircraft.
760
 Who actually held the bastion did 
not become known with certainty until the morning of 4 December.
761
  
 
 
Plate 5.3 RE 8 of No. 21 Squadron 
(Source: Air of Authority <http.rafweb.org/Sqn021-25.htm>) 
 
 
 Projected manpower shortages, coupled with the slim possibility of any 
favourable outcome, gave GHQ pause when considering Major-General Shute‟s request 
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to resume operations. Brigadier-General Davidson (DMO GHQ) conveyed Sir Douglas 
Haig‟s final decision to Second Army during a brief morning telephone exchange: 
Sir H. Rawlinson rang up [at] 10:45 a.m. & stated that the 
enemy attacked last night & drove most of our troops back 
to where they had started from on the previous night. Shute 
wanted to resume the attack again tomorrow. I said that the 
C in C wished to economise troops & did not want to get 
involved in anymore unnecessary fighting. Sir HR said he 
would stop anything further being done. It was also his 
opinion – The N[ew] Zealanders are going for Polderhoek 
Chateau today between 12 & 1 pm.
762
  
 
The British Field Marshal‟s choice, primarily influenced by an overriding concern for 
deficits in the BEF‟s potential reinforcement pool, was based on recent disturbing 
developments at home and abroad. The effective distribution of available manpower to 
meet the military and industrial demands of Great Britain‟s war effort had become a 
significant point of civil-military contention by the close of the year. “Indeed in 
December 1917 a manpower crisis was identified, and, for the first time, the War Cabinet 
became actively involved in relating manpower provision to priority areas of the war 
effort”.763 A highly critical public speech on 4 November followed by an equally 
contentious opening address to the recently convened Supreme War Council
764
 on 1 
December, made clear Prime Minister David Lloyd George‟s resolve to husband 
manpower resources whilst diminishing perceived prodigality of British lives on the 
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Western Front.
765
 On 27 November Haig told Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Macready 
(Adjutant-General to the Forces) that by “31 March British infantry units would be 
250,000 men or approximately forty per cent below establishment, unless reinforcements 
were sent to rectify this situation”. Lord Derby (Secretary of State for War) followed his 
lead at a Cabinet meeting on 3 December by demanding to know when the BEF could 
expect substantial reinforcements.
766
 Such appeals, following on a costly and seemingly 
inconclusive Flanders campaign and subsequent Cambrai debacle, would make little 
headway with an increasingly disenchanted War Cabinet. Governmental concerns 
appeared to be further substantiated when, after Derby‟s outburst, Sir Auckland Geddes 
(Director of National Service) “submitted a memorandum which indicated how close the 
nation was to the limit of its manpower”. The “stark reality” behind this report was that 
“future quotas of fit men for military service would necessitate the automatic reduction of 
either the shipbuilding, food-production or munitions programmes”.767 3 December was 
also the date armistice negotiations commenced between the new Bolshevik regime and 
Imperial Germany. That same day, Haig – in recognition of the grand strategic 
implications of a Russian cease-fire – instructed his four Army commanders to prepare 
for the imminent, albeit short-term, loss of the strategic initiative:  
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[T]he general situation on the Russian and Italian fronts, 
combined with the paucity of reinforcements which we are 
likely to receive, will in all probability necessitate our 
adopting a defensive attitude for the next few months. We 
must be prepared to meet a strong and sustained hostile 
offensive. It is therefore of the first importance that Army 
commanders should give their immediate and personal 
attention to the organisation of the zones for defensive 
purposes and to the rest and training of their troops.
768
 
 
 GHQ‟s desire to gain more ground in the vicinity of Passchendaele and Westroosebeke 
would, given prevailing circumstances, have to be put aside while larger issues of 
manpower and strategy were debated in London and Versailles. Shute subsequently 
commented: “The proposal to attack with the 14th Infantry Brigade on the night of 3/4th 
December was submitted to the [II] Corps but was not approved and orders were received 
that no further active operations were to be undertaken”.769 The projected two-battalion 
attack against Polderhoek Chateau by the New Zealand Division would, nevertheless, be 
allowed to proceed. Zero hour was scheduled for 12:00 p.m. on the 3
rd
.  
 
The morning of 3 December, 41
 Brigade‟s diarist noted, was “fairly quiet” in the 
sector opposite Venison Trench. 14
th
 Division‟s GSO 3, on orders from VIII Corps, was 
sent forward to reconnoitre and pinpoint outposts along the recently occupied frontline: 
“Owing to lack of guides he did not go beyond Battalion HQ, and obtained dispositions 
as far as could be ascertained from the Battalion intelligence officer of the 8
th
 Rifle 
Brigade”. It would be several days before the general course of the outpost line was 
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plotted out.
770
 32
nd
 Division‟s diarist recorded more activity in the sector opposite Hill 52 
and Vat Cottage Ridge: “Enemy artillery fairly active on roads and tracks throughout the 
day. His snipers were active particularly near Vat Cottages”. Fire by the latter eventually 
subsided as attempts to retrieve casualties were observed:  
Many wounded were lying out, suffering the most 
appalling rigours of war and the Battalion stretcher-bearers 
displayed great devotion to duty in ignoring the heavy fire 
while bringing them to comparative shelter. The work at 
first was extremely dangerous, but later on in the day a lull 
occurred when it was possible to carry on this labour of 
mercy under less trying conditions. And it must be 
recorded, as far as this battle is concerned, that from this 
point onward the German reversed his frequent policy and 
shewed respect for the Red Cross flag, only one instance of 
sniping taking place when one of the Battalion stretcher-
bearers was shot dead while bending over a wounded 
comrade. Enemy stretcher-bearers were also at work and in 
some instances they reciprocated attentions given to their 
wounded by dressing and carrying our casualties. In this 
way all the wounded were got in before the [97] Brigade 
was relieved that night.
771
  
 
The Reverend R.E. Grice-Hutchison (Chaplain to 32
nd
 Division‟s attached 161 Field 
Artillery Brigade) first heard news of “a fairly extensive attack which our infantry made 
last night from Passchendaele” on 2 December following the usual Sunday services. 
Word of 2
nd
 Lieutenant V.J. Horton‟s (FOO attached to 16th HLI) death was received 
early on the 3
rd
. Grice-Hutchison, distressed by the loss of this officer, resolved to 
retrieve his remains from the forward area: 
I went in the morning to D.161 waggon-lines to see about 
poor Horton. I found he had been killed on liaison with the 
infantry at Bellevue some little way behind the line. 
Buckley and I first went back to CRA, where we 
telephoned through to the place to make sure his body was 
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there before going up. We left about 11:30 with four 
volunteers, and walked the whole way to Bellevue. Never 
have I been through or pictured such a scene of desolation 
– mile after mile of shell holes and wreckage. We found 
poor Horton lying just outside the pillbox where he was 
killed together with another officer and seven men. The 
shell went clean through the door and burst inside. The 
pillbox (there are two) stands on the top of a kind of knoll 
with a fine view in every direction, particularly of 
Westroosebeke and the ridge. We had a very long and 
heavy carry along the duckboards for some four miles to 
Cheddar Villa, where we put him on a light railway which 
runs close to the waggon-lines. What shelling there was 
was always where we had been. So back home.
772
  
 
Across no man‟s land a young German Offizier-Aspirant (candidate for commission) 
attached to IR95 (38
th
 Division) experienced for the first time the same grim conditions 
encountered by the imperturbable Grice-Hutchison. His introduction to the Passchendaele 
– Westroosebeke sector had been a gradual initiation into miserable surroundings: 
On 1
st
 Dec[embe]r we paraded before the Battalion 
Commander (GOFLER) who kept us in the bitter cold for 
an hour to listen to his babbling. In the afternoon we went 
forward. As we knew, we were destined for the most 
contested bit of all FLANDERS, PASSCHENDAELE, a 
peculiar mood ceased hold of us – some of us tipsy from 
the tea-with-alcohol, some full of the fear of death. To 
OOSTNIEUWKERKE, the billet was occupied, and before 
we could bivouac, the order came back to pack up and back 
we went to ROULERS. Here we were put into an out of the 
way farmhouse, the wealthy owner of which had apparently 
left in great haste.  
 
2 December. The next morning we had made ourselves 
quite comfortable. F… came, and we drank and read 
together. Again came orders to “get ready” and a quarter of 
an hour later “corpses” marched off past us. Half an hour 
later we all got orders to go further forward; since then I 
have never seen F… again. To COLLIEROLENHOEK. 
Once more into ruined barns in the bitter cold … En route 
we met wounded of the [25
th
] Division on the left, the 116
th
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and 117
th
, who told us that the English had attacked their 
Rosbautz (?) B[attalio]n, had advanced in some places and 
been driven back with loss in others. In the morning, 
therefore, we were alarmed and shuddered. At 6 o‟clock in 
the evening the barrage began; at 7 we were warned by 
telephone that a counter-attack without artillery preparation 
would be made at 10:32. At 11 p.m. I was called by the 
Coy. Commander and told I must go forward into support 
as advanced party. HEIDENGOED at 8 o‟clock next 
morning. 
 
The long trek to the mined dugouts at Heidengoed Farm (SE of Westroosebeke) began 
just before sunrise on 3
 
December:  
Next day I went forward. I wanted to go by the map but 
N… begged me to go his way. The further we went the 
more miserable it became. Got to HEIDENGOED near 
WESTROOSEBEKE. Quarrelled with the 4
th
 Coy. 
regarding accommodation. The night previous a dugout had 
been hit and 1 officer and 8 men killed. The CSM of the 
coy. in support was filled with horror; his coy. had to 
counter-attack in full daylight. To settle the quarrel, went to 
the KTK. Heard our B[attalio]n is to go into frontline 
tonight. I went in daylight to NORDHOF (VOID FARM). 
12 dead lying there from yesterday and a wounded Tommy. 
I heard from Lieut[enant] X that the 5
th
 Coy. was in front, 
14 men all told, supported by the 3
rd
 B[attalio]n. The 
English had broken in on the front of the 94
th
 and got 
behind the 5
th
 Coy. … they had got to within 50 yards of 
the NORDHOF.
773
 
 
25
th
 Division was able to reinforce and consolidate threatened portions of its 
Hauptwiderstandslinie throughout the night of 2/3 December. IR115, responsible for 
defences opposite Passchendaele, dispatched its reserve battalion to the embattled centre 
where, after bolstering the front battalion of IR116, it “eked out two full days in the 
                                                 
773
 TNA: WO/157/120: „Annexe to Second Army Summary Dated 19th Dec[embe]r 1917: Translation of 
the closing pages of a diary taken from a dead German (probably a warrant officer of the 3
rd
 Coy. 95
th
 Inf. 
Regt., 38
th
 Division) who was shot in V.29.b. in the early morning of the 15
th
 inst.‟, Second Army 
Intelligence Files.  
Chapter 5 
 326 
forward-most lines of the adjacent right sector”.774 Hard-bitten, heavily armed 
Stosstruppen of 25
th
 Sturmabteilung,
775
 appearing in IR117’s advanced positions 
sometime after midnight, immediately went forward and “cleared the Sicherungslinie 
area without further loss”.776 Observers in Luftstrietkräffe (German Army Air Service) 
two-seater reconnaissance and artillery spotting aircraft, communicating with 25
th
 
Division HQ by wireless or lamp signalling apparatus, reported the “enemy line to be 
heavily occupied” after daybreak on the 3rd, “although the anticipated attack failed to 
materialise”.777  
 
Battalion stretcher-bearers and RAPs carried out removal and initial succour of 
the wounded with reasonable efficiency during 2-3 December. Devoted RAMC personnel 
of the 25
th
, 90
th
, 91
st
 and 92
nd
 field ambulances (supported by attached parties of infantry) 
provided vital transport assistance, despite intensive shellfire on roads and tracks, 
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throughout the tortuous evacuation by “hand carriage” from RAP to ADS. Colonel G. St. 
C. Thom (ADMS 32
nd
 Division) noted that by 6:00 a.m. on the 2
nd: “2 officers and 74 
other ranks, all walking cases, had passed through” the ADS. These were transported by 
light railway to the CMDS. Stretcher cases, he added, started to arrive at the ADS shortly 
after 6:00 a.m. “Owing to enemy shellfire it was decided that, as the light railway was 
about to be destroyed, lying cases should all be evacuated by ambulance cars and the 
railway used for walking and sitting cases only”. A section of light railway track was 
eventually interrupted by shellfire near Bridge House on the Kansas Cross – Wieltje 
Road at 11:00 a.m. “This, however, did not delay evacuation as Red Cross lorries were 
available to take walking wounded from BRIDGE HOUSE. A train happened to be on 
the line between the Advanced Dressing Station and the destroyed part, consequently 
sitting cases were sent by train from the Advanced Dressing Station as far as the 
destroyed part of the line”, where they “detrained and entrained again on the farther side 
of the destroyed part”. The evacuation, nonetheless, “went on smoothly” following track 
repairs by 2:00 p.m. “After fighting had ceased both our and the enemy [stretcher-] 
bearers collected wounded in the open. The bearers carried small Red Cross flags and 
were not fired upon”. Additional support provided by 14 Brigade (one officer and fifty 
men) was sent forward at 11:00 p.m. “to assist the stretcher-bearers of 92nd Field 
Ambulance who were getting quite done up”. All RAPs, Thom concluded, were 
“reported clear by 3 a.m. on the 3rd December”. The entire line was clear of any 
remaining wounded as far as the ADS by 5:00 a.m. On 4 December – a fair, cloudy day 
interspersed with sudden snow storms – British observers reported considerable 
movement of small German parties “throughout the day on the WESTROOSEBEKE – 
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PASSCHENDAELE Ridge, and collection of the wounded is apparently still in 
progress”.778  
 
 Little notice was probably taken by the average Times reader, the majority no 
doubt enjoying the meagre contents of a home front breakfast, of recent developments in 
Flanders. Headlines above the usual column of despatches (telegraphed daily by GHQ for 
domestic consumption) on 3 December read:  
BATTLES FOR CAMBRAI 
ENEMY‟S BIG PLAN FAILS 
MORE LOST GROUND WON BACK 
The following communiqués primarily dealt with Third Army‟s dogged defence against 
counter-attacking German “hordes” during 2 December. A comparatively unremarkable 
report – inserted by time of receipt amongst more newsworthy items – recounted further 
territorial gains on the Passchendaele Ridge with a brief summation of the basic facts: 
10:14 p.m. – A minor operation was undertaken early this 
morning by Rifle, North Country and Home County 
battalions north-east of Ypres. Some fortified buildings and 
strongpoints on the main ridge north of Passchendaele were 
captured and our troops have taken a number of 
prisoners.
779
  
 
                                                 
778
 See TNA: WO/95/1677: „8th Division Instructions No. 2‟, 25 November 1917, 8th Division War Diary, 
WO/95/2370: „Report on Medical Arrangements During the Recent Operations: Night 1/2nd December 
1917‟, 15 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary, WO/157/288: „II Corps Summary of Information‟, 4 
December 1917,  II Corps Intelligence File and LHCMA: Second Army War Diary, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers, File 7/16, King‟s College, London.  
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 The Times, Monday 3 December 1917, p. 9.  A subsequent despatch, appearing in print the following 
day, stated: „In a minor operation carried out yesterday north of Passchendaele 129 prisoners and a few 
machine-guns were taken by us‟.  
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A concise synopsis of another minor operation, this time 7000 yards SW of 
Passchendaele village, on the Ypres front would shortly appear in The Times GHQ 
despatch column for 4 December.  
 
 The New Zealand Division (temporary GOC Brigadier-General W.G. 
Braithwaite)
780
 took over the frontline opposite Polderhoek Chateau on the night of 25 
November (Text Map 5.1.1). Its scheduled attack against the worrying German 
strongpoint was fraught with difficulties.
781
 The flooded Reutelbeek and Scherriabeek 
streams bound the spur on which the chateau and its outlying defences were situated to 
the north and south respectively. “Two alternative lines of attack offered themselves. The 
chateau might be carried from the flank and rear by troops advancing from the [II] 
ANZAC [Corps] positions across the Reutelbeek, or, secondly, a frontal assault could be 
delivered straight down the spur from the IX Corps position on the [Gheluvelt] plateau”. 
Deadly enfilade fire from the east, supporting artillery barrage issues,
782
 lack of 
satisfactory assembly positions and a virtually impassable Reutelbeek valley
783
 ruled out 
any possible advance from the north. “For these reasons recourse was had for the second 
alternative, which offered several advantages. Assembly trenches were available directly 
opposite and in close proximity to the chateau. A frontal barrage could be obtained. The 
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 Major-General A. Russell had been invalided back to Great Britain after being diagnosed with 
bronchitis. See Glyn Harper, Massacre at Passchendaele: The New Zealand Story (Auckland: Harper 
Collins, 2000), p. 99.  
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 See Chapter 1, pp. 64-66 for the genesis of the Polderhoek Chateau operation.  
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 Batteries situated to the north would have to fire in enfilade.  
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 The Reutlebeek was by this time an unfordable mass of continuous shell holes 20 to 30 feet wide. From 
its left bank extended an „impenetrable black morass of soft mud, into which patrols sank to their knees 
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IX Corps heavies could carry out a preparatory bombardment, and the tell-tale 
registration by a large number of new guns could be avoided”.784    
 
Map 5.1.1 Polderhoek Chateau: New Zealand objectives (Source: TNA: W0/95/3659) 
                                                 
784
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Stewart, The New Zealand Division 1916-1919: A Popular History Based on 
Official Records (Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1921), pp. 305-06.  
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 Two Battalions (1
st
 Canterbury and 1
st
 Otago) of 2 New Zealand Brigade jumped-
off from their support line at 12:00 p.m. on 3 December. Preliminary forenoon 
bombardments, a ruse devised to keep defenders below ground at the time of assault, on 
28 and 30 November failed to cow an alert enemy ensconced in pillboxes and ruin 
cellars: “The garrison of the chateau was confidently aggressive. Both on the 26th and 30th 
they attempted small raids which were completely repulsed. They had, however, no 
suspicion of the impending attack and exposed themselves injudiciously about the spur to 
our snipers”. The attack plan was conceived as a pincer movement to envelope the enemy 
defences: “It would be made by 2 companies in each battalion advancing abreast in 2 
waves. The first wave would carry the line to an intermediate objective beyond the 
chateau, and the second, following 50 yards behind, would then „leap frog‟ through, and 
push on to a final objective some 300 yards further, sufficiently far down the eastern 
slope to give observation of the flats” beyond. Companies of select personnel, recently 
reinforced by a large proportion of inexperienced drafts, had been reduced for this 
operation to an acceptable fighting strength of 100 all ranks.
785
 Hopes of catching the 
enemy off guard were immediately frustrated when, maintaining vigilance during the 
now customary forenoon bombardment, IR163 (17
th
 Reserve Division) opened fire with 
machine-guns from pillboxes situated about the chateau grounds and from the south at 
Gheluvelt.
786
 “Undismayed, however, the first wave pushed on, crossed our frontline, and 
were rapidly among the wilderness of tree stumps where the wire was found 
demolished”. Protective smoke barrages, discharged to cover the exposed left and right 
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 Ibid, pp. 307-09. „Reinforcements received during November were particularly poor, lacking even in 
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1
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Chapter 5 
 332 
flanks from enfilading machine-guns, were dissipated by strong winds and casualties 
began to mount. 1
st
 Canterbury, “faced with a series of strong pillboxes, including those 
at the stables and at the Manager‟s House”, was, nevertheless, able to secure, after fierce 
fighting, the right flank along slopes overlooking the mired Scherriabeek valley to a point 
150 yards short of the first objective. 1
st
 Otago, tasked with capturing Polderhoek 
Chateau, made good initial progress until an “overwhelming barrage of machine-gun 
fire” forced survivors to seek cover opposite the first objective.787 “The enemy‟s 
pillboxes”, II ANZAC Corps‟ diarist later observed, “undamaged and strongly garrisoned 
with troops and MGs, proved so formidable an obstacle that our attacking troops were 
held up and were compelled to consolidate a line about 150 yards east of the CHATEAU 
grounds, but west of the CHATEAU itself”.788 Loss of half the assault battalions‟ 
effectives hindered fresh attempts to push on. Brigadier-General Braithwaite “urged a 
further effort after dark and suggested an enveloping movement from the Reutelbeek 
slopes”, but arrival of German reinforcements, “together with the continued alertness of 
the enemy and the continued activity of his machine-guns did not favour surprise”.789  
                                                 
787
 Stewart, The New Zealand Division 1916-1919, pp. 309-10 and 312. Private Henry James Nicholas MM 
(Nelson Company, 1
st
 Battalion Canterbury Regiment) was awarded the Victoria Cross for destroying a 
machine-gun position during the advance.     
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 TNA: WO/157/593: II ANZAC Corps Intelligence File.   
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Plate 5.4 Polderhoek Chateau grounds from the air 
(Source: Flandernland <http.//www.flandernland.de/>) 
 
 97 Brigade‟s situation remained unchanged throughout 3 December. Hours of 
tedium punctuated by incidents of sudden terror passed, as the somewhat irregular 
frontline was reinforced and strengthened under active sniping and desultory machine-
gun fire (Map 14). Brigade HQ issued orders for the anticipated relief at 2:00 p.m.
790
 The 
prospect of impending escape from the frightful Goudberg sector cheered up weary men 
whose battalions had been in close contact with the enemy for over forty-eight hours. 
5/6
th
 Royal Scots, 1
st
 Dorsetshire Regiment and 2
nd
 Manchester Regiment (14 Brigade) 
began to relieve the depleted battalions of 97 Brigade after nightfall:  
On arrival here early on the 3
rd
 it was learnt that the 
situation was very bad and the Battalion was placed under 
orders to be ready to move at a moment‟s notice: while 
waiting orders, however, the enemy shelled Bellevue 
heavily, killing 2 and wounding 4 men. At 10:30 p.m., the 
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Manchesters moved up to the left sub-sector and relieved 
the 15
th
 Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, the front held being 
an organised system of shell holes, and Battalion 
headquarters being at Pillbox 88.
791
  
 
Harassing fire, maintained by supporting artillery and machine-guns throughout the day, 
continued into the night.
792
 The historian of 309
th
 Honourable Artillery Company Siege 
Battery, situated in advanced positions just south of the Lekkerboterbeek, recalled:  
As for our own shooting, we had taken up so advanced a 
position at Hannixbeek in anticipation of an attack to be 
made on the night of December 1
st
 – 2nd. This was duly 
made, and we fired in it, but unfortunately it met with but 
little success. We retained the position, however, and fired 
(but not too frequently, as we could often be observed) on 
batteries, and at night on roads, our „arc of fire‟ extending 
from Stadenreef almost to Passchendaele itself, but our 
chief activity centring round Westroosebeke.
793
  
 
Reconnaissance patrols were active in the semi-darkness, as relieving infantry attempted 
to discover the enemy‟s whereabouts. Several of these enterprises came under direct fire 
as they approached hostile, heavily manned outposts, one particularly active sniper near 
Vat Cottages engaging targets easily under the bright moonlight. Losses, nevertheless, 
had been surprisingly light by the time 14 Brigade telegraphed „HOLES‟ or relief 
complete before dawn on 4 December.
794
  The weather remained “damp and frightfully 
cold” as the desolate landscape came into view after sunrise: “It is almost impossible to 
describe the barrenness of the country in that locality. There was not a shrub or a tree of 
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st
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nd
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th
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 Division War Diary, WO/95/2400: 97
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any kind and the whole place was mud, ploughed up by continuous shellfire. We were 
occupying ground that had been fought for every inch, and the only features in the 
landscape behind our lines were badly battered pillboxes and derelict tanks”.795 Morning, 
with all its apocalyptic-like revelations, also found the young Offizier-Aspirant still trying 
to locate his company:   
4 December. The position is better than the HOUTHULST 
FOREST one, drier, just as sinister; it reeks of battle and 
blood. Only the dead of yesterday and the day before 
around, bootless and sockless …796 There is more firing 
here than in the HOUTHULST FOREST sector and less 
protection. Relief is to come on the 5
th
 at midnight … Well, 
I went to the KTK for the second time and learned that our 
Coy. had gone over to Tommy. I went, therefore, to 
HEIDENGOED and reported to POHLENER, who was 
quite disheartened.
797
  
 
Sir Henry Rawlinson, unhappy, although not wholly disheartened, about the outcome of 
the Passchendaele and Polderhoek operations, confided sentiments in his diary the 
previous evening that were sadly reminiscent of the entry for 10 November: “The New 
Zealanders attacked at Polderhoek Chateau today but [,] after severe fighting [,] failed to 
take it chiefly on account of the pillboxes on the south of it and a trench in the rear [,] 
which commanded the entrance to the concrete shelter in the chateau – It is very 
disappointing that both the attack n[orth] of Passchendaele and on Polderhoek should 
have failed”.798  Sir Douglas Haig‟s 3 December instructions on projected manpower 
deficiencies and adoption of a short-term defensive policy had been the primary reason 
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for halting further attacks north of Passchendaele. GHQ‟s additional demands for 
reinforcements would stretch Rawlinson‟s available reserves for attack or defence to the 
limit: “News from Cambrai area is that the Bosches are persisting in their assaults in spite 
of very heavy casualties – Tonight Tavish [Davidson DMO GHQ] rang up to say they 
wanted nine div[isions] down south [,] so I have to send away the 63 Naval Div[ision] 
which is well up to strength [,] and the 19 Div[ision] which is well rested and I had hoped 
to put in the line to relieve tired ones. The Cambrai battle is going to make us very short 
of troops I fear…”799  
 
 Extraordinarily hard fighting, followed by conspicuous British failure, contributed 
to the reservedly triumphalist tone of the daily German Heersbericht (Army Bulletin):  
Front of Crown Prince Rupprecht: – Early yesterday, after 
violent drumfire during a moonlight night, the English with 
strong forces attacked our positions at and north of 
Passchendaele. Thüringian and Hessian troops threw back 
the enemy in a sharp counter-attack and made 60 prisoners. 
After the attack had been beaten off the firing died down. It 
increased again at times during the evening to considerable 
violence.
800
  
 
There was, nevertheless, a great deal to be congratulatory about. The enemy‟s latest 
attempt to seize more ground on the vital Passchendaele plateau had been repelled with 
heavy losses:  
The English gained not an inch of ground. They were 
thrown back to their position in the sumpf [mud]. The 
commanding heights remained in our hands. On the bodies 
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of the English dead were discovered maps that revealed the 
enemy had attacked with five battalions; very few of these 
poor souls returned. In the Vorfeldzone lay hundreds of 
English dead. Our losses, however, were not few, but, 
thank God, more were wounded than dead. Captured booty 
consisted of 14 prisoners and eight Lewis Guns. On 2 
December 1917 the Regiment [IR95] again demonstrated, 
despite a lack of rest for months, great heroism. Through all 
this fighting it maintained its reputation with the high 
command.
801
 
 
IR95’s postwar historian also grasped, with some exaggeration, the strategic stakes 
involved: “Through captured maps it was discovered that it was highly important for the 
English to reach the commanding heights in order to overlook the U-boat bases in the 
Brugge basin. The eastern slopes of the Feldherrnhügel protected the entire light and 
heavy artillery. It would have been a tremendous victory had the English succeeded. Such 
a success may have led to an early ending to the war”.802 The German official history of 
the desperate series of defensive battles conducted in Flanders by Fourth Army from late 
July to early December 1917 summed up the final result of this last (in their eyes) major 
British assault with exceptional accuracy: “On 2 December, after a long pause in the 
struggle, there roared again, over Flanders terrain transformed into mud fields, a powerful 
storm of intense bombardment. But the attacks undertaken on a narrow front by two 
English brigades against the front divisions of Gruppes Staden (38. Inf. Div.) and Ypern 
(25. Inf. Div.) were, after initial partial success, driven back and proof was restored to the 
English that there was no other outcome”.803                           
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5.3 Tactical Debrief 
 
8
th
 Division moved, immediately following relief by 14
th
 Division, to the Wizernes area 
SW of St Omer in French Flanders. Major-General Heneker remarked in his diary with 
some satisfaction: “Nice comfortable chateau and good training area”.804 25 Brigade, 
after marching to camps at St Jean, travelled by light railway on 3 December to equally 
agreeable – in sharp contrast to the grisly ambience of the Passchendaele Salient – billets 
nearby. 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire, 2
nd
 Lincolnshire, 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade and 1
st
 RIR finally settled 
down for much needed clean-up, re-organisation and training at Wizernes and the 
outlying hamlets of Boisdinghem, Noir Carme and Zudausque. Lieutenant Nettleton 
recalled after reaching his final destination that 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade “looked more like a 
weak company than a proper battalion and everybody felt extremely low”.805 32nd 
Division remained responsible for the Goudberg sector after relief of 97 Brigade, so the 
five battle-worn assault battalions returned to camps in divisional reserve and support 
north and NE of St Jean and near Vlamertinghe respectively. 2
nd
 KOYLI, departing from 
positions opposite Hill 52 on the night of 2/3
rd
 December, made its way to Irish Farm 
before being transported by bus to Dambre Camp on the 3
rd
. 16
th
 HLI, 11
th
 Border 
Regiment and 17
th
 HLI spent a short time at Hilltop and Irish farms before entraining at 
St Jean station for Brake and Hospital camps. 15
th
 LF and 16
th
 NF, now back with 96 
Brigade, made themselves at home as best they could inside “Nissen huts floating in the 
mud” that made up the austere, unsalutary enclosures around Irish Farm. Battalion roll 
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calls, one of the first orders of business in the immediate aftermath of an attack, were 
particularly poignant in the most hard-hit battalions: “At Brake Camp the roll-call was 
one of the saddest since 1915. Twenty officers and 469 other ranks went forward on 
Passchendaele [sic]. Eight officers and 204 other ranks now answered their names. More 
than half of the Battalion were casualties…”806 Among those not accounted for were 
former tank gunner Private Fred Wakely, Private Hugh Cairns (who had enlisted whilst 
underage) and ex-sports journalist and popular former RAMC NCO 2
nd
 Lieutenant Will 
Ridgway.
807
  
 
 “An important but often overlooked feature of [British] GHQ‟s thrust to improve 
standard tactics”, Paddy Griffth has observed, “consisted of extensive debriefs and 
questionnaires that were often completed immediately after combat. On some occasions 
this was done to in an attempt to identify scapegoats and incompetents … On other 
occasions a very different motive came into play, as some particular organisation or HQ 
attempted to establish and document its own credentials in order to impress its rivals”.808 
Some tactical debriefs “were mounted so quickly after the event that they should be 
classified more as „immediate situation reports‟ than as detached historical 
investigations”.809 Commanders and staffs, nevertheless, “really did often want to know 
the full detail of what was going on in mudfields ahead of them, and they were avid to 
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interrogate absolutely every individual who emerged from that zone”. Overall, the 
primary motivation for “collecting post-combat impressions was purely and simply an 
interest in genuine tactical science”.810 This empirical (bottom-up by necessity) approach 
is evident in the immediate aftermath of the night operation, as battalion commanders, 
having queried surviving subordinates, passed along reports and questionnaires to 
brigade, who, in turn, passed on their own reports, based on received battalion comments, 
to division. Division commanders and staffs, who also, on occasions, conducted inquiries 
and face-to-face interviews, were then expected to write-up, based on total collected 
evidence from subordinate formations, a final after-action report for the edification of 
Corps and Army HQs.
811
  
 
25 Brigade HQ began the formal process of gathering post-combat impressions by 
forwarding a questionnaire to its three assault battalion commanders, who, in addition to 
providing the routine detailed after-action report, were asked to comment on five distinct 
(barrage, assembly, enemy fire, forming-up and equipment) operational aspects. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling (CO 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire) noted that the supporting barrage 
“was effective, although there “were many shorts”. Battalion officers, he added, “state 
that the barrage seemed to lift too quickly after the original beginning. All agree that the 
defensive barrage of artillery … was excellent”.812 2nd Royal Berkshire‟s assembly, 
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Stirling observed, was almost compromised by poor overland communications: “The 
duckboards were raised too high above ground, so when the men got off where there 
were gaps, it was difficult to get on again. A new tape should have been laid from the 
head of the duckboards, as the old one was hardly discoverable”. Observations about 
enemy fire focused on the hostile barrage, which “came down from our old frontline back 
to behind the PASSCHENDAELE – VINDICTIVE X roads”. Forming-up along the 
jumping-off line, regardless of the exhausting march forward, was expedited by accurate 
layout of direction tapes, although “some of them were not securely fastened and had 
moved in the wind”. No shortage of equipment was experienced and overloading was not 
a serious problem “except in the mud and on the duckboards, but the carrying of spare 
stores by the 3
rd
 wave was a mistake”, as the use of these battle supplies “never 
eventuated”. This designated 3rd wave „carrying platoon‟ would, in Stirling‟s opinion, 
have been “invaluable as a support but got it into its head that it was there to carry. I 
[Stirling] consider a totally separate carrying party to go up when the barrage had 
moderated would be better”. Stirling concluded by attributing absence of “complete 
success to lack of depth on my centre due to the easing off of to keep touch with the left 
… I consider that the forming-up could only have been done in moonlight, but the attack 
would have gone better if it had been darker, as the Germans could not have located 
where are men were and I think, in this case, we could have held on to the [Southern] 
redoubt”.813  
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The adjutant of 2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment, replying to the Brigade questionnaire 
on Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin‟s behalf, noted the barrage was “efficient”, despite some 
unwelcome howitzer „shorts‟. German machine-gun fire and the subsequent hold up 
made it impossible to determine if the barrage pace was satisfactory or not. The march to 
assembly was also an ordeal as the Battalion traversed Track No. 5 South to the jumping-
off line: “There was not more than 20 yards length continuous + track was laid too high 
off the ground … Owing to the condition of the track, my battalion and the Berkshires 
were a little mixed up by the head of the track, otherwise the assembly was not worried 
much. Hostile fire caused an average of 10-15 casualties a company before assembly”. 
The enemy‟s barrage fire was observed “about Zero + 9. It was his MG and rifle fire 
(rifle fire negligible), which stopped the advance. His MGs opened at Zero + 3 minutes”. 
Forming-up was, as with 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire‟s experience, ably assisted by proper 
placement of direction tapes, which proved “undoubtedly useful”. Equipment concerns 
were, for the most part, minimal, overloading and the abysmal state of No. 5 Track being 
the chief causes of fatigue prior to Zero. Spare Lewis Gun magazines, however, were in 
short supply and it was recommended that these be distributed “throughout the assaulting 
troops” in the future.814  
 
Lieutenant Anderson, adjutant and acting CO 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade since Lieutenant-
Colonel Brand was wounded, also found the supporting barrage to be efficient with an 
acceptable pace and “not many shorts”. Assembly had been “carried out with only slight 
interference from the enemy, although, from their subsequent action, the forming-up on 
                                                 
814
 TNA: WO/95/1730: „Report on Action of the Battn. from 2:30 p.m. 1-12-17 – M.N. 2/3-12-17‟, 6 
December 1917, 2
nd
 Lincolnshire War Diary. See Appendix 13 for complete transcript.  
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the tapes was apparently observed by them”. Hostile batteries maintained “searching fire 
from about Zero + 5 in rear of support line. Machine-gun fire [was] particularly deadly. 
Machine-guns firing low – about 2 feet from the ground”. Forming-up along the direction 
tapes, despite Teall Cottage being in enemy hands, was “all that could be desired”. The 
men were not overloaded with equipment prior to the assault and there were no 
discernable shortages “except for very lights”. German casualties, Anderson noted, 
appeared to be equally severe: “From our new line the ground slopes very slightly to the 
Northern Redoubt and thence steeply to the NE. This has a considerable number of 
enemy dead between our advanced posts and the Northern Redoubt”.815 
 
All three battalion commanders, therefore, appear to have generally agreed on the 
relative effectiveness of the supporting barrage, soundness of procedure (notwithstanding 
the condition of Track No. 5) during assembly and forming-up, lethal efficiency of the 
German machine-gun fire and satisfactory quality and quantity of issue equipment. Two 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling and Lieutenant Anderson) believed the primary cause of the 
reverse was increased visibility resulting from the bright moonlight. Stirling, while 
acknowledging, “forming-up could only have been done in moonlight”, also opined it 
could have been darker, while Anderson noted in his after-action report, “Visibility in the 
moonlight was up to 500 yards. The moon was behind us. It seems obvious that the 
enemy observed our forming-up…” Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin‟s judgement that machine-
                                                 
815
 TNA: WO/95/1731: „Report of the Part Played by the 2nd Battn. The Rifle Brigade in the Recent 
Operations at Passchendaele‟, 6 December 1917, 2nd Rifle Brigade War Diary. See Appendix 13 for 
complete transcript. Major-General Heneker subsequently observed that the field artillery barrage could 
have remained on Venison Trench beyond the fixed (1 minute) part of the timetable: „I did not like to leave 
it on this trench for a longer period for fear of catching my own infantry should they be sweeping 
successfully. As it happens [,] the 2/Rifle Brigade noted this barrage and say it did not stay on this line long 
enough‟. WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/2nd December 1917‟, 
13 December 1917, 8
th
 Division War Diary.  
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guns “stopped the advance” of 2nd Lincolnshire appears, by implication, to have further 
substantiated Stirling and Anderson‟s perspective even though he failed specifically to 
endorse moonlight as the leading tactical handicap in his after-action report.
816
  
 
 Major-General Heneker (whose contingency plans had been overruled)
817
 wholly 
agreed with the battalion commanders on the principal reason for the failure. He had, as 
we have seen, predicted the negative impact of a full moon and un-subdued machine-
guns during the initial planning phase of the attack. Although 8
th
 Division‟s subsequent 
after-action report bears the signature of Brigadier-General Coffin,
818
 it is obvious, when 
evaluating tone and content that Heneker (who departed for home leave on 10 December) 
and the like-minded GOC 25 Brigade collaborated on a forthright narrative document that 
closed with a damning indictment of the entire operational scheme:  
To attempt a surprise on a bright moonlight [sic] night 
when bodies of men can be seen easily on the move at a 
distance of 300 yards is not sound. Directly the right of 32
nd
 
Division and left of 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade rose at Zero hour in 
order to advance, the machine-guns in TEALL COTTAGE 
opened and others N. W, and E of them took it up almost at 
once. I have heard it said that when snow is on the ground, 
and when the night is bright with the moon full, bodies of 
                                                 
816
 TNA: WO/95/1929: „Appendix B‟, 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary, WO/95/1731: 
„Report of the Part Played by the 2nd Battn. The Rifle Brigade in the Recent Operations at Passchendaele‟, 6 
December 1917, 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade War Diary and WO/95/1730: „Report on Action of the Battn. from 2:30 
p.m. 1-12-17 – M.N. 2/3-12-17‟, 6 December 1917, 2nd Lincolnshire War Diary. 
817
 See Chapter 2, pp. 59-60.  
818
 Brigadier-General Coffin‟s earlier after-action report was written (without critical commentary) in pure 
narrative style. His view on the failure to hold Southern Redoubt, however, is discernable in the 8
th
 
Division after-action report of 13 December: „Owing to casualties to runners, and to the fact that a verbal 
message was delivered wrongly, the reserve [„A‟] company of the right Battalion [2nd Royal Berkshire] was 
sent to the extreme right where it was not needed. Had it been sent to help the situation in the SOUTHERN 
REDOUBT, there can be no doubt but that the objectives there would have been held‟. This criticism is 
challenged by evidence that „A‟ Company was dispatched to the right after 2nd Royal Berkshire was ejected 
from Southern Redoubt. See TNA: WO/95/1727: „Report on Operations‟, 7 December 1917, 25 Brigade 
War Diary, WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/2nd December 
1917‟, 13 December 1917, 8th Division War Diary.  
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men at 200 yards cannot be seen. This is not my 
experience.  
 
To expect infantry to advance some 200 yards over an area 
cut-up by shellfire in the face of accurate machine-gun fire, 
and without the protection of an artillery barrage, is to 
expect too much … I lost two very valuable commanding 
officers and a great many junior officers. As usual, the men 
were splendid…819 
 
The night operation, 8
th
 Division‟s postwar historians (J.H. Boraston and C.E.O. Bax) 
observed, could “only be regarded, at best, as a qualified success”.820 This surprising 
assessment must, however, be viewed in context. 8
th
 Division had a gruelling and 
somewhat unlucky war experience and it is likely its „establishment‟ chroniclers 
moderated their judgment with targeted interwar veteran readership in mind.
821
 It is also 
certain, based on comments found in Heneker‟s diary and the divisional after-action 
report, that post-operational impressions of any sort of “success”, qualified or otherwise, 
among Division and Brigade leadership were completely non-existent. Boraston and Bax, 
nevertheless, adequately elucidated the lamentable tactical circumstances and melancholy 
results with contemporaneous clarity:  
                                                 
819
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Narrative of Operations Carried Out by the 8th Division on 1st/ 2nd December 
1917‟, 13 December 1917, 8th Division War Diary. The two battalion commanders referred to were 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Brand (CO 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade) wounded just prior to Zero on 2 December and 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Tillett (CO 2
nd
 Devonshire) mortally wounded on 29 November.  
820
 Sir Douglas Haig observed in the divisional history‟s foreword: „In the major offensives in which it took 
a direct part the 8
th
 Division, despite unfailing gallantry, was signally [sic] unfortunate‟. See Boraston & 
Bax, The Eighth Division, pp. viii and 167.  
821
 Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston (private secretary to and staunch supporter of Sir Douglas Haig) had 
previously edited the omnibus edition (1919) of the British Field Marshal‟s wartime despatches and co-
authored, along with popular outdoor (The Book of the Dry Fly 1897, South Country Streams 1899, etc.) 
writer, official war correspondent and (Saturday Review 1914-17 and The Nineteenth Century 1919-25) 
editor G.A.B. Dewar, the controversial two-volume Sir Douglas Haig’s Command 1915-1918 in 1922. In 
their preface (pp. ix-x) for the 1926 divisional history, the authors (Boraston & Bax) speculated the 
narrative would be of „special interest to the junior officers and rank and file of the of the division, who, it 
is common experience, had neither the time nor the opportunity during the war itself to give much thought 
to what was happening outside their own battery or battalion. It is hoped that this history will be the means 
to enable them in retrospect to take a broader view of the memorable events in which they took so worthy a 
part…‟  
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[A]lthough about 150 prisoners
822
 and 4 machine-guns had 
been captured and a certain amount of ground had been 
gained, the main purpose of this attack – the capture of the 
two redoubts and the gaining of observations down the 
valleys they commanded – had not been accomplished. The 
noise inseparable from forming-up for the attack among 
such trying conditions of mud and water had put the enemy 
on his guard; thereafter the brightness of the moonlight and 
the absence of a protecting barrage during the first crucial 
eight minutes were responsible for all that followed. It was 
evidently possible for the enemy to see our men, moving 
forward in bodies, at a distance of 200 yards. Assuming 
that he could do that and that he made proper use of his 
opportunities, failure was inevitable.
823
  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Beddington (GSO 1) concurred in an unpublished memoir forty-three 
years later when he recollected that 8
th
 Division had “gained two thirds of the ground we 
set out to capture, but did not succeed in gaining the crest of the hill and, with it, the 
observation north-eastwards that we wanted”.824 
 
Plate 5.5 Observation denied: Site of Venison Trench looking east from new British outpost line 
(Source: Rob Thompson) 
                                                 
822
 This figure is contradicted by contemporary reports. See Conclusion, fn. 927.   
823
 Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, p. 167.   
824
 See Edward Beddington, „My Life‟ (UK: Privately Printed, 1960), p. 119. Capture and retention of a 
further „two-thirds‟ of the Vorfeldzonelinie directly opposite the objective may have resulted in the view 
(more than likely originating as some sort of post-operational „spin‟ by higher – possibly VIII Corps – 
formation HQs) that the night attack was a „qualified success‟.   
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 What sort of conclusions did the GOC 32
nd
 Division arrive at in his nineteen-page 
after-action report? A similar bureaucratic method, as adopted by the neighbouring 8
th
 
Division, of obtaining facts based on information gathered from subordinate units existed 
in 32
nd
 Division, although no evidence of a 97 Brigade questionnaire has come to light. 
Thus an almost identical bottom-up inquiry process, based on a routine combination of 
submitted written accounts, enquiries and personal interviews, was applied during the 
subsequent tactical debrief.
825
 Heavy casualties amongst the junior leadership would, 
nonetheless, contribute to some debatable conclusions while leaving certain questions 
unanswered.  
 
Brigadier-General Blacklock attributed the failure to enemy foreknowledge, 
“therefore the element of surprise failed and the assault became movement without 
supporting fire of any description”; subsequent “heavy casualties and initial 
disorganisation were never overcome”. Failure to retain captured positions was, in his 
considered opinion, due to three primary factors: Loss of touch between units “in the dark 
and over bad going”; severe losses amongst junior officers that ensured “there was 
nobody on the spot to reorganise and supervise the consolidation” and the almost 
complete absence of timely subordinate situation reports deemed essential for 
ascertaining “a sufficiently clear situation to act upon”.826  
                                                 
825
A window into the process adopted by 32
nd
 Division can be found in IWM 4723 Brigadier-General T.S. 
Lambert papers (Box 80/10/2), which contains „correspondence relating to the attack carried out by the 
Division on the 2
nd
 December 1917…‟ not archived in the corresponding TNA file. Standard subordinate 
(brigade, battalion, MG and RE companies) unit after-action reports are also accompanied by a series of 
memos, divisional enquiries and typescript/hand-written statements.  
826
 IWM 4723: Typescript „Preliminary Report on Operations, December 1st, 2nd and 3rd‟, 4 December 
1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2). An undated hand-written summary by 
Brigadier-General Blacklock also observed, „Comments: (1) It was calculated that the 97th Bde would reach 
its objective at Zero + 32 or 2:27 a.m. At this time then [,] commanding officers should have moved up to 
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Only two of six battalion (15
th
 LF and 16
th
 NF) after-action reports were located. 
The former only examined consequences of the battalion‟s exposed right flank. The 
latter, besides observing that the enemy‟s defensive fire “was not heavy enough to stop 
the attack” had nothing further to add about the initial assault phase.827 Two (2nd KOYLI 
and 17
th
 HLI) of six battalion war diary accounts attribute the failure to enemy 
foreknowledge of the attack, lethal defensive machine-gun fire and consequent heavy 
losses among officers and NCOs.
828
 The remaining four (16
th
 HLI, 11
th
 Border Regiment, 
15
th
 LF, 16
th
 NF) are narratives with no real attempt at post-operational analysis, although 
most of the factors related by 2
nd
 KOYLI and 17
th
 HLI are referred to at one time or 
another. Moreover, no direct reference to moonlight as a significant hindrance appears in 
any of these contemporary battalion records. One postwar regimental history (2
nd
 
KOYLI) subsequently noted, “movement of troops before „Zero‟ hour had been only too 
easily observed”, while another (16th HLI) commented that the enemy had “a free hand 
for five minutes on a target that looked grotesquely big against the bright moon”. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
supervise consolidation. Commanding officers had not visited their battalions even by 3 a.m. by which time 
daylight made moves difficult if not impossible. Had commanding officers gone up to their battalions any 
time before 3 a.m. & 5 a.m. [,] they would have been able to see the situation and push on the advance b[y] 
a series of encircling moves as taught. (2) Report of a German prisoner says our men lay down when fired 
at. In any case [,] encircling movements were not made nor were the enemy strongpoints rushed. Casualties 
were thus largely increased & our men pinned to the ground & lost our barrage. (3) Company officers and 
platoon commanders sent back no reports of the situation. (4) Although the failure of the 17
th
 HLI to 
advance was early known at Brigade HQ [,] the danger of this gap in our line, through which the final weak 
counter-attack eventually came, was not grasped, nor were orders at ??? sent out to move round Veal 
Cottages. (5) Men scattered & hid in shell holes or moved to the rear as casualties when unfit [?] Thus very 
heavy casualties were reported [?] when these had, in truth, not occurred. (6) The final counter-attack [,] 
which drove back the 17
th
 HLI, 11
th
 Border Rgt, & part of the 15
th
 Lancs. Fus. only consisted of 200 men. 
Stokes mortars at Tournant Farm & south of Vat Cottage did not open fire upon them. No attempt was 
made to ??? & 2 ½ batt[alions] moved rapidly to the rear [,] 50 odd men of them not stopping until caught 
by straggler points. (7) Little or no effort was made to dig in or place Lewis guns or machine-guns in 
position‟. See ibid: „Summary of the Attack of the 97th Inf. Bde. with 2 battalions of the 96th Inf. Bde. on 
December 2 [1917]‟, ibid.  
827
 See ibid, „Narrative of Operations 2/3rd December 1917, 15th (S) Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers‟, 4 
December 1917 and „32nd. Div. No.G.S.1499/3/33‟, 5 December 1917. Both reports contain terse, hand-
written marginalia comments by Major-General Shute.  
828
 TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI and WO/95/2405 17
th
 HLI war diaries.  
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author of a third (16
th
 NF) observed: “The night [of the attack] was clear and moonlit. At 
once the advance was seen…”829 These published interwar impressions, however, still 
conform to the immediate battalion war diary entries, which, by manifest inference 
(passing mention of a bright moon when relating prevailing weather conditions, 
perceived enemy awareness of impending attack and almost instantaneous opening up of 
hostile machine-guns) indirectly emphasise the adverse effect of moonlight on the recent 
operation.
830
   
 
 Major-General Shute concluded his after-action report with a narrative of 97 
Brigade‟s retirement followed by a general analytic précis – „Reasons for the Failure of 
the Operation‟. Losses among officers and NCOs, he observed at the head of the former, 
made it “difficult to collect reliable details as to the reason of [sic] the withdrawal …” 
Recent reports, based on “best information available”, debunking that certain key 
objectives were captured or retained for any lengthy period had, nevertheless, finally 
been verified: “During no period of the day were we in possession of TEALL 
COTTAGE. We were never in possession of HILL 52 after we had been driven off it by 
the enemy‟s counter-attack at 5:30 a.m.”831  
 
11
th
 Border Regiment, which had advanced the farthest distance to Mallet Copse, 
was the subject of a great deal of official disapprobation for retiring in the face of the 
                                                 
829
 See Bond, The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the Great War Vol. 3, p. 911, Chalmers (ed), A 
Saga of Scotland, pp. 109-10 and Cooke, Historical Records of the 16
th
 (Service) Battalion 
Northumberland Fusiliers, p. 88.  
830
 See TNA: WO/95/2402: 2
nd
 KOYLI, WO/95/2404: 16
th
 HLI, WO/95/2403: 11
th
 Border Regiment, 
WO/95/2405: 17
th
 HLI, WO/95/2397: 15
th
 LF and WO/95/2398: 16
th
 NF war diaries.  
831
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part IV, Narrative Dealing with the Retirement of the 97th 
Infantry Brigade‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary, p. 16. 
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4:10 p.m. counter-attack: “There is nothing”, Major-General Shute remarked, “to indicate 
that the strength of the attack or the artillery fire employed by the enemy in the slightest 
degree justified this withdrawal”.832 The Lonsdales‟ retreat, while highly questionable in 
his eyes, was somewhat mitigated by the Battalion‟s isolated position and enemy 
resourcefulness: “The German seems throughout to have shewn [sic] a good deal of 
enterprise and to have persistently tried to work round the flanks of 11
th
 Border 
Regiment”. Shute also recognised that the hard-pressed men were “without leaders, had 
been fighting all day and their stamina was probably nearly exhausted. This explanation”, 
he nevertheless observed, “cannot be accepted and all that can be said is that the 11th 
Border Regt., who are normally fine fighters, failed on this occasion”.833  
 
 Major-General Shute also cast a critical eye on 16
th
 HLI by remarking that the 
afternoon counter-attack, extending to the Battalion‟s left, brought about a withdrawal at 
the same time as 11
th
 Border Regiment. Fatigue and losses among junior leadership were, 
as with the neighbouring 11
th
 Border Regiment, taken into account: “This Battalion had 
also had very heavy fighting all day and had had heavy casualties in officers and NCOs, 
the commanding officer being amongst the officers hit”. Shute, while not indifferent to 
these circumstances, nonetheless dryly observed that 16
th
 HLI‟s “action in withdrawing is 
not explained and there seems little excuse beyond the extreme strain imposed on the 
men in their leaderless condition”.834 This conclusion, despite contrary evidence in the 
                                                 
832
 Ibid.  
833
 Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
834
 Ibid, p.17. This assertion was probably based on after-action reports submitted by 97 Brigade. See IWM 
4723:„Preliminary Report on Operations, December 1st, 2nd and 3rd‟, 4 December 1917 and „Summary of 
the Attack of the 97
th
 Inf. Bde. with 2 Battalions of the 96
th
 Inf. Bde. on December 2
nd
 1917‟, Brigadier-
General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
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relevant Battalion war diary, is puzzling. 16
th
 HLI, after successfully repelling the 
German counter-attack, did not retire from positions around Void Farm until ordered to 
do so before dawn on 3 December. Perhaps Brigadier-General Blacklock‟s previous 
remark that the Battalion had retired to Vocation Farm following the counter-attack 
combined with the wounding and evacuation of Major Scott (acting CO) on the late 
afternoon of the 2
nd
 had a negative impact on the quality of information subsequently 
related by the latter‟s successor (Lieutenant-Colonel Scully).835  
 
 The precipitate action taken by 16
th
 NF in the wake of the afternoon counter-
attack, Major-General Shute commented, “requires explanation”. The designate „counter-
attack counter-attack‟ battalion‟s advance from the vicinity of Virile Farm resulted in a 
minimal gain of 300 yards from the original jumping-off line with both flanks refused. 
This circumscribed forward movement, made regardless of the fact that “the enemy did 
not follow up our retiring troops and the OC 16
th
 North‟d Fusiliers did not see any 
Germans advancing”, was justified – during the course of an interview with Lieutenant-
Colonel Scully – by the fact that no organised troops remained to defend the old frontline 
as the Battalion moved forward.
836
 Concern for exposed flanks also contributed to the 
perceived untimely halt. Shute, however, remained unconvinced: “I am of the opinion 
                                                 
835
 Lieutenant-Colonel Scully made no mention of the pre-dawn (5:00 a.m. 3 December) order for 16
th
 HLI 
to withdraw posts from Void Farm in his subsequent after-action report. See IWM 4732:„32nd Div. 
No.G.S.1499/3/33‟, 4 December 1917, Brigadier-General T.S. Lambert Papers (Box 80/10/2).  
836
 Lieutenant-Colonel Scully‟s replies to a series of questions (not stated) from Division HQ further 
illuminate his decision to halt the advance: „Ref. Questions (a) My No. 3 and 4 companies dug in on the 
line they advanced to i.e. about 250 yards ahead of our line. They started digging in about 4:30. (b) No 
counter-attack was seen by any of my battalion but it was reported from the direction of MALLET COPSE. 
(c) I visited the advanced line (Nos. 2 and 3 companies) at 6 p.m. By that time they were reorganised and 
were already dug in (about 4 to 5 feet deep) they had established touch and put out defensive flanks. (d) I 
never saw any trench mortars. My Lewis guns were used to engage hostile machine-guns and to fire on any 
bodies of hostile infantry. Very few however were seen. (e) My Battalion was detailed as the forward body 
for CCA [counter counter-attack] My Battalion did not retire but pushed forward as soon as the troops in 
front were seen ot be retiring‟. Ibid.  
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that the OC 16
th
 Northumberland Fus. was wrong in the decision he came to, and that he 
should have advanced at once to VOID FARM and attacked the enemy he encountered. 
The situation in which he found himself, however, was a difficult one, and the reasons he 
gives for his action are reasonable”.837  
 
 The last section („Reasons for the Failure of the Operation‟) of Major-General 
Shute‟s after-action report is of particular interest for what is not – the detrimental impact 
of moonlight – directly addressed. This is not surprising given his past advocacy of night 
attacks under similar atmospheric conditions. Moreover, three pre-disposed tactical 
viewpoints likely influenced Shute‟s overall assessment of the disappointing results: 
First, the importance of units maintaining direction and cohesion by moonlight; second, a 
ready acceptance of the need for operational risk-taking; third, clear recognition that the 
enemy had successfully adapted to British offensive tactics (hence the unusual hybrid 
tactical approach that dispensed with a barrage for the first 8 minutes of the attack) by 
late 1917. It is also fair to point out the unfortunate tactical situation confronting 32
nd
 
Division left few alternatives once Second Army ordered the attack. Thus Shute, always 
the confident and aggressive soldier, made the best of bad job by attempting to introduce 
surprise as a crucial element in the first phase of the operational scheme. Errors had 
obviously been made at subordinate levels. The novel attack plan (the best that could be 
devised given the circumstances) was, in his view, not at fault.  
 
                                                 
837
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part IV, Narrative Dealing with the Retirement of the 97th 
Infantry Brigade‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division War Diary, p.17.  
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 The primary factor, “which directly conduced to the failure of this operation”, the 
GOC 32
nd
 Division observed, “was that fact that machine-guns were all alive and in 
action from Zero plus 7 onwards”. The enemy‟s establishment of complete “fire 
superiority” forced the attackers to seek cover in scattered shell holes. “Local advances 
were attempted and carried out after this period, but all movement cost us dearly in 
leaders, who had to expose themselves in organising and leading these advances”. Most 
units, therefore, “were practically without leaders and when the time of stress [afternoon 
counter-attack] came, the men, being deprived of their usual commanders and a good 
deal disorganised by the day‟s fighting, failed to deal with the situation”. The “indirect 
cause”, Shute continued, was the “firing from west to east, while the attack was being 
delivered from south to north”, of the supporting artillery. This made it “impossible to 
organise and effective creeping barrage to cover the infantry advance”. Had it been 
possible to place batteries directly behind 97 Brigade, he concluded, “the enemy 
machine-guns might have been kept under until captured”. The “contributory cause”, 
Shute added in perhaps the most controversial section of „Reasons for the Failure of the 
Operation‟ was disorganisation resulting from an “attack delivered in darkness … 
accentuated by the loss of officers”. Thus command and control broke down, as surviving 
ORs (lacking prerequisite training and initiative) proved unwilling or unable to act as 
substitutes for fallen commissioned leadership: “Although night attacks have been carried 
out with complete success, it must be realised that we are now dealing with only partially 
trained troops, whose training and discipline may not be sufficiently good to enable them 
to surmount the difficulties of control entailed by an attack in the darkness”.838  
                                                 
838
 Ibid, p. 18. Severe losses among junior leadership would often decide the fate of an attack: „There is 
much to be said for the view that by the summer of 1917 „war was becoming more than ever a platoon 
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 Major-General Shute prefaced his closing summary by observing “that an 
intercepted German message shews [sic] that an attack by us was expected by the enemy 
on the night of 1/2
nd
 [December], and that although his frontline of posts had not been 
manned, his main line of defence had been reinforced, and his machine-guns were ready 
for our men”. Enemy anticipation and consequent augmented vigilance, as opposed to 
bright moonlight was, therefore, the reason why his machine-guns achieved fire 
superiority shortly after Zero. “Our attack, therefore, although generally successful in 
surprising his posts, failed in coming as a surprise to his troops in the main line of 
defence and this fact made the operation more difficult”. The reason for the afternoon 
retirement “in the face of a not very considerable enemy attack” by such “staunch 
fighters” as 11th Border Regiment, was, Shute remarked, difficult to explain:  
The loss of officers was no doubt a direct cause of their 
failure. A contributory cause may be that conditions at this 
time of year are very trying on a man‟s vitality, and that 
after some hours of fighting in the wet and muddy ground 
his stamina and powers of resistance are worn out and 
unless resolute leadership is present he is no condition to 
withstand further high tests on his endurance. 
 
 The remedy for this, he concluded, “is not easy to discover. It may be desirable to relieve 
the attacking troops a few hours after Zero by fresh troops moving through them. On this 
occasion this would have been difficult owing to the machine-gun fire. In most operations 
it would be equally difficult to accomplish owing to the enemy‟s barrage”.839 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
commander‟s war, for it would be on their initiative and determination that success would depend‟. See 
A.M. McGilchrist op.cit., in Gary Sheffield, „The Indispensable Factor: The Performance of British Troops 
in 1918‟, Peter Dennis & Jeffery Grey (eds), 1918: Defining Victory: Proceedings of the Chief of Army’s 
History Conference Held at the National Convention Centre, Canberra 29 September 1998 (Canberra: 
Army History Unit, 1999), p. 89.  
839
 Ibid, p.19.  
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 The GOC 32
nd
 Division‟s general and specific criticism of collective and 
individual actions by battalions and battalion commanders appear to be tainted, despite 
recognition of the impact of battlefield conditions upon troop stamina, with censure 
engendered by his personal stake in the success of the night operation.
840
 These 
controversial views, which have an echo in a contentious verdict of the subsequent 
Cambrai enquiry, were also expressed in an existing atmosphere of personal and 
professional anxiety amongst responsible mid-level commanders over future employment 
in the aftermath of recent successful German counter-attacks.
841
 Shute‟s observations 
about perceived infantry shortcomings were, nonetheless, founded on valid contemporary 
concerns:  
The calibre of infantry, as seen by the British officer corps 
between 1914 and 1918, was rarely encouraging.  The tide 
of volunteers and the heavy casualties suffered by the BEF 
in 1914 and early 1915 meant that the supplies of the 
experienced officers necessary to train and lead the 
unmilitary British masses in the New Armies were 
inadequate. As the war went on, this difficulty increased as 
the pool of eligible and „appropriate‟ officers dwindled 
along with the quality of recruits in the rank and file. The 
enthusiastic patriots and mature men were to be replaced by 
those unpatriotic slackers who required conscription to join 
the army and defend King and Country … By 1918, the 
average British platoon of 50 men would be lucky to have 
one soldier with prewar training, although the vast majority 
of the remainder had at least one year of combat 
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experience, while between one-third and one-half of the 
strength of an average platoon of the German Army in 
March 1918 was made up of soldiers trained before the 
war.
842
  
 
Absorption of new drafts similar to the hapless party of 4 officers and 65 ORs dispatched 
to 16
th
 HLI on the eve of the night attack or, for that matter, a large reinforcement draft to 
2 New Zealand Brigade prior to the Polderhoek Chateau operation,
843
 remained 
problematic throughout 1917, one infantry brigade HQ noting at the height of Third 
Ypres that 50 percent of brigade commanders had to rely on „short intensive training‟ to 
turn new men “into soldiers, as apart from brave men dressed in khaki”.844 Shute‟s claim 
that “little was left undone to ensure each man knowing his part”, while contradictory in 
light of his remarks on the behaviour of “untrained troops”, may imply adherence to a 
general policy implemented by Second Army that emphasised “it was more and more 
evident that greater stress must be laid on training in open warfare to encourage initiative 
and power of leading in the ranks of junior NCOs and privates, which are so necessary 
when officers become casualties”.845 Realisation of such lofty goals would prove almost 
unattainable with the time available and human material provided.
846
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 Major-General Shute‟s observation in regard to ineffectual artillery support as an 
“indirect cause” is also valid, inasmuch as batteries firing west to east for an attack 
moving from south to north obviously failed to provide adequate assistance during the 
afternoon counter-attack.
847
 This handicap was engendered by a dearth of available 
battery sites within the restricted confines of the Passchendaele Salient. Alternative heavy 
and field battery positions due west of Westroosebeke proved, regardless of herculean 
efforts to move guns and supplies east of the Langemarck – Winnipeg Road, inadequate 
fire support bases from which to engage targeted strongpoints, pillboxes and troop 
concentrations with sufficient accuracy. Moreover, 128 (protective barrage and area 
concentration) of the 144 Vickers machine-guns assigned to support the operation, while 
easily maintaining a steady indirect fire of 50 rounds per minute without overheating, 
were ultimately found lacking in their nominal role as an effective artillery substitute and 
force multiplier.
848
  
 
 The GOC 32
nd
 Division, it will be recalled, subsequently praised RE efforts to 
improve inadequate overland communications before the attack. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pollard (CRE) summed-up experience gained from an “R.E. POINT OF VIEW” in his 
                                                                                                                                                 
1938 correspondence with official historian Cyril Falls that the „British fought the war after 1914 (or say 
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lengthy „Report after Operations‟: It was, he observed, essential that duckboard tracks be 
extended right up to the frontline. “If for want of materials this cannot be done [,] tapes or 
wires should be carried on from the track-heads”. RE dumps should be “placed as far 
forward as possible as long as they are not under direct observation”. Pollard concluded 
by noting the usefulness of tramways for transporting RE and infantry stores to the 
forward area. “This line should [,] if possible [,] be kept free of RFA traffic. [A] tramway 
for RFA to serve as many batteries as possible is of greatest service”.849 
 
 Official historian Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, commenting on their 
inherent efficacy, remarked that night attacks are “at least as old” as Gideon‟s assault on 
the Midianite encampment.
850
 Major-General Shute, confronted with seemingly 
insurmountable tactical circumstances (inability to form-up in daylight and a potentially 
devastating enemy counter-barrage) decided to revert again to this age-old method of 
warfare, “as so many recent attacks had been made at dawn it was decided to risk the 
inherent dangers of a night attack on a big scale...”851 Indeed, the Kirke Committee 
(established in 1932 to examine the lessons of the Great War)
852
 subsequently noted that 
night operations often ensured that elusive tactical surprise was achieved on the far-flung 
battlefields of 1914-18.  
[T]he increasing use of darkness to cover preliminary 
movements was a noteworthy feature of all campaigns, 
whether in trench or open warfare. These were carried out 
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on a large scale and over considerable distances in our 
eastern campaigns, favoured no doubt by conditions of 
comparatively good visibility. These same conditions also 
favoured the attacks by night on difficult objectives, which 
were a marked characteristic of the latter operations in 
Palestine and Syria. But the fact that night operations were 
eventually common to all theatres shows their great 
importance. And this is natural since without a doubt the 
automatic small-arm weapon forms the great strength of the 
modern defensive, and anything that tends to blind it must 
be to the advantage of the attacker if he is suitably trained. 
The conclusion is that movements by night may often be 
the only way of obtaining a tactical surprise, and attack by 
night the most economical way of crowning it by tactical 
victory.
853
  
 
A need for “comparatively good visibility” was almost certainly taken into account when 
Shute proposed to attack under conditions of bright moonlight. Conditions of total 
darkness as opposed to optimal half-light, would, based on Shute‟s previous experience, 
prevent assaulting troops from maintaining desired direction and cohesion while 
traversing the featureless, “cut-up” terrain. Similar demonstrations of this viable 
operational technique continued well into 1918 when Shute (as GOC V Corps) oversaw, 
along with other corps commander counterparts, steady advances during the final 
„Hundred Days‟, although these operations, according to Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, 
were often “continuous and small in scale. Plans were improvised by divisional generals 
or brigadiers as the situation demanded. Often there was no time to refer these plans to 
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corps commanders, let alone army commanders”.854 The successful application of 
searchlights (“Monty‟s Moonlight”) to duplicate artificial moonbeams during 1944-45 
also attests to the advantage of attacking in semi-darkness provided, as we shall see, 
corresponding circumstances of atmosphere and terrain are scrutinized. Perhaps Shute, 
having readily embraced a difficult and dangerous task, should have considered Major-
General Heneker‟s recommended contingencies to deal with potential hostile machine-
gun fire before Zero + 8. Support for the original scheme without alteration by both corps 
commanders further militated against adoption of these reasonable precautions.
855
  
 
 Major-General Shute‟s erroneous conclusion that the Passchendaele operation 
was compromised before Zero was ultimately based on a flawed interpretation of an 
intercepted wireless message.
856
 Thus the attackers, whose intentions and or movements 
remained undetected during forming-up, were almost immediately observed while 
advancing into no man‟s land. That bright moonlight was subsequently recognised as a 
potential disadvantage for assembling assault troops is clearly demonstrated in a 32
nd
 
Division after-action report, which, in summarizing the planning phase of a large-scale 
raid launched in late February 1918, tellingly observed: “Moonrise on the night of the 
27
th
 was at 7:30 p.m. and this gave at least one hour of darkness for the assembling of 
troops. After 7:30, with the prevailing conditions, it was reasonable to suppose that 
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towards 8 o‟clock the light would improve. Zero hour was therefore fixed at 7:52”.857 
Such precautions, when one considers Major-General Heneker‟s scathing remark 
concerning the perceived fatal combination of snow, moon and unsuppressed machine-
guns on the night of 1/2 December, were taken without due consideration of snow- 
covered ground as one of three critical foils to achieving surprise. Brigadier-General 
Aspinall noted on 21 November that the “actual time of Zero will be decided on after 
trials of the time required for forming-up have been carried out by the divisions 
concerned”.858 Visibility trials to assess Shute‟s disputable views on snowfall, bright 
moonlight and the conspicuousness of advancing infantry at 200 yards distance were, 
even if feasible, not contemplated in the days leading up to the attack. As former 
Wehrmacht Brigadier-General Alfred Toppe (reflecting on his extensive Second World 
War experience) astutely observed: “The effect of events taking place at night increases 
or decreases in proportion to the degree of darkness. Operations taking place during 
moonlight and starlit nights, especially across snow-covered terrain, may approximate 
daytime conditions”.859  
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C.1 Operational, Strategic & Political Consequences 
 
Post-battle prisoner interrogations and examination of captured documents supplied 
important details about enemy defences, tactics, equipment, organisation, strength, 
morale and, most importantly to both sides, orders of battle. Information obtained from 
captive British ORs was often of limited tactical value, as they were purposely kept in 
“deliberate ignorance about the make-up of their formations, the names of their leaders 
and military affairs in general”.860 The German private soldier, a GHQ intelligence 
officer later observed, “knew remarkably little about anything except his own unit in the 
frontline and rarely had any information about reserve troops in their rear, so it was all 
very localized information we got from captured prisoners”.861 Nonetheless, “from at 
least the end of 1915 they [British intelligence officers] sought those that were 
„intelligent and willing to talk‟ … In this respect officers were considered a waste of time 
because, although intelligent, they would be reluctant to talk. It was felt that the best 
results came from smart young NCO[s]‟ and intelligent soldiers”, who sometimes 
provided “direct insight into matters of strategic importance”.862 All three officers 
captured during 2-3 December appear, as probably anticipated, to have held their 
tongues. This was not the case with certain astute other ranks like the previously quoted 
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Feldwebel of IR94,
863
 who, besides providing a wealth of local intelligence, speculated 
on the Passchendaele Salient and possible hostile offensive intentions: “There is no talk 
of any attack developing in this area from the enemy, and it is common rumour that the 
Battle of Flanders will be forced to die down on account of the condition of the ground” 
and “He did not think the enemy would attack, but we (the English) are not to be allowed 
to advance further along the ridge. There are many troops in the villages, and especially 
in ROULERS for counter-attacking, if necessary. All shoulder-straps are covered up, and 
it is impossible to say what units are seen”. A Gefreiter of the same regiment 
corroborated this view: “The prisoner knew nothing of an intended attack on a large 
scale. OSTEND, BRUGES and GHENT are swarming with troops, and it is rumoured 
that many divisions have been transferred from RUSSIA to the Western Front, but it is 
not known how many have been transferred to RUSSIA”. He also remarked that the 
general policy was to “advance the present outpost line [Vorfeldzonelinie] about 400 
metres”, while the talkative Feldwebel observed: “Trenches near ROULERS [are] being 
worked on.
864
 They are not deep and wire is not very strong”.865 Such revelations, when 
taking the unsuccessful night operation and recent German counter-attacks at Cambrai 
into consideration, failed to allay the anxieties (expressed along with rapturous terms of 
endearment to his wife) of Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston:   
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The Army commander has given over the defences of the 
whole Passchendaele Salient to me. An honour, but a 
perfectly damnable position to hold. If the Germans think it 
worthwhile to put in an attack in force on this silly salient, 
we are, I fear, certain to lose it. However, I‟ll do my little 
bit to get the horrid place in the best order possible to 
safeguard it. I have & have had, many damnable & difficult 
jobs, and, as someone has to do them, it is just as well it 
should be me, for I am so happy that if the whole world 
tumbled about my head & everything went wrong (which, 
by God‟s help, it shall not do here) I shall still be a happy 
and contented man in the possession of your wonderous 
[sic] love… 866 
 
Sir Henry Rawlinson, having delegated this unwelcome responsibility to an uneasy GOC 
VIII Corps, was left to consider additional resource demands on Second Army after the 
German counter-offensive at Cambrai: “Tonight Tavish [Davidson] rang up to say they 
[GHQ] wanted nine div[isions] down south [,] so I have to send away the 63 Naval 
Div[ision] which is well up to strength [,] and the 19 Div[ision] which is well rested and I 
had hoped to put in the line to relieve tired ones. The Cambrai battle is going to make us 
very short of troops I fear”.867  
 
 Sir Douglas Haig convened an army commanders conference at Doullens on 7 
December. “The main topic was the organisation of our defensive lines in view of the 
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Russians having dropped out of the war. This will allow the Germans to employ some 30 
more divisions on this front. These can be brought here at a rate of 8 to 10 per month if 
the Enemy so will it”.868 Sir Henry Rawlinson remarked on the potential threat of these 
substantial enemy reinforcements and the vulnerability of the exposed salient in his diary 
the following day: “Things are pretty quiet now here in Flanders [,] but at Cambrai it 
looks as if there were going to be trouble for the Bosch has 34 div[isions] concentrated 
there – and may try Passchendaele simultaneously – I think he means to have a jolly good 
go at us somewhere [,] and I am anxious about this P[asschendaele] salient”.869 That the 
worrying strategic situation also put paid to any further discussion of a Flanders spring 
offensive was made clear during a Second Army conference on 9 December:  
The collapse of Russia would enable Germany to withdraw 
divisions from the Eastern Front. No large movement has 
so far commenced but there were indications that it might 
begin shortly. The rate of withdrawal can be calculated at 
from 8 to 10 divisions per month, so that, at this rate, the 
enemy will be able to increase his force on the Western 
Front up to the end of March 1918 by some 30 to 40 
divisions. In view of the above facts, and taking into 
consideration the question of manpower, which at present 
is unsatisfactory, and the probability that America will not 
be able to put large forces into the field in the near future, 
there must be a period of five or six months when the 
enemy will be in preponderance on the Western Front. 
Therefore, we must look, during this period, to a defensive 
rather than an offensive policy. Consequently, although the 
basis of the policy adopted heretofore on the Army front 
has been the resumption of the offensive in the spring, it is 
now clear such an offensive is not feasible.
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All of this begs the question, was it necessary to launch another operation from the 
dangerously exposed protuberance?
871
 The apparent lack of any tangible gain caused one 
regimental historian to observe: “It has been difficult to find any reason why the 
operation about to be described ever took place”.872 The few recent historians who 
comment on this episode have been equally dismissive of a seemingly “futile” two-
division attack on “meaningless fragments of trench, barbed wire and pillboxes…”873 
Such retrospective judgments, whatever their merit, fail to recognise the larger complex 
interaction of pressing (dire need for adequate observation facilities and overall tenability 
of the Passchendaele Salient) operational determinants, contemporary operational 
methodology and technological capabilities, on-going manpower deficiencies vis à vis 
their relation to the totality of Third Ypres and its uncertain military and political 
aftermath.   
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Plate C.1 Map overlay: Area north of Passchendaele January 1918 (Source: MMP) 
 
The formation of a salient is never desirable, “as there is too much of a threat that 
the other side will find a way to pinch it off. Additionally, the enemy can concentrate fire 
in the area of the salient at will”.874 From 4 October, Second Army attempted a strategic 
breakthrough that eventually devolved into a series of post-strategic assaults aimed at 
securing the northern portion of the Passchendaele Ridge before winter set in. These 
successive drives, culminating in the attack on 10 November, resulted in a lamentably 
exposed bulge that was to worry the British high command throughout the first quarter of 
1918. All thoughts of further local offensives were put on hold after the Polderhoek 
                                                 
874
 Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
1998), p. 172. Pre-war FSR stated: „Salients and advanced posts which are held to deny ground to the 
enemy, and not merely as a screen to the main position, are a weakness if they are exposed to artillery fire 
which cannot be answered, and if they cannot be supported by effective infantry fire. As a general rule such 
positions had better be left unoccupied, and the ground between them and the main position be defended 
either by bringing a crossfire on to it from other parts of the position or by strong entrenchments, which are 
within supporting distance‟. See War Office, Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations 1909 (Reprinted 
with Amendments, 1912) (London: HMSO, 1914), p. 145.  
Conclusion 
 368 
Chateau operation.
875
 On 13 December GHQ issued special instructions (“one of the most 
remarkable documents which ever emanated from a victorious staff” a cynical Lloyd 
George would later observe)
876
 outlining measures to be taken by Second and Third 
armies for the defence of the Passchendaele and Flesquières
877
 salients: “Here it was 
decided that the front of the Battle Zone should be the approximately the base of the 
salient, leaving all in front of it in the Forward Zone”, which, in the event of a serious 
German attack, would be held chiefly by machine-guns protected by supporting artillery 
and ample placement of barbed wire obstacles.
878
  This reasoned response to appalling 
tactical circumstances was ultimately based on hardheaded consideration of the key issue 
(general withdrawal to a more defensible line) raised in Brigadier-General Aspinall‟s 
„Appreciation‟ of November 1917. Lieutenant-General Kiggell (CGS GHQ) subsequently 
observed in an order dated 10 January 1918:   
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1. The policy as regards the defence of the 
PASSCHENDAELE Salient in the event of a hostile 
offensive in that neighborhood has been described in 
O.A.D. 291/29 dated 13 December 1917.
879
 The 
question of shortening our line by a voluntary 
withdrawal north-east of Ypres, which under 
exceptional circumstances may become advisable, 
should also be considered and the necessary plans for 
such an operation worked out.  
 
2. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that 
there are strong moral and political, as well as military 
objections to a voluntary withdrawal from 
Passchendaele. Such a move could, therefore, by the 
general situation necessitating the strongest possible 
reinforcement on some other part of the front, in which 
case the order for withdrawal would be issued from 
GHQ.
880
 
 
Attention to aforementioned pressing operational determinants and the resultant night 
attack appear, with the benefit of hindsight, to have been irrelevant in light of 
subsequently adopted defensive policy. Nevertheless, the capture and retention of 
Venison Trench, Hill 52 and Vat Cottage Ridge could have resulted in a serious local 
setback for the German defenders. Loss of the former position and its conjoined redoubts 
would have provided Second Army with an extended panoramic view (from Broodseinde 
to NE of Passchendaele village) of the enemy occupied hinterland west of Roulers, while 
the seizure of Hill 52 (which dominated the triangle Westroosebeke – Vindictive 
Crossroads – Oostnieuwkerke and nearby hostile battery positions) and Vat Cottage 
Ridge (overlooking low-lying enemy positions to the north and NW) would also have 
secured the northern shoulder of the salient. Sir Henry Rawlinson acutely articulated his 
disappointment over the failure to even achieve these limited objectives, thereby 
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emphasising the perceived importance of the night attack as an attempt to improve a 
“defective, not to say dangerous” position following the post-strategic phase that 
officially ended with the Second Battle of Passchendaele, in a memorandum dated 10 
December: “Nothing we can hope to do can make the line now held a really satisfactory 
defensive position. We must therefore be prepared to withdraw from it, if the Germans 
show signs of a serious and sustained offensive on this front, or if an attack elsewhere 
necessitates the withdrawal of more troops from the front of Second Army”.881   
 
 No doubt critically viewed by contemporaries as a „dud show‟, the night operation 
on the Passchendaele Ridge can also be viewed, irrespective of the apparent failure, as 
indicative of a bite and hold “style of attack” (adopted from September 1917) where 
“army merely passed to corps an outline of what it had to do, and corps organised the 
whole operation, delegating to divisions as necessary”.882 Pre-assault tactical preparations 
and organisation prior to this last – albeit unofficial – large-scale formulaic attack of the 
campaign were further expedited by general adherence to relevant sections of S.S. 135 
Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action.
883
 This was especially true 
in regard to the all-important logistical arrangements: Light railways, corduroy roads and 
duckboard tracks were maintained and extended with satisfactory results. Supply dumps 
along with vital artillery assets, moved forward regardless of almost unimaginable 
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battlefield conditions, were also in place before zero hour on 2 December. Counter-
battery work by HAGs (a corps artillery asset), according to a II Corps intelligence 
summary, was “exceptionally successful”.884 The accuracy of this conclusion is, 
considering aerial observation was “impossible owing to the high winds”, poor visibility 
and mist, on-going sound ranging and flash spotting complications, frequent shifting of 
individual guns and manipulation of dummy battery positions by the enemy and 
subsequent intense preparatory bombardment experienced before the 4:15 p.m. counter-
attack, difficult to substantiate. Perhaps a general comparative perception that the 
“enemy‟s artillery activity was not intense, and it was certainly far less heavy than on our 
attack of the 10
th
 November”,885 appeared to confirm the overall effectiveness of the 
recently adopted pre-assault artillery programme („Second Army Artillery Instructions 
No. 28‟) notwithstanding acute absence of the usual battle-proven air-artillery co-
operation component.
886
 Nevertheless, these relatively positive developments have to be 
considered along with elements (attacking on a narrow front and problematic division of 
mid-level formation authority) of what appear to be operational and administrative bad 
practice. 
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 Adoption of a narrow attack frontage astride firmer ground within the 
Passchendaele Salient was, given prevailing swampy conditions west of the main ridge 
opposite Poelcappelle and its environs, clearly unavoidable in early December 1917. 
Formation of the salient during Sir Herbert Plumer‟s successive attacks in October and 
November was a deplorable operational outcome inherited by Sir Henry Rawlinson and 
his staff. The new GOC Second Army, lacking final authority to withdraw from 
strategically valuable high ground, deemed one more attack necessary in order to 
improve the unsatisfactory tactical situation. Having duly sanctioned the hybrid assault 
scheme, designated objectives lying between 100 and 700 yards beyond the jumping-off 
line were obviously not considered at army or corps level to be beyond the attacker‟s 
capabilities when compared with measurable Canadian success (two bounds of 500 yards 
on similarly restricted frontages)
887
 against more formidable German defences on 6 and 
10 November.
888
 This was not unreasonable given the fortnight (18 November-1 
December) available for planning and preparation. Division of corps responsibilities 
inside the limited confines of the salient resulted from the maintenance (with some minor 
adjustments before 2 December) of previously established Second Battle of 
Passchendaele formation boundaries.
889
 Perhaps Second Army HQ should have 
contemplated, taking into account subsequent relegation of responsibility to VIII Corps, 
turning over the entire salient to II Corps (tasked with overseeing the most difficult part 
of the operation) prior to the attack. Administrative and organisational aspects would, no 
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doubt, have been rendered more efficient by having one corps provide operational 
oversight instead of two.
890
   
 
 Sir Douglas Haig‟s overall position had, by the winter of 1917-18, eroded 
considerably as growing pessimism amongst Great Britain‟s policy making elite appeared 
to be confirmed by the inconclusive results of Third Ypres and Cambrai.  Preparations for 
the former offensive had been “accompanied by fierce struggles in Whitehall between the 
War Office and civil departments” over manpower resources, “which grew in intensity as 
the phases of the offensive unfolded. In effect the character of the British war effort 
underwent a transformation in which the military dimension became part of a more 
integrated and, eventually, transnational [i.e. establishment of a Supreme War Council] 
war effort”. This state of affairs, hastened by a “political response to the final phase and 
immediate aftermath of Passchendaele”, manifested itself in virulent partisan press 
campaigns, acrimonious Parliamentary debate and bitter civil-military contention that left 
Haig at a distinct disadvantage in the months leading up to the anticipated German spring 
offensive.
891
 It is in this context of political doubt and despondency, recognised 
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dwindling manpower assets and the consequences of conducting simultaneous operations 
at Cambrai and Passchendaele that the night attack will now be evaluated.  
 
The desire to clear the Belgian coast in spring 1918 remained Sir Douglas Haig‟s 
chief strategic priority as 1917 drew to a close. Indeed, as late as 7 January (during a War 
Cabinet meeting ostensibly convened to discuss the current state of BEF defences and 
French demands for it to take responsibility for forty miles of their line south of the 
Somme) he expostulated that the next four months would be the “critical period of the 
war” and that the “best defence” in anticipation of a major enemy offensive “would be to 
continue our offensive in Flanders, because we would retain the initiative and attract 
German reserves against us”.892 Nevertheless, on 13 October, “when it was evident that 
no visible success would soon come to British arms in Flanders, the Field Marshal 
approved preliminary preparations for an operation designed to restore British prestige 
and strike a theatrical blow against Germany before the winter set in”.893 This often 
overlooked aspect of the „first great tank battle‟ implies political motive for some sort of 
tangible Western Front victory, albeit without the glittering strategic prospects offered 
farther north, as an obvious foil to alternative strategic options then under consideration 
by the Lloyd George government.
894
 In the meantime, Second Army prepared to carry out 
phase one of a projected “advance north of PASSCHENDAELE to include HILL 52 and 
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SPRIET to north of POELCAPPELLE”, which would, along with other contemplated 
attacks, “facilitate the initial stages of a possible general offensive operation in the 
spring”.895 Thus Haig, with one strategic eye still fixed on Flanders, oversaw Third 
Army‟s preparations for the Cambrai battle. One suspects that the Passchendaele night 
operation would (considering the close downhill proximity of Roulers and embryonic 
state of its western defences)
896
 have received more support but for the fact that GHQ 
perceived the need for a triumphal prestige offensive before 1917 reached a perceived 
indeterminate and bloody conclusion. Haig‟s subsequent insistence that costly Cambrai 
attacks be maintained after all prospects of further success vanished need only concern us 
in relation to recognised manpower deficits, expectations that the BEF would, besides 
dispatching five of its 62 infantry divisions with Sir Herbert Plumer to Italy, takeover a 
sizeable portion of the French line as far as the Oise and such extraneous operational 
schemes contrived to improve the overall position in Flanders before year‟s end.  
 
 Manpower shortages became a major cause for concern at GHQ as Third Ypres 
progressed into its first full month, Sir Douglas Haig informing his senior staff in late 
August that in order to maintain the flow of drafts it would be “necessary that every 
service and department should immediately give up every man who is in any way likely, 
by training, to become fit for service in the ranks of the infantry” if final victory were to 
be achieved by December.
897
 The reinforcement outlook did not improve, as Whitehall‟s 
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commitment, Keith Grieves has observed, to a “frontline 62 division force in France, 
comprising 680,861 rifles, was thoroughly undermined by news of the battles in the 
second phase of the offensive which started on 28 August and continued through Menin 
Road Ridge, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde into the first week of October”. The last 
appalling phase, which Lloyd George and his cabinet colleagues all but sanctioned 
despite extreme doubts of a favourable outcome,
898
 culminating in the capture of 
Passchendaele, also “marked the end of the government‟s commitment to the „large army 
first‟ principle as its confidence in Haig‟s purpose in the Ypres salient was progressively 
undermined”. War Cabinet fears that a “resilient, stoical home front might not withstand 
the costly and disillusioning outcomes of these continuous battles became of more urgent 
concern”. By December, the same month that manpower allocation was formally referred 
to a Cabinet committee, replacement drafts were arriving on the continent at a rate of just 
180 men per day.
899
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Was Sir Douglas Haig wise to sanction the night operation given prevailing 
strategic and political circumstances? Over three quarters of the Passchendaele Ridge had 
been secured during three and one half months campaigning. The prospect of a relatively 
modest offensive toward Roulers in spring 1918 offered an enticingly close strategic 
prize just beyond reach. Overall feasibility of this paper scheme, of which the hybrid two-
division attack on 2 December was a notable preliminary, is debatable. The highly 
unsatisfactory supply and overland communications infrastructure – unrelentingly 
harassed by German artillery – east of Ypres may or may not have been sufficiently 
developed in time for another offensive, but that is by the way when considering 
consequent political backlash and husbanding of Great Britain‟s vital manpower 
resources.
900
 The writing, insofar as manpower appropriation and GHQ‟s future Western 
Front strategy are concerned, was already on the wall by the autumn of 1917 if not 
earlier. While it is obvious the British Field Marshal hoped his strategic vision for 1918 
would ultimately prevail, one has to consider in hindsight the wisdom of ordering a large-
scale subsidiary night attack that was, to “economise troops” and avoid getting “involved 
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in anymore unnecessary fighting”, subsequently terminated within ten hours of Zero.901 
The 1,689 combined casualties sustained by 8
th
 and 32
nd
 Divisions may seem a drop in 
the bucket when compared with 733,308 total estimated killed, wounded and missing 
from 9 April to 31 December.
902
 It remains (in the light of political fallout engendered by 
the BEF‟s staggering losses and subsequent unpropitious strategic circumstances as 1917 
drew to a close), nonetheless, questionable that two relatively full-strength and rested 
infantry divisions should have been used in a somewhat risky and ultimately barren 
“local operation” as the crisis of the war fast approached.903  
 
Plate C.2 Passchendaele winter 1917-18 (Source: IWM 56258) 
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C.2 Costs 
Subsequent battalion and company roll-calls, supported by eyewitness accounts and 
enquiries, established approximate first casualty returns for both divisions. 8
th
 Division‟s 
losses for 2-3 December were estimated at 40 officers and 584 ORs, 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire 
Regiment suffering the most with 154 killed, wounded and missing.  
    Table A
904
  
 
Killed Wounded Missing Total 
 
Officers Other ranks Officers Other ranks Officers Other ranks 
 
8th DIVISION 
       
        
25 Brigade 
       
        
Bde HQ 
  
1(b) 
   
1 
2 Lincs 1 17 11 56 
 
45 130 
2 R Berks 1 35 3 73 2 40 154 
1 RIR 
 
6 3 55 1(c) 26 91 
2 RB 3 22 7 71 
 
27 130 
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4 2 10 
  
16 
TM Batt. 
 
5 
 
7 
  
12 
        
24 Brigade 
       
        
1 Worcs 
   
2 
 
1 3 
2  E.Lancs 
 
1 
 
2 
  
3 
2 Northants 
 
1 
    
1 
MGC 
 
6 3 21 
  
30 
        
23 Brigade 
       
        
MGC 
 
6 
 
15(a) 
  
21 
        
RFA 
  
1 5 
  
6 
MGC 
 
7 1 8(d) 
  
16 
FA RAMC 
 
2 
 
8(e) 
  
10 
        
Total 5 112 32 333 3 139 624 
Note:  (a) 2 ORs at duty (b) At duty (c) Wounded and missing (d) 1 OR at duty (e) 5 ORs at duty. 
 
2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment and 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade trailed slightly behind with 130 
casualties (killed, wounded and missing) each. 1
st
 RIR lost 91, while 25 Brigade‟s 
supporting machine-gun company and TM battery lost 16 and 12 respectively. Additional 
                                                 
904
 TNA: WO/95/1677: „Appendix „J‟ 8th Division: Casualties – 2nd/3rd December 1917, Narrative of 
Operations Carried Out by the 8
th
 Division on 1
st
/2
nd
 December 1917‟, 13 December 1917, 8th Division War 
Diary.  
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losses, besides 1 officer from 25 Brigade HQ, in 23 Brigade (21), 24 Brigade (37) and 
component RFA, MGC and RAMC (32) units brought total reported casualties to 624 
officers and men.
905
 Added to the number of verified deaths for 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire 
Regiment (36), 2
nd
 Lincolnshire Regiment (18), 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade (25) and 1
st
 RIR (6) 
were the unknown circumstances of 141 infantry recorded as „missing‟. Their ultimate 
fate can be deduced by examination of available CWGC data, which lists 173 gravesites 
and commemorations for the four battalions of 25 Brigade during the period 30 
November-3 December as follows: 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire Regiment (49), 2
nd
 Lincolnshire 
Regiment (52), 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade (44) and 1
st
 RIR (28). To this figure should be added 12 
men from attached MGC and RAMC units, along with a further 12 infantrymen who died 
of wounds (3 in captivity) in the seven days after 3 December.
906
 Thus 8
th
 Division‟s 
losses amounted, by adding the combined adjusted figure of 197 men 
killed/missing/DOW with the reported 365 wounded minus 10 men (9 infantry
907
 and 1 
RAMC) known to have died of wounds at CCS and base hospitals during 4-10 
December, to approximately 552 officers and men.
908
  
 
                                                 
905
 Ibid and Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston & Captain Cyril E.O. Bax, The Eighth Division: 1914-1918 
(London: Naval & Military Press reprint of 1926 edition), p. 167.   
906
 See Appendix 17.  
907
 Three infantrymen (10359 Pte. G.W. Hodgson, 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire, Z/738 Rifleman P. Higginbottom 
and S/10061 Rifleman R.W.G. Shepherd, 2
nd
 Rifle Brigade) who subsequently DOW in captivity have been 
deducted from the aforementioned CWGC total of 12 infantrymen DOW during the period 4-10 December, 
as they would have been originally recorded „missing‟. See Appendix 17.  
908
 Comparisons of contemporary casualty returns with on-line sources produced the inevitable number of 
minor anomalies. For instance, 1
st
 Worcestershire, 2
nd
 East Lancashire and 2
nd
 Northamptonshire of 24 
Brigade are recorded as having lost a combined total of 3 men (1 missing) during the period (2/3 December 
1917) in question, although no matching fatalities for these battalions have been identified using CWGC 
data. Twenty-four total fatalities were also reported for 8
th
 Division‟s component 23rd, 24th, 25th and 218th 
machine-gun companies as compared with 11 listed deaths (none from 23
rd
 or 24
th
 companies) obtained 
from CWGC sources. It is, nevertheless, also recognised that some casualties may have subsequently DOW 
in the weeks and months following 4-10 December, but the seven days after 3 December appeared to be an 
appropriate cut-off point. See Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, p. 167, Geoff‟s CWGC 1914-21 
Search Engine <http://www.hut-six.co.uk/cgi-bin/search14-21.php> and Appendix 17.   
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 “It only remains to add”, Lieutenant-Colonel Boraston and Captain Bax observed, 
“that the 32nd Division had been even more unfortunate; for though some ground was 
won at the opening of the assault, all its gains were lost in the afternoon counter-
attack…”909 Total casualties incurred by 97 Brigade were estimated at 66 officers and 
1,036 ORs (1,102), 16
th
 HLI sustaining the heaviest losses with 245 killed, wounded and 
missing.   
Table B 
910
  
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
 
Officers Other ranks Officers Other ranks Officers Other ranks Officers Other ranks 
32nd DIVISION 
        
         
97 Brigade 
        
         
16 NF 
 
24 4 65 1 8 5 97 
15 LF 2 15 5 63 
 
17 7 93 
11 Border 5 32 9 159 1 51 15 242 
2 KOYLI 4 21 8 116 2 41 14 178 
16 HLI 3 17 9 179 1 4 13 245 
17 HLI 6 37 5 131 
 
13 11 181 
MGC 
 
3 1 20 
 
4 1 27 
         
Totals 20 147 41 733 5 183 66 1036 
         
 
11
th
 Border Regiment and 17
th
 HLI suffered almost as heavily with 242 and 181 
respectively. Submitted casualty returns for the remaining three assault battalions and 
component machine-gun company were 2
nd
 KOYLI (178), 16
th
 NF (97), 15
th
 LF (93) and 
97 MGC (27). Verified deaths reported by these units amounted to 167. The 188 recorded 
missing must, as with 8
th
 Division returns, also be compared with available CWGC data 
for the period 30 November-3 December, the breakdown of which is as follows: 16
th
 HLI 
(65), 11
th
 Border Regiment (99), 17
th
 HLI (62), 2
nd
 KOYLI (60), 16
th
 NF (27), 15
th
 LF 
                                                 
909
 Boraston & Bax, The Eighth Division, p. 167.  
910
 TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd 
Division War Diary, p. 15. 
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(29) and 97 MGC (7) or 349 total identified gravesites and commemorations. To this 
figure should be added a further 17 men from attached RFA
911
 and MGC units
912
, along 
with 28 additional infantrymen who died of wounds (one in captivity) between 4-10 
December.
913
 Total casualties for 32
nd
 Division, when adding 394 killed/missing/DOW 
with 774 recorded wounded (minus 27 infantry
914
 and 4 machine-gunners known to have 
died of wounds at CCS and base hospitals), amounted to approximately 1,137 officers 
and men.
915
  
 
Plates C.3, C.4, C.5 L to R: 2
nd
 Lt. W.B. MacDuff, Pte. R.T. Hogg MM 11
th
 
Border Regiment and 2
nd
 Lt. R.H. Reid 17
th
 HLI KIA 2 December 1917 
(Sources: MMP, The Lonsdale Pals Battalion, 11
th
 Service Battalion Border 
Regiment 1914-1918 <www.freewebs.com/granatloch/> and UGA Roll of 
Honour <http://www.gla.ac.uk/honour/>) 
 
German casualties (killed, wounded and missing), based on examination of 
published postwar regimental histories, can only be surmised; IR117 (239) and IR94 
                                                 
911
 Two (116739 Gunner Nigel Edmondson and 152893 Gunner William Edward Healer) of three fatalities 
of the component 161 RFA Brigade are inexplicably commemorated on the Louverval Memorial to the 
Missing near Cambrai. See Commonwealth War Graves Commission. <http://www.cwgc.org>  
912
 14
th
, 96
th
, 219
th
 MG companies and 161 and 168 field artillery brigades. See Appendix 17.  
913
 See Appendix 17.  
914
 One infantryman (260268 Pte. Frederick F. Bent, 11
th
 Border Regiment) who subsequently DOW in 
captivity has been deducted from the aforementioned CWGC total of 28 infantrymen DOW during the 
period 4-10 December, as he would have been originally recorded „missing‟. See Appendix 17. 
915
 See Geoff‟s CWGC 1914-21 Search Engine <http://www.hut-six.co.uk/cgi-bin/search14-21.php> and 
TNA: WO/95/2370: After-action report, „Part III, Narrative of Events‟, 11 December 1917, 32nd Division 
War Diary, p. 15.   
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(211) suffering a combined total of 450 killed, wounded and missing.
916
 The former 
regiment, however, combined losses (the bulk of which were likely sustained during 2-3 
December) experienced over a period of six days i.e., after 25
th
 Division’s takeover of 
Abschnitt A on 26 November. The histories of IR116 and IR95, while acknowledging 
severe loss (more wounded than dead in the latter‟s case) provide no concrete numbers to 
work with.
917
 Best estimates, when considering available casualty figures of just over 200 
men each for IR117 and IR94, could reasonably be presumed to have totalled around 800 
officers and men.
918
  
 
 The exact number of British prisoners, included as part of aforementioned 
contemporary figures for the missing, taken during the night operation is also difficult to 
determine. Sixty PsOW, according to the daily Heersbericht, remained in German hands 
at the close of the night attack, but this was probably a general estimate based on early 
reports.
919
 Combined figures obtained from three of four consulted regimental histories 
provide a more accurate headcount (IR116 (20), IR94 (46), IR95 (14) of 80 prisoners.
920
 
IR117’s account, unfortunately, is vague about numbers; the only figure provided being a 
                                                 
916
 Some of the reported missing would have been captured. See below.  
917
 See Kurt Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich 
Hessisches) Nr. 117 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1931), p.196, Alexander von Hartmann, Das Infanterie 
Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag von Klasing & 
Co., 1921), p. 238, Prof. Albert Hiss, Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) 
Nr. 116 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1924), p. 158 and Major A.D. Buttmann, Kriegsgeschichte des 
Koninglich Preusischen 6. Thüringishen Infanterie Regiment Nr. 95: 1914-1918 (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: 
Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935), p. 254.   
918
 Losses sustained by I Battalion, IR115 (dispatched from reserve to assist the beleaguered IR116 and 
IR117) could not be ascertained.  
919
 Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg , 
p. 238 and The Times, Tuesday, 4 December 1917.  
920
 See Hiss, Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116, p. 158, 
Hartmann, Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg, p. 
238 and Buttmann, Kriegsgeschichte des Koninglich Preusischen 6. Thüringishen Infanterie Regiment Nr. 
95: 1914-1918, p. 254.  
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reference to eight compliant prisoners led away in broad daylight by Gefreiter Speiz on 
the morning of 2 December.
921
 Nevertheless, it is probably safe to assume that the 
number of captives attained by 25
th
 and 38
th
 divisions was, give or take, fewer than 100 
ORs.
922
 Conversely, Second Army noted, based on reports received up to the evening of 
2 December, that a combined total of “3 officers, 126 other ranks and 3 machine-guns 
were captured” by 8th and 32nd divisions. Subsequent figures tabulated by VIII Corps (2 
officers and 52 ORs) and II Corps (1 officer and 42 ORs of which 15 were wounded) 
totaled 96 PsOW accumulated in divisional prison cages or CCS by dusk on the 3
rd
.
923
  
 
 
C.3 Epilogue  
 
Perceived historical inconsequence does not render insignificant the human tragedy 
befalling hundreds of bereaved families like those of Private Frederick Wakely, Private 
Hugh Cairns and 2
nd
 Lieutenant William Ridgway, all of whom were originally reported 
missing before being presumed dead by the War Office.
924
 Fred Wakely‟s remains were 
                                                 
921
 The narrative implies that additional prisoners were taken before and after this incident. See   
Offenbacher, Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) 
Nr. 117, pp. 195-96.  
922
 No officers were taken prisoner during the attack. See Messrs. Cox & Co., List of Officers taken 
prisoner in the Various Theaters of War between August 1914, and November 1918 (London: London 
Stamp Exchange, 1988 reprint of 1919 edition).        
923
 For data relating to numbers of German prisoners taken during 2-3 December see LHCMA: Second 
Army War Diary, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, File 7/16, King‟s College, London, TNA: 
WO/157/120: „Second Army: 868th Intelligence Summary, Part 1‟, 3 December 1917, Second Army 
Intelligence File, BL: 48359: „Report of Operations Carried Out by the VIII Army Corps on the Morning of 
2
nd
 December 1917, Official War Diaries with Appendices and Addenda, VIII Army Corps, Passchendaele 
Front, November 1917-April 1918‟, Vol. V, Hunter-Weston Papers, TNA: WO/157/288: „II Corps 
Summary of Information‟, 2 and 3 December 1917, II Corps Intelligence File and Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. 
Boraston & Captain Cyril E.O. Bax, The Eighth Division: 1914-1918 (London: Naval & Military Press 
reprint of 1926 edition), p. 167. The latter source, given its nebulous contradictory figure of „about 150 
prisoners‟, is probably a rough estimate of total captures obtained by 8th and 32nd divisions.  
924
 Captain Hubert Essame (2
nd
 Northamptonshire Regiment) poignantly described a stricken landscape 
littered with unburied dead opposite Venison Trench as it appeared at dawn on 1 January 1918: „Shell hole 
intersected shell hole, often containing the ghastly remains of a soldier fallen in the attacks of late 
November and early December. Around here their shoulder patches showed them to be mainly Royal 
Berkshires, Lincolns and Rifle Brigade. Defiled with mud and slime they lay huddled on their faces, their 
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discovered, along with those of another 2
nd
 Royal Berkshire comrade (17129 Private F. 
Knott), SE of Exert Farm by an „Exhumation Company‟925 in 1921. The location of the 
bodies confirms both were shot down after mistakenly advancing beyond the final right 
flank objective.
926
 Hugh Cairns‟ parents received no additional information about the fate 
of their next-to-youngest son who vanished without a trace somewhere in the vicinity of 
Void Farm, while Fred Ridgway (2
nd
 Lieutenant Ridgway‟s younger brother) recalled 
many years later: “My parents received a telegram informing them that Will was missing. 
Another telegram told them he was dead. Like many thousands of other soldiers Will has 
no marked grave but his name is on the memorial at Tyne Cot Cemetery near 
Passchendaele…”927 Such anonymity in death has been overcome by official 
memorialisation and lingering memories of lost loved ones like Will Ridgway, whose 90-
year-old brother paid a final remembrance tribute during a visit to West Flanders shortly 
before his own passing at Tingewick in late 2000.
928
  
 
 Venison Trench, Southern and Northern redoubts, Teall Cottage, Mallet Copse 
and Mallet Wood have long since vanished. The backwater West Flanders setting, now 
interspersed with prosperous farms, gigantic greenhouses and some light industry, for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
equipment still on their backs, their rifles with bayonet fixed still in their hands, their faces almost as if they 
were asleep. British and German steel helmets, petrol tins, sandbags of jettisoned rations and coke, mingled 
with the abandoned equipment of the wounded, littered the landscape particularly along the dirty white 
tapes laid out to show the way to the frontline‟. See H. Essame, The Battle for Europe 1918 (London: B.T. 
Batsford, 1972), pp. 5-6.  
925
 For the organisation and work of postwar exhumation units see Franky Bostyn, Kristof Blieck, Freddy 
Declerck, Frans Descamps, Jan Van der Fraenen, Passchendaele 1917: The Story of the Fallen at Tyne Cot 
Cemetery (West-Vlaanderen: Roularta Books, 2007), pp. 224-30.  
926
 Privates Wakely and Knott are buried in Tyne Cot Cemetery. Their CWGC recorded death date (1 
December) is, considering where their remains were subsequently found, open to question. Special thanks 
to Jan Van der Fraenen for providing additional details on discovery of the bodies at 
E.1.d.2.4.,„Passchendaele Sheet 28‟ (1: 10,000 scale) map reference.   
927
 Telephone interview with Dr Joanne Coyle 29 May 2010 and Angela Foster, „Fred Paid His Final 
Tribute‟, Buckinghamshire Advertiser (November 2000).   
928
 Foster, „Fred Paid His Final Tribute‟, Buckinghamshire Advertiser (November 2000).  
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long ago night operation has no draw for battlefield tourists seeking more appreciable 
sites of commemoration and memorialization (Maps 15 & 16). Little local evidence, 
beyond pertinent gravesites primarily distributed about nearby Tyne Cot and 
Passchendaele New cemeteries or names listed by regiment on the former‟s immense 
memorial to missing United Kingdom and New Zealand servicemen, of the almost 
forgotten incident remains. One tangible piece of period material culture (currently on 
display at Tyne Cot Visitor‟s Centre) connected with the remote events of early 
December 1917 is a fine sepia military portrait (see Plate 3.2) of Fred Wakely bordered 
by the moving inscription: 
„I have fought the good fight, I have finished my course‟. 
In Loving Memory of 
Gunner FREDERICK JOHN WAKELY 
Dearly Beloved Son of Mr and Mrs F.J. Wakely 
Killed in Action December 1
st
 1917,
929
 
While Serving His King and Country 
Aged 21 Years 
Too Dearly Loved to be Forgotten 
 
Most recently, on a warm sunny day in August 2004, a hazel sapling was ceremonially 
planted not far from where the Goudbergstraat and Haringstraat (just opposite the 
present-day site of Virile Farm) intersect to commemorate 20-year-old Private Hugh 
Cairns‟ short life. An all-weather plaque placed beneath read:  
In loving memory of 
Pte Hugh Cairns 
of 16
th
 Bn Highland Light Infantry 
who died near this place on Dec 2
nd
 1917 
and who has no known grave 
REST IN PEACE 
 
This modest tribute, a final act of remembrance by Joanne Coyle of Tayport, Fife for the 
maternal uncle neither she nor her mother (born 1922) ever knew, constitutes the only 
                                                 
929
 See fn. 930 above.  
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existing memorial directly related to an arcane First World War military operation in 
which 1,689 British officers and men were killed or wounded. Subsequent familial 
memorialization some eighty-seven years on originated with a dedicated niece‟s fervent 
desire to do something meaningful and permanent, for young Hugh, as intimated by 
relatives, was someone “well-loved and precious”. The now burgeoning hazel tree is thus 
symbolic of potential maturity unrealised.
930
   
 
Plate C.6 Junction of Haringstraat and Goudbergstraat 11 August 2004: A hazel sapling 
commemorating Private Hugh Cairns is ceremonially planted by niece Joanne Coyle   
(Source: Wereldoorlog 1 in de Westhoek <www.wo1.be>) 
                                                 
930
 Telephone interview with Dr Joanne Coyle 29 May 2010.  
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